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Abstract  
This thesis asks whether the post-2011 transition has allowed Tunisian civil society 
to fulfil the democratic functions attributed to it by civil society and democratisation 
theorists. It uses an understanding of civil society as playing a democratising function 
through Oppositional-Resistance and Liberal-Associative roles, both of which rely on 
the existence of a civil political culture. The thesis examines the existence of a civil 
political culture, identified through the presence of the six criteria of Freedom, 
Equality, Pluralism, Tolerance, Trust, and Transparency. This thesis uses Welch’s 
theory of political culture, which recognises that political culture manifests as both 
discourse and practice. In order to understand civil society’s discourse and practice, 
Welch’s theory is developed into a methodology of three research methods, drawn 
from both positivist and interpretivist approaches of social science research. The role 
of civil society in the Tunisian transition is assessed in relation to its counterpart - 
the state. A triangulation of methods - a quantitative attitude survey, structured 
interviews, and ethnographic participant observation – examines inter-CSO relations, 
how CSOs interact with the state, and the internal CSO dynamics in addition to CSO 
institutional culture. This approach enables the assessment of the discourse and 
practice of civil society organisation (CSO) members’ political culture.  
The Tunisian case demonstrates the validity of the argument that the state must 
allow civil society sufficient public space to accomplish a democratic function. 
Simultaneously, civil society, in both Oppositional-Resistance and Liberal-Associative 
understandings, must exhibit civil political culture in order to fulfil a democratic 
function. It further demonstrates that only through a multifaceted research approach 
that addresses discourse and practice can political culture accurately be assessed. 
This thesis concludes that civility is developing in Tunisian civil society as CSO 
relationships with the state, other CSOs and its own members evolve, which has 
enabled CSOs to fulfil a democratic function.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2011 Tunisian revolution of “Freedom and Dignity”, the first in the wave of 
uprisings commonly known as the Arab Spring across the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region, was unexpected given the apparent political stability and 
economic prosperity of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali’s dictatorship. The revolution 
brought an end to 24 years of corrupt leadership by Ben Ali, his mafia-like family, 
and the majority of the ruling elite who were removed from their positions of power 
and privilege. Despite halted economic progress, rising unemployment rates, political 
assassinations, and episodes of political deadlock in the years since 2011, 
democratisation progress in this small North African state has been hailed as a 
success in its path towards removing authoritarian, one-party state governance. The 
political transition has brought Tunisia closer to becoming a democratic country than 
the other Arab states that experienced uprisings: Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and 
Yemen. Although comparisons between these Arab Uprising states can be made, they 
are, however, limiting because each country has experienced different aftermaths to 
their revolutions. Furthermore, in addition to the specific dynamics of each country, 
each had undergone different colonial and post-independence experiences prior to 
the uprisings.  
This thesis focuses on understanding the factors that are unique to Tunisian civil 
society and Tunisian political culture and how they have influenced Tunisia’s post-
revolutionary transition. Therefore, it seeks to answer the following research 
question; Have Tunisian civil society organisations exhibited a civil political culture 
and how has this influenced their ability to fulfil a democratic function through the 
post-2011 transition? 
Three sub-questions that emerged from the primary research question are 1) Has 
civil society in Tunisia exhibited political civility through the democratic transition? 
2) How has political civility in civil society organisations supported the democratic 
transition? 3) How does this inform the theoretical understanding of civil society’s 
position in democratic transition?  
The revolution liberated Tunisian civil society by enabling the proliferation of CSOs 
that have performed an active role in guiding the transition and ensured democratic, 
non-authoritarian outcomes were achieved. However, this thesis argues that it was 
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not simply the increased space for CSO activity or the state of their activities that 
enabled them to play this role. It demonstrates that a civil political culture has been a 
requirement for civil society, enabling it to effectively assist a transition, fulfil a 
democratic function, and complete a democratic consolidation. Political culture 
studies in the MENA context have been inhibited by the presence of authoritarian 
government which restricted access to on the ground, micro-interpretivist research 
methods. Prior to the Arab Uprisings, the study of civil society in MENA was 
conducted in the context of authoritarian governments and dictatorial regimes, 
where only Israel and Lebanon could be considered exceptions. As Tunisia is in a 
transition away from authoritarian government, the opportunity is provided for this 
thesis to offer a revised approach to the study of political culture that implements 
Welch’s theory of political culture (2013) and which includes direct observation of 
discourse and practice. The literature review in this thesis identifies weaknesses in 
other political culture works that apply one or two methods. This thesis is a 
contribution to studies in political culture by demonstrating that an approach to 
political culture research which includes the application of three separate research 
methods (structured interviews, ethnographic participant observation, and online 
survey questionnaire) creates a complex assessment that provides inquired, 
observed, and subject self-assessed understandings of culture that outweighs the 
weaknesses of each individual method. This approach is effective for capturing a 
current political culture, as it does not seek recourse to Culturalist, macro-
interpretivist, written or historical sources, therefore making it appropriate for 
studying political culture while the state is in transition. 
As an application of civil society theory to a post-authoritarian MENA context, this 
thesis also contributes to empirical studies of MENA civil society organisations. The 
Tunisian transition towards democracy demonstrates that civil society in Tunisia had 
previously been shaped by the authoritarian regime. This thesis diverges from the 
Culturalist argument that MENA civil society is shaped by Middle Eastern or Arab 
culture, or the consequent assumption that this renders MENA civil society 
undemocratic. In doing so, it argues that civil society can significantly contribute to 
democratic consolidation if CSOs are provided sufficient public space and if their 
practices and discourse exhibit a civil political culture. This thesis also argues that 
prerequisites of democracy existed in Tunisia and that the country’s progress 
towards democracy is partly due to its history of constitutionalism, political 
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institutionalism, and civil society activism. This has meant Tunisia’s pre-existing 
culture of consensus and political moderacy has aided the transition.  
Chapter One establishes that the concept of civil society has evolved to hold a pro-
democracy meaning, therefore it can influence democratic transition on the 
condition that a political culture of civility is exhibited. MENA civil society is not 
inherently different, but it has been described differently to western civil society 
because it emerged in the contexts of colonialism and authoritarianism. Therefore, 
MENA civil society has not been able to influence democratic transition because it 
existed under authoritarianism and a political culture of civility has been heavily 
restricted.  
Chapters Two and Three identify six criteria of civil political culture (Freedom, 
Equality, Pluralism, Tolerance, Trust, and Transparency), as derived from civil 
society, democratisation, and political culture literature. They respectively define the 
methodology and methods required to study Tunisian civil society organisations and 
to assess the extent to which their political culture is civil. This methodology was 
developed through the application of Welch’s theory of political culture, MENA 
literature on the use of political culture, and a critical assessment of other studies in 
political culture. Both chapters posit the hypothesis that, if Tunisian CSOs 
demonstrate civility, then they can perform their democratic functions of 
maintaining freedom and equality which prevent despotism.  
Chapters Four and Five offer an historical overview of Tunisian political history with 
a focus on the function of civil society. Chapter Four uses literature on Tunisian 
history which demonstrates that Tunisian civil society was limited and restrained 
under colonialism and authoritarianism. Chapter Five uses news reports, press 
releases, international non-governmental organisation reports, and academic work 
published since 2011, to emphasise the vital role that civil society has played in 
Tunisia’s transition and that Tunisia is no longer under authoritarian conditions. 
Chapters Four and Five provide an historical and contextual background to the 
research period and illustrate the relationships between the Tunisian state and civil 
society.  
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight each present the results of the data collected from the 
three methods: an online attitude survey, structured interviews, and ethnographic 
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participant-observation respectively. These results are based on 10 months of 
fieldwork research, conducted by the researcher while living in Tunisia (2013-2014). 
They represent the methodological contribution of the thesis; that a multi-layered, 
micro-interpretivist approach is optimal to researching a political culture. Through 
analysis of CSOs’ relationships with the state, other CSOs and their own members, 
these three chapters present evidence that the six criteria of civil political culture are 
interconnected and are developing at different rates in Tunisian CSOs.  
The concluding chapter demonstrates that, in a post-authoritarian context, Tunisian 
civil society has been allowed to flourish through the state’s provision of an enabling 
legal framework. This research project provides evidence that civil political culture, 
conducive to democratic consolidation, is emerging amongst civil society 
organisations in Tunisia. The concept advanced by democratisation theory, of civil 
society requiring space from the state, is validated in this research as this occurred in 
Tunisia. 
This thesis aims to understand CSO political culture from three different directions in 
order to gain a multi-layered understanding of the complexities of the political 
culture of a civil society in a political transition from authoritarianism to an emerging 
democracy. Therefore, it aims to address the research question by seeking to 
understand internal operation of CSOs through observing behaviour, CSO’s 
relationships with other CSOs and the state, and attitudes and values of CSO 
members. 
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CHAPTER ONE – CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS, 
TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY, THE ROLE OF POLITICAL CIVILITY IN SUSTAINING 
DEMOCRACY 
1. Introduction  
 
This thesis demonstrates the potential that a civil society can possess in assisting the 
establishment or maintenance of a democratic system, providing two conditions are 
met. Firstly, when the political environments and structures allow it to exist through 
the absence of authoritarian government and existence of suitable legal protection, 
and secondly, if the organisations that constitute the civil society exhibit a political 
culture that is conducive to establishing and maintaining a democracy; civil political 
culture.    
In order to establish this argument, the first section defines what civil society is by 
analysing the evolution of its different conceptualisations. This process identifies ten 
functions that civil society has historically and theoretically performed which lead to 
the current pro-democracy understanding and manifestation of civil society. The 
collective action of coordinated civil society members in civil society organisations 
(CSOs) is explained because the study of CSOs is the primary focus of this thesis. Why 
civil society might, or might not, lead to democracy and the role of civil society in 
democratic transition are also addressed to explain the importance of suitable 
political environments and structures.  
In the second section, with reference to the specific regional case study of this thesis, 
this chapter establishes that the current body of literature indicates that civil society 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) context has been shaped and limited by 
the persistence of authoritarian governments which have co-opted voices of dissent 
and restricted the free public space required for a civil society to flourish. This is 
contrary to the Culturalist assumption that Arab societies are inherently 
incompatible with democracy. The third section brings together the two concepts of 
civil society and political culture, this chapter defines how the concept of political 
civility manifests and its importance to the maintenance of a democratic political 
system. 
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2. Civil society 
As this thesis is a study of CSOs, this section - divided into five subsections - provides 
a definition of civil society and, in the second subsection, explains how its functions 
have evolved due to its historical implementation and theoretical conceptualisation 
by scholars in different periods. Both Gramscian and Tocquevillian 
conceptualisations of civic associations are outlined in the third subsection to 
provide a functional definition of CSOs. These definitions are essential to the 
establishment of the theoretical basis for the argument advanced in the fourth 
subsection; that civil society has the capacity to lead to democracy. The final 
subsection identifies the role that civil society can perform in a democratic transition.  
2.1. Definition of civil society  
 
This subsection defines civil society but it is also essential to this thesis to note 
the etymological similarities of civil society and the other major terms of this thesis, 
political civility and the political culture of democracy, to their Latin origin 
of citivas. While civitas refers to the city, it also denotes the concepts of citizen rights, 
citizenship, and the community within the city and/or state. Lewis provides an 
abstract definition of civitas: “the condition or privileges of a (Roman) citizen, 
citizenship, freedom of the city, upon its conditions”, in addition to a concrete 
definition: “the citizens united in a community, the body - politic, the state, and as 
this consists of one city and its territory, or of several cities, it differs from urbs, i.e. 
the compass of the dwellings of the collected citizens” (Lewis, 1879). DeLue and Dale 
claim that “citvitas represents the ideal character of society, which in no sense can be 
found in completed form” (2009: 281). Civil is derived from the 
Latin civilis and relates to a citizen and public life. From this, civility is related to 
good citizenship, civilisation, and the state of being civilised while civil society 
originated in Aristotle’s work when he used the term koinōnía politike. This was to 
describe a portion of society which is separate from government but consists of a 
community of citizens with shared interests (Davis , 1996). 
 
Civil society is a non-governmental entity as the elements do not seek election or 
power. As Held summarises, “Civil society constitutes those areas of social life – the 
domestic world, the economic sphere, cultural activities and political interaction – 
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which are organised by private or voluntary arrangements between individuals and 
groups outside the direct control of the state” (1993: 6). It can loosely be defined in 
three categories; institutions (e.g. legal system, citizenship, family), organisations 
(e.g. Non-Governmental Organisations) and individuals (e.g. membership, organising 
events). Media, however, falls under several categories since it has institutional, in 
addition to organisational and individualistic characteristics. The complexity of the 
concept means there are several perspectives regarding what is civil society. Rather 
than using an abstract definition, Walzer’s definition is suitably encompassing: 
“Civil society is the sphere of uncoerced human association between the 
individual and the state, in which people undertake collective action for 
normative and substantive purposes, relatively independent of government 
and the market.” (1998: 123-4) 
Scholte adds another dimension to this definition by arguing that “pure” civil 
activities “involve no quest for public office and no pursuit of pecuniary gain” (2002: 
283), thus excluding political parties, firms, and commercial mass media. Considering 
this viewpoint, Scholte notes that civil society is present when rules that govern 
society are influenced by voluntary associations and lists the actors as:  
“academic institutions, business forums, clan and kinship circles, consumer 
advocates, development cooperation initiatives, environmental movements, 
ethnic lobbies, faith-based associations, human rights promoters, labour 
unions, local community groups, peace movements, philanthropic 
foundations, professional bodies, relief organisations, think tanks, women’s 
networks, and youth associations.” (2002: 283) 
McLaverty (2002) analyses scholars Hall, Perez-Diaz, and Gellner who have defined 
civil society through expressing the importance of its normative aspects. Hall and 
Gellner focus on factors such as opposition to despotism, the role of controlling the 
state through acting as a counter-balance, volunteerism, and modular members of 
autonomous groups. Perez-Diaz lists the socio-political institutions that civil society 
includes; “rule of law, limited and accountable public authority, economic markets, 
social pluralism and public sphere” (1998: 211). Seligman expands the Ethical-
normative component by arguing the “ethical ideal of the social order that if not 
overcomes, at least harmonises the conflicting demands of individual interest and 
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social good” (1992: x). These works suggest that independence from the state and 
legal protection by the state are required for civil society to perform an opposition to 
despotism function. Furthermore, they raise issues of the normative and the ethical 
perspectives that because a civil society is non-power seeking entity that engages 
civic or philanthropic purposes, it is an inherently ‘good’ force. 
To summarise, in an ideal and non-co-opted form, civil society is defined by its 
independence from the state, enabling it to challenge government policy but acting 
within the rule of law and not in order to seek power. The definition of civil society 
that this thesis will be implementing is based on Anheier’s (2001) contextual 
definition.  
“Civil society is a collective of institutions, organisations, and individuals 
located among the family, the state and the market, in which people associate 
voluntarily to advance common interests. It functions primarily as a check on 
state power.”  
2.2. Functions of civil society: i-x  
 
Scholars who have worked on the concept have largely been in agreement regarding 
its economic and political functions. It is a citizen-led force that helps to represent 
the interests of private citizens and maintain a balanced relationship between the 
state and non-state actors. The present day agreement is that civil society is a 
separate entity from the state as it is the “state-guaranteed realm of commodity 
production and exchange of private property, greedy market competition and private 
rights” (Keane, 1988: 32).  
By surveying the literature, in addition to building on the analysis produced by Keane 
(1988), it appears that there are 10 functions to civil society. As the academic 
conceptualisation of civil society has evolved through history, its functions have also 
developed. Although there are overlapping understandings of civil society between 
thinkers, this review of the literature focuses on the development of the functions 
that civil society has performed. 
Firstly, civil society was a term referring to the means of resolving conflict. In 
western antiquity, the term was originally understood by Socrates, Plato, Cicero, and 
Aristotle to emphasise the ‘good society’ and resolution of conflict through reasoned 
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arguing. Secondly, it was used to enable the protection of citizens through a social 
contract. Bodin, Hobbes, and Spinoza argued that to safeguard against the natural 
state of all against all war (Hobbes, 1651), strong government is required to protect 
the citizens, who in turn submit to sovereign authority through a social contract. 
“Hobbes’s justification of the ‘security state’ thus rests upon a dramatic contrast 
between war and civil society” (Keane, 1988:37). Civil society is seen as equivalent to 
the state and its laws but civil society is controlled by the state (Keane, 1988:35). 
Rousseau’s The Social Contract, 1762, recognises how Man used to exist in a pre-
societal ‘State of Nature’ where freedom and equality naturally existed. The process 
of civilisation to modern society that progressed over time has subverted freedom 
and created social and economic inequality, as summarised in the renowned opening 
sentence, “Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains" (Rousseau, 1998: 5). 
Therefore, in order to return to freedom and equality, without returning to the state 
of nature, a social contract is required between rulers and ruled. This arrangement 
leads to a civil society. 
Thirdly, to ensure the division of state and non-state institutions, scholars of the ‘Age 
of Enlightenment’ such as Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith (1650s to 1780s) 
produced literature on differentiating the ‘state’ from the ‘non-state’. These formed 
notably different interpretations, which Keane (1988) summarises, where civil 
society was primarily analysed regarding the state of nature or absolutist 
government and the term itself remained synonymous with the state or political 
society approximately until the end of the eighteenth century. J.S. Mill, a proponent of 
liberal democracy, saw state government as necessary but that its desire for power 
also made it dangerous. Therefore, On Liberty (1859) discusses the need for the state 
to be separate from society, and that a truly civil society must function to always 
guarantee the liberty of its citizens. 
Fourthly, to maintain a Constitutional state. Locke spoke of “civil government” in 
addition to, and as an alternative term for, “civil or political society”, while Kant saw 
it as the constitutional state that enables political evolution to occur (Kumar, 1993: 
376). Locke and Kant’s approaches developed a constitutional state model, whereby 
“Civil society consists of a complex of stable interactions among free, equal and 
independent male individuals, whose properties are secured politically through their 
subjugation to state which monopolises the process of formulated, administering and 
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enforcing laws” (Keane, 1988:39). This led Kant to define civil society as a political 
arrangement which secures “mine and thine” through public law (Kant, 1970) and 
the patriarchal household naturally forms collectively as a defence against common 
enemies. Property owning individuals have respect for others in a similar situation 
and therefore peace is maintained. This view established limitations of authority, as 
in Locke’s civil society no individual should be exempted from the Rule of Law 
(Locke, 1963:409). Further conditions of the constitutional state are that political 
power is held by trust and legislators are subject to elections (Keane, 1988:41). 
Fifthly, civil society acts as the protection from despotism and an opposition to the 
authoritarian state. This line of thought was inspired by Ferguson (1767) and Paine 
(1792), who both saw civil society as protection from the “abuse of power by 
political leaders” (Sater, 2007:3). Clear separation of state and non-state are evident 
in Paine’s The Rights of Man (1791) which pitched civil society against the state and 
established the ‘minimum state’ concept; a critique of despotism and over-
government. Paine viewed the state as a necessary evil and a delegation of social 
power for the common benefit of society. A good civil society, however, ‘regulates its 
own affairs’ and therefore has less need for government. Furthermore, he supported 
“the need for citizens to resist state power which encroaches upon their liberties” 
(Keane, 1988:44). De Tocqueville thought that civil society “should function as a 
counterweight to the state to ensure freedom of citizens” (Sater, 2007:3). In addition, 
civil society offers a revolutionary function. Gramsci developed the anti-authoritarian 
dimension of civil society as the nucleus of independent political activity, which was 
influential in the struggle against dictatorships in Eastern Europe and Latin America. 
Sixthly, civil society acts for the protection of commercial and economic interests. A 
notable paradigm shift in the literature occurred in 18th and 19th century European 
understanding of civil society, as it was viewed instead within the development of the 
commercial sphere and the modern state. Alagappa argues that modern accounts of 
civil society can be traced to works by the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam 
Ferguson (2004: 27). “Ferguson regarded associations for commercial ends, 
associations which were not primordial, as characteristic of civil society” they were 
also “pluralistic, outside the family, and not assimilated into the state” (Shills, 1991: 
5). The commercial aspect was expanded under the Marxist view of civil society 
which regarded civil society as the social organisation evolving directly out of 
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production and commerce. Marx saw the market as a bourgeois separation from the 
state and that civil society develops with the bourgeoisie. Therefore, “the anatomy of 
civil society is to be sought in political economy” (Marx, 1962: 362). Engels made the 
same distinction that “The State- the political order - is the subordinate, and civil 
society - the realm of economic relations - the decisive element" (1980: 394-395). 
The Marxist view of civil society, as only the market, lost credibility as Goulder 
(1980: 370) argues it is reductionist. Hegel’s writings, which had inspired Marx, also 
saw civil society as a market-related entity and “the realm of economics and 
economic relationships” (Stillman, 1980: 623) that was separate from state 
institutions. However, his conceptualisation of civil society, as a universal state, also 
encompasses the protection of individual rights and the French revolutionary goals 
of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Hegel also saw civil society as being necessary in 
order to secure freedom and the solution to societal problems, such as poverty. 
Seventhly, the Liberal-Associative model, which was created when another paradigm 
shift occurred with de Tocqueville, whose work took civil society away from the 
economic, and back to the socio-political, realm. While accepting the liberal 
democratic form of government, he urged the importance of protecting and renewing 
civil society, understood as a self-organising, legally guaranteed sphere, which is not 
directly dependent on the state. De Tocqueville’s notion of the Democratic State, as 
the name suggests, includes “pluralist and self-organising civil society, independent 
of the state” which is additionally “an indispensable condition of democracy” (Keane, 
1988:51). His work draws from Hegel but highlights the political dangers of the 
Universal State. He argued this could lead to popularly elected state despotism, 
which is “the principal danger confronting modern nations” (Keane, 1988:49). He 
also brought a third aspect to the state vs. society distinction; the state and then a 
division between political society and civil society. Therefore, civil society’s role is to 
be an obstacle to state power that prevents elected despotism, protects the freedom 
of citizens, and prevents democracy from being sabotaged by an overbearing state. 
This is called the Liberal-Associative model because de Tocqueville argued strong 
institutions and associations are required to ensure democratic freedom and 
equality. His work mentions the “independent eye of society” which refers to 
“interacting, self-organised and constantly vigilant civil associations” (Keane, 
1988:51). This is not, however, an anti-state position because it recognises the 
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centralised state is required for civil associations to exist but argues the excesses of 
the state must be controlled. 
Eighthly is the Oppositional-Resistance function derived from the revisionist, cultural 
Marxist works of Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci separates himself from the Marxist 
tradition by stating that civil society is not solely concerned with economics. His 
analysis is similar to the three-part distinction that de Tocqueville also makes, 
“Between the economic structure and the State with its legislation and its coercion 
stands civil society” (Gramsci, 1971: 208-209). However, Gramsci discusses the 
revolutionary potential of civil society in the removal of a regime, and that civil 
society must be radically transformed if revolutionary change is not to degenerate 
into “economic moralism”. Regarding the Oppositional-Resistance dimension of 
Gramsci’s understanding of civil society, he argues that political parties (in 
opposition) can be part of civil society and that “the institutions of civil society can 
also exercise coercive force” (Ransome, 1992:142). Furthermore, through the 
concept of hegemony, institutions of civil society can provide ideological or 
consensual control, to individuals, which voluntarily join, in order to challenge the 
state’s monopoly. Gramsci’s theorising overcomes the negative depiction of civil 
society, as being inherently dominated by hegemonic interests of the state, but would 
also provide an important site for action, specifically that of gradual resistance via 
‘the war of position’. The Gramscian perspective also established the notion that civil 
society can be associated with radical agendas and limited to resistance within 
authoritarian regimes (Edwards and Foley, 1996: 40). 
Ninthly, by acting as an intermediary between the state and society, civil society has 
the function of applying pressure on the government. Through civic organisations, 
citizens can express their feelings to the government; they are a channel to voice 
their concerns. This can influence state decision-making process by private citizens 
who are outside of government. Also, civil society relieves pressure from the 
government. Contrary to totalitarian government, “privatisation and other market 
reforms offered civil society the chance to step in as governments retracted their 
reach” (Carothers, 1999: 19). Gramsci also saw civil society as an entity essential to 
the state, as situated behind the state or within the superstructure, giving the state 
its stability and power, leading to his formula; “State = political society + civil society” 
(Gramsci, 1971: 262). This is how civil society can assist social renewal and allow a 
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method of civil engagement that is an alternative to political parties. In addition, a 
general assumption is made in democratisation and development literature that civil 
society has a positive connotation as it works against ‘uncivil’ institutions e.g. those 
who encourage disrespect of human rights, organisations who advocate violence or 
individuals who nurture ethnic or religious prejudice (Anheier, 2001). In discussing 
the functions of civil society, Carothers (1999) unpacks some of the myths regarding 
civil society. He addresses how the state and civil society work together regarding 
the formulation of policy, and how the increasing strength of civil society does not 
simultaneously weaken state power; rather the two are mutually beneficial. He adds 
that civil society is not always “good” and it is a “misleading conception (that civil 
society) is only noble causes” (1999:20). 
Tenthly, civil society seeks to ensure the democratic function of a state. In the 20th 
century, as democracy became the increasingly favoured method of government, civil 
society became more closely associated with being a pro-democratic vehicle that 
facilitated a balanced relationship between the state and non-state actors. This 
contrasts to sixteenth-century English political thought of understanding civil society 
as being part of the state (Scholte, 2002: 283) but draws on works from Locke, Hegel, 
and de Tocqueville who saw that it can act as a check on state power. This pro-
democratic function was also largely influenced by Gramsci’s definition of the non-
state or private sphere consisting of the economy, churches, the education system, 
trade unions, cultural associations, political parties, and the family. In other words, 
all the organisations and institutions outside the process of production and the 
state’s authority. Although Gramsci saw civil society as the intellectual battleground 
between the capital and labour classes, he also recognised it was the “sphere of all 
the popular-democratic struggles” (Simon, 1982:69). 
Civil society can play numerous functions, depending on what a political system or 
society requires it to perform. Civil society is defined by the functions it fulfils 
relative to the state, which may be economic, political, or both. The literature, 
therefore, identifies ten possible functions of civil society, although fulfilling all 
simultaneously is impossible. However, the collective and historical development of 
these functions, as discussed in this section, have created a compounded 20th Century 
pro-democracy understanding, which became particularly germane in the post-Cold 
War era. Within the pro-democracy understanding, Foley and Edwards (1996) 
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classify the two distinct strands as the Liberal-Associative model, based on the works 
of Ferguson, de Tocqueville, and Putnam, in contrast to Gramscian Oppositional-
Resistance model. The similarities and nuances between these two alternative 
approaches will be elaborated on in the following subsections.  
2.3. Civil society organisations (CSOs) 
 
The focal point of research in this thesis is the study of Tunisian CSOs, the 
organisational groupings that constitute civil society. Therefore, this subsection 
provides a working definition for CSO and identifies the theoretical origins and 
significance of the CSO from works of Gramsci and de Tocqueville.  
 
Tvedt emphasises the need for employing precise language in the categorisation of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as each category (VO, CSO, CBO, IO…) can 
“emphasise one aspect while downplaying others” (1998: 12). Therefore, despite 
admitting the value of the common denominator term of NGO, he provides separate 
legal, economic, functional, and structural-operational definitions based on the 
functions of organisations (1998: 12-18). This thesis uses CSO because its research is 
focused on the practices and behaviours of indigenous Tunisian organisations that 
position themselves within civil society, rather than international NGOs, aid or 
developmental type organisations. 
 
CSOs is a broad term for organisations that are defined by their non-state, non-
economic, non-commercial, and non-governmental status. They are organised groups 
that operate within the public space, between the state and the marketplace, 
therefore differing from the economic sector in their non-profit status. However, 
organisations can be voluntary or have salaried staff members. These foundations, 
charities, advocacy groups can also be both national and international. A list of CSO 
types is provided in Section 2.1. CSOs are formed for different reasons but their 
existence is often linked to the belief that the state is in some way insufficient and 
requires organised citizenry to draw attention to, address or confront an issue 
(Lewis and Wallace, 2000). Therefore, they often seek to inform and influence public 
policy or exert influence on political decisions. Their work is often related to a 
particular domain whereby a common interest is pursued. However, CSOs represent 
different ideologies and vary in their focus which often leads to a lack of homogeneity 
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within any civil society. Although his work was often rooted in criticism of the Italian 
state’s authoritarianism and he regarded civil society as an integral part of the state, 
Gramsci’s notion of revolution against dominant classes required the organisation of 
both political parties and civil organisations. “Without strong national political 
parties, the people, including the majority of the bourgeoisie, cannot participate in 
the formulation of a national agenda and a cogent government policy” (Buttigieg, 
1995: 17). For the Forma Mentis (shape of the mind or ideology) of the population to 
change, Gramsci “insisted adamantly that the revolutionary transformation of society 
starts in civil society” (Buttigieg, 1995: 19). He recognised that individuals who 
oppose aspects of government could be easily dismissed as rebels. When organised, 
however, individuals became groups which would begin the ‘cultivation of a broad-
based revolutionary culture’. Therefore, it was the duty of the ‘the revolutionary 
party’ to encourage “the development of an independent socio-cultural and political 
consciousness among the subaltern classes and by promoting the formation of self-
regulated autonomous organisations among workers and peasants” (Buttigieg, 1995: 
19). Gramsci also acknowledged that in the process of being organised and in order 
to become effective, freedom must be taken from those in power. “It is through their 
activities and autonomous organisations in civil society that the subaltern masses 
must first acquire their freedom or independence from the ruling classes and the 
allied intellectuals, that they must first learn to become themselves a leading force” 
(Buttigieg 1995: 20). This notion is problematic because, under authoritarian 
conditions, any attempt to acquire freedom would be met with repression. However, 
it identifies the importance of CSOs possessing autonomy. 
 
Aware that the age of aristocracy was in its twilight period, as liberal though was 
gaining popularity and the masses sought greater rights and political equality, de 
Tocqueville recognised two threats to European societies; firstly, a form of despotism 
through a populist leader and secondly, a form of tyranny of the majority established 
through democratic means (Howell, 2001: 42-43). Therefore, de Tocqueville 
championed the notion of a participatory citizenship that is active in civil society 
associations or organisations as a critical barrier to despotism. He argued it nurtures 
self-rule and encourages debate, vital for developing a pluralist society. Furthermore, 
“de Tocqueville showed how associationalism could preserve individuality from the 
pressure of conformity to the will of the enfranchised masses” (Howell, 2001: 44). In 
  
26 
 
addition to the democratic functions, which are addressed in the following 
subsections, de Tocqueville also argued that CSOs should serve as ‘schools of 
democracy’ (1969: 517) and that freedom of association is essential for developing 
democratic culture. 
2.4. The relationship between civil society and democracy 
 
As this thesis seeks to establish a connection between civil society and democracy, 
following a neo-Tocquevillian approach, Keane argues “a pluralist and self-organising 
civil society independent of the state is an indispensable condition of democracy” 
(1988: 51). This subsection explains civil society’s relationship with democracy and 
why civil society might lead to democracy. As the third wave of democratisation was 
carried out in Latin America and Eastern Europe, driven principally by civil society, a 
common assumption began formulating in the 1990s that civil society was 
synonymous with democracy. This was based on the postulation that a diverse and 
vibrant civil society may encourage democratic practice and political participation. 
Without using the term civil society, “de Tocqueville was the first to attribute the 
importance of associationalism and self-organisation for democracy” (Kaldor, 2003: 
19). 
A neo-Tocquevillian position was established in the works from a series of scholars 
such as Putnam, Fukuyama, and Diamond. It reflected the linkage of civil society to 
democracy and became a key element of the post-Cold War zeitgeist (Ishkanian, 
2007: 58). Putnam argued that civil society is crucial to "making democracy work" 
and that “Democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a 
vigorous civil society" (1993). This is because civil society holds the state to account 
and enables society to reach agreement on values and norms, as mentioned in 
section 1. Furthermore, as Entelis notes: 
“without a well-developed civil society, it is difficult, if not impossible, to have 
an atmosphere supportive of democracy. A society that does not have free 
individuals and group expression in non-political matters is not likely to make 
an exception for political ones” (1996:47).  
Scholars in the field of transitology maintain this view; that an active, functioning 
civil society is necessary for democratic transition. However, transitology tends to 
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argue that the role of civil society is necessary for democratic consolidation, the 
latter stages of transition, rather than recognising that civil society can initiate 
political change or steer a country through a transition. Classic transitology can be 
traced back to Rustow’s 1970 work which stated that there are no particular social 
and economic preconditions are required in order for reforms towards democracy to 
be enacted. The experience of the Latin American states’ political transitions from 
authoritarianism to democratisation in the 1980s further inspired the concept of 
transitology which became a sub-field of the democratisation literature. Transitology 
looks to explain and create a framework for, the conditions required for democratic 
government, structures, norms, and values to become embedded in society after 
dictatorships have been removed. These works use empirical data to challenge 
previously made assumptions on democratisation. Deconstructing Lipset (1959), 
that democracy only comes from modern (urbanised, educated, and mass media 
consuming) industrial societies, and Dahl (1971), that higher social-economic 
development increases the possibility of democracy, O’Donnell (1973,1988) 
questions these assumptions pointing to high and low levels of modernisation in 
South American states, yet a lack of democratisation. Contrary to the assumption that 
religion is an obstacle to democratisation, Karl (1990) acknowledges the role of the 
Catholic Church as opposition to authoritarianism.  
Regarding civil society, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) recognise mass mobilisation 
and the “resurrection of civil society” as being crucial to the democratic transition 
process, however, as a later stage in transition, rather than from the start of a 
transition process. This thesis diverges from this perspective by arguing that in the 
Tunisian case, civil society has been central to the transition process. Doorenspleept 
identifies cases of Argentina, Chile, Spain, Peru, the Philippians, and Korea that show 
the positive role of civil society in liberalisation and creating disunity amongst ruling 
elites, in addition to noting that literature on the collapse of the communist regimes 
in Eastern Europe and democratisation in Latin America attribute the role of civil 
society (2005:5). Furthermore, Doorenspleet argues that civil society promotes 
democratic transition since:  
“Civil society can alter balance of power between state and society, by 
organising opposition against the state, by mobilising the citizens of the state 
in opposition against the present non-democratic regime and providing 
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information, which may inspire citizens to protest against the regime” 
(2005:6).  
Transitology largely champions civil society as “the antithesis of the totalitarian 
conception of the state as the single institution possessing legitimate authority” 
therefore defined by being “not central but dispersed; not hierarchically or vertically 
organised, but horizontally structured (or indeed completely unstructured); not 
official but private and voluntary. It was not despotic or controlling or part of the 
power structure” (Armstrong, 2011:4.) This is not to say that transitions and the 
process of democratic consolidation are always a success. Regarding the countries 
described as ‘transitional’, and therefore trying to achieve democracy, there have 
been successes, moderate successes, and failures. However, most countries fall into 
what Carothers (2002) describes as ‘Grey Zone’, where the state has both democratic 
features and democratic deficits. Within the Grey Zone there is vast diversity and 
creates a series of terms for these qualified democracies, “including semi-democracy, 
formal democracy, electoral democracy, façade democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak 
democracy, partial democracy, illiberal democracy, and virtual democracy” (Collier 
and Levitsky, 1997: 430-451). 
The works of De Tocqueville, in addition to J.S. Mill, argue that “many social benefits 
flow from membership of voluntary organisations in the community” (Newton, 2001: 
202). Newton (2001) principally agrees but is more sceptical in his belief that 
empirical evidence to support the claim that civil society organisations (CSOs) 
generate trust between citizens is lacking. Instead, he argues that “the relationship 
between social and political trust and democracy is more complex and indirect than 
appears to be the case at first” (Newton, 2001: 202). In spite of highlighting these 
differences, Newton agrees that civil society is a boon for democracy. His work 
identifies that they are said to teach trust, social understanding, empathy, the art of 
compromise and cooperation, in addition to breeding and enforcing reciprocity 
(Newton, 2001: 206). Regarding the relationship between civil society and 
democracy, Newton makes a positive correlation;  
“Poorly developed civil societies are unlikely to sustain developed 
democracies. As social capital is created in civil society so it is easier to create 
political capital as well, but the link between the social and the political is not 
  
29 
 
necessarily close in any given case, though it is generally found in most 
nations” (2001: 212). 
In contrast to the literature that suggests active civil society is required for 
democracy, works that are more critical of civil society have been produced that 
argue civil society itself is not guaranteed to be sufficient and the assumption that a 
strong civil society ensures democracy is misleading. Berman (1997) uses the case of 
Weimar Germany to describe how, in certain conditions, a civil society that is too 
strong and influential can undermine democracy and subvert, rather than solidify, 
democratic and liberal values. However, this unique case is an anomaly. Equally, 
there is no certainty that democracy guarantees a strong civil society. Carothers 
points to how Japan, France, and Spain have stable democratic governments and 
weak civic associations (1999:23). 
Despite the recognition of these exceptions and critical perspectives, the positive 
impact of civil society on democratisation features predominately in the literature. 
Scholte discusses the democratising possibility civil society offers and how 
democratic deficits can be reduced through civil society activism (2002: 281). Also, in 
contrast, this work expresses caution that civil society has the potential to both 
detract from and add to democracy: “civil society is not inherently a force for 
democracy any more than the public sector or the market” (Scholte, 2002: 299). By 
addressing the assumption that civil society is “a way to enhance public participation, 
consultation, transparency and accountability” (2002: 293), Scholte looks at six 
potential contributions that civil society might offer to the process of 
democratisation. Firstly, civil society gives a voice to stakeholders by opening 
political space which can enable organisations to inform governance agencies. This 
also empowers civil society members, leading to greater participatory democracy. 
Secondly, since democracy requires an “informed citizenry”, civil society can fulfil the 
role of educator. Thirdly, democracy also requires “vigorous, uninhibited discussion 
of diverse views” (2002: 293), therefore civil society can help to fuel debate by 
facilitating discussion opportunities and creating openings for dissent. Fourthly, civil 
society enacts regulatory frameworks so that institutions are subject to public 
scrutiny. Fifthly, “Increasing the public accountability of the regulatory agencies 
concerned” (2002: 294), has a democratic accountability function. Finally, the 
aforementioned five points combined, help with creating legitimacy. When citizens 
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respect the legitimacy of the government they, therefore, acknowledge its right to 
govern and their duty to obey. Furthermore, legitimate government tends to be more 
effective, more productive and less violent than illegitimate rule. Civil society 
working with regulatory bodies can “give stakeholders a voice, improve public 
education, promote debate, raise transparency and increase accountability” (2002: 
294). Also, the space created by civil society allows dissent to be expressed at what is 
deemed illegitimate. However, this thesis argues that the legal status of civil society, 
determined by the state, plays a major role in developing and shaping the public 
space. This consequently determines the type of civil society that is permitted to 
exist.   
Noting that democracy may also be damaged by civil society, Scholte qualifies that 
civil society can only fulfil the role described above if it improves its own practices 
(2002: 296). A voice must be given to all stakeholders and all must have equal access 
and opportunity to participate. If not, “civil society can reproduce or even enlarge 
inequalities” (2002: 296). In some cases, the cultural base of civil society 
organisations is too narrow as they consist of western-styled, western-funded NGOs 
that are led by Western elites. Regarding education, civil society can fail to educate if 
behind the scenes lobbying takes precedent or they misinform the public. Debate can 
be stifled if civil society members are co-opted, or they stop fuelling debate. Also, if 
civil society’s discourse is co-opted, it can be recast by official institutions. In 
agreement with Anheier (2001), Scholte also recognises that civil society is not an 
intrinsically virtuous space; rather that “it includes destructive elements…who seek 
to deny the democratic rights of others” (2002: 296). Firstly, through practices like 
lobbying, democratically legitimate processes can actually be undermined by CSOs. 
Secondly, professionals in civil society can become convinced their views are correct 
to the detriment of the masses they consequently ignore. Finally, CSOs are often not 
transparent themselves. Scholte concludes that if civil society is to be a force for 
democracy, it needs to demonstrate its own democratic credentials. Also noting the 
importance of the civil society’s own practices but without arguing that civil society 
either helps or hinders democracy, McLaverty concludes that those who think that 
civil society is the best way of enhancing democracy may be mistaken. He argues 
“CSOs may represent important democratic initiatives; in reality, they often fall short 
in democratic principles” (2002:314) which emphasises the importance of 
democratic values existing in civil society.  
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To summarise this section, De Tocqueville, Keane, Entelis, Putnam, Fukuyama, 
Diamond, and scholars in transitology argue that a vibrant civil society can lead to 
democracy. However, the works of Berman, Carothers, Scholte, and McLaverty 
recognise that civil society is not intrinsically a force for democratisation and that 
analysis of a civil society through a critical perspective is essential for assessing its 
democratic function. This thesis takes a similarly critical stance towards civil 
society’s democratising potential and these works pose fundamental observations 
regarding the importance of civil political culture within civil society is addressed, 
which are addressed in section 4. The functions of civil society mean that it has 
developed a relationship with democracy, on the condition that it is an entity which 
is removed or has a degree of separation and autonomy from the state government. 
Furthermore, both Liberal-Associative and Oppositional-Resistance strands can have 
the capacity for a democratising effect. While Liberal-Association civil society offers a 
supportive stance for a liberal government, Oppositional-Resistance civil society is 
equally necessary for the democratising role by acting as a more vigorous check on 
state authority while posing a greater challenge to ideational state hegemony.  
 
2.5. The role of civil society in democratic transition 
 
Civil society can serve different purposes depending on the political situation. Civil 
society in an established democracy behaves differently to one that operates under 
authoritarian conditions. This subsection addresses literature that recognises the 
important role that civil society plays in order for democratic transition, and later 
democratic consolidation, to take place. It concludes by suggesting that civil society 
can contribute to democratic transition and consolidation if certain pre-conditions 
are met. 
This thesis recognises the value of transitology, as a framework for understanding 
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, but argues that the lack of 
recognition it gives to civil society’s potential in a political transition means it is a 
flawed paradigm. Classic transitology identifies three stages in the process of 
transition: an opening of the authoritarian regime, a breakthrough to democracy 
where a democratic government comes to power via elections and, lastly, the long-
term process of consolidation where democratic habits become entrenched, the state 
institutions are reformed, and civil society is established and strengthened. This 
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thesis, however, disagrees with the prescriptive sequencing of transition transitology 
describes whereby civil society’s contribution is only during the democratic 
consolidation phase. This thesis demonstrates that civil society can play a vital role  
throughout a transition, as was the case in Tunisia.  
In a post-authoritarian context, where a democratic transition is occurring, civil 
society can play various roles to aid this process. In the earliest stage of transition 
after revolution, anti-corruption watchdogs, pro-democracy associations and 
political mediator CSOs are of greater urgency as a platform for opposition needs to 
be established to ensure authoritarianism does not return. As democratisation and 
consolidation occur, the role of civil society develops to include interest groups, 
human rights organisations, professional associations, development and social 
services NGOs, and political reform movements. However, the development of theses 
CSOs would be unique to each case. 
Diamond (1999) argues that civil society advances democracy in two ways; by 
helping generate a transition from authoritarian rule to elected democracy and by 
consolidating democracy. This thesis focuses on Tunisian civil society’s role in both 
of these concepts. His work highlights the importance of the public in the third wave 
of democratisation drawing on O’Donnell and Schmitter’s analysis of citizenship 
revival and civil society resurrection, which occurs when weaknesses in 
authoritarian rule appear (1986), and Collier and Mahoney's work on protests and 
strikes destabilising authoritarianism (1997). Diamond forms a comprehensive 
‘thirteen points’ list of how civil society assists democratic development which draws 
on both Gramscian and Tocquevillian conceptions of civil society (1999: 239-250). 
Two points are of particular note from his thirteen-point assessment. Firstly, civil 
society can play a role in checking, monitoring, and restraining the exercise of state 
power by holding it accountable. This function helps avoid corruption and adds 
legitimacy to new governments by demonstrating their accountability, transparency, 
and responsiveness to the public (Diamond, 1999: 239-240). Secondly, civil society 
can stimulate and increase political participation, which “strengthens the legitimacy 
and the institutionalisation of democratic government, which are essential for 
consolidation” (Diamond, 1999: 242).  
As addressed in sections 2.2 and 2.3, civil society can facilitate learning of democracy. 
Helping the population understand the practices and procedures of democracy is an 
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important aspect of transition in which CSOs can partake. de Tocqueville regarded 
associations as ‘schools of democracy’ and the associational model of civil society, 
that scholars such as himself and Putnam advocate, affirms that civil society can 
assist a state in transition by endorsing the norms and values of political civility (See 
section 3). This occurs within associations by imparting ‘habits of co-operation, 
solidarity and public-spiritedness’ on its members (Putnam, 1993:89-90). 
Due to the lack of MENA examples where civil society has successfully influenced a 
democratic transition, cases from Latin America, Eastern Europe, and East Asia are 
considered. Friedman and Hochstetler identify that civil society in Brazil continues to 
influence the intermittent transition. Cooperation between Brazilian state actors and 
CSOs to create regular consultation and participation through institutionalised 
interactions in councils has helped transform a military dictatorship into an either 
cooperative or deliberative democracy. Yet it is social movements that play a vital, 
Gramscian ‘confrontation with state’ role in reaction to “incomplete democratisation 
and the impact of economic transformation” (2002:37). Referring to the levels of 
political influence and organisational capabilities, Ekiert and Kubik argue that “the 
post-communist experience as a whole, however, attests to the positive and 
important role that civil society can play in democracy’s consolidation.” (2014: 53) 
They cite Polish unions and farmers’ groups’ ability to defeat or delay proposed 
economic and social reforms as evidence. 
“In the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand, without the participation of the 
masses or civil society, democratisation would not have been achieved. 
Although their role was only supportive, it lent popular weight to the 
democratic transition and helped deepen democracy” (Bunbongkarn, 2004: 
137).  
Bunbongkarn asserts that civil society contributes to democratic consolidation, 
firstly, by creating political pressure on the government to implement reform. 
Thailand is an example of pressure from a developed business sector and urban 
middle class on the military leadership whereas the Philippines drew on their pre-
existing democratic consciousness in response to electoral irregularity. Secondly, 
organisations and groups must commit to democracy. In doing so they can propagate 
democratic principles and ideas that lead to ensuring that both political elites and the 
majority of the people believe democracy is the best form of government (2004: 
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141). South Korean civil society became increasingly critical of the authoritarian 
government. These efforts “empowered the people, making them more assertive in 
the political arena” (Bunbongkarn, 2004: 142). 
In order to identify the objective of a transition, Linz and Stepan describe the process 
of democratic transition as complete when,  
“sufficient agreements have been reached about political procedures to 
produce an elected government, when government comes to power that is the 
direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the 
authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and 
judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power 
with bodies de jure” (1996: 3). 
Of ‘the five areas’ that Linz and Stepan (1996: 7-13) describe as requirements for 
consolidated democracy’, three of these interconnected and mutually reinforcing 
conditions mention the role of civil society. Firstly, conditions for the development of 
a free and lively civil society must exist. Secondly, civil society should not make way 
for ‘political society’ during democratic consolidation. Instead, civil society should 
continue to be a field for alternative viewpoints and to monitor the government’s 
progress in transition. Thirdly, that the rule of law, which protects and embeds civil 
and political society in a spirit of constitutionalism, is required. Linz and Stepan see 
these three as “virtually definitional prerequisites of a consolidated democracy” 
(1996: 10). The other two, ‘democracy as the form of government’ and an ‘economic 
society’ do not directly address civil society but they argue that democracy is an 
interacting system and these five conditions support one another. 
This establishes the prerequisites of a consolidated democracy. However, this thesis 
argues that the preconditions of state must be considered when assessing a 
democratic transition. A state’s history, including its civil society traditions, is 
relevant when considering its chances of successful democratic transition. Although 
transitology does not have a single party-line, there are certain works in the field that 
hold a no preconditions assumption: that any country can achieve democracy and 
that the underlying conditions in transitional countries will not be major factors in 
either the onset or the outcome of the transition process. This thesis does not 
subscribe to perspective. Also, these works include the secondary assumption that 
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the required level of ‘state building’ to make a coherent, functioning state is not an 
obstacle to democratic transitions (Carothers, 2002). The list of countries from the 
third wave of democratisation that have not transitioned to democracy but remain in 
the Grey Zone between dictatorship and democracy is testament to the naivety of the 
transitology paradigm and demonstrates that states which lack necessary 
preconditions are significantly disadvantaged when attempting to make a successful 
transition.  
Jankauskas and Gudžinskas (2008) argue that a state faced with the triple transition 
of state-building, market reforms, and democratisation is more likely to end up in the 
Grey Zone. They argue the importance of preconditions and that a functioning state is 
a pre-requisite to democratic transition, and therefore state-building should take 
priority. This suggests that transitology was only related to a specific set of countries 
at a specific time or that the Latin American experiences are non-transferrable to 
other world regions. Chapter Four illustrates this point by identifying the significance 
of the historical development of Tunisia’s civil society.   
Diamond asserts that “civil society can, and typically must, play a central role in 
building and consolidating democracy” (Diamond, 1999: 259-260) but adds that the 
deconstruction of any patron-client relationship with the government is crucial as it 
would prevent an independent civil society from functioning effectively. 
Furthermore, a level of co-operation with the state government is required. Civil 
society can remain ‘in opposition to the state’, what Diamond refers to as an 18th-
century conception, but if this relationship is over-confrontational or civil society 
overwhelms the state with demands, which can be the case after long periods of 
authoritarianism, it becomes a counterproductive force to democratisation.  
The assumptions that preconditions to democratisation are irrelevant demonstrate 
the weaknesses of the transitology paradigm. Chapters Four and Five demonstrate 
that Tunisia had the preconditions necessary to transition from dictatorship to 
democracy due to its pre-existing constitutional and civil society history which 
meant that extensive state building was not required. However, this thesis recognises 
that civil society should be viewed critically. It is not an inherent force for good but 
has the potential to be corrupted. Therefore, CSO activities should not be viewed as 
necessarily assisting democratic transition. This section demonstrates the definition 
and functions of civil society and how CSOs are defined and operate. It also 
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demonstrates that if certain preconditions are met, then civil society can have an 
active role in a state’s democratic transition.    
3. Civil society in the MENA region  
 
The conceptual work on civil society in section 2 represents an ideal manifestation of 
civil society and how it contributes to democracy. This section demonstrates that 
civil society has been present in the MENA region but has been constrained by the 
political contexts of colonialism and authoritarianism. The authoritarian context 
required MENA scholars to entertain a different view of civil society. Therefore, 
studies on MENA civil society were forced to adopt an exceptionalist stance, which 
sought to understand civil society with a ‘local concepts to describe local people’ 
approach or to argue that civil society was non-existent. This thesis does not agree 
with the exceptionalist approach but affirms that the MENA context literature only 
deviates from the Gramscian and Tocquevillian framework, established in section 2, 
because MENA civil society exists and operates within an authoritarian context 
where free public space is largely restricted or co-opted by the government. Since 
MENA civil society has not been completely autonomous, literature on its 
development prior to the 2011 Arab Uprisings has therefore focused on ways in 
which it operates within the context of an authoritarian state.  
To address civil society in the MENA region, it is important to acknowledge how the 
term is linguistically understood in Arabic. The operational translation is al-
mujtama' al-madani. “The Arabic word for society, mujtama’ is a noun of the place 
derived from the root jama’ (to join together or assemble)… the root has more of a 
connotation of unity and totality than the English society” (Browers, 2006: 62). 
Madani derives from madina (city) but it pertains to civility, civilisation and civil 
society as Browers notes that madani (civil) “also contains the same root as the 
verb madan, meaning to civilise or refine” (2006, 106). This confirms that meaning of 
civil society has not been distorted through translation. 
The MENA CSO context is relevant to this thesis as it constitutes an accurate 
representation of the Tunisian CSO landscape prior to the 2011 revolution. 
Therefore, the works on Tunisian civil society were conducted under the constrained 
authoritarian context. This thesis argues that as Tunisia transitioned from 
authoritarianism to democracy, its civil society continued to exhibit a gradual move 
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from the MENA CSO landscape, defined in pre-Arab Uprisings1 literature, to one that 
aligns more closely with the Gramscian and Tocquevillian models.  
This section analyses the existing literature on civil society in the MENA region by 
addressing the debates on its existence and its functions. It argues that civil society is 
a universal concept - as opposed to a Western model that is inapplicable to the MENA 
region - but the lack of autonomy from authoritarian governmental structures has 
limited and shaped MENA civil society and defined its functions. This argument is 
framed within the Culturalist-Structuralist debate and demonstrates that, rather than 
the MENA civil society being limited by the region’s inherent cultural incompatibility 
with Gramscian and Tocquevillian civil society conceptualisations, as the culturalist 
argument claims, its functions are constrained by the authoritarian environment, as 
per the Structuralist argument. These restrictions also meant MENA civil society’s 
impact on democracy was limited.  
Paine argued civil society should be unhindered by state institutions (Keane, 1988: 
45). The civil society literature presented in section 2 largely reaches an agreement 
with Paine; that for civil society to be effective, vibrant, and varied, it must be a 
separate entity from the state. Furthermore, the state must guarantee civil society’s 
freedom for it to function autonomously. Authoritarian governmental structures in 
MENA states, however, have prevented the development of an autonomously 
functioning civil society.  
Despite the authoritarian presence in MENA states, Bellin notes that the term civil 
society is “sufficiently elastic” to be adaptable to different political contexts (Bellin, 
1995: 121). Owen, however, criticises this lack of clarity in the term and argues that 
it is “too slippery and ambiguous” (2004: 201), making it an ineffective analytical 
tool. This conundrum is made apparent in the lack of agreement regarding the 
existence of MENA civil society. Focusing solely on Westernised NGOs devoted to 
non-partisan public interest advocacy work on national issues, hurried civil society 
assessment missions by democracy promoters declared that “very little civil society 
exists” in the Middle East (Carothers 1999: 248). Such assessment missions neglect 
the literature asserting that civil society in the MENA region exists but has different 
attributes and operates differently to its Western counterpart. Culturalists and 
Structuralists alike argue this divergence of MENA civil society is due to its lack of 
                                                        
1 The series of protests and uprisings that occurred in Arab states during 2010 and 2011.  
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autonomy from the state. However, while Structuralists attribute this lack of 
autonomy to organisational and material causes, Culturalists emphasise the MENA 
region’s different beliefs and values system. Owen argues that the Western 
definitions and understandings of civil society are not necessarily suitable for the 
MENA context but maintains that civil society may “exist in a wide variety of political 
vocabularies” (2004: 200). Civil society is certainly a part of the MENA political 
vocabulary, yet it is used “to criticise authoritarian government in the name of social 
justice and human rights” in addition to non-religious or tribal alternative forms of 
mobilisation (Owen, 2004: 201). The MENA authoritarian context heavily limits the 
space in which civil society operates. 
In addition to the limited space, the MENA civil society is fragmented and subservient 
to the state. Zubaida considers that MENA civil society is “a number of islands of 
independent endeavour, heavily dependent on the state itself to provide the clear 
legislation and institutional mechanisms which alone guarantee their autonomy” 
(Zubaida, 1992:2-3). He adds the lack of precise legislation and unpredictable 
treatment of CSOs makes them dependent on the state. Confirming this dependency 
relationship, Owen prefers the term “informal politics” over civil society for the 
MENA context since he considers it more suitable as he argues that a distinct state 
and non-state division does not exist (2004: 201). This analysis of MENA civil society 
demonstrates that the division between the state and civil society are not always 
entirely clear. This thesis does not support MENA exceptionalism. Rather, it 
recognises that due to the presence and persistence of authoritarian governance, 
which limited public space, state interference in MENA civil society is prominent.  
Once the analysis of civil society by Age of Enlightenment thinkers began to 
recognise a separation of state and non-state institutions, definitions from the 
Western body of literature began to assume that civil society should be autonomous 
from the state and that a division between public and private is also apparent. In the 
MENA region, however, authoritarian political conditions have made the divide 
between the state and the civil society less apparent and subsequently civil society 
has had severely restricted autonomy. The distinction between the private and 
public sectors is more suitably imagined as a spectrum of varying degrees rather 
than a clear division.  
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3.1. Culturalist Vs Structuralist debate  
The role and status of civil society in the MENA region is addressed in the Culturalist-
Structuralist debate. Culturalists argue that the MENA region’s culture prevents civil 
society from developing. However, this thesis agrees with the Structuralist argument 
which identifies that the political conduct of authoritarian MENA government 
structures has constrained the development of MENA civil society. The argument in 
this section is positioned within the Structuralist side of the debate, while the 
relationship between culture and civil society is addressed in the civility section.  
The Culturalist argument makes the case that civil society is an exclusively Western 
concept that is not applicable to other regions with different historical experiences. 
Therefore, a Western understanding of civil society is not possible in MENA. Gellner 
(1994) argues that Western liberalism is defined by civil society. For Gellner, being 
modular, free to join or leave societies or groups who have open memberships, is 
essential to civil society. Therefore tribal, religious, and kinship groups, which people 
are born into, are not a genuine part of civil society. Modularity requires 
commonality of values and practices, which requires a population ‘trained’ for this 
high culture. Gellner and Mardin reached similar conclusions that Middle Eastern and 
Muslim countries lack civic associations for civil society; claiming that civil society is 
based on the “uniqueness of the Western cultural tradition” (Niblock, 2005: 488). 
Mardin believes that Muslim society, as set out in the Quran, promotes social 
cohesion rather than ‘Western individual rights’, and Islamic cities are ‘segmented on 
religious and ethnic communities’, leading to no hegemony of the bourgeoisie. This 
makes ‘Islamic civil society’ a different entity that almost is incomparable because 
people are prevented from being modular.  
Contrary to the analysis of civil society being alien to the MENA region, S. E. Ibrahim 
makes an historical case for the existence of civil society in MENA by identifying a 
public space “shared by Ulama, merchants, guilds, Sufi orders, and sects” (Ibrahim, 
1995: 30). Furthermore, Niblock partially accepts Gellner and Mardin’s perspective 
but argues that although the emergence of civil society in MENA has followed a 
different historical and cultural experience to the West, primordial groups can 
perform the same function of checking government power as modular civil society 
organisations. MENA civil society may not be modular, yet tribal and religious 
groups, even in a sphere controlled by the government, can still limit government 
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power and can mobilise large selections of the populations with legal authority. 
Addressing the case of Kuwait, Tetreault (2000) notes that public space developed 
through the participation of Islamist groups and Diwaniya institutions of social, 
economic, and political interaction. These cases show that MENA civil society can 
perform an active democratic functional role, insofar as being a public space, but not 
to the extent of being the thorn in the side of political power (Keane, 1988). Instead, 
it can apply pressure on the state without fully holding it to account and can also 
negotiate with the state. Furthermore, Niblock disregards the importance of being 
modular, noting the Western world is not culturally homogenous as people hold 
notably different values. 
The Structuralist argument suggests that the lack of democracy in MENA is due to the 
structural characteristics of the state (See Crystal (1994) Salamé (1994) Brynen et al 
(1995) Kamrava (1998). Varied and vibrant civil society is a universal concept which 
is only absent from MENA due to authoritarian governmental structures preventing 
autonomy and democracy from flourishing. Corporatist structures in politics and 
society (Murphy, 1999) and the dynamics of rentierism (Luciani, 1990) have 
maintained authoritarianism and prevented political liberalisation from occurring. 
Therefore, civil society has not been afforded the space to develop and civic activity 
ceased in the face of repression. 
The Structuralist approach, that Western economic penetration has strengthened the 
MENA state’s power also features in Niblock’s analysis. This limited the scope of civil 
society and its effectiveness was further reduced by the social contract that placed 
the needs of the state before citizens through the promotion of economic growth and 
stability over public discourse (Niblock, 2005: 492). Since gaining independence 
from colonial powers, the MENA states have been ruled by an authoritarian 
government. In order to maintain control, they have excluded, silenced or co-opted 
civil society and invaded the space in which the civil society would have operated. 
MENA states have either prevented civil society from existing or, when it has allowed 
civil society to exist, has ensured it was constrained. For example, following their 
unsatisfactory developmental, political, and economic performance in the 1960s, 
MENA states enter a period of economic and social liberalisation during the 1970s. 
Despite the lack of democratisation, this opening allowed expression of discontent 
and civil society re-emerged (Kramer, 1992). This resulted in a large growth in the 
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number of NGO’s from 20,000 in the 1960s to 70,000 in the 1980s (Mazlish, 
2006:51). In the 20th Century, regimes banned civil society organisations on a 
national level but satellite and Internet technology has enabled associations to 
organise and transmit their views due to the internationalisation of civil society 
(Niblock, 2005: 493). Although civil society expanded in these periods, regimes 
limited CSO autonomy and activity. However, it further supports the Structuralist 
view by demonstrating that the MENA region is not an exception to civil society 
growth, if the conditions are not constrained.  
3.2. MENA civil society Vs the MENA state  
Furthering the perspective the MENA civil society is predominantly deferent to the 
state, Ayubi applied Gramsci’s idea, of the state dominating civil society, to the MENA 
context. Power in the MENA region has been largely seized forcefully by regimes, 
then maintained through administration and policing. The ruling class, with no 
intention of relinquishing power, has not been subject to public scrutiny since it 
maintains power through politically co-opting or isolating opposition (Ayubi, 
1995:25). The MENA state was also able to maintain control over the public despite 
periods of economic liberalisation. MENA regimes “occupied the prize position in the 
economy (of their state)” during the ‘state capitalism’ phase of the 1950s but 
financial crises from the 1960s onwards forced the encouragement of private 
enterprise and initiative (Tripp, 2001:212). Ayubi (1995) thought the economic 
openness would lead to political openness. However, the period of economic 
liberalisation occurred in such a way that enabled authoritarian regimes to increase 
their maintenance of control over their citizens. Economic liberalisation produced 
“licensed entrepreneurs, dependent capitalists, politically indebted cliques, and 
cronies of the rulers,” who, instead of becoming economically liberated, became part 
of the system of patronage (Tripp, 2001:224). Tripp explores three aspects of the 
MENA state that define its omnipresence; a community based on Islam, a hierarchical 
system of neo-patrimonialism, and a coercive apparatus centred on security services. 
He summarises that within all three, a system of patronage and the blurred lines 
between what lies in the public and the private sections are key to maintaining 
authoritarian state control. Niblock (2005) maintains that civil society can still 
perform the function of pressuring the state in an undemocratic political climate. He 
argues that MENA civil societies do not conform to the Western conceptualisation of 
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civil society but can still perform some functions of civil society. Therefore, despite 
being considerably restricted, MENA civil society still plays a role and should 
therefore not be discounted as unhelpful, just not analysed by Western-liberal 
criteria.  He adds that either tribal, religious, kinship groups, or other primordial 
groups can perform the function of civil society. However, even if various 
associations exist, all representing different non-modular or primordial groups; this 
does not represent a vibrant and varied civil society. Autonomy from the state and 
volunteerism is required for civil society to be considered vibrant and varied. 
Chapter Four demonstrates that prior to the 2011 Revolution, Tunisia boasted many 
associations, addressing various aspects of human and women’s rights, in addition to 
professional associations (lawyers, trade unions). However, they were controlled by 
the state through co-option or were eliminated if their agendas diverged from the 
state’s. Due to its lack of autonomy, Tunisian civil society could not be considered 
vibrant nor varied. For example, Women’s associations in Tunisia under Ben Ali and 
Bourguiba existed but were not fully autonomous and were forced to operate within 
the state’s agenda in a top-down liberalisation process. Therefore, the rights that 
constituted the state-feminist agenda, the rights that the state wanted women to 
have, were promoted to the advantage of liberal-secular women, since their interests 
coincided with those of the state, the state allowed them to exist and promote rights 
that were mutually agreed. Women’s associations could pressure the regime, pursue 
goals of mutual interest, and work with, rather than against the state. However, 
critiquing, openly challenging, or presenting views antithetical to those of the state 
was not permitted. The Tunisian secular-liberal Women’s movement was still able to 
make considerable strides in terms of achieving legislation that supported women’s 
rights, but could not stand against any state-imposed constraints. This is akin to the 
Gramscian idea of how civil society can emerge within an oppressive or totalitarian 
state, as was the case in Algeria between 1988-1992 where groups had goals that did 
not threaten the power or legitimacy of the regime (Entelis, 1996:47). 
As MENA civil society was largely constrained, this has implications on its 
relationship with democracy. The Norton project on MENA civil society (1995) found 
that there was no linkage between active civil society and democracy in the Middle 
East. It did, however, claim that liberal civil society “provides both the structural 
underpinning of representative democracy and the terrain on which an organising 
working class can develop” (Sater, 2007:4). Hawthorne (2004) explains why 
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American support and funding for MENA CSOs  has had little impact on 
authoritarianism and that MENA civil society activity has not been “the magic 
missing piece of the Arab democracy puzzle” (2004:6). Firstly, the limited space that 
civil society has been allowed to operate within has not been permitted further 
expansion; rather the growth of civil society has been due to ‘top down’ 
liberalisation. Secondly, Arab regimes are “successful in maintaining control and 
quashing dissent” (Bellin, 2004), therefore NGOs focused on culture, rather than 
politics to avoid repression. Finally, authoritarian rule has bred political apathy and 
primordial allegiances have remained strong because civic participation and active 
membership has been low. Moreover, not all CSOs are pro-democracy and a lack of 
civil political culture is evident.  
This section summarises that civil society literature on MENA has had an 
exceptionalist stance but this does not require a fundamental re-thinking of the 
concepts established in section 1. It is conducive to this thesis to note the diverse 
groupings that might be labelled under the heading of civil society as some have been 
more relevantly investigated in MENA countries than in the West. Research and 
analysis of civil society in the MENA region is different from theoretical civil society 
literature because pre-Arab Uprising understandings of civil society in MENA had 
been shaped and constrained by the continued existence of authoritarian forms of 
government. This has made MENA appear incapable or inhospitable to a Western 
conception of civil society, hence the apparent MENA exceptionalism towards 
democracy. 
MENA civil society is incomparable to the West, not due to factors offered by 
Culturalist explanations but because authoritarian conditions have persisted and 
prevented an autonomous civil society from developing, a view consistent with the 
Structuralist approach. MENA civil society has often been manipulated to function as 
a means of legitimising the state but it has also been effective, in some cases, at 
performing a limited mediation role between society and the state. However, it 
remains the case that when civil society is not completely autonomous, it is unable to 
fully function.  
Pre-Arab Uprising MENA civil society literature is important because it represents 
how MENA civil society was forced by the state to conform and be co-opted or be 
marginalised and oppressed. Indeed, Tunisian civil society has a legacy of operating 
  
44 
 
under a corporatist-authoritarian context that has influenced its development. Now 
that Tunisia is in a democratic transition and not under authoritarian conditions, the 
question posed in this thesis on how civil society in a MENA context should be 
addressed where authoritarianism is not present gains importance. The lack of an 
independent public space between citizens and government means that a political 
culture that focuses on protecting the rights of the individual, in relation to other 
individuals, did not develop. 
4. The political culture of civil society required to maintain democracy 
 
This chapter has established firstly, the connection between civil society and 
democracy, and secondly, the role of civil society in democratic transition. This 
section builds on these connections to propose that civil society needs to have a 
democratic culture in order for it to play a democratising role in a democratic 
transition. Therefore, it defines the concept of political civility, which derives from 
studies of political culture and establishes the significance of political civility, by 
explaining its importance as the culture of democracy and how it can be vital to 
installing democracy. It concludes that six criteria form the components of political 
civility and can assess if a political culture is democratic. Also, both Oppositional-
Resistant and Liberal-Associative versions of civil society activism and types of CSOs 
require political civility to be demonstrated in order for civil society to perform a 
democratic function.  
4.1. Political culture  
 
This thesis is a study of political culture, therefore it is important to explain the term 
in order to clarify its meaning and relevance to this work. Political culture is 
problematic to define; for example, Chilton (1988) developed nine criteria for 
political culture conceptions due to the lack of consensus over a definition from 
social scientists. It can also be misused to offer a sweeping, reductionist analysis of 
political action or to create an uncritical causality between political culture and 
political action e.g. a population behaves in a certain manner because of its political 
culture or a political culture causes a population to act in a certain manner. Shklar 
notes that political culture makes a convenient tool for policy makers and that “it can 
be used by informed political observers to devise intelligent questions” but admits 
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that “its scientific standing is poor” (1987:106). The anthropological use of culture 
employs a broad definition that includes behaviour, a concept that also differs from 
attitude.  
Political culture, as a concept, was introduced into political science by Almond, who 
saw it as the “particular of orientations pattern of orientations to political action” in 
which “every political system is embedded” (Almond, 1956: 396). Almond notes the 
diverse origins and various disciplines that influenced the inception of political 
culture, such us European sociology, social psychology, and psycho-anthropology. 
However, he credits the development of the attitude survey as the ‘catalytic agent’ in 
the conceptualization of political culture (1989: 10-16). 
The first major political culture work, which also employed the attitude survey 
method, was Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture (1963). The study used opinion 
survey data, as the raw material, to explain the stability of a country based on how 
closely it adheres to the model of civic culture. Despite their study being Western-
centric, it enabled political culture to be more easily defined. It identified that 
individuals and their attitudes are connected to the overall political system structure 
through a political culture. The aggregated reading of individual’s attitudes and 
collection of statistical data enabled political culture studies to become positivist 
works. 
Political culture is, collectively, traditions of society, spirit of public institutions, 
passions and collective reasons of citizens and style and operating codes of its 
leaders. Therefore they are not just random but products of an historical experience. 
For an individual, political culture provides controlling guidelines for effective 
political behaviour, therefore ideals and operating norms. “A political culture is the 
product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of 
individuals who currently make up the system” (Pye & Verba, 1965:8). 
Political culture is also about predictability; individuals accept the norms of their 
society which ensure the society is given structure. In addition, the laws that govern 
the individual affect the society’s culture. Political culture refers to “the system of 
beliefs about patterns of political interaction and political institutions” (Pye & Verba, 
1965: 516) in addition to what people believe about political happenings. Verba 
(1965) expansively explains political culture, addressing the relationship between 
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political culture and political structures, belief in political structures, culture and 
political culture, and the homogeneity of culture. Furthermore, he identifies when it 
is most suitably applied; “Political culture is a helpful concept in understanding and 
explaining political change and modernisation.” (Pye & Verba, 1965: 517). 
Conversely, when political culture is less useful; as an explanatory term, for example, 
the political culture of nation X, therefore, determines political structure Y. “Rather 
one must specify what aspects of political culture – what beliefs about what subjects 
– are the important elements for explaining the operation of political systems” (Pye & 
Verba, 1965: 518). Verba justifies and defends its use and importance as if he 
recognises that political culture lacks the academic currency of other approaches 
within political science.   
Based on the interpretations of other political culture works, Welch (1989) identifies 
two differing ways of viewing political culture: subjectivist and comprehensivist. The 
‘subjectivist’ sees political culture as the subjective orientation to politics (Tucker, 
1987: 3) while the 'comprehensivist' view sees it as the “attitudinal and behavioural 
matrix within which the political system is located” (White, 1979:1). 
This thesis recognises both subjectivist and comprehensivist approaches to political 
culture and, as Almond noted that political culture study was founded on the attitude 
survey method, Chapter Three develops suitable methods for exploring these 
approaches. This thesis also recognises the ﬂuidity of political culture; that it is not 
static and that beliefs and attitudes, in addition to norms and behaviours, within a 
country can change, dependent on what that country experiences.    
4.2. Political Civility: the six criteria of civil political culture 
Rather than “politeness, manners, and civility”, features of what Ferguson calls a 
civilised, polite, or polished society in Essay on the History of Civil Society  (1767), the 
civility that this thesis addresses is the culture required to establish and sustain 
democracy. Almond and Verba’s work (1963) sought to argue that civic culture “is 
the type of political culture most conducive to stable democracy” (Welch, 1993: 15). 
Inglehart, a proponent of The Civic Culture argument concurs by adding that “stable 
democracy reflects the interaction of economic, political, and cultural factors” (1988: 
1220).  To summarise The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba identify three kinds of 
political culture; participant, subject, and parochial. Participants are people who are 
  
47 
 
politically informed, as they are aware of the political process and the institutions of 
government, and are confident with intervening in politics. Subjects are also 
politically informed but are more passive and have trust in politicians and the 
political system, therefore, do not seek to intervene or be politically active beyond 
voting. Parochials are politically uninformed and therefore do not seek to intervene 
in politics. Almond and Verba’s argument emphasises that democratic theory has 
placed greater emphasis on the importance of active citizenry whereas deferential 
citizens, subjects, are also vital to the maintenance of a democratic system. Critics of 
this argument believe it encourages political apathy, which may be seen as anti-
democratic. However, the balance of participants and subjects advocated by Almond 
and Verba enables a political system to function while the sufficient trust that is 
placed in the government on the part of the deferential citizens implies that the social 
contract between the government and citizens is being upheld. Almond and Verba 
argue that an excess of participants at the expense of subjects could undermine the 
political system. The comparative approach to their work highlighted the political 
culture of the stable, and therefore civic, democracies of Britain and the United 
States, in contrast to countries where the citizens had lower levels of trust in their 
governments and lacked political civility; Italy and Mexico. 
There are various aspects to political civility. “In very generic terms civility can be 
presented as a set of rules and behaviours shared by individuals and communities 
that conform to and are conducive to a social order that is deemed ‘civilised’—a 
depiction that is particularly important in relation to the organisation of violence” 
(Volpi, 2011: 828). Non-violence is a primary requirement of political civility. 
Regarding behaviour, discourse, and discussion, citizen interactions must be non-
violent, with civility as “the centralisation and monopolisation of ‘legitimate’ violence 
by the state, as national ruling elites seek to encourage the formation of docile and 
productive citizens” (Volpi, 2011: 282). In addition to citizen agreement, Habermas 
deemed that the “notion of civility as a reflection and embodiment of a state-
guaranteed ‘non-violent’ space for discourse and behaviour becomes a hallmark of 
the rise of powerful and self-regulated national bourgeoisies in modern Europe” 
(Volpi, 2011: 830). Notions of national community and citizenship are established in 
the liberal perspective, which considers that the link between civility and civil society 
means that: “the attitude and ethos that distinguish the politics of a civil society is 
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civility, i.e., solicitude for the interest of the whole society, a concern for the common 
good” (Shils, 1992: 1). 
In addition to non-violence, this thesis recognises the following six criteria of 
political civility: Tolerance, Equality, Pluralism, Freedom, Trust, and Transparency. 
Principally based on themes stemming from DeTocqueville’s Democracy in America 
and Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture, this set of criteria is derived from the 
existing literature on civil society, political culture, political civility, and 
democratisation addressed in this Chapter, and are the components and 
characteristics of political civility. These criteria are central to this thesis as they are 
operationalised for the purposes of this research as measures of assessing political 
culture. Chapter Two clarifies how each criterion is developed into lines of inquiry. 
The extent to which there is evidence of these criteria in a political culture exhibits 
the degrees of political civility.  
Tolerance of different opinions and beliefs may reluctantly develop within a political 
culture. However, respect and tolerance of differing opinions is an essential aspect of 
civility and is derived from the civic culture literature. Drawing on J.S. Mill’s 
interpretation of the Truth Principle, “toleration is connected with the willingness 
and the ability to acknowledge the presence of different viewpoints that are remote 
from oneself” in the case of the possibility that alternative viewpoints are indeed 
closer to the truth (Cohen-Almagor, 2016). If the “vigorous, uninhibited discussion of 
diverse views” (Scholte, 2002: 293) is to take place, Tolerance is required. If this 
principle is prevalent, it amounts to a culture of respectful, considerate and co-
operative interactions, on behavioural and discursive levels, between the state and 
civil society. Tolerance can be described as “the willingness of individuals to accept 
disparate views and social attitudes; to accept the profoundly important idea that 
there is no right answer” (Norton, 1995: 12) or “a mutual accommodation of 
differences in everyday dealings” (Volpi, 2011: 835).  
Equality refers to permission for all citizens to participate, in the understanding that 
all voices and opinions are equally valid. DeTocqueville’s writing discusses the 
importance of “equality of conditions” to the existence of democracy. Equality, 
through liberal approaches, addresses the issues of fairness and open communicative 
action (Volpi, 2011: 837). If certain voices in a political system or a civil society are 
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suppressed or considered unacceptable, then equality is not given to the population 
and the culture cannot be considered to exhibit civility.   
Pluralism is derived from the Weberian concept of the multi-dimensionality of power 
and, in the case of this thesis, refers to the presence of a range of voices expressing a 
range of opinions. Pluralists place particular weight on the process created by and 
resulting from, individuals combining their efforts in groups in the competition for 
power (Held, 2006:159). Pluralism is a key tenant of liberal democracy and 
DeTocqueville’s work also saw the plurality of numerous associational groups as a 
means to prevent majoritarian democracy from becoming tyrannical. He also 
identified that these groups could increase citizen independence by performing tasks 
previously undertaken by the state. Indeed, Gramsci denotes the value of pluralism in 
civil society as a means to challenge the ideational hegemony of the state. Diamond 
describes Pluralism as a feature of civil society as “no organisation that is civil can 
claim to represent all the interests of its members” (1999: 231-233). Therefore, the 
diversity of views in a variety of organisations ensures pluralism. 
“Freedom of the city” e. i. citizenship (Civitas) refers to the condition or privileges 
granted to citizens.  Indeed, Rousseau discusses the importance of citizens retaining 
freedom, characteristic of the state of nature, while remaining in the modern era 
through a social contract. In the same vein, de Tocqueville understood that civil 
society helps ensure freedom of citizens by counterbalancing state power. Indeed, 
the various aspects of the concept of freedom are central to civility. The first aspect is 
freedom of speech and expression: the liberty of not being at risk from state 
censorship or persecution. The second aspect is freedom of participation: the ability 
to freely join any association and to leave without the risk of persecution. The third 
aspect is the condition that freedom must also be defended by the state and legally 
enshrined.  In addition to the literature analysed in this chapter, further 
deconstruction of the notion of freedom, the differences between freedom to 
(positive liberty) and freedom from (negative liberty), derived from Berlin’s Two 
Concepts of Liberty (1958), are also significant to the understanding of freedom in 
political civility. Freedom to act as an individual with autonomy and self-sufficiency 
is central to the understanding and practice of freedom, as J.S. Mill argued that “the 
only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own 
way” (Mill, 1859: 27). However, Berlin argues positive liberty must be tempered by 
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negative liberty in order to prevent an authority acting with impunity, as is the case 
in authoritarianism. Indeed, Habermas' conception of democracy and a strong civil 
society requires freedom from domination (Flyvbjerg, 1998: 219). 
Trust is recognised as a “democratic character” quality by Almond and Verba based 
on Lasswell’s assessment of personal characteristics (1963:11). Indeed, trust is a 
“non-political” attitude, but a norm of citizen behaviour. It could be manifested 
through trust in other members of one’s organisation, in members of different 
organisations, and in the political system. Trust is an important norm for the 
development of a political civility. Political trust; trust between citizens and political 
leaders, differs from social trust; trust between citizens. At civil society level, the 
latter is relevant and, according to de Tocqueville and J.S. Mill, developing trust 
through participation in voluntary associations is a major benefit of civil society 
action. “Trust is a—probably the—main component of social capital, and social 
capital is a necessary condition of social integration, economic efficiency, and 
democratic stability” (Newton, 2001: 202). Identifying whether trust is developing in 
civil society is, therefore, an important indicator of the development of political 
civility. Newton adds that “Individual social trust helps to build the cooperative social 
relations on which effective social and political organisations are built—a bottom-up 
process” (2001: 211). 
Transparency, pertaining to the notions of openness and accountability within 
government, is imperative to civility.  If Almond and Verba argue that the democratic 
citizen is expected to be actively involved in politics and to make informed, rational 
political decisions (1963: 31), then transparency within political processes is 
required. Diamond asserts that “transparency is a precondition for accountability 
and reform” (1999: 240). Furthermore, the lack of transparency can lead to 
corruption which “undermines democratic capacities of associations within civil 
society by generalising suspicion and eroding trust and reciprocity” (Warren, 2004: 
329). Although civil society may seek transparency from the state, Scholte (2002) 
discusses the importance of transparency from the perspective of civil society’s 
practice as a means of exhibiting its democratic credentials. 
In summary, the interplay between these six criteria would vary in each political 
system or civil society, as it would be implausible to expect any one political culture 
to simultaneously express all attributes to a complete degree. Although they 
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represent normatively ideal attributes for a civil political culture, some evidence of 
all six would be required to consider a political culture as civil. This thesis uses civic 
culture as the model or ideal type to determine if Tunisian civil society exhibits the 
criteria of civil political culture. 
4.3. Role of civility in sustaining democracy 
As section 2 establishes the potential that civil society has in establishing and 
maintaining a democratic system, this subsection asserts that political civility is the 
political culture required for democracy and that political civility within the civil 
society is also required in order to establish and maintain democracy. Therefore, this 
thesis argues that if the organisations that constitute a civil society possesses civility, 
then they have the potential to be a force for democratisation. 
The so-called ‘civil society argument’ is based on the premise that a robust, strong, 
and vibrant civil society strengthens and enhances liberal democracy (Walzer, 1992). 
While the characteristics of civil society being robust, strong, and vibrant are 
important in maintaining its autonomy and fulfilling its pro-democracy functions, it 
cannot strengthen or enhance liberal democracy if it fails to exhibit the 
aforementioned values of political civility. Berman (1997) argues civil society in the 
German Weimar Republic was vibrant and well-organized but its strength and over-
vibrancy was a responsible element in the destabilisation of the government and the 
rise of the Nazi movement. This is why The Civic Culture recognises that although 
‘participatory’ civil society actors are required, there must also be a passive element 
of civil society that trusts the government, rather than constantly protesting or 
opposing it. Furthermore, Chambers and Kopstein (2001) identify that strong 
organisations might build trust and solidarity among members, but if they cultivate 
hatred, violence, and sectarianism then they inhibit the establishment of democracy. 
Therefore, the type of civil society that promotes democracy is one that exhibits 
political civility. Indeed, Merkel stresses the importance of political civility and a civil 
society as “two closely intertwined dimensions” that support a stable democratic 
system (Merkel, 2007: 57). Merkel creates a distinction in the multi-levels of 
democratic consolidation; constitutional, representative, behavioural, and fourthly 
‘the consolidation of civic culture and civil society’ (Merkel, 2007: 40). He places civil 
society last because he argues that can disrupt democratisation and turn it into a 
“defective democracy” (2007: 57) adding that “only after democracies are 
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consolidated can emancipatory civil societies contribute fully without major risks to 
the democratisation of democracy.” (Merkel, 2007: 59) 
In conclusion to this section, regarding the approach to my research question and the 
structure of this thesis, this section identifies the significance of political civility in 
democratisation and the role that a civil society can play in that process.  The 
literature explains the importance of political civility by underscoring its 
contribution to democracy. Political civility is also crucial to a functioning democratic 
system. The institutions and procedures of democracy also require the culture of 
democracy; which can be identified through indications of Tolerance, Equality, 
Pluralism, Freedom, Trust, and Transparency.  
5. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter established that the functions of civil society have been identified 
through analysing the historical conceptualisations of the term. These functions are: 
resolving conflict, protecting citizens through a social contract, division of state and 
non-state institutions, creating a constitutional state, protection from despotism and 
an opposition to the authoritarian state, commercial and economic functions. These 
have culminated into a modern, pro-democratic force that manifests in both Liberal-
Associative and Oppositional-Resistance forms. It is possible for a sufficiently vibrant 
and diverse collection of CSOs to address these functions simultaneously or in 
reaction to when required.  
Having identified the relationships between civil society and democracy, political 
civility and democracy, and civil society’s impact on democratic transition, this thesis 
suggests that a civil society that exhibits political civility can positively assist a state’s 
transition to democracy, if pre-existing conditions of a suitably functioning political 
society and state institutions are met.  Furthermore, this thesis proposes that CSOs 
can help to build and strengthen democracy, if both the political conditions are 
suitable and CSOs possess a civil political culture. 
The existing literature on MENA civil society states that the region was an exception, 
ultimately because of the persistence of authoritarian forms of government. 
Therefore, pre-existing work on MENA civil society has been written under a context 
of authoritarianism, which suggested that it lacked autonomy and political civility. 
However, it was authoritarianism that prevented civil society from performing a 
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democratic function. As Chapter Four will establish, Tunisia has been in a post-
authoritarian context since 2011.   
Democratic transition is a fragile process and although civil society can have a 
positive effect on the process, the aforementioned caveats demonstrate that it must 
also act with caution. Civil society has a democratic function but, considering that 
civil society is not intrinsically a force for democratisation, the presence of political 
civility within civil society is required to achieve this democratic function. A civil 
society that lacks civil political culture can hinder a democratic transition. The 
literature has highlighted that in order to study a civil society, analysis of the 
functions and characteristics of the civil society in question must be included. 
Studying and evaluating a civil society in a transitional context, such as Tunisia’s, 
requires focusing on the following aspects of CSOs; their relationship and dealings 
with the government, their internal practices and external behaviour, and their goals 
and aims. This helps to determine whether they are assisting or inhibiting 
democracy. The State must enable CSOs by providing them with sufficient public 
space to operate. In addition, as civil society is not an inherently good entity, the state 
is required to regulate and protect civil society from itself by producing rules and a 
legal framework. Furthermore, it is important to address their beliefs, insofar as; 
how CSOs and civil society actors understand the meaning of civil society and what 
they think their role should be. Therefore, the criteria of political civility; Tolerance, 
Equality, Pluralism, Freedom, Trust, and Transparency, provide the variables 
through which Tunisian CSOs are analysed.  
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CHAPTER TWO – POLITICAL CULTURE THEORY AND METHODOLOGY  
1. Introduction 
Developing on the theoretical framework provided in Chapter One, which 
demonstrated how this thesis understands the terms civil society, CSO, political 
culture, and civility, this chapter identifies how the research conducted for this thesis 
measures the political culture of Tunisian CSOs. Measuring the civility of their 
political culture is required to assess their ability to fulfil a democratic function 
through the transition. This chapter also addresses the various approaches to 
studying civil society and political culture by analysing the advantages and 
weaknesses of comparable works, specifically those relevant to the MENA region 
context.  
The method of inquiry in the thesis is one of Triangulation: a juxtaposition of two or 
more methods whereby the weakness in one will be compensated by the strength in 
others (Mays & Pope, 2000:51). This thesis further advances Welch’s theory by 
applying it practically to develop suitable methods to studying discourse and 
practice. The three methods employed in the research are a quantitative attitude 
survey, qualitative structured interviews, and ethnographic participant-observation. 
These three methods are recognised as positivist, interpretivist, and a combination of 
both. They are selected based on their suitability for capturing discourses and 
practices required for studying political culture. Furthermore, they are employed 
because they are suitable for studying the political culture of CSOs in the Tunisian 
context. For example, Tunisia has sufficiently high internet access and penetration 
rates to conduct an online survey. However, this does not imply that this 
methodological approach is inapplicable to other states or political culture studies. 
For secondary reasons, these three methods are employed to counter deficiencies of 
each individual method, thus providing greater dynamism in the research, which 
improves upon previous political culture studies. 
2. The difficulties of measuring political culture and deficiencies of other 
political culture studies 
This section addresses the understanding and measurement of political culture. As 
established in Chapter One, this thesis rejects Culturalist approaches to the study of 
political culture. The two main ontological and epistemological approaches to social 
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science research, Positivism and Interpretivism, are addressed. The positivist 
approach is an objective process that seeks to employ scientific methods of inquiry in 
order to gain a logical understanding of society. Comte is credited for pinioning this 
approach in The Course in Positive Philosophy through his claim that natural law 
could be applied to the study of society. Positivist research “considers that 
knowledge of things can only be advanced by framing hypotheses, testing them by 
observation and experiment, and reshaping them in the light of what these reveal” 
(Acton, 1951: 291). In positivist inquiry, predominantly qualitative methods are 
employed as research instruments to capture reality. The positivist researcher is 
largely distant from the research subjects and is limited to interpreting collected 
data. Rather than using a natural science understanding of society, Interpretivism 
employs human interpretation, perception, and cognition to explain any actions 
therefore to all analysis in the social sciences (Green, 2002: 6). This approach is 
drawn from Weber’s assertion that human sciences should be concerned with 
understanding rather than explaining (Weber, 1964:88). The interpretivist approach 
contrasts by placing the researcher as central to the collection process and produces 
data that is subjective to the researcher’s experience and environment. These 
approaches, therefore, utilise different methods of capturing political culture. There 
are inevitable positives and negatives to each of these approaches, which are 
addressed in this chapter. 
Firstly, a discussion of the Culturalist approach and Orientalism is conducted through 
an examination of other political culture works. This demonstrates the deficiencies in 
their approaches and methods and subsequently enables the delineation of how 
these considerations shape the method of inquiry employed in this thesis. The 
distinction between the macro-interpretivism approach of culturalism and the 
micro-interpretivism approach of ethnography is made while the former is rejected 
and the latter advocated. Secondly, the problems regarding the use of only one 
research method or only using a positivist or interpretivist approach is addressed. 
Thirdly, analysis of the recommendations from the Hudson and Anderson debate 
(1995) shaped this thesis’ approach to studying political culture in the MENA 
context. Fourthly, how this thesis overcomes the deficiencies of other political 
culture studies and incorporates recommendations is explained in Welch’s dualistic 
understanding of political culture and the substantive implementation of 
triangulation. Fifthly, how organisational culture works - including positivist-
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culturalism of Hofstede’s survey approach, DiMaggio and Powell’s Isomorphism, and 
ethnomethodology - have influenced the method of inquiry is addressed. Finally, 
through the understanding of civil society as organised into CSOs and the 
disaggregated use of institutional culture, the research question is established. 
2.1. Orientalism and Culturalism 
The value of other political culture works; such as Hofstede’s use of survey methods, 
Tucker’s separation of cultural norms and behaviours, and the breadth of Lukin’s 
study and his acknowledgement of sub-cultures, are recognised in this chapter. 
However, the weaknesses in these works; such as overgeneralisation, causality, the 
use of historical literature, and reliance on one method, are also noted. This thesis 
seeks to overcome such methodological pitfalls and complete a more robust political 
culture study. As previously stated, this thesis rejects the culturalism approach to 
studying political culture. In the face of these obstructions and with insufficient 
survey data, the study of political culture in the Middle Eastern Studies has often 
resorted to the use of history, tradition, or religion as explanatory variables for 
political culture. The use of cultural explanations to describe political situations has 
also been a feature of Middle Eastern studies. As noted in Chapter One, this thesis 
rejects the Culturalist approach due to its reductionism and unrepresentativeness, its 
static conception of culture, and its tendency to commit Orientalism. 
Said’s influential work, Orientalism (1978), criticises the Culturalist approach by 
highlighting the false assumptions and prejudices that Western writers express 
against the Orient as they depict Arab or Islamic peoples as inferior, irrational, 
illogical, sexualised, and violent. These works conversely portray the West as 
intellectually and culturally superior. This thesis does not present a full analysis of 
Said’s work but seeks to identify the methodological and ethical problems Said 
highlights of reducing studies of MENA, such as relations to democracy, to cultural 
explanations and then further presenting said culture as a static entity. Said did not 
state that Westerners should not work on MENA issues, as he rejects the argument 
that “only a black can write about a black, a Muslim about Muslims” (1978:322). 
However, he argues that the Middle East is more complicated and cannot be 
summarised, studied or understood from a distance. In addition to the Orientalist 
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critique, Structuralists2 recognised the weakness of the Culturalist approach by being 
sceptical of its methods such as the generalisations towards Islam and Arab or 
Bedouin practices. The Structuralist approach, discussed in Chapter One, instead 
focuses on structural determinants such as political regime, political economy, and 
institutional legacies (see Brynen et al. 2012). The focus on political structures 
changes the approach to studying the MENA region rather than addressing the 
problems with the study of political culture. This thesis seeks to implement an 
improved study of MENA political culture. 
The Culturalist approach is characterised by invoking Middle Eastern cultural traits 
of fatalism, individualism, primordial chauvinism, and herd instinct. Arab world 
political culture writers often fall into two categories: reductionists and empiricists. 
Reductionists make grand generalisations about the region, its people and their 
beliefs. Writers like von Grunebaum, Lewis, and Gellner used Islam as their starting 
point.  “Islamic political culture (in the reductionist presentation) permits 
no autonomous public sphere, and no separation of the spiritual and the temporal” 
(Hudson, 1995:66). Empiricists such as Berque, Hourani, and Patai use Arab peoples 
as their explanatory variable through stereotyping and looking at the 
Bedouin substructure of the Arab personality, shame, honour and the Islamic 
component of the Arab personality. Kedourie concluded that Arab culture is non-
democratic and Pryce-Jones blames Islam, tribalism, shame and honour culture for 
the lack of democracy, even stating “an Arab democrat is not even an idealisation but 
a contradiction in terms” (Pryce-Jones, 1989: 406). Both versions of the cutluralist 
approach, adopted in the writings of the aforementioned scholars, are guilty of 
Orientalist tendencies. 
In addition to studying attitudes and values of political culture, this thesis recognises 
that study of behaviour is essential to a political culture work. As noted, the second 
approach to political culture is interpretivism; the antithesis of positivism. 
Interpretivism does not implement a scientific approach to research, but looks at 
understanding and interpreting social actions. It focuses on specificities rather than 
general patterns or trends. Regarding political culture, interpretivism focuses on 
methods that feature observations and the recording of behaviour (practice). In 
recognising the disparity between the manifestations of practice and discourse, 
                                                        
2 Critics of the essentialist/Culturalist approach to Middle Eastern studies and the lack of democracy 
in the MENA region. 
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Welch (2013) advocates the importance of observation to understanding behaviour 
in the duality of political culture based on the premise that patterns of behaviour are 
not always the same as what people say about their patterns of behaviour. As White 
adds, political culture is “the attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the 
political system is located” (1979:1).  
The manner in which practice is studied is vital. Therefore, it is important to 
recognise the variation within interpretivism and that culturalism is indeed a form of 
interpretivism. The fundamental distinction is the scale at which the interpretivist 
approach is conducted. Culturalism is an approach that is macro in style because it 
provides an interpretation of the culture through the use of historical synopsis or 
generalisation. This thesis rejects the use of culturalism because it is a defective form 
of interpretivism as it does not consider detail, is essentialist, and views culture 
statically. Said’s work is in opposition to the synoptic culturalism and macro-
interpretivism, meaning studies that use these approaches suffer from the possibility 
of committing Orientalism. 
2.2.  The disadvantage of a singular method or approach 
Analysing the methodological approach from works on Russian political culture and 
the weakness of relying on only interview data influenced the research design. Due to 
their similarity to works on the MENA region attempting to study political culture in 
authoritarian conditions, works on Russian political culture were also considered. 
Lukin’s study of Russian political culture (2000), which invokes the approaches of 
Geertz and Welch, recognises that political culture is a belief-system and that 
changes in beliefs occur. The primary criticism is that Lukin relies heavily on 
interviews. It is a comprehensive study where 67 interviews were conducted in nine 
major cities with 19 different parties and groups, which demonstrates that a wide 
range of opinions were considered. It also highlights important concepts to political 
culture, such as commonly-shared or typical beliefs. Lukin emphasises the 
importance of sub-cultures, instead of mass-culture, and that studies of values and 
behaviours do not often produce uniform results. Lukin’s work is criticised for its 
recourse to historiography and reliance on a singular method. Despite the volume of 
data collected, implementing mostly interviews meant that there was no 
triangulation or alternative method to verify his findings. Furthermore, interview 
transcripts are not provided, meaning his conclusions are harder to verify.  
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Tucker (1987) looks at the important influence of leadership and individual leaders 
on a political culture in the case study of Soviet Russia. The majority of his work still 
has recourse to historical explanations, which is an approach that this thesis 
considers methodologically simplistic and reductionist. However, he highlights the 
difference between cultural “norms” and cultural “behaviour”. Political scientists 
have tended to focus on cultural norms, but Tucker, like Welch, argues that political 
culture should include the study of behaviour, in addition to values, attitudes, and 
beliefs. In recognising the split between political scientists and anthropologists, 
Tucker emphasises the value of anthropological methods in the study of political 
culture. This study further demonstrated the importance of conducting ethnography 
in the analysis of cultural behaviour. White’s 1979 work is a commendable political 
culture study for the great range of survey data that it accumulated. It addresses sub-
cultures and cleavages in Soviet society, rather than making wider national culture 
claims. It also notes the revolutionary upheaval and effect on political culture. This 
highlights the question of whether there has been enough time for a civil political 
culture to develop in Tunisia, or whether the political culture of the Ben Ali era still 
exists. 
However, there are major criticisms of the methodologies in Tucker and White’s 
studies that this thesis seeks to avoid. Using secondary literature, where culture is 
determined by historical literature, presents two dangers. Firstly, when using 
religious and historical texts, it is likely that attitudes have changed since they were 
written. Secondly, “It is also not clear that classic texts reflect the broader canvas of 
varying cultural attitudes across social groups or give adequate voice to 
disadvantaged groups” (Brynen, 2012: 104). McAuley (1984) is particularly critical 
of White’s historical, synoptic use of political culture for its inaccuracy. White states 
that Russia has a traditional political culture; a central characteristic that is 
autocratic and anti-democratic, therefore beliefs and values are informed by 
historical experience rather than current political institutions situations. Indeed, 
culture requires time to change, but this approach presents it as static and McAuley 
argues that Russian history is more complicated than White portrays.   
A synoptic-historical view of macro-interpretivism, as used in the Culturalist 
approach, is problematic because it tries to interpret too much from a distance and 
can seek to reduce the explanation of political culture to simply historical 
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explanations. Welch argues that part of political culture is habitual patterns of 
behaviour, therefore history is an explanatory variable. McAuley does not reject 
analysis of history and recognises that history reveals insights into the formation of a 
political culture, as she states “of course it must, but the question is how” (1984: 21). 
What she rejects, however, is the manner in which White packages Russian history 
into a single formula i.e. that Russian political culture is more greatly influenced by 
personalistic Tsarism than Marxist-Leninism. According to Said, White’s work would 
be guilty of committing Orientalism, but without the same political inflection as in a 
MENA context. White still expresses a generalisation of Russian political culture 
based on history in addition to the notion that the East can be grasped by the 
Western mind in its entirety, synoptically, as a whole.  
Indeed, this thesis acknowledges Tunisian history as a factor in explaining the 
political culture of civil society but the historical analysis is provided as background 
detail in order to represent a cultural sensitivity that is required to perform the 
micro-interpretivism of ethnography. Contrary to White’s study, this information is 
not the substantive findings of the thesis. Chapters Four and Five establish that an 
influential civil society has been active in Tunisia prior to European colonialism, and 
it played a role in the independence struggle, the revolution, and the period of 
transition. Tunisia’s political culture has been influenced by authoritarianism and the 
inclusive, cooptive, one-party state republicanism’s tendency to build consensus, 
which has led to attitudes and practices of cooperation and reaching agreements. 
This sets the Tunisian case apart from the uprisings and coups in Libya and Egypt, 
where cooperation and agreements have been more problematic to achieve. 
However, the methodology of this thesis does not exclusively use the history of a 
state (Tunisia) to explain its political culture. Furthermore, this thesis does not reject 
interpretivism as a school of thought, only the macro approach. It is against reliance 
on history as an explanatory factor and advocates for the use of micro-interpretivist 
methods to ascertain a current political culture. 
Although the importance of implementing positivist approaches in a political culture 
study are mentioned in subsection 2.1 of this chapter, the disadvantages of these 
methods must also be noted. Hofstede’s works produce systematic, quantitative data 
on organisation culture which were used to draw conclusions and assumptions 
regarding national culture; that a ‘national norm’ (1980b: 45), or a ‘central tendency’ 
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(1991: 253) exists and can be determined from observing subcultures. McSweeney 
(2002) presents a detailed criticism of Hofstede’s use of data by highlighting how 
making assumptions and universal claims undermine the credibility of a study. This 
thesis looks for evidence and elements of civil political culture in CSOs but does not 
make assumptions that all CSOs are the same or that the political culture of CSOs is a 
reflection of a national Tunisian political culture. In addition, it is important to 
demarcate culture as civil political culture is identified, by its supporting literature, 
aa a distinct type of culture. 
A criticism of political culture studies is the causality it implies. Hofstede credits 
strong, often absolute, causality to national cultures (1991:170). Essentially, he 
endorses national cultural determinism (McSweeney, 2002:91). McSweeney 
concludes that a more sophisticated approach towards political culture is required.  
2.3. The Hudson and Anderson debate: political culture studies in MENA 
With regards to studying political culture in the MENA context, Hudson and 
Anderson (1995) produce separate chapters3 regarding the conceptualisation of 
political culture and how to study political culture in MENA states. They produce 
recommendations to studying political culture in the Middle East, because other 
works have been unsatisfactory, and point towards the use of positvitst and micro-
interpretivsm approaches. Both reject culturalism-reductionism approaches, as does 
this thesis, but the debate focuses on the use of positivist approaches, namely 
surveys, to political culture. Hudson is aware of the weaknesses of political culture 
works that essentialise the region’s culture but argues it "is hard to ignore culture" in 
seeking to understand conditions that foster democracy and a civil society (1995: 
71). Rather than reject political culture as a tool for analysing the MENA region based 
on the weakness of the Culturalist approach, Hudson argues the process needs to be 
developed and refined rather than throwing out “the political culture baby with the 
Orientalist bathwater" (1995: 65). Hudson’s work focuses on practicalities and 
considerations regarding methods. It does not address what is political culture and 
does not undertake a theoretical discussion of methods but clearly identifies the 
                                                        
3Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble, (eds) (1995). Political Liberalization and 
Democratization in the Arab World, Volume V. Theoretical Perspectives Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers 
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need for positivist political culture research in MENA, citing the weaknesses of 
Culturalist studies that essentialise the region. Hudson argues that political culture 
work is not fully developed in the Middle East because there is a lack of surveys and 
systematic interview data. The recommendations that Hudson makes on studying 
political culture in MENA, in order to produce higher quality and more rigorous 
works, were fundamental to the research design and are incorporated into the 
methodology of this thesis.  
1. Avoid reductionist concepts and essentialist assumptions. 
2. Disaggregate political culture, therefore look at Sub, elite, popular and mass 
cultures 
3. Regard different levels; formal ideologies, opinions, attitudes, and on a deeper 
level; collective values and orientations. 
4. Group identities, orientations towards authority and principals of equity and 
justice. 
5. Be methodologically multifaceted. Use texts from newspapers to graffiti. Be 
wary of the misuse of primary texts and sources. Conduct more interviews 
and use wider survey data (1995: 73). 
 
In response to these recommendations, this thesis also rejects the culturalism 
approach and disaggregates political culture by addressing the political culture of 
CSOs, rather than of the entire Tunisian population. Chapter Three discusses the 
methods used in the research and demonstrates how opinions, attitudes, and values, 
group identities (of CSOs), orientations towards authority and the principals of 
equity and justice are included in both the rationale and formulation of survey and 
interview questions and observation criteria.  
Despite criticising academic works that utilise a political culture approach, Anderson 
agrees that it can produce useful analysis if accurate, unrestricted survey work is 
performed (1995: 79). Anderson concurs with Almond and Verba’s work:  that 
political culture is ascertainable through survey research (1995:79). The method and 
accuracy of the latter’s work The Civic Culture (1963) was criticised for “depicting a 
culture based upon individual interviews (survey questionnaire) and that the 
approach was ethnocentric and more prescriptive than objective and empirical" 
(Barrington, 2009: 108). However, this is the case when a study seeks to make over-
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arching claims; as The Civic Culture did. If survey data results are balanced against 
results from interpretivist research that address practices of political culture, it 
would have produced the dualistic view of political culture that this thesis advocates 
In the MENA context, positivist survey work has not, until recently, been possible, 
due to the interference of authoritarian governments, or entirely accurate, due to the 
fear of government repression as a consequence of participating in a survey. A lack of 
civil liberties and a reluctance to publicly express political opinions under 
authoritarian rule has therefore impeded the collection of reliable survey data. 
Therefore, positivist work has been marginalised in favour of other methods of data 
collection. This was also the case with Russian political culture works by White and 
Tucker.  
However, the approach to studying political culture through conducting surveys, as 
Hudson and Anderson propose, suffers from Welch’s critique that “Positivist political 
culture research has marginalised theory in favour of operationalisation and data 
collection” (2013:11). Contrary to this aspect of Welch’s theory of political culture, 
this thesis argues that his criticism is overstated for two reasons. Firstly, this thesis 
argues that positivism is essential in understanding political culture. It is not only for 
data collection purposes, its implementation is halfway to understanding political 
culture (see fig.1). Almond noted that political culture is founded on the survey 
method and that the development of the attitude survey was the “catalytic agent in 
the conceptualization of political culture” (Almond, 1989: 15). Structured interviews 
are both positivist and interpretivist, due to the systematic method of data collection 
and the presence of an interviewer who interprets and interacts with the 
respondents. However, an entirely positivist method, such as a survey questionnaire, 
is therefore also required for a complete positivist understanding of the political 
culture of Tunisian CSOs. Secondly, in addition to being systematic, survey data is a 
crucial aspect of understanding political culture from a positivist perspective. As this 
thesis recognises that both the positivist and the interpretivist approaches must be 
addressed to obtain a complete understanding of political culture, an appropriate 
method to studying this aspect of political culture is required. 
The body of literature on positivist political culture, the mainstream of political 
culture studies, recognises that survey data is a highly appropriate method of 
ascertaining a political culture. This is based on the “folk psychology” notion that 
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individual’s behaviour is shaped by their attitudes and values (Welch, 2013:207). 
Positivism argues that asking subjects what their attitudes and values are, via an 
attitude survey, is sufficient for determining behaviour. Welch argues that the folk 
psychology justification for positivist research is inadequate because it assumes 
motivations are part of a fixed “portfolio of beliefs and desires’? (Hindess, 1988: 48-
9) whereas, contrary to this rational choice model, people’s motivations can, and do, 
change (Welch, 2013:67-70). Hindess (1988) and Wilson et al. (1996) argue that the 
attitudes people express in a survey are not the same as what motivates their 
behaviour i.e. a disparity between what is said and what is done (Welch, 2013: 145-
6). Furthermore, this social psychological literature suggests people do not always 
know their own motivations. Therefore, surveys do not always discover what is 
causally significant because attitude surveys assume people know their own 
attitudes. Surveys retain values in measuring discourse, one element of political 
culture, but should be treated critically and carefully when providing a 
rationalisation for behaviour, the ‘practice’ element of political culture. Further 
implications of employing survey data as a method are addressed in the following 
chapter.  
3. Triangulation and Welch’s understanding of political culture  
The approach that sufficiently incorporates Hudson’s recommendations and 
Anderson’s apprehension to political culture, in addition to providing a solution to 
the aforementioned deficiencies of political culture works, is the implementation and 
application of Welch’s theory of political culture to the research conducted in this 
thesis. This requires a triangulation of three separate research methods to 
satisfactorily capture this conceptualisation of political culture. As discussed, single 
research method studies are insufficient, which therefore encourages a triangulation, 
mixed-methods approach. Political culture is dualistic and therefore requires 
different methods to understand it. Political culture calls for the use of different 
methods, making this implementation of triangulation more substantive than using 
mixed methods merely to compensate for the others methods’ deficiencies. 
Furthermore, as discourses and practices are studied at both micro and local levels, 
the risk of committing Orientalism in this research is reduced.  
The approach of this thesis is not a case of satisfying the criteria or needs of either 
positivist or micro-interpretivist approaches, but that Welch argues that 
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understanding political culture is approaching the research from both positivist and 
interpretivist perspectives. Welch’s theoretical understanding frames political 
culture as the manifestation of discourses and practices; essentially, what people say 
and what people do. Therefore, the application of both positivist and micro-
interpretivist methods is required in order to comprehend the phenomenon. One 
perspective without the other is not sufficient because one perspective in isolation, 
and its subsequent methods, cannot capture both discourse and practice.  
Unlike the rigid separation between researcher and subject in positivist research 
methods, interpretivist research requires interaction between researcher and 
subject in a relationship that is more interactive, cooperative, and participative. In 
addition, it is subjective and implicit: how Geertz describes culture as “mental 
programming” and “software of the mind" (1980a), therefore requires a degree of 
interpretation. Therefore, as this thesis also concurs with Welch’s work (2013), that 
political culture manifests as both discourse and practice, the employment of 
different research methods is required to capture both these observable and 
subjective expressions, in addition to qualitatively measurable attitudes and values 
(norms) of political culture. Capturing both objective and subjective aspects of 
political culture provides a multi-layered data set that enables more nuanced 
analysis of political culture. Attitudes and values (discourse) can be ascertained via 
surveys and interviews, whereas understanding behaviour (practice) requires 
observation.  
Triangulation enables the advantages of qualitative and quantitative research 
methods to be combined in one study. Furthermore, the credibility and validity of 
results are increased through the use of mixed methods (Schwandt, 1997). By 
providing the rationale of why this thesis employs three methods – quantitative 
attitude survey, qualitative structured interviews, and ethnographic participant-
observation – this chapter establishes that the investigation of a concept should be 
the starting point of a research project, rather than the research being dictated by the 
method. Rather than agreeing with Eckstein’s assertion that “Almond and Verba got 
the concept exactly right” (1996: 473), this chapter establishes that the attitude 
surveys, on their own, are insufficient for understanding political culture. The 
triangulation methodology of this thesis is justified by the implementation of Welch’s 
theoretical understanding of political culture. In Welch’s conceptualisation, political 
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culture can only be understood in the unification of two opposing schools of social 
science research, positivism and interpretivism, because “both positivism and 
interpretivism leave a gap where theory should be” (Welch, 2013: 37). This is 
because political culture then manifests dualistically as both discourse and practice 
(Welch, 2013). This research’s approach of employing Welch’s political culture 
theory work overcomes the difficulties of measuring political culture.  
Fig. 1 
 
4. Institutional culture  
This section expands on how studies in institutional culture and ethnomethodology 
have influenced the method of inquiry. Following Hudson’s second recommendation 
to address culture specifically and disaggregate culture, and since this research 
focused on the political culture of CSOs rather than an overgeneralised national 
Tunisian political culture, two  methods and approaches of institutional culture 
studies have been incorporated into this thesis; isomorphism and 
ethnomethodology. Indeed, the operations and goals of a CSO are not akin to a 
business or company, but the procedures and decision-making processes are 
comparable due to both having a formalised structure of bureaucratic procedures. 
However, the form of management and hierarchy might be less strict and the settings 
less formal. This has enabled additional lines of enquiry regarding the internal 
organisational culture in relations to assessing CSOs political culture.  
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The positivist approach of Hofstede’s organisational culture studies is a conventional 
collection of attitudes and use of survey data. This approach has influenced the 
survey design in this thesis. However, as mentioned, his works seek to make 
generalisations about the country through the study of an organisation. This thesis 
disagrees with this form of positivist-culturalism and therefore the research 
conducted differs greatly with regards to the conclusions Hofstede sought to draw 
from his results. This research focuses on the culture of CSOs and the collected data 
is not used to make generalisations or estimations beyond the sub-culture; Tunisian 
CSO members.  
The DiMaggio and Powell (1983) study on the process of institutional isomorphism 
shaped this research. Institutional isomorphism is where organisations become 
increasingly homogeneous and more similar to one another in terms of their values 
and practices, due to their need for efficiency. However, this potentially constrains 
their ability to change in later years (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148). This leads to 
inquiring whether institutional isomorphism is occurring amongst Tunisian CSOs. 
CSOs may embark on various projects but this thesis recognises civil society as an 
organisational field. Therefore, this research can ascertain if Tunisian CSOs are 
similar regarding their values and practices as institutions, and therefore are facing 
isomorphism, or if there is no similarity between them. Collective results from 
survey and interview data should indicate the similarity or diversity amongst them. 
Considering isomorphism for my work regards the development of norms in the CSO 
field. If isomorphism is occurring or has occurred, there should, therefore, be 
evidence of central tendencies or norms which help to address if an organisational 
culture is emerging amongst Tunisia CSOs. If there is no isomorphism, no central 
tendencies, or no common norms, this suggests that there is no singular culture 
amongst Tunisian CSOs. The survey data might be more suitable for identifying 
‘central tendencies’ or ‘norms’. 
To frame the study of institutional culture, this thesis draws upon 
ethnomethodology, a sociological field of inquiry to studying actions and practices of 
everyday life.  The term’s creator Garfinkel, states that “Ethnomethodological studies 
analyse everyday activities as members’ method for making those same activities 
visibly-rational and reportable for all practical purposes, i.e. accountable, as 
organisations of commonplace everyday activities” (Garfinkel, 1967: vii). In The 
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Practicalities of Rule Use (1971), Zimmerman’s focus on the use of rules, how they are 
established, and the degree to which they are implemented through observation 
served as an example of how the CSOs establish their own procedures. Also, to 
determine if decisions made on an ad hoc basis where a precedent has not been 
established (1971: 223). Rather than only paying attention to the aspects of 
observing procedures and investigating the variety of practices, as per Zimmerman’s 
work, these observations were used to understand the CSO’s political culture. 
Observation combined with the scrutiny of the CSO’s Charter or Internal rules 
provided a comparative analysis of any disparity between their practice and 
discourse, using Zimmerman’s terms, “the formal plan to actual conduct” (1971: 
224). Furthermore, the extent to which rules are ‘bent’ in order to perform tasks, in 
addition to who bends them and for what purposes, would also demonstrate the 
aspects of the organisations. This could highlight if some principles or values 
established by the CSO are more flexible than others or whether the CSO rigidly 
adheres to its own bureaucracy. Welch discusses the relation between rules and 
practice, recognising that tacit knowledge is gained through partaking in practical 
skills. Considering that, “the acquisition of skills requires repeated action, and results 
in a new bodily capacity. At the same time, instruction by others, if not essential, is 
almost always involved, and gives rise to a community standard of correctness”  
(2013:118).  In addition, “A dualistic view of culture: a duality, that is, of practice—
exempliﬁed by skill—and discourse.” (2013:131). Therefore, addressing the habits 
and routines of CSO members can be used to establish ethnographic inquiry research 
questions. Understanding the style of interaction and whether changing the member 
in an organisation leads to a change in style, assists in the understanding of what 
skills CSO members possess.  
 
As the analysis of everyday activities and the study of procedure, these 
ethnomethodological works were of particular relevance to constructing the 
framework and processes of observation. For the ethnographic participant-
observation work such as describing CSO practices (see Chapter Eight), 
ethnomethodology seeks to investigate the grounding rationalities of members’ 
behaviour and how normal practices are established. Furthermore, applying the 
approach used by Zimmerman (1971) in addressing the establishment and 
implementation of rules also informed this research as for how rules and practices 
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were established and to what extent members adhered to them was also a purpose of 
investigation. However, ethnomethodology features in all methods employed in this 
thesis. It also proved relevant for questions in the survey questionnaire e.g. describe 
the culture of your organisation (see Chapter Six) and the structured interviews; e.g. 
describing the leadership and management of the CSO (see Chapter Seven). 
 
5. The Research Question 
The research question of this thesis is “Have Tunisian civil society organisations 
exhibited a civil political culture and how has this influenced their ability to fulfil a 
democratic function through the post-2011 transition?” This is based on the 
assertion made in Chapter One that democracy requires a civil political culture. This 
requires identifying the civil society actors and assessing their political culture, in 
order to determine whether they exhibit traits and components of civil political 
culture, aka civility, established from the literature of political culture as Tolerance, 
Equality, Pluralism, Freedom, Trust, and Transparency.   
Chapter One identifies the criteria and characteristics of a CSO in a non-authoritarian 
context: independent from the state and political parties, not power-seeking, and 
pursuing civic, non-partisan goals. Therefore, in order to determine whether they 
exhibit traits of civility, the approach of this thesis aims to understand three aspects; 
internal operation of CSOs through observing behaviour, CSO’s relationships with 
other CSOs and the state, and attitudes and values of CSO members.  
Each method is employed as a window into understanding various aspects of the 
political culture of Tunisian civil society. Therefore, this triangulated methodological 
approach to a political culture study aims to address the research question from 
three different directions in order to gain a multi-layered understanding of the 
complexities of the political culture of a civil society in a political transition from 
authoritarianism to an emerging democracy. This also utilises Welch’s political 
culture theory and provides what this thesis argues to be the optimum approach for 
studying political culture; one that unifies positivist and interpretivist approaches. 
This thesis rejects macro-interpretivism of the Culturalist approach to the study of 
political culture. Therefore, positivism and micro-interpretivism are implemented. 
The positivist approach is an objective process, as the researcher is distant from the 
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research subjects and is limited to interpreting collected data. The micro-
interpretivist approach contrasts by placing the researcher as central to the 
collection process and produces data that is subjective to their experience and 
environment. These approaches, therefore, utilise different methods of capturing 
political culture. Inevitably, there are positives and negatives to these approaches, 
which are addressed in the following chapter. 
Welch’s theory understands political culture as the manifestation of discourses and 
practices. Therefore, the application of both positivist and micro-interpretivist 
methods is required in order to comprehend the phenomenon. Capturing both 
objective and subjective aspects of political culture provides a multi-layered data set 
that enables more nuanced analysis of political culture.  
6. Chapter Conclusion 
In order to answer the research question posed in this thesis, it is necessary to assess 
the extent to which the six criteria which determine the presence or absence of 
civility are exhibited in civil society. This is required to assess the extent to which 
Tunisian civil society possesses or is developing the prerequisite democratic political 
culture for fulfilling its democratic function. Therefore, to fulfil a democratic function, 
civil society has to exhibit a democratic political culture which comprises of the six 
attributes; Freedom, Equality, Pluralism, Tolerance, Trust and Transparency. 
After the theoretical framework established the understanding of political culture, 
this chapter has primarily established an improved and multi-faceted approach to 
measuring civic political culture. The approaches and methods that measure values 
and attitudes, in addition to behaviours, are essential to understanding political 
culture. Furthermore, the weaknesses and shortcomings of other political culture 
studies enabled the development of a methodology and informed the rationale of the 
methods this thesis employs. The critique of other political culture works recognises 
the weaknesses of applying one or two methods.  
This chapter has established that the critique of Culturalism and macro-
interpretativism includes discarding this defective form of interpretivism that 
features essentialist, static, large-scale analysis that makes generalisations and 
derogations of the subjects. This thesis addresses political culture but is not 
Culturalist because it is specifically concerned with the political culture of Tunisian 
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CSOs. It does not essentialise the country or the region. Furthermore, rather than 
misuse of primary text and historical sources, it uses positivism and interpretivism 
on a micro level. McSweeney’s call for a more sophisticated approach towards 
political culture further supports Hudson’s recommendation to disaggregate political 
culture, prevents the reliance on only positivist approaches, and justifies the three 
method approach that focuses on a specific subculture. The institutional culture 
literature has also framed the method of inquiry. Understanding civil society as 
organisations (CSOs) will enable understanding of how they interact with the state, 
each other, and their internal practices.    
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CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH METHODS  
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains and justifies the use of the research methods employed in the 
fieldwork of this thesis. It addresses the advantages and deficiencies of the three 
methods this thesis employs and examines general concerns faced when conducting 
research. These methods are from both Positivist and Micro-Interpretivist 
approaches and, when conducted in concert, seek to understand and measure both 
discourse and practice manifestations of political culture.  
The literature review of political culture and analysis of political culture studies 
suggests that a sophisticated, mixed methods approach that focuses on one aspect or 
sub-culture of a political culture is the most satisfactory means of undertaking a 
political cultural study. As the previous chapter has established, political culture has 
two major manifestations of discourse and practice, which therefore require 
appropriate methods with which they can be ascertained. This section explains why 
this thesis employs a mix-method approach to studying political culture and explains 
the rationale for each method. 
In response to the issues that Hudson’s work raises, structured interviews were 
conducted and an online survey in Arabic was developed and disseminated to ensure 
the resulting data was systematic. Therefore, this research avoids recourse to 
historical, traditional, or religious explanations by disaggregating national culture to 
focus on the sub-culture of civil society members. Rather than using Hofstede's 
causal approach to understanding a national culture, Hudson, White, and 
McSweeney’s recommendations to disaggregate political culture were adhered to 
therefore this thesis focuses on the culture of CSOs. In response to Lukin’s work 
lacking diversity by relying on interviews and McSweeney and Hudson’s separate 
recommendation to conduct methodologically multifaceted studies, three separate 
research methods are employed. Through adopting these three methods, it is 
possible to identify different levels of political culture. With this information 
considered, a methodology for studying political culture was developed that focused 
on the questions; how is political culture demonstrated and therefore measured? 
What methods are suitable for obtaining information on attitudes and values? 
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Hudson (1995) suggests that results from ethnographic observation work are 
triangulated with quantitative data from opinion surveys and therefore complement 
each other. Furthermore, mixed-methods approach increases credibility when 
findings either confirm or confound each other (Greene 2005:207). Another 
advantage of triangulation is that “all methods have inherent biases and limitations, 
so the use of only one method to assess a given phenomenon will inevitably yield 
biased and limited results” (Greene et al. 1989:256).  
2. Quantitative Survey Questionnaire  
 
As established in Chapter Two, at least one entirely positivist method of measuring 
political culture was required for this work. Therefore, an online, Arabic language, 
self-completion survey questionnaire to measure attitudes and values of working 
members of Tunisian CSOs was developed. The questionnaire was administered 
online with Bristol Online Survey (BOS) software. When designing this questionnaire, 
the following issues were considered regarding the questions; type, style, wording, 
format, and ensuring the questions were phrased in close-ended structure. Dillman 
(1978:80) identifies five different types of question content; behaviour, beliefs, 
knowledge, attitudes, and attributes. “An awareness of the 5 types of information 
that can be collected should lead to the systematic development of question for each 
type rather than a haphazard set of questions” (de Vaus, 2002: 95). The design 
process ensured the difference between these question types was considered to 
improve the clarity of the research. 
The behaviour aspects of the work are addressed in the ethnographic study and 
participant’s personal details are not necessary. Therefore, the survey focuses on 
determining beliefs and attitudes – perceptions people hold, their thoughts, feelings, 
ideas, judgements, and ways of thinking. The questionnaire begins with “Attribute” 
questions to determine respondent demographics. These are designed to produce 
“information about the respondent’s characteristics...questions about age, education, 
gender, and ethnicity” (de Vaus, 2002: 95). These questions will determine ‘variables’ 
through which the results can be analysed. Belief questions determine what 
respondents believe to be true or false. This is useful for the current ‘transition in 
progress’ situation in Tunisia because beliefs are central to political culture e.g. “CSOs 
should make their accounts and financial donors available for public access” (True / 
False). Considering that “attitude questions try to establish what [respondents] think 
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is desirable” (de Vaus, 2002: 95), therefore attitude questions could show how 
respondents want civil society to be. The survey questionnaire design of this thesis is 
modelled based on Hofstede’s research design from his surveys on political culture 
(1980 and 1991). These predominately ask closed-ended questions to ensure that 
systematic, quantitative data is produced. Despite using a similar template to 
Hofstede, this research differs greatly with regards to the conclusions he sought to 
draw from his results. This focuses on the culture of CSOs and collected data is not 
extrapolated to make speculative claims regarding trends in culture at a national 
level. Civil society members represent a disaggregated section of Tunisian society. I 
have considered the short-comings of Hofstede’s assumptions yet his research 
design, neutral phrasing of questions and statements, and use of a five-point Likert 
scale are appropriate methods for determining political culture (see Chapter Six for 
survey results analysis).  
The questions were designed as ‘close-ended, multiple choice’ statements that are on 
a five-level, Likert scale for the following reasons. Firstly, a five-scale allows 
respondents the option to select a midpoint, which gives neutral response, thus not 
forcing them into an answer. Secondly, the options are ‘value’ options, which are less 
confusing or ambiguous than numerical ranking scales. Finally, ordered response 
choices create an attitude scale with 1 reflecting ‘strongly agree’ and 5 reflecting 
‘strongly disagree’. The rationale for the predominant use of close-ended, rather than 
open-end, questions is as follows. Firstly, the given answers can be easily processed 
into systematic data. This quantitative data is more comparable than qualitative 
answers. Secondly, for the respondent, a selection of options is easier to complete 
and less time consuming than writing answers. In other words, when choices are 
provided, it is less demanding for the participant. Thirdly, the limited selection of 
answers clarifies the meaning for the respondent. Finally, “open-ended questions 
rarely provide accurate measurement or consistent, comparable information across 
the whole sample” (Salant and Dillman, 1994: 80). Closed answer questionnaires 
have disadvantages, which I addressed in my design. Firstly, a limited selection of 
answers can force respondents into making a choice. To counter this, I included 
‘none’ or ‘would rather not say’ options. Secondly, in an interview, lack of clarity can 
be addressed through the interviewee asking the interviewer to explain the question. 
Forced choice answers must be extremely clear to prevent confusion, which could 
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affect the validity of results. Piloting the survey sought to reduce any confusion. (For 
piloting results, see Chapter Five.) 
The same style and format of questions can help prevent the questionnaire from 
being confusing. The testing of different issues or themes requires different 
measurements formats and an attitude scale is not appropriate for all questions. 
Some questions will require unordered response choices. For example, “How would 
you describe your manager’s leadership style?” is provided with (Autocratic, 
Bureaucratic, Delegator, Participative, Laissez-Faire) options. 
The average number of CSOs is important because “using a large number of 
respondents does not of itself guarantee representativeness” (Bryman, 1988). Having 
too many respondents from CSO ‘A’ and fewer from others reduces the 
representativeness of the research. All those surveyed in my study are part of CSOs 
which adds a focus to my research and prevents me from making over-arching claims 
or generalisations. I can state that they share an occupation, but whether they have a 
common occupational culture remains to be seen. 
To increase the response rate, after conducting the executive interviews, I sent a 
follow-up email again thanking the president/chairman for their time and if they 
would circulate my survey to their members. Also, I posted the survey on my 
Facebook page and asked friends in Tunisia to disseminate the survey. I also asked 
CSO members I met at conferences or civil society fairs for their email addresses in 
order to send them my survey. 
2.1. Opinion Surveys in Middle East Context 
 
During the development of my opinion survey, other surveys which have been 
administered in the MENA context were considered for comparison of question 
design, survey length, the number of respondents, and results. This was in order to 
ensure the suitability and appropriateness of my questions, ensure ‘best practice’, 
and recognise what should be avoided in this context.  
Ismael and Ismael (1993) conducted an opinion survey on the Gulf war through 
informal and open-ended interviews on the topics of Nature of Arab society, 
Diagnosis of the crisis, and Prescriptions for change and improving the Arab World. 
By speaking exclusively to academics and professionals their work focused on two 
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population demographics but having spoken to 264 people from various Arab 
countries, their conclusions on the antagonisms between politics and popular 
political culture, and popular political culture and public political culture are too far 
reaching. Furthermore, their informal and open-ended work was not systematic.  
Tessler (2002) produced a short survey questioning Islam’s compatibility with 
democratic political culture from public opinion data collected in Palestine (West 
Bank and Gaza), Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt. The hypothesis is based on evidence 
from USA and Europe that religious beliefs influence political attitudes. This is an 
unusual survey for two reasons. Firstly, that it asked slightly differently phrased 
questions under 3 subheadings; ‘Attitudes toward Democracy’, ‘Personal Piety’ and 
‘Islam and Politics’ in each country, and secondly that the number of questions varied 
for 7 questions in Morocco to 12 questions in Egypt. Both factors reduced the 
collective data’s comparability yet it concludes that “Islam appears to have less 
influence on political attitudes than is frequently suggested by students of Arab and 
Islamic society” (Tessler, 2002: 348). As this survey provided an example of a 
political culture study that also includes a religion demographic, a religion question 
was included in this research’s survey.  For country specificity, I looked at surveys 
conducted in Tunisia by Zogby International, Gallup, Pew Global Attitudes Project, 
World Values Survey, and Arab Barometer, and BBC Media Action (See Appendix).  
Borrowing from the design and structure of these surveys helped inform the 
construction of the survey in this thesis and ensured it conformed to norms of these 
international research companies. Also, the manner in which the results are 
displayed informed the layout of the 5th chapter. All were conducted with face-to-face 
interviews using Arabic, however, the approach used in this thesis is an online 
survey completion, predominantly for time efficiency in data collection, to ensure 
respondent anonymity and to avoid the need for additional researchers (see Chapter 
Six for further details and analysis of results). This research, however, is more 
focused on civil society members and organisations than those above, which are 
general opinion surveys. 
2.1.1. Problems of Opinion Surveys in Middle East Context 
There are a number of problems that exist with survey data in the MENA region. 
Firstly, rural underrepresentation must be considered in the distribution of my 
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surveys. 54% of the population live in capital or east coast, Sahel regions4 as a 
consequence of Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s policies that marginalised the interior and 
southern regions leaving them underdeveloped. This has resulted in a 
Coastal/Interior economic cleavage. The majority of CSOs are based in the capital 
with some in the coastal regions and fewer in the interior (see table on p. 160). I, 
therefore, ensured that my survey was completed by CSOs in the southern and 
interior regions.  Furthermore, I attempted to address the Urban/Rural divide. I met 
with CSOs in interior cities such as Gabes, Sidi Bouzid, and Gafsa but I also 
distributed my survey amongst CSOs that focus on issues that affect rural areas. I 
interviewed CSOs from the smaller interior towns of Regeub, Zaghoun, and 
Medenine, then asked the managers of those CSOs to pass on my survey. The 
demographics question no.5 ‘Which area in Tunisia are you originally from?’ helped to 
ensure a degree of regional representation. Secondly, I ensured that my research did 
not suffer from Female underrepresentation. The first demographics question, What 
is your gender? ensured an equal response. By addressing dynamics of 
patrimonialism and male-dominated management, I sought to select enough CSOs 
with female leadership. Of the 64 interviews I conducted with CSO leaders, 20 were 
with women. There were many females working within CSOs and the survey results 
were more balanced with 51% men to 49% women. Thirdly, authoritarian 
interference was not a problem since the Ben Ali regime has been removed and a 
freedom of association law had been passed after the Revolution. I did not have any 
issues with governmental interference with survey data collection in post-Revolution 
Tunisia.  
I translated both the survey and the interview questions face-to-face with a private 
Arabic teacher. This translation process was an interesting and reflective experience. 
Trying to find the correct nuances of the translation from English to the appropriate 
combination of French and Tunisian Arabic helped me to reconsider the questions I 
am asking. The one-to-one translation process gave me, the researcher, more control 
in the outcome of the questions. Instead of relying on just a translator, we worked 
together to ensure that the translation really conveyed the meaning of the questions 
in English. For example, there is no difference between ‘delegate’ and ‘instruct’ in 
                                                        
4 Institut National de la Statistique Tunisie (http://www.ins.nat.tn/indexen.php)  [accessed 
11/12/2013] 
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Tunisi. Often we had to use French words since they are more suitable and natural in 
Tunisian speech patterns and sentence structures.    
3. Structured Qualitative Interview 
In order to analyse the relationships CSO members have with their colleagues, other 
CSOs, and the state, it was necessary to conduct a significant number of one-to-one, 
structured qualitative interviews with presidents and bureau exécutif/committee 
members of CSOs (seventy-five). In addition, eight interviews with journalists, 
international NGO staff, CSO consultants, and the member of the National Constituent 
Assembly in charge of Relations with civil society were conducted for the purposes of 
data verification. All eighty-three interviews were conducted in Tunisia between 
January and July 2014. 
The choice of organisations examined resulted from an effort to identify actors who 
are active in the public space. Furthermore, I included a variation of CSO types; 
established institutions (the Quartet: UGTT, LTDH, ONAT, and UTICA plus FTDES) 
Watchdogs (Al Bawsala, I-Watch, Mourakiboun) democracy builders and citizenship 
promoters (Tounesa, Destourna, Kolna Tounes), developmental (TAMSS and 
Association Tunisienne pour la Promotion du Droit à la Différence) women’s 
associations (Femmes Democrates) youth (WeYouth, JID, Sawty, La Voix de l'enfant 
rural) regional (Gabes Action, Sousse Demain, Association Cepsa) and Think Tanks 
(CSID, Jasmine Foundation) 
While the Jamiaty.org database platform was used to find other active CSOs, 
interviews were also based on which organisations were available (Rachid Kahlani of 
UGET arranged to meet twice and unexpectedly cancelled on both occasions) and 
accessible (some organisation did not have functioning telephone numbers or email 
address). Predominantly, urban-based organisations constitute this thesis' research 
subject. I did not interview organisations with particularly Islamist goals, such as 
Quranic associations. Donker (2013) identifies two types of Islamist activism in post-
revolutionary Tunisia based on their goals: activism aimed at societal change and 
that aimed at political influence. Interviewing either of these types of organisations 
proved problematic because they did not publicly advertise their Islamist agendas 
making it difficult to identify them. The ruling Islamist Ennahda party was largely 
blamed for the rise of terrorism due to their perceived leniency towards Salafist 
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Islamist groups. Ennahda were criticised for allowing groups such as the Leagues for 
the Protection of the Revolution (LPR) to operate and spread political uncivil, even 
extremist, discourse and behaviour. The assassinations of secular-leftist politicians 
Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi reinforced the belief amongst many Tunisians 
that Islamist groups who were suspected of having ties with the ruling party were 
responsible for perpetuating violence and discrimination based on religious grounds. 
Within this context, CSOs were reluctant to publicise any Islamist agendas and 
actively distanced themselves from the “Islamist” label. It is worth mentioning that 
Article 4 of Decree 88 published on 24th September 2011[1] states that “Associations 
are prohibited from the following: One: Adopting in their bylaws, data, programs or 
activities any incitement for violence, hatred, fanaticism or discrimination on 
religious, racial or regional grounds.” Of particular importance is “discrimination” 
because CSOs that require members to be religious are not legally permitted to exist. 
 
The line of questioning and type of questions employed are vital to constructing an 
interview specific to the research needs. Qualitative interviews are often semi or 
unstructured in nature as they seek to “explore topics unanticipated by the 
interviewer, facilitate the development of a subtle understanding of what happens in 
the case and why” (Mabry, 2009:218). However, structured interviews to create 
systematic data were constructed for this thesis in order to obtain a greater 
reliability than unstructured conversations because “interviewees are given exactly 
the same context of questioning” (Brymen, 2001: 107). It was important to maintain 
the structure of the interview because using a consistent question order also reduces 
variation error (Brymen, 2001: 116). Once the variability is reduced by the 
interviewer asking the same questions in the same order, the ‘true’ or ‘real’ variation 
from the participant should be revealed. Furthermore, as Hudson (1995) argues that 
political culture work is not fully developed in the Middle East, due a lack of surveys 
and systematic interview data, the interview process of this research adopts a more 
systematic and less conversational style-structured interviews with a defined set of 
questions that are asked to all CSOs bureau executive members. This also addresses 
the ‘conversational style’ interviews that were considered a weakness of Almond and 
Verba’s approach (Barrington 2009: 108). Therefore, the same questions asked to all 
interviewees produces directly comparable results.  
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Questions were asked that sought to obtain answers on two levels; firstly the 
respondents answer and secondly the values that can be ascertained from their 
answer. For example, in the question ‘How is the leadership of your organisation 
chosen?’, if the interviewee knows, they state the method of selection e.g. election by 
members, consensus after discussion or are the people who founded the organisation 
the leaders. If the response is an undemocratic selection method, it is possible that 
they justify why they have not implemented democratic methods. This would 
indicate that they believe that democratic methods are preferred. However, if the 
interviewee does not know, they attempt to fabricate an answer or saw how they 
think their organisation should select their leaders. Therefore, the values and 
justification of the answer are more reflective of political culture than the answer 
itself.   
As I needed to quickly gain trust from the interviewee, convince them that I am 
listening to them and that I am not entering the interview with pre-conceived 
notions, the initial trust-building questions were general and open-ended.  
Considering that “Questions should be grouped into sections, since this allows a 
better flow than skipping from one topic to another” (Bryman, 2001: 117). To ensure 
the interviews flowed, I grouped and ordered questions by themes; independence, 
co-operation, democratic practices, relations with the government, and funding, then 
finishing by asking for their charter or constitution. Grouping by theme meant that I 
had to jump between questions about civil society in general and the respondent’s 
own CSO. This required me, or my interpreter, to clearly state the difference. Since 
“general questions should precede specific ones” (Bryman, 2001: 117) I, therefore, 
asked “Does Tunisian Civil Society, in general, receive sufficient funding?” followed by 
“Do you know who funds your CSO?” As “potentially embarrassing questions or ones 
that may be a source of anxiety should be left till later” (Bryman, 2001: 117), I saved 
the funding questions until as close to the end of the interview as possible since 
funding is a potentially invasive subject, even though CSOs should be financially 
transparent according to Decree 88. 
Prior to each interview, permission to record our conversation was granted from the 
interviewee. I considered that verbal consent was sufficient because, in the Tunisian 
context, permission forms are unexpected, likely to make the situation feel more 
formal, and were more likely to arouse suspicion. My interpreter and research 
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assistant, Myriam Ben Ghazi, told me that “Tunisians don't like to sign documents 
because they feel like they are bound to it. If they do, it feels like you have leverage 
over them.” To the interviewees who asked what the data was to be used for, I 
explained it was for my PhD thesis and that I was not a journalist. Therefore, names 
and organisations were not anonymous. Only one interviewee had to remain 
anonymous, due to their INGO’s neutrality and privacy policy, but interviewees were 
often proud of their association and therefore had no desire to hide their name. The 
material and issues we talked about were not especially sensitive therefore I do not 
believe the use of voice-recording inhibited free discussions. Furthermore, CSOs 
often hold press conferences, therefore some individuals who were interviewed are 
semi-public figures. Sensitive matters were said off-record e.g. names of politicised 
organisations, accusations of corruption or lack of transparency. However, some 
interviewees were happy to make accusations on tape. 
3.1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Structured Interviews 
Structured interviews allow a controlled environment to be created. During an 
interview, the interviewee cannot skip through and look at later questions because 
the interviewer determines when the questions are asked. “If a respondent doesn’t 
understand a question, you can probe for more complete data” (Bernard 2011: 190). 
This allowed me to ask more complex questions than in a survey. I probed where 
necessary, to clarify terms or for a more detailed response, but in order to maintain a 
structured interview, I returned to the systematic order of questioning. In order to 
maintain consistency, I used the same explanation of terms to all respondents.   
Structured interviews were selected for the following reasons. Firstly, because the 
same questions were asked, the results produced are easily and directly comparable. 
I wanted to collect systematic data, as recommended by Hudson, in order to counter 
the issues political culture studies face. Secondly, time constraints were a 
consideration. The people I interviewed are often very busy, because if they are in a 
professional CSO, they are sacrificing their working hours by speaking to me, or 
because they are in a part-time CSO, and they were giving up their spare time. 
Therefore, it was not possible to engage in long, open-ended, unstructured 
interviews that ran for two or more hours, as did Weinstein in his study of Rebel 
groups in war-torn regions (2006). Neither could the managers nor bureau members 
manage this amount of time nor very busy interviewees, e.g. with ONAT and UTICA, I 
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was only afforded 30mins. Thirdly, I was not looking for extensive narrative accounts 
and the structured format kept the interviewees’ responses relevant. The story of 
how CSOs operate is not sensitive and can usually be summarised succinctly. 
There are various disadvantages of the structured interview method, which I aimed 
to address wherever possible. Firstly, the Feminist critique addresses the imbalanced 
power relationship that occurs when the researcher has total control over the 
agenda of the interview (Hesse-Biber, 2007: 116). Furthermore, “The structured 
interview epitomises the asymmetrical relationship between researcher and the 
subject” (Bryman, 2001: 124). This method is, therefore, exploitative by the 
researcher, treating the interviewee as objects of investigation while providing 
nothing in return. Requiring written consent would also enhance the validity of the 
feminist critique.  Indeed, I could offer little in return to the subjects for their time 
and the information they gave me. I was not a journalist and could therefore not 
promote their CSO. However, the interviews were entirely consensual and their 
willingness suggests they did not feel exploited. When I was asked for my opinions, I 
offered advice and willingly answered any questions in an attempt to reciprocate. I 
interviewed equal numbers of men and women, the female voice and experience are 
not excluded or marginalised in my research (Harding, 1989) and I regularly used a 
female interpreter to redress the gender imbalance.  
Furthermore, although the Feminist critique was acknowledged in the research 
design, I find it to be overstated as it impedes the possibility of producing findings. 
The unequal power relations issue could not be resolved methodologically because 
this research sought systematic data as the collection of conversational data was a 
criticism levelled at The Civic Culture (1963). Therefore I could not pay closer 
attention to the personal feelings and emotions of the interviewees. However, I 
endeavoured to be sensitive in the way I asked questions and conducted interviews, 
maintaining a sense of naivety and genuine interest. The interviewees also retained 
power as they were the ‘owners of knowledge’ which I sought, therefore I needed 
them, rather than they needed me. 
Secondly, despite trying to develop a friendly rapport with the interviewee, I avoided 
too much familiarity because it is a bias that can negatively affect results. As Bryman 
notes, “Questions asked by respondents (for example, about the research or about 
the topic of the research) should be politely but firmly rebuffed on the ground that 
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too much familiarity should be avoided and because the respondent’s subsequent 
answers may be biased” (2001: 121). This is contrary to the feminist interview 
method in which a more reflexive and reciprocal approach seeks to reduce the 
hierarchy between the researcher and the researched (Hesse-Biber, 2007: 128). 
However as mentioned above, I find this critique to be overinflated. The majority of 
my interviews did not feature any personal questions. After briefly explaining the 
purpose of my work, interviewees were content with proceeding with the interview 
and rarely had questions for me. 
Thirdly, there are various biases that qualitative interviews can also reveal. Face-to-
face interviews lack anonymity which can affect the responses that interviewees give. 
There is a possibility that interviewees are more guarded or less honest when their 
anonymity is not protected. It is also possible that interviewees will seek to present 
their own organisation and Tunisian civil society generally, in more favourable 
terms. Therefore, interviewee dishonesty remains a risk. Some interviewees were 
refreshingly honest about the deficiencies and problems, Amira Yahyaoui at Al 
Bawsala for example, but many presented an optimistic spin on their work. However, 
these interviews were not a search for a universal truth. Respondent’s dishonesty 
regarding their own CSO might suggest their beliefs and attitudes towards how it 
should be run.  
3.1.1. Intrusive and reactive research issues 
Interviews require skill in administering questions without getting answers the 
interviewer initially seeks (Bernard, 2011). In some occasions I was the only person 
conducting the interviews, so the reactivity was reduced. On the occasions when an 
interpreter is present, this changes slightly. I used three different interpreters but 
one for the majority of the work. There are cost factors, in terms of time and money, 
associated with interviewing. Finding a representative sample to interview is time-
consuming, especially for ‘hard to find’ respondents. However, it was important for 
me to ensure a range of respondents/interviewees otherwise the sample would have 
become homogenised and therefore less representative. To counteract this I 
conducted interviews in 10 different cities (Tunis, Bizerte, Zaghouan, Sousse, Sfax, 
Sidi Bouzid, Gafsa, Gabes, Medenine, and Djerba) to ensure the data was 
representative.  
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Despite conducting structured interviews, qualitative rather than statistical data was 
produced which required a framework to analyse the data. The framework consisted 
of the six criteria of civility; Freedom, Equality, Pluralism, Trust, Tolerance, and 
Transparency. The data was analysed by employing two methods; inductive (reading 
the interview data to look for emerging themes and patterns) and deductive 
(searching for the criterion of civility, developed from the literature review, in the 
interviewee responses.)  
4. Participant-observation ethnography 
Baiocchi and Connor consider the study of CSOs as political ethnography and identify 
how the method enables the researcher to engage in close-up, on-the-ground and 
real-time observation of actors involved in political processes (2008: 139). The study 
of behaviour from a political culture perspective requires the anthropological 
technique of ethnographic participant-observation. The focus of my work is to 
observe the internal operation of a Tunisian CSO and behaviour of its members. 
Ethnographic observation can be described as “immersion of the observer in the 
social setting in which he seeks to observe the behaviour of the members of that 
setting and to elicit the meaning they attribute to their environment and behaviour” 
(Brymen, 2001:163). It is largely an anthropological method but is key to observing 
and understanding cultures and cultural phenomena. It helps to understand what 
people ‘do’ rather than what they ‘say’ (Welch: 2013). Culture is not always easy to 
verbalise but can also be expressed through behaviour. Brymen notes the advantages 
of observation; that it is “almost certainly more accurate and effective than getting 
people to report on their behaviour through questionnaires” (2001:166). 
As this thesis rejects synoptic and essentialist understandings of political culture, it 
also recognises that political culture is not static and does not require generations to 
change. The ethnographic chapter implements Geertz’s approach, as approved by 
Said in Orientalism (1978, 326), to understanding culture that emphasises close 
proximity to research subjects. This chapter addresses some of the general 
inadequacies of studies in political culture and those specific to the MENA region 
context. Anderson’s critique of political culture studies in the MENA context and 
Hudson’s recommendations for a more sophisticated approach, including 
disaggregated political culture by focusing on groups rather than national level, has 
  
85 
 
informed the development of the methodology in this thesis to incorporate 
ethnographic work.  
Almond and Verba established the concept of civil political culture in The  
Civic Culture and identify the criteria through which democratic culture can be 
measured. The reliance of their work on questionnaire data makes it appear weak in 
light of Anderson and Hudson’s contributions. This thesis expands Almond and 
Verba’s work by using ethnographic observation to further uncover the criteria of 
civil political culture. 
An ethnographic study enables this thesis to apply Welch’s theoretical understanding 
of political culture (2013) into practice with empirical evidence. There are various 
approaches to understanding culture and an ethnographic study enables behaviour, 
rather than discourse, to be measured. There are methodological issues associated 
with ethnography that I sought to address prior to and during my research. Brymen 
identifies four criticisms of observation. Firstly, that it focuses on ‘observable’ 
behaviour and proceeds to neglect the ‘intention’ or the ‘meaning’ of the behaviour. 
Secondly, that it generates lots of ‘bits’ of data but fails to produce an overall picture. 
Thirdly, it neglects the context in which the behaviour takes place (2001:173). 
Fourthly, the quality of ethnography – “to what extent can individual observation and 
anecdotal evidence provide a firm enough basis upon which to base broader theories 
of political psychology?” (Brymen, 2012:105) 
From a positivist point of view, ‘representativeness’ of the findings is a key issue. 
Therefore, I recognise that observing just one CSO will reduce the generalisability or 
the external validity of the findings. However, interpretivism is key to noting 
specificities and smaller details. The other methods used in this thesis have greater 
generalisability. In addition, poor data collection methods can lead to research losing 
validity.  
Observation suffers from the risk of reactivity; a phenomenon that occurs when 
individuals alter their performance or behaviour due to the awareness that they are 
being observed (Heppner, Wampold, & Kivlighan, 2008: 331). This is commonly 
defined as the ‘Hawthorne Effect’, the central idea is that subjects alter their 
behaviour because they are aware that an observer is present. Yet Jones asserts that 
“Contrary to the conventional wisdom in much research and teaching, I found 
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essentially no evidence of Hawthorne effects, either unconditionally or with 
allowance for direct effects of the experimental variables themselves” (1992:467). 
Reflexivity and bias should also be considered before conducting ethnography. 
Critical Ethnography asserts that the relation between the fieldworker and those 
being researched, the self and the other, should be considered (Armstrong, 2009: 
59). Therefore, greater awareness and acknowledgement of my biases as the 
researcher plays a role in what is observed from my perspective. As a Caucasian, 
middle-class, British, 28/29-year-old male who is non-fluent in French or Tunisi, 
entering a Tunisian context would impact on the data I obtain. I acknowledge that my 
Tunisi or French language skills are to a working knowledge, rather than native 
standard, therefore I focused on interaction with members who were competent 
English speakers. However, I conducted interviews with non-English-speaking 
members of the organisation I worked with, Jeunes Indépendants Démocrates (JID), 
through an interpreter in an attempt to level this bias. Furthermore, the interviews 
as an addition to observations allowed the research subjects to act as interlocutors in 
order to introduce a greater polyphony into the ethnography. Although I am working 
with the concept of ‘civility’ in a time frame of post-revolutionary Tunisia, I have no 
ulterior motive to find either civility or incivility. I recognise that I would like to see 
Tunisia complete a successful transition and consolidation into a democratic state 
but this personal hope did not interfere with the process of observing whether or not 
JID exhibited behaviour and practice of democratic culture. 
Sampling is not specifically used in ethnographic research. This is because 
“Ethnographers are forced to gather information from whatever sources available 
and whoever is prepared to divulge details” (Bryman, 2001: 301). As a result, it is the 
duty of the ethnographer to access a wide range of perspectives from relevant 
individuals in order to reduce bias. The whole sample for the ethnography is the 
members of JID and the larger number of people observed reduces ‘sampling error’. I 
sought to observe male and female, junior and senior, recent and established 
members but this was limited to who was present at each meeting. Informants 
within the CSO played an important role in helping verifying and adding information 
but I ensured their contributions did not alter the direction of the study. 
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The ethnographic work of this thesis can be placed in the literature on 
democratisation in the MENA region, specifically Tunisia. It was conducted in the 
context of reassessing the previously held exceptionalist view of the region, even if 
Tunisia does prove to be an anomaly or the only ‘winner’ of the Arab Uprisings. 
However, the single-case of this ethnography and specificities of Tunisia undergoing 
transition mean the findings from this chapter alone cannot be generalisable.   
5. General Research Issues 
 
Events overtaking the research period and issues of reliability, internal validity, 
external validity and reflexivity are relevant concerns to all three methods 
undertaken in this thesis. In a country experiencing a political transition, it was a 
possibility that during my time in Tunisia (2013-2014) events or drastic political 
changes could occur that would have an impact on the themes and tones of the 
interviews. 2013 saw political assassinations and a political deadlock that was 
eventually overcome through the National Dialogue. I, therefore, made sure that the 
research was conducted in one period, from January to August 2014, after the 
constitution was finished and before the elections scheduled for October. This period 
was reasonably uneventful; the Ennahda-led ‘troika’ coalition government had 
stepped down and an appointed, technocratic government had taken power. The 
data should, therefore, have greater consistency and reliability. This period allowed 
interviewees to compare the Troika and the technocratic government, and comment 
on civil society’s role, especially by the Quartet5, in the National Dialogue. I chose to 
wait until the Constitution had been adopted on 26th January 2014 before starting to 
conduct research, for continuity and so that CSO members who had been reporting 
and lobbying were available for interviews. I was also fortunate that no major events 
happened during this period to dramatically alter the content and character of my 
interviews.  
If “a reliable measurement is one where we obtain the same result on repeated 
occasions [and therefore] if people answer a question in the same way on repeated 
occasions then it is reliable” (de Vaus, 2002:52) then more than one question on the 
                                                        
5 A civil society alliance formed in 2013 to overcome a political deadlock. It consisted of four major 
Tunisian organisations; The Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Confederation of 
Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), and the 
Tunisian Order of Lawyers (ONAT). 
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same subject needs to be included to ensure the reliability. The survey has a degree 
of repetition as it was divided into criteria of civil political culture: Tolerance, 
Equality, Freedom, Pluralism, Trust, Democratic Practices, and Financial 
Transparency. Repetition to achieve reliability was difficult in interviews as it would 
appear I had not listened to the interviewee’s responses, but derived from the 
criteria of civil political culture, the 5 themes of the interviews questions - 
Independence (Freedom), Co-operation (trust and pluralism, Democratic Practices 
(Equality and Pluralism), Relations with the government (Trust) and Funding 
(Financial Transparency) - contain similar questions e.g. “12) How would you 
describe Civil Society’s relationship with the government?” And “14) Does your CSO 
work with the government?” The ethnography was conducted over many meetings, 
therefore any repetition of habits and interactions could be observed. 
Considering that “the validity of a measure depends on how we have defined the 
concept it is designed to measure” (De Vaus, 2002:53) the internal validity, or 
credibility, of this work was ensured because as the criteria of civil political culture is 
a defined concept, the measure is clearly defined. The external validity, or 
transferability, of these results determines whether they can be applied to other 
settings. Although Tunisia is the case study of this thesis and has its own 
particularities and qualities, the results could be compared to other Arab Uprising 
countries or any civil society with newly granted freedom.   
Although mentioned with particular importance when conducting an ethnographic 
study, reflexivity, defined as “a critical look inward and reflecting on one’s own lived 
reality and experiences” (Hesse-Biber, 2007: 129) is crucial in every aspect of this 
research.  My background has given me a lived experience of relative privilege that is 
absent of discrimination.  My reflexivity addresses the concerns raised in the articles 
by Abaza (2011) and Zevallos (2012) of the ‘neo-Orientalism’ displayed in foreign 
researchers exploiting local academics and claiming superiority in their analysis of 
the Egyptian revolution, which is more relevant to interviews and observations than 
the survey.  When I arrived in Tunisia to begin my research, it was my 6th visit to the 
country in 3 years. I proceeded to live in Tunisia from October 2013 until July 2014, 
therefore the research period was extensive rather than a brief trip. However, I 
appreciate the position of privilege I have, as I can critique the practices and beliefs 
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of Tunisian CSO members then return to the UK while commenting on a country that 
is not my own. 
My work uses Tunisia in comparison to literature on democracy, political culture, 
and civil society but does not seek to portray otherness any more than studies of 
transition in Latin America, Eastern Europe, or South East Asia. Ever since 
Orientalism was written, sensitivity has been required from Western researchers in 
the MENA region, especially when working on cultural issues or democratic deficits. 
However, this work in no way seeks to pass normative judgments on Tunisian 
culture, but it rather seeks to establish how the colonial and authoritarian legacy has 
shaped Tunisian political culture.    
Tunisians were the ‘objects of observation’ but I did not seek to present myself as the 
‘knowing subject’ (Abaza, 2011). Rather I was the unknowing subject. I knew the 
literature on political culture and civil society, Tunisian history, and I was already 
familiar with Tunisia, having visited and researched on five previous occasions, but I 
was not ‘knowing’ of the internal workings and relations between Tunisian CSOs. 
Retaining the naivety in the questioning attempted to convey that I was not the 
expert, but rather they were the experts on their own lives. Most crucially, my work 
does not seek to take precedent over any other similar work by local academics or 
weaken their research voices in the creation of academic discourse Zuleyka (2012). 
6. How the research project is shaped by my approach 
The research project is fundamentally shaped by the dualistic understanding of 
political culture that marries approaches of positivism and interpretivism and seeks 
to understand and measure discourse and practice manifestations through the 
application of three different research methods. It is also shaped by the theoretically 
understanding of civil society as possessing the potential to perform a democratic 
function. As Tunisian CSOs in 2014 were not subjected to severe security apparatus 
scrutiny, the acquisition of data was without authoritarian state interference. The 
political conditions in post-revolutionary Tunisia were transitional yet they could no 
longer be considered as authoritarian. The legal framework that Decree 88 published 
on 24th September 2011, passed by the interim unity government before the 2011 
elections, created a context in which organisations could operate within by providing 
clear requirements of CSOs and providing protection that was previously not 
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afforded to them. For example, Article 6 protects associations from public authority 
interference. Therefore, recourse to reductionist concepts or essentialist 
assumptions is entirely avoided in this thesis because the Tunisian context is suitable 
for both uninhibited positivist and interpretivist political culture research to be 
conducted.   
7. Chapter Conclusion 
The methodology of the thesis consists of an application of Welch’s theoretical 
understanding of political culture. This is based on the understanding that the use of 
exclusively positivist or interpretivist methods is an insufficient approach to 
identifying the six attributes of political culture. As Welch determines political 
culture manifests as both discourse and practice. Therefore, the use of a singular 
method approach does not adequately and fully encapsulate these criteria. The 
unique and original contribution of this thesis is the application of Welch’s 
theoretical work on political culture which has been used to develop a triangulated, 
three methods approach to studying political culture in a post-authoritarian context. 
The use of structured interviews, ethnographic participant observation, and online 
survey questionnaire implements a triangulation approach to political culture 
creates a balanced assessment that provides inquired, observed, and subject self-
assessed understandings of civil society’s political culture. This approach is effective 
for capturing a current political culture as it does not recourse to written or 
historical sources, therefore making it appropriate for studying civil societies in 
transition. The weaknesses, shortcomings, and critiques of the methods this thesis 
employs are also acknowledged in this chapter but the implementation of a three 
methods approach overcomes the weaknesses of each individual method.   
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CHAPTER FOUR –HISTORY OF TUNISIAN CIVIL SOCIETY 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter shows how Tunisia’s history and tradition of civil society, that existed 
prior to the Revolution, allowed it to fulfil different functions (see Chapter One) but 
was also shaped by the context of authoritarian government. Different degrees of 
autonomy afforded by Ottoman rule, French colonial administration, and the post-
independence authoritarian presidents to Tunisia’s civil society has had various 
influences but demonstrates that a long-standing tradition of civil society activism 
had nonetheless existed prior to the 2011 Revolution. This chapter addresses the 
manner in which four periods in Tunisia’s historical experience impacted the 
development of civil society: Ottoman semi-autonomy, European colonialism, the 
independent nationalist regime, and Ben Ali’s false liberalisation. These phases 
represent a consistent historical tradition of civil society activity in which 
organisations were able to perform different functions, despite operating under 
colonial rule and authoritarian oppression.  
 
2. Tunisian civil society from 1574-2010 
 
Under the Bey, civil society developed a market-oriented function that was able to 
constrain the head of state’s power. The colonial period enabled civil society to 
absorb many of the values of French republicanism, constitutionalism, and aspects of 
liberalism. However, it also developed into an oppositional-resistance function 
during the nationalist struggle for independence. During the post-independence 
period of authoritarianism, civil society existed within the constraints of an inclusive 
government system. Bourguiba modified civil society into a co-opted corporatized 
set of associations, which enabled citizenship but prevented them from developing 
into democratic organisations. Under Ben Ali, the brief political openings in a phase 
of pseudo-democratisation allowed a proliferation of CSOs but the oppositional role 
these organisations sought to play was suppressed after the regime cracked down on 
political Islamist opposition. Attempts to pressure the state to implement democracy 
were retrained. Therefore, authoritarian government structures prevented civil 
society from performing its democratic function. Any form of opposition or attempts 
to speak out against Ben Ali’s dictatorship, not only from civil society, was met with 
arrest, police harassment, or deportation.  
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The lack of violence by civil society, in most cases, points to some evidence of civility, 
but freedom, equality and pluralism were constrained by firstly the nationalist 
struggle and later corporatist state structures. Leftist opposition views were 
incorporated into the one-party state while dissidents were suppressed. Regime 
imposed secularism remained a key criteria of citizenship to combat the threat of 
Islamism.  Repressive security state apparatus and violent secret police methods 
created a general ambience of mistrust, in both the regime and others in society 
(Hibou, 2006: 187). 
This chapter concludes that prior to the 2011 revolution, Tunisia had a pre-existing 
history and tradition of civil society that operated in various and limited forms under 
colonial and authoritarian rule and, furthermore, that Tunisian civil society was 
shaped and characterised by the systems of government which it operated under. 
Therefore, in a post-authoritarian context, Tunisian civil society can be re-evaluated. 
It is appropriate to apply civil society and political civility literature and to ask new 
questions about the quality of Tunisian democratic practices.  
2.1. Phase 1 - Ottoman Semi-Autonomous rule 
 
Before France colonised the country under the auspices of a protectorate, Tunisia 
was a semi-autonomous Ottoman province governed by a succession of Beys from 
1574 until 1881. During this period, until the decline of the Bey’s power due to 
European encroachment, a civil relationship existed between the Bey and society. 
The Ottoman government was primarily concerned with their provinces collecting 
revenue and “many of the Beys proved to be capable administrators and reformers, 
and Tunisia developed a strong tradition of central control and functioning 
government” (Murphy, 2001: 19). On the condition that taxes were paid, the Bey 
governed society in a laissez-faire manner and the state did not interfere with 
religious and commercial affairs of the main actors in this period: guilds, tribal 
leaders, the bourgeoisie, and the Ulama6. Requiring a functioning economy, however, 
the Bey could not afford to ignore the interests of the guilds. Granted independence, 
guilds “made and enforced rules that governed who could practice particular trades, 
quality of their work, prices, and taxes” (Alexander, 2010:13). Furthermore, “Tribal 
leaders traded tax collecting and peacekeeping duties for autonomy” (Alexander, 
                                                        
6 The scholarly class of Muslims with specialist knowledge of Islamic law and theology. 
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2010:13). Joffe recognises that North African states’ pre-colonial experience 
impacted the development of state and society relations, particularly between the 
state and the urban bourgeoisie whose vested economic and political interests were 
“reflected in their close interrelationship with central authority” (Joffe, 2009: 931). 
Although they could not challenge the state’s power, the Tunisian Ulama were able to 
‘check’ the Bey did not abuse power. 
This demonstrates that the Tunisian context was contrary to the notion that the 
Orient is “all state and no society” and, conversely, there was not a complete “absence 
of the autonomous individual exercising conscience and rejecting arbitrary 
intervention by the state” (Turner, 1994: 34). The plurality of socio-political actors in 
this period filled the space between state, market, and family, and therefore 
constituted a civil society.  This emerging civil society was co-operative, since its 
autonomy was ensured by a non-meddlesome state, but also limited the Bey from 
acting as an absolute ruler.  Murphy argues that “the institutionalism of the political 
system which has existed since Ottoman days” has had a lasting impact which even 
managed to restrain President Ben Ali’s hold on power (1997: 120) and Stepan adds 
that medieval and Ottoman Tunisia had cultural roots of tolerance and openness in 
its liberal and rights-friendly political system (2012: 97) which would have impacted 
the nature of civil society.    
2.2. Phase 2: French Colonialism 
 
Tunisian civil society was weakened under French control and reacted to the 
injustice by adopting an oppositional-resistance stance. After the Tunisian state was 
declared bankrupt in 1869, France stepped in as ‘Protector’ of their extensive 
investment on May 12th 1881 with the signing of the Treaty of Bardo. The 1883 
protectorate treaty signed at La Marsa created a ‘facade of independence’ that gave 
France ultimate power in Tunisia, allowing the bureaucratic administration of the 
local state to be retained, strengthened and extended (Anderson 1986:9). Through 
centralising power, land reforms, and privatisation while strengthening existing 
central state institutions, the French undermined and severely weakened the 
autonomy of local political authorities and economic institutions without destroying 
them (Alexander, 2010: 21). Resentment towards the colonial power grew as 
inequalities with the French became more evident (see Alexander, 2010). As the 
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income and influence of the traditional elite and bourgeoisie came under greater 
threat, it gave rise to Tunisia’s nationalist movement; initially led by the Young 
Tunisians, then later the Destour and the Neo-Destour parties. Anderson (1986) 
notes how these three stages of the movement engaged and mobilised the Mamluk 
aristocracy, the Bourgeoisie, and the hinterlands respectively. Civil society activism 
worked against the French Protectorate in the form of an independence struggle. 
Political parties, trade unions, and influential figures orchestrated boycotts and 
strikes, wrote critical journals, and courted foreign dignitaries for international 
support. The movement’s absence of violent means represents a degree of civility; 
with the major exception being the 1938 Neo-Destour party instigated riots in 
response to the arrest of their party leaders (Perkins, 2014: 107). Civil society 
activism in an independence struggle is in line with the Gramscian oppositional-
resistance understanding of civil society. An independence struggle represents an 
ideational hegemony is not held over the population. By the social grouping of civil 
society confronting the coercive apparatus or repressive institutions of the state, it 
seeks to challenge the dominance of the state, or in this case, colonial power 
(Ransome, 1992: 138-141) or identifies resistance within an authoritarian regime 
(Edwards and Foley, 1996: 40). 
The nationalist struggle was initiated by the Young Tunisian movement, who were 
weakened by almost exclusively hailing from baldiyya7 families, which “distanced 
them from the bulk of the population and prevented them from embracing changes 
that would negatively affect their class interests” (Perkins: 2014:76). Their published 
journal, Le Tunisien, from 1907 was a means of expression and acquired 
sympathisers to their cause, while their Alumni Association of Sadiqi College 
encouraged greater educational reform that better equipped students for 
professional life (Perkins: 2014:75). Although not responsible for its instigation, the 
1911 riots over French land confiscation of the Jellaz cemetery led to a clampdown 
on Young Tunisian activity and for their organisation of the 1912 transportation 
boycott in the capital, their leaders Bach Hamba, Abdelaziz Thâalb, and Hassan 
Guellaty were exiled to the southern city of Medinine. Despite this bringing an end to 
the Young Tunisians, these actions unified society against the French officials 
(Perkins: 2014:77). The 1915-1916 al-Hana uprisings caused problems for the 
French but did not spread throughout the country (Ziadeh, 1962:89) The Young 
                                                        
7 From Merchant families 
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Tunisian movement’s impact remained limited, however, as it did not question the 
legitimacy of the protectorate nor demand independence. (Anderson, 1986: 160). 
1920 saw the establishment of the Destour8 party, whose more revolutionary goals 
were the restoration of the 1861 Constitution and the liberation of Tunisia from 
French control. Executive positions in the party were taken by Sadiki 
College graduates from Sahelian9 background, while Zitouna10 graduates, who had 
also adopted an anti-French stance, formed the lower and medium cadres of the 
party (Micaud, 1974:93). Destour leaders showed some support for strikes organised 
by the Confédération générale des travailleurs tunisiens11 (CGTT) but saw union 
tactics of demonstrations and strikes as “vulgar and dangerously provocative” which 
weakened  their alliance (Perkins: 2014:91). The Parti Communiste Tunisien (PCT) 
also had uneasy relations with Destourians which hampered the latter’s chances of 
creating alliances with leftists in Paris. With the nationalist movement divided, in 
1926 the French Resident General banned political criticism, criminalised various 
political activities, and restricted the press. The Tunisian monarch Amir Bey 
supported the Destourians, but his successor Mohammed Bey saw greater 
cooperation with the French as more prudent for Tunisia’s interests. Ziadeh (1962) is 
complimentary about the Destourian movement’s approach and tactics in the 
national struggle as their activities, organisation and ability to cause disruption laid 
important groundwork for Neo-Destour. Their divergence of opinions represented a 
plurality but their leaders’ disagreements concerning ‘methods and means’, further 
internal disputes, and Abdelaziz Thâalb’s departure for Italy weakened the national 
movement (Ziadeh, 1962:121). 
2.2.1. Rise of Neo-Destour under colonialism 
Following a split from the Destour at a party conference, the Neo-Destour (NDP) was 
established in 1934. Learning from the elitist approach of their predecessors, the 
NDP held a wider appeal and encouraged nationwide participation. Membership not 
only included upper-middle class urbanites and Zitouna graduates but attracted 
merchants, artisans, businessmen, and landowners who thought the NDP were more 
likely to further their interests. The Union Tunisien de l’Artisant et du Commerce 
                                                        
8 Parti Liberal Constitutionnel Tunisien and in Arabic Al-Ḥizb Al-Ḥurr Ad-Dustūrī, was most commonly known 
as Destour which is Arabic for Constitution. 
9 Coastal cities Tunisia’s eastern shore; Hammamet, Sousse, Sfax, Mahdia, and Monastir.   
10 A major mosque in Tunis and University of Islamic studies. 
11 A central trade union founded in 1924 
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(UTAC) backing the NDP represented support from the business community 
(Perkins: 2014:121). The NDP engaged youth and forged ties with youth 
organisations that saw the Destour as a failure but managed not to isolate Sadiki or 
Khalduniyya12 alumni. The creation of NDP ‘cells’, as a decentralised organisation 
structure, in all districts of major cities,  in addition to rural areas, ensured the 
hinterlands were not neglected. Presenting itself as the party of the whole nation, the 
ND attracted “all elements of the population” whose commonality was being 
explicated by the protectorate (Anderson, 1986: 175). 
 
Sorbonne law and political science graduate and former Destourian Habib Bourguiba 
emerged as the leader of the new party. He originated from the Sahel and advocated 
for ‘elites regaining contact with the masses’ (Anderson, 1986: 168). Furthermore, he 
managed to combine the defence of the nation with the defence of Islam by 
portraying the French as ‘meddling with Islam’ (Perkins: 2014:95-97), while he 
argued the PCT’s imported communist ideology was at odds with Tunisia’s 
traditional values. (Perkins: 2014:115) Zitouna graduates formed an important part 
of the ND movement, mosques became meeting places, and the nationalist struggle 
became intertwined with defending the faithful as “Islam provided both a simple way 
to distinguish the vast majority of Tunisians from their European rulers and a 
legitimisation of the struggle to which the party urged the people” (Anderson, 1986: 
175). The NDP also adopted less traditional protest methods and employed 
aggressive tactics that defied the protectorate such as refusing to pay taxes, 
boycotting French goods, and refusing to appear for military service (see Perkins, 
2014:100-101 and Anderson, 1986). 
 
The national movement (Young Tunisians, Destour and Neo-Destour) remained quiet 
during the Second World War but the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), 
established in 1946, stood apart from the French ran CGTT and took a leading role in 
opposing French rule by organising a general strike. The UGTT remained focused on 
nationalist goals but rejected overtures from the World Federation of Trade Unions 
and remained at odds with the communist Franco-Tunisian Union des Syndicats des 
Travailleurs Tunisien (USTT).  
                                                        
12 An educational society that opened a window to the west for Arabic-speaking Tunisians (Perkins: 2014:71) and 
was “designed to furnish the students at the Zitouna Mosque with a Europeans style compliment to their Islamic 
education” (Anderson, 1986: 159). 
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Amin Bey used his limited political power to aid the national movement by 
preventing the UGTT from being dissolved and publically aligned himself with the 
NDP (Perkins: 2014:123). During the 1950s relations between NDP and UGTT 
remained close as UGTT leader Farhat Hached lead the struggle for independence 
while nationalist movement leaders were detained or fled abroad. Despite the 
leadership struggle with the NDP between Secretary-General Salah ben Yusuf and 
Bourguiba, both managed to remain united to the goal of independence.  
In addition to NDP bridging societal differences and the use of Islam as a unifying 
factor, Sadiki attributes the rise of Tunisian “ethnonationalism”13 as a reaction to 
French colonialism. He points to how identification was predominantly through 
tribal background until colonisation created an ‘us Vs. them/ Tunisian Vs French’ 
dichotomy which instilled a ‘Tunisianess’ and “marked the onset of state-orientated 
ethnic nationalism,” which included the liberal notion of national identity and the 
commonality of race, history, and language (Sadiki, 2008:115-6). These notions were 
not dissimilar to the identity building process other MENA nations fighting a colonial 
background faced (see Pratt, 2007). Furthermore, the Tunisian singularity, the one-
people narrative, had profound implications for the future of Tunisian politics and 
society since a focus on consensus restrained the development of pluralism, critical 
opposition, and alternative opinions as they could be considered un-Tunisian.  
2.3. Phase 3: New Nationalist Regimes in the Post-Independence era  
 
Unlike Algeria’s bloody war with France, independence was negotiated in 1956. This 
represented a degree of civility as the national movement established behavioural 
norms of non-violent approaches in addressing dispute.  Emancipation from France 
could have created ‘citizens’ in Tunisia, but “Colonial hegemony was replaced with an 
indigenous hegemony” (Sadiki, 2008:118).  The French colonial legacy meant that at 
the time independence was achieved, Tunisia was “an established bureaucratic state” 
(Salame, 1994: 16-17). In addition to their wide support base, this enabled the NDP 
to gain comprehensive control over the state. The NDP’s formal structure was 
modelled on that of the French Social party with the use of cells where “their 
executive committee were freely elected at annual branch assemblies” (Micaud, 
1964: 84) making it both democratic and centralised.   
                                                        
13 Nationalism based on a common ethnicity. 
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Civil society can be articulated, in the Gramscian sense, as opposition to a regime, but 
Henry argues that because it is “shaped by laws, regulations, and historical legacies 
of conflict and co-operation with authorities” (1999:12-13) it is the state who 
facilities the existence or oversees the repression of civil society. In Tunisia’s ‘First 
Republic’, newly appointed President Bourguiba’s approach to civil society was 
somewhat destructive. Under Bourguiba’s rule, discourse and policies of ‘national 
unity’ by the NDP, perhaps a necessary and unifying strategy during the national 
movement and uncertainty of the immediate post-independent era, soon became an 
entrenched strategy which was intolerant of alternative views. 
Despite pluralistic tendencies at the beginning of his rule, Bourguiba moved 
forcefully to create a system that revolved around him and his party. The ‘national 
organisations’ (NOs), such as the UGTT and the UGAT, ostensible intermediaries 
between state and society, which had served Bourguiba’s cause faithfully under 
colonialism, saw their autonomy even more constrained after independence.  L’Union 
Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat (UTICA) and l’Union Nationale 
des Agricultures Tunisine (UNAT), major economic associations, were political 
creations of the NDP. Although the UGTT could claim some independence, it 
remained close to the state because its leaders were also ND members enabling the 
Union to be utilised for political purposes. Henry notes that the vibrant civil society 
that existed at independence was redesigned by the one-party government “into 
administrative hierarchies paralleling those of the government” (Henry, 1999: 17). 
Civil society could not be considered independent as it was brought into national 
associational life. This incorporatism prevented the development of oppositional 
voices and the distinction between state and the non-state, and between political and 
civil societies, became less apparent. Therefore national associational life was 
constrained by the single party state rule. 
The divisive institutions which were united in the struggle for independence were 
largely banned or co-opted as a mass movement turned into an authoritarian party. 
Henry (1965) discusses how all NOs were eventually quietened and co-opted to 
become arms of the NDP. Even the powerful UGTT and the outspoken Union Générale 
des étudiants de Tunisie (UGET) found themselves politically weakened and under the 
control of the single party state. Despite allowing a small degree of freedom, the NDP 
“subordinated professional interests to the national interest, they helped to maintain 
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Tunisia’s cohesion; but party control sapped their vitality and tended to divorce them 
from their members” (Henry: 1965: 159). 
After independence, the single–party state’s national agenda made opposing the NDP 
akin to acting as an enemy of the state. After cohesion between the party and 
organisations in the struggle for liberation, NOs became a threat to the NDP. “After 
independence, the national organisations threatened to become free-wheeling 
pressure groups, rivalling the supremacy of the party” (Henry: 1965: 160).  By 
turning NOs into branches of the one-party state, the NDP removed the vibrancy and 
autonomy from Tunisian civil society. NOs acted as arms of the party as “party 
control seemed to be exercised at all levels” (Henry: 1965: 164-5).  Party members 
were also trade unionists and the merry-go-round of organisation leaders played to 
Bourguiba’s advantage. Furthermore, the political positions of the UGTT were similar 
to those of the government. “Ben Salah and Ahmed Tlili as trade unionists both 
identified themselves with national rather than class interests” (Henry: 1965: 162).  
When a trade union no longer prioritises working class interest, or even harmonises 
the interests of labour and management, it fails to effectively represent its members 
(Clarke and Pringle, 2008: 85).  
The leftist views from the Union Générale des Etudiant Tunisienne (UGET) were 
suppressed as leading members were arrested and public rallies were overrun by the 
NDP Youth organisation. Therefore, realising the restrictions on their organisation, 
students began using UGET as a launch pad for a career in politics. UGET became 
closer to a state institution instead of a movement. “In politics, there was little feeling 
of participation because the party’s small ruling clique dominated political life” 
(Henry: 1965: 180). The constitutional state, akin to Locke and Kant’s model, did not 
exist in Tunisia, instead a clientelistic ruling culture was the reality (Krichen, 1992: 
119-120). 
The emancipation of women, via the 1956 Personal Status Code (PSC), led to greater 
freedom and equality, such as equal divorce rights for both women and men. 
Bourguiba endeavoured to “portray himself not as sweeping aside Islam, as had 
[Turkish leader Mustapha Kemal] Ataturk, but rather as reinterpreting it through 
ijtihad14, or independent reasoning – a process esteemed by 19th and 20th century 
Islamic reformers as well as Bourguiba, for whom the rationalism instilled by his 
                                                        
14 "Independent reasoning" - An Islamic legal term.   
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French education ranked among the most noble of human qualities” (Perkins: 
2014:140-141). For the sake of progress and sovereignty of the Tunisian people, 
women occupied a central position in the nation-building process because Bourguiba 
believed that social reform was closely related to the emancipation of women 
(Voorhoeve, 2012). L’Union Musulmane des Femmes de Tunisie had been founded in 
1936 but was a conservative organisation and would not have effectively served the 
government’s modernising programme. In order to educate women and run health 
programmes, Bourguiba established the Union Nationale des Femmes Tunisiennes 
(UNFT). “Neo-Destour officials knew that providing girls with a modern education 
would influence the social values they would impart to their families when they 
became wives and mothers” (Perkins: 2014:143). By the 1980s, in response to the 
Islamic resurgence, the Bourguiba government developed a less secular discourse on 
family law and women’s rights. In addition, they “sought to strike a balance between 
often contradictory demands from different groups in society, such as the Islamists 
and the women’s rights organizations” (Sonneveld, 2015: 5). This suggests that 
Bourguiba’s approach to citizenship and secular society aimed to reduce the Islamic 
traditions and create loyalty to Tunisia rather than the patriarchy of fathers and 
husbands. Empowering politically and productively active women was a way to 
solidify on a broader base Tunisian national identity. Furthermore, this was a 
utilitarian move, in the sense of reinforcing the ethnoreligious national identity. The 
PSC was considered a forceful reform by the Ulama and conservatives who opposed 
this form of Quranic reinterpretation (Touati, 2014:164), but in comparison to 
Ataturk’s reform programme, the Tunisian approach was more restrained.  In order 
to reduce the appeal of leftist politics, the NDP renamed itself Le Parti socialiste 
destourien (PSD) in 1964 and enacted state-led economic development programmes. 
In the early 1970s, after this socialist experiment proved largely unsuccessful, 
Tunisia embarked on an economic liberalisation programme to encourage private 
investment and export-led development. It also saw the creation of the 
breakaway Mouvement des démocrates socialistes  (MDS) party but did not lead to 
further democratisation or a plurality of parties. The switch from socialism to 
economic liberalism increased economic disparity while Bourguiba’s “preferences 
for authoritarian personalised rule ultimately undermined corporatist structures” 
and left the party incapable of addressing the conflicting interests of the national 
organisations (Murphy, 1999: 78-79).    
  
102 
 
University campuses became fields of ideological conflict between the leftists and 
Islamists who struggled to become the mantle of opposition to Bourguiba. Both, 
however, sought to challenge the corporatist vision in the late 1970s early 1980s and 
in some ways it shaped both forces for the subsequent era. As the communist 
criticism of the new economic policies became increasingly vocal on University 
campuses, Bourguiba allowed the establishment of the Association for the 
Preservation of the Quran because “a culturally oriented Islamist organisation could 
provide a useful counter to his critics on the left” (Alexander, 2000: 470). The 1970s 
also saw the creation of the Mouvement de La Tendance Islamique (MTI) by Rashid 
Ghannouchi, which later became Ennahda Movement. Initially, Islamists avoided 
class related issues and lacked access to worker networks.  
“In the mid-1970s, Tunisian Islamists became increasingly critical of Habib 
Bourguiba's authoritarianism. But they said nothing about economic 
liberalization (infitah), and they ignored the labour movement while the 
UGTT developed into the country's most powerful opposition force. Islamist 
rhetoric became more sensitive to labour issues in the early 1980s, but the 
movement still did not develop an explicit union strategy” (Alexander, 2000: 
466-467). 
 
A change of strategy occurred for Islamists in the early 1980s when, borrowing from 
Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini's ability to reframe leftist themes in explicitly 
Islamic terms, Ghannouchi “published a tract that defended workers' rights and 
extolled the Islamic virtues of trade unions” (Alexander, 2000: 471-472) and MTI 
created a more populist message. 
 
2.4. Phase 4: False Liberalisation 
 
Tunisia was not an exception to the liberalisation trend that was symptomatic of the 
MENA region from the 1980s onwards, as ineffective and failed economic policies 
forced governments to make reforms.  Foreign aid was received by pro-democracy 
and human rights groups yet governments failed to grant any real autonomy to civil 
society. While the rest of the world seemed to be liberalising, Arab state leaders 
made promises of liberty and democracy as a tactic to improve the flimsy state of 
their legitimacy amongst the population in the face of progressively worsening 
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economic conditions. These ‘top down’ reforms did not, however, provide the 
essential basis for the growth and development of a civil society. Instead, they were 
measures to increase government control masked in the rhetoric of liberalisation. 
Instead, the liberalisation phase fragmented civil society and the reforms 
strengthened central power. (Anderson, 2006, 195) For example, NGOs were 
established by political and economic elites “in order to feel the people’s pulse and 
manipulate interests” (Schlumberger, 2004: 374).  Also, CSOs that were legally 
created then had ‘a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes’ imposed upon 
them, which allowed the state to closely monitor their activities, thus increasing 
central state control (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 43). 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Tunisia witnessed the beginnings of a new 
plurality in political life. UGTT leader Habib Ashour “turned trade unionism into a 
fairly dynamic and autonomous, and at times, confrontationalist, branch of civil 
society” (Sadiki, 2008:119). One of the MENA region’s first human rights 
organisations, la Ligue Tunisienne des droits de l’homme (LTDH), was founded in 
1977 (Hawthorne. 2004:8). A non-state Islamic organisation, the origins of the 
Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique (MTI), was established (Hermassi, 1991) and 
student groups were allowed to operate as political organisations (Belkhodja, 
1998:249). 
Yet no opposition party gained the required 5% of the vote in the 1981 
parliamentary election in order to be legalised, enabling the PSDU-UGTT ‘National 
Front’ coalition to maintain its hegemony. Furthermore, the trade union movement, 
that was already a political heavyweight in its own right, remained part of the 
‘corporatist system’ (Waltz, 1995: 50). Tunisia’s civil society seemed to be 
developing in this period (Alexander, 1997) but Bourguiba’s preoccupation with 
national unity and his patrimonial manner of rule meant that his “brand of 
nationalism left no room for any free space for non-governmental or non-party 
actors” (Moore, 1988: 178). The rise of Ennahda Movement in that era saw the 
emergence of the Union Générale Tunisienne des Etudiants (UGTE) student union as 
an opposition to the leftist UGET. Antagonism between the two student unions 
resulted in violent clashes across Tunisian universities.  
“By the mid-1980s, Islamists had established themselves as the best organised 
and most influential force on the university scene. This willingness to engage 
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in a prolonged, often violent, campaign against the left on campus makes it 
difficult to believe that ideology is what kept them away from the unions”  
(Alexander, 2000: 466-467). 
This continued until Tunisia’s Second Republic was established by a bloodless coup 
on 7th November 1987 in which Interior Minister Zine El Abidine Ben Ali seized the 
Presidency from the erratic and senile Bourguiba who official doctors had declared 
medically unfit to rule. Despite suggestions of democratic opening and promises to 
implement democratic political reforms (Alexander, 1997), it was singularity, 
national unity, and collective interest that remained the themes of the Tunisian elite. 
Ben Ali implemented reforms that were “cast in a language that suggested a deeper 
commitment to democracy” (Alexander, 2010: 54). In addition, tangible gestures 
towards pluralism were made, for example, Islamists were released from prison and 
joined in the national debate while opposition parties were legalised. Although this 
liberalisation would ultimately prove false, the opening of the civic space allowed for 
a proliferation of associations. Political liberalism moved to implement new 
freedoms for the press as “press department rules were relaxed and television and 
radio stations were instructed to be more objective in their coverage and to 
concentrate less on PSD affairs” (Murphy, 1999: 168). Current and former members 
of the LTDH, an internationally recognised, 3000-member organisation, Hamouda 
Ben Slama, Saadedine Zmerli, and Mohamed Charfi found themselves co-opted and 
included in Ben Ali’s new cabinet, which “clearly illustrated Ben Ali’s incorporative 
intentions” (Murphy, 1999: 168). In contrast, LTDH Secretary-general Khemais 
Chemari was arrested in 1987 for ensuring jailed MTI leaders received suitable 
treatment (Perkins, 1997:100).   
Within the false liberalisation, there were periods when a Liberal-Associative civil 
society could operate. The rise of women’s organisations was important but was also 
incorporated into the party system. L’Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la 
Recherche sur le Développement (AFTURD) was government organised but 
independent women’s organisations, such as L’Association Tunisienne des Femmes 
Democrates, (ATFD), established in 1989, also appeared. AFTD and LTDH, 
established in 1977, were two exceptions that both managed to retain a degree of 
political independence yet were confronted with the operational difficulties from 
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suppression and arrest to infiltration and manipulation from party loyalists 
(Alexander, 2010:65). 
2.4.1. National Pact and destruction of Islamists  
 
In September 1988, 16 organisations, made up of legal opposition parties, trade 
unions, national organisations, in addition to representatives of the MTI were invited 
by Ben Ali to reach a national consensus, the National Pact, regarding commitment to 
liberal reform. This document appeared to be a pathway towards reform but was a 
reassertion of the corporatist state model that included dissenting voices in order to 
weaken their appeal as opposition.  
At a political level, Ben Ali intended the National Pact to foster a formal national 
political consensus in the period leading up to the first election of the post-Bourguiba 
era” (Perkins, 1997: 133). Opposition figures and intellectuals joined the re-named 
ruling party, The Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD) and accepted 
positions in the new government with the intention of implementing the reforms 
they demanded (Belhassen, 1998). To obtain legal status and obey the law which 
prohibited party names from containing religious references, “in early 1989, MTI 
renamed itself Hizb Ennahda (the Renaissance Party) to comply with Ben Ali's stated 
position that no single group should monopolize the claim to be Islamic since all 
Tunisians were Muslim” (Esposito and Piscatori, 1991: 431). This political 
liberalisation was not, however, a step towards democracy but a strategy to gather 
information and identify opposition. By listening to their grievances and making 
appropriate changes, Ben Ali removed the opposition movement’s potency. The RCD 
learnt how to rule more effectively and co-opted opposition into government 
through appointing their most influential leaders.   
The implications for civil society were that, after an opening for potential change, 
Tunisia’s Second Republic remained an authoritarian state; manipulating the fear of 
Islamism and terrorism to weaken Tunisian civil society. The National Pact 
“reinvigorated the role of national organisations as partners with the state, rather 
than potential and sometimes actual combatants” (Murphy: 1999: 173). As part of 
the state, the national organisations were legal and part of the system but lacked 
independence.  A subordinate UGTT was required for Ben Ali’s economic reforms to 
be implemented. By 1993, a younger and more technocratic minded leadership had 
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replaced the older and confrontational members and the UGTT was left ‘weak and 
internally divided’ (Murphy: 1999: 187-192). An alternative student’s union, Union 
Générale Tunisienne des Etudiants (UGTE), was established to compete with and 
divide UGET members. However, it created more independent bodies that could 
think independently and challenge national associations; whom the regime would 
later be forced to co-opt.   
CSOs could only exist when at least partially co-opted by the regime. Opposition 
organisations, those not established by the regime, had little impact and high risk of 
arrest. Therefore, since they were forced to participate and operate within the 
parameters of the regime, there were overlaps in personalities between political 
parties and CSOs.  For example, the LTDH members in Ben Ali’s cabinet meant that 
the RCD claimed to include opposition and voices. By allowing grievances to be aired 
within the regime, thus potency of opposition voices was reduced. When 
organisations relied on the governments for funding, or when the government 
established associations to compete with existing ones, e.g. Le comité supérieur des 
droits de l'Homme et des libertés fondamentales against the LTDH, they became 
progressively undermined and controlled by the regime. 
“Ben Ali’s effort to break the connection between elite and popular politics 
has also created a profound strategic malaise for the organizations that long 
constituted the bedrock of associational life. As elsewhere in the region, the 
struggle for meaningful autonomy from state control has dominated the lives 
of workers’ and students’ unions, human rights groups, women’s groups and 
Islamist organizations in post-independence Tunisia. At the same time, 
though, these organizations have always understood that the line between 
state and civil society is blurry at best. For more than 30 years, establishing 
alliances with individuals and factions of the governing elite and playing on 
tensions within party and state bureaucracies was a fundamental part of these 
organizations’ strategies for influencing government policy. The dissolution of 
these ties, the end of opposition politics as it operated for so long, has left 
Tunisia’s traditionally vigorous civil society adrift” (Alexander, 1997). 
 
Having secured electoral victory and defeated his main opposition, Ben Ali 
strengthened his own position by using the Algerian Civil War and Islamic terrorist 
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attacks against France in the 1990s to emphasise the Islamist threat and shift to a 
hard-line policy towards Islamic activists (Esposito and Piscatori, 1991: 432). As a 
pro-Western Arab leader he used the situation to strengthen his hold on power by 
crushing Islamic opposition at home, and continuing authoritarian measures, 
knowing he had the complete backing of Europe. The Algerian case allowed Ben Ali 
to convincingly argue that “democracy needed to be introduced gradually or Tunisia 
would follow Algeria’s descent into instability and violence” (Wood, 2002:97).  
Faced with growing apathy at the lack of opportunity in the unfair election process 
and government harassment of Ennahda, the movement’s spokesman, Ali Laarayedh, 
accused the government of being incapable of dialogue but argued that Ennahda 
should, “Continue the fight because there is no longer any means of reaching an 
agreement with the government. Through demonstrations in the street, we fight for 
our rights and the country’s” (Marouki, 1990: 33). As a response, Ennahda became 
more militant through increased protests and lifting their ban on violence (Soudan 
and Gharbi, 1991). Ben Ali countered Ennahda with suppression when 200 Islamic 
activists were arrested in December 1990 (Alexander, 2010:60). On 17th February 
1991, three Islamic activists attacked the RCD office. The government claimed it was 
an assassination attempt on Ben Ali. In response, government oppression 
dramatically increased and between 1990 and 1992 over 8000 allegedly dangerous 
or threatening Islamists were arrested (Waltz: 1995: 72).  
While political parties based on religion remained illegal, they were permitted a 
limited existence in civil society. The role of religion was recognised in the UGTE, the 
student organisation that had close relations with MTI, which was legalised in 
September 1988, while a new cabinet position, sectary of state for religious affairs, 
was created in November (Murphy, 1999: 179). “Hoping to encourage Islamist 
moderation, Ben 'Ali promised MTI/Ennahda leaders that he would legalise their 
party if they would keep peace at the universities and give him time to consolidate 
his position” (Alexander, 2000: 474). Ennahda gained 15% of the vote in the 1989 
and performed better than the secular opposition. Now that they represented the 
only genuine threat to the RCD, Ben Ali reneged on his promise to legalise Ennahda. 
This prompted the party’s more militant elements, especially students, to argue that 
“the government's refusal [was] proof that trading moderation for legalisation would 
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never pay off” (Alexander, 2000: 476). A protest and repression exchange followed 
until Ennahda was depleted and their leaders imprisoned or exiled. 
Partly as compensation for severe violations of political and civil rights, women’s 
rights were enhanced under Ben Ali while some pressure on Islamists was relieved, 
such as the ban on university students wearing the veil was not strongly enforced 
(Sonneveld, 2015: 5). However, “Islamist opposition, which expressed the 
frustrations of masses either unrepresented by secular parties or suppressed within 
the national organisations, was not to be tolerated at all” (Murphy, 1999: 79). The 
Islamist UGTE was also suspended in 1991 under the accusation of stockpiling 
weapons (Khlifi, 2013). After the Islamist threat was crushed, the voice of the legal 
opposition was also limited.  
2.4.2. Human Rights and Western Support 
 
Ben Ali sought to control human rights and lawyer’s organisations by implementing a 
new Law of Associations in 1992 to restrict membership and activities. This included 
clauses whereby LTDH members could not hold office in other associations or 
political parties. Therefore, the overlap between party and CSO personalities ended 
and LTDH lost active leaders. Former LTDH leader Moncef Moncef Marzouki 
responded by establishing the Comite National pour la Defence des Prisonniers 
d’Opinion (CNDPO) but while the government allowed them to exist, they also 
monitored their membership and activities. The regime denied the existence of 
political prisoners or torture cases, instead seeking to highlight the improvements in 
human rights and political freedom which they had implemented. Ben Ali postured as 
a human rights supporter while simultaneously quashing genuine activists (Murphy, 
1999: 205-207). Mohammed Moada, leader of the legal MDS party, was sentenced to 
11 years in jail for an open letter that called for a gradual move towards a pluralist 
culture and democratic choice. Marzouki was arrested for running as a Presidential 
candidate in the 1994 election, and the Tunisian press was suffocated as journalists 
were routinely harassed. An additional example of Tunisian state oppression was the 
case of Judge Mukhtar Yahyaoui, whose open letter to President Ben Ali on 6th June 
200115 criticised the oppressive control over the judicial system, was consequently 
                                                        
15 Yahyaoui, Mukhtar (2001). Open letter to President Ben Ali. Human Rights First. Available at 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/open_letter.pdf (assessed 13/12/2015) 
  
109 
 
dismissed from the body of magistrates and had his property was confiscated 
(Marzouk, 2015).  
Wood acknowledges how Tunisia’s poor Human Rights record was constantly 
overlooked by the French government despite the French, and international press 
highlighting the problem. The ‘special relationship’ between France and Tunisia and 
their mutually profitable trade added to Ben Ali’s confidence that he was somehow 
untouchable. In addition, Ben Ali’s speed at denouncing the 9/11 terrorist attack and 
pledging support for the US ensured international pressure on his regime would be 
alleviated. Perhaps Ben Ali would have become less repressive as French and 
international pressure to liberalise intensified in the late 1990s but the 9/11 attack 
helped Ben Ali galvanise French and EU support for Tunisia as an anti-terrorism, pro-
Western Arab regime. Furthermore, the situation allowed authoritarianism to 
increase. The structures supporting authoritarianism were not only deeply rooted 
but capable of adaptation to modern conditions—thus keeping ahead of the 
developing societal forces.  While civil society was benefiting from new information 
technologies, regimes could also use these instruments to their own advantage to 
enhance surveillance capabilities. This is evident in Tunisia as by December 2001, 
FBI involvement in Maghrebi counter-terrorism significantly improved the Tunisian 
security services (Wood, 2002).  Human rights activists were often imprisoned, in 
particular prior to a UN-sponsored world summit on information in November 2005, 
there was an increase in state repression focused against leading human rights 
activists (Rishmawi, 2007).  
On a social-welfare level, the Caisse 26-26 and 21-21 Funds, established to help the 
poor and needy, aimed to reduce inequality and prevent “the rise of NGOs that could 
utilise charity as a springboard for political recruitment” (Sadiki, 2008:127). 
However, the non-existence of freedom of information acts and the lack of 
transparency meant that how these funds were spent or to where they were 
transferred remained unknown (Henry, 2012: 668). Indeed, open-governance was 
not prevalent and authoritarian rule had not encouraged the practice of 
transparency. A Word Bank report cites the ‘lack of transparency and rampant abuse 
by cronies’ in Tunisia’s economy as major factors behind the anger that caused the 
revolution (2014: 27).  
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Economic corruption increased during the 1970s as the state implemented a 
privatisation programme from which data was either inaccurately reported or not 
published. Under Ben Ali, levels of crony-capitalism and mafia-style family control of 
businesses became rampant as rules were manipulated to serve their interests. 
“Members of the ruling family - as the parents, brothers, sisters and allies of 
Ben Ali and his wife, Leila Trabelsi, are known - have been the main 
beneficiaries of the privatisation of public companies, dubious bank loans and 
the flourishing black market. Several have one foot in the public sector and 
the other in the private. They use their position for personal gain, acting as 
brokers” (Labidi, 2006).  
For example, of the 220 businesses owned by family members, the World Bank 
determined that while these firms accounted for only three percent of economic 
output, they controlled 21 percent of net private sector profits (World Bank report, 
2014). Corruption was facilitated by the lack of adequate participation, transparency, 
and accountability in the management of public affairs. Consequently, corporatism, 
paternalism and corruption permeated all levels of Tunisian society (see 
Hibou, 2011) which left transparency absent. 
 
3. Civil society before the Revolution  
 
Hawthorne summarises the state of Tunisian civil society, prior to the revolution, as 
follows, 
“Tunisia’s civil society is dominated by a very large service-NGO sector and a 
few labour unions and professional associations. Its handful of prodemocracy 
groups suffer continuous state harassment and have a precarious legal status. 
Tunisia’s Islamic sector consists primarily of associations tied to the 
government. This is due to Tunisia’s history of state-enforced secularism, 
which intensified in the late 1980s and 1990s with the government’s attempts 
to eradicate an incipient Islamic opposition movement, Al Nahda, and any 
other independent Islamic activity” (Hawthorne, 2004:8-9). 
 
Overall, civil society activity was heavily regulated and limited due to the 
authoritarian tendencies of the regime. Of the few that functioned, even fewer 
escaped the regime’s corporatist civil society mechanisms. CSOs were not able to do 
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more at this point because they were constrained by the risk of their organisation 
being closed and members arrested. The majoritarian view (Alexander, 2010:120) 
prevented debates and dissent were not tolerated. Civil society faced constraints in 
the form of ambiguity between press and government, which meant the media was 
forced to self-censor, and CSO activities received no coverage of their events which 
were in any way against the majority view.   
The government operated under a “with us or against us” policy, the same approach 
that had been prevalent since Bourguiba’s disagreements with Youceffists. The 
decade-long Algerian civil war helped ingrain the idea that political-Islam would 
threaten economic prosperity; therefore the RCD’s secular and liberal economic 
approach was the only acceptable option for stability and prosperity. Worker 
grievances were addressed in the UGTT, which was also largely co-opted by the 
regime.  This left opposing or criticising the government akin to an act of treason. 
4. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter identifies that Tunisia has a history of civil society action but 
authoritarian government systems limited civil society from fulfilling a democratic 
function. Tunisia’s historical experience placed the country in a position that was 
more conducive to the successful completion of a democratic transition. This is 
because extensive building of state institutions would not be required (Jankauskas 
and Gudžinskas, 2008) and that a civil society, a crucial element to a democratic 
transition (established in Chapter One), had existed, survived and developed from 
Beylical rule via French colonialism to the 21st Century. However, the analysis of the 
four historical phases outlined in this chapter cannot sufficiently account for the 
existence of civil political culture within the civil society. Despite organisations’ 
commitment to survive by working with the regime or challenge the regime from the 
periphery of the legal constraints, in addition to their use of non-violent approaches, 
it cannot entirely explain how organisations operated or what values and beliefs 
their members held. 
 
A civil society, which prevented despotic government tendencies of the Bey, existed 
prior to French colonialism. French rule centralised power and largely dismantled 
pre-existing civic traditions by weakening local political and economic institutions. 
As the nationalist movement against the French developed under the Young 
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Tunisians, Destour, and Neo-Destour, each party respectively learned from their 
predecessor and progressively engaged greater sections of society. Resistance to 
colonialism created Tunisian identity based on ethno-nationalism (Sadiki, 2008) and 
links across society encouraged homogenisation.  
The ethno-nationalism of Bourguiba’s and Ben Ali’s authoritarian rule created an 
exclusive “us vs. them” dichotomy, which was coupled with the incorporation of 
dissident opinions within the ruling party structures and the suppression of Islamic 
identities. To some extent, the nationalism struggle encouraged peaceful co-
operation, however, the post-Independence leadership’s suppression of opposition 
succeeded in inhibiting the development of socio-political pluralism or tolerance 
towards alternative visions, as the National Associations became increasingly state-
controlled. Civil society may have been co-opted and constrained, however, the 
political openings during the 1978 strike, riots in the early 1980s, the small window 
of opportunity after Ben Ali came to power in 1987, and the involvement in the 1988 
National Pact contributed to maintaining the tradition of an active civil society. 
Indeed, civil society was able to exhort influence on government and had a role in 
affecting change. The extensive networks of the UGTT, for example, demonstrated an 
oppositional-resistance capacity through their large membership base and the ability 
to call a general strike.  
 
The ‘false liberalisation’ that Ben Ali applied was not unique to Tunisia and is 
concurrent with the analysis of civil society in Liberalised Autocracies throughout 
the MENA region. As Brumberg noted at the time, CSOs have not been able “to pierce 
the armour of liberalised autocracies” (2002: 63). Albeit under the conditions of 
authoritarianism, Tunisia has a history of “elected parliaments and opposition 
politics, a smattering of nongovernmental Islamic societies, professional associations, 
clubs, and prodemocracy groups” (Hawthorne, 2004:8). Chapter One highlights that 
certain preconditions are necessary to a successful democratisation process. 
Therefore, the breath of civil society institutions described in Hawthorne’s summary 
implies that, based on the assumption that a "political society" and state institutions 
must exist prior to civil society (Stepan and Linz, 1996) and (Bodenstein, 2013), 
extensive state-building would not be required in Tunisia.  
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While relevant historical experience is important to beginning a democratisation 
process, historical experience must not be over-emphasised as an explanatory 
variable to summarise a political culture, as per the historical-synoptic assessments 
of political culture critiqued in Chapter Two. However, as Anderson identifies 
political culture as “the values that might support or undermine a particular set of 
political institutions, the particular distribution of patterns of political orientations-
attitudes towards the political system” (1995: 7), the evidence of CSOs existing and 
operating, despite authoritarian conditions restraining their activities,  could account 
for the basis of a civic culture. The only way CSOs could operate was therefore, 
working within the system as ‘loyal’ co-opted opposition. While the regional 
branches retained greater independence, the upper echelons of the powerful and 
mostly independent UGTT fell under government control (Perkins, 2014). Liberal-
Associative forms of civil society were permitted to operate if their aims and goals 
were consistent with regime’s agenda. The public space was controlled by the regime 
and any opposition to the government or Oppositional-Resistance forms of civil 
society were suppressed or dismissed as enemies of the state. The false-liberalism 
and the end of Bourguiba’s rule presented an opportunity for an opening in civil 
society. However, Ben Ali, using the threat of radical or political Islam, ensured 
pluralism did not develop. He used the same threat throughout his rule which meant 
that contesting the government through civic action remained effectively 
criminalised. National cohesion was gained by fostering tacit consensus. Salamé 
points to how national unity has been a cloak for authoritarianism (1994:4-6) while 
Sadiki describes it as a straightjacket that that “has historically compromised 
pluralism and plurality” (2008:113). Furthermore, the ethno-nationalism created 
during independence “lacked a democratic imagery” (Sadiki, 2008:118). With the 
exception of the national organisation, prior to the revolution, Tunisian civil society 
was not entirely autonomous and therefore could not effectively challenge or 
constrain the state from a fully independent stance. Instead, their activity was 
constrained by the state because it was not sufficiently separate from the state. 
Therefore, civil society could perform a limited oppositional function, but not a truly 
democratic function. As far as can be ascertained, the patrimonial nature of the 
regime and influence of authoritarianism was reflected in civil society’s political 
culture. There was mistrust and scepticism of the government and RCD due to civil 
society’s experience with government manipulation tactics.  
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Civil society held an unclear position towards Islam as organisations like LTDH 
would have shown no prejudice towards Islamists and defended human rights of 
Tunisian regardless of political views. However, state-imposed secularism and the 
suppression of Islamism meant that all organisations had to appear secular as 
Islamist organisations would not have been permitted to exist under Ben Ali’s rule, 
with the exception of pre-schools run by Imams to teach Arabic through study of the 
Quran.  
What makes Tunisian civil society unique, however, is the manner in which it’s 
continuous evolution, which began prior to colonialism, survived through French 
occupation, and then became a vital part of nationalist struggle. In post-
independence Tunisia, civil society might have been weakened and depleted – 
through arrests, exile of key figures, and was heavily constrained by harsh 
authoritarian state repression – but it was never completely destroyed. Although it 
existed to serve the regime and appeared as a façade of liberalisation, it was 
organised and nationally networked as opposition groups, at home or in exile, were 
connected. This meant that it was somewhat prepared for the revolution. The 
following chapter explains in depth civil society’s unique role in the revolution and 
transition. Indeed, activists who had gained experience from operating in a restricted 
and co-opted civil society were vital at the start of the revolution. For example, the 
UGTT existed nationwide, but while the higher ranks were co-opted and close to the 
party-state, they were still connected to regional branches who had greater 
autonomy. Also, experienced activists who had been forced underground or abroad 
were prepared. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVITY IN THE REVOLUTION AND TRANSITION PERIOD 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the vital role of Tunisian civil society in the democratic 
transition. Furthermore, the political culture of Tunisia’s civil society is evaluated by 
addressing its character, evolution, and contribution to the transition. The history of 
civil society in Tunisia, established in Chapter Four, serves as a platform for this 
chapter’s detailed discussion of the revolution and subsequent transition. Tunisia’s 
pre-revolution government, albeit a liberalised autocracy bolstered by sustained 
economic success and protected by an inflated security apparatus, appeared 
politically stable. Tunisia had no history of violent or revolutionary transformation, 
instead “reform, not revolution, was the core demand of Tunisian nationalists from 
the Young Tunisians through the Neo-Destour” (Alexander, 2010:111). Hibou argues 
“the myth of "reform" has been used in Tunisia to disguise from the world the 
deepening corruption, nepotism and stagnation of a one-party state, dominated by 
what is, in effect, a president-for-life” (Applebaum, 2007). However, the bottom-up 
protests that culminated into the revolution still took the world by surprise (Gana, 
2013:1). 
This chapter tells the story of the revolution and consequent transition, until the new 
government was formed after the 2014 elections, and identifies the agency and the 
role played by civil society. This chapter demonstrates that Tunisia has politically 
moved from authoritarianism to post-authoritarianism and is in the process of 
transitioning towards democracy. Additionally, civil society has played an active role 
in the revolution and transition due to Tunisia’s historic tradition of civil society 
activism and the political weight organisations such as the UGTT hold in influencing 
state decisions, as established in Chapter Four.  This chapter expands on sub-national 
civil society activism, through the role of regional UGTT branches in mobilising and 
organising protests both during the 2008 Gafsa uprising and at the outset of the 2011 
revolution.  
2. Bloody Roots 
The 2008 Gafsa uprising demonstrates that civil society was active and, in the 
regional ranks, took an oppositional stance even when the co-opted central or head 
offices were too constrained by the authoritarian regime to take such a position. The 
  
116 
 
roots of the revolution can be traced to this expression of Oppositional-Resistance 
civil society activity. The uprising was a series of protests and riots in the Mining 
Basin due to levels of high regional unemployment, the worsening economic 
situation, and the corrupt recruitment processes of the Gafsa Phosphate Company 
(CPG). In January 2008, CPG, the major employer in the mining region, opened a call 
for applications. Residents held that the recruitment process was nepotistic, as over 
60 positions were offered to citizens from a neighbouring governorate, the 
hometown of the Gafsa governor and his two cousins- the CPG president and the 
director of the local chemical factory (Bakchich16, 2008). Subsequently, four 
unemployed graduates went on hunger strike when their names were not included in 
the list of accepted applicants. This was followed by a peaceful procession by 
hundreds of high-school students, trade unionists, unemployed people and their 
families and a one-hour sit-in opposite the CPG head office in Redeyef, one of the four 
major mining cities in Gafsa (La Riposte17, 2008). Regional UGTT members and 
leaders were active in organising the uprising, while LTDH Gafsa section leaders 
were active alongside demonstrators and “were sometimes able to serve as 
mediators in the negotiations with the local authorities” (Gobe, 2011:19). This level 
of CSO coordination and cooperation demonstrates the existence of tolerance and 
trust between different organisations, criteria of civility.  
These protests continued sporadically until July 2008. Security and military forces 
responded heavily by firing live rounds at protesters, injuring 26 and fatally 
wounding two on 6th June  (Nawaat, 2009). Information surrounding the Gafsa 
uprising remains limited due to media blackouts and authoritarian constraints, 
therefore some details remain unclear. However, these events demonstrate that 
while oppositional civil society activism existed in the regions, it was largely covered 
up by the regime. Due to lack of access and information opacity, regional civil society 
activism remained understudied in the literature on Tunisian civil society. A 
sycophantic report from the state-owned La Presse newspaper on 11th April 2008 
stated that protesters were pro-regime, that they were marching in support of Ben 
                                                        
16 This article was censored on its original website but is available at 
http://tunisie.tumblr.com/post/33088735/gafsa-la-rebelle-est-en-%C3%A9bullition (Accessed 
28/1/16). 
17 Révolution: Journal marxiste (2008). La révolte du bassin minier de Gafsa, en Tunisie Article. 
Available at http://www.marxiste.org/international/afrique/tunisie/118-la-revolte-du-bassin-
minier-de-gafsa-en-tunisie (Accessed 28/1/2016).  
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Ali, were thanking him for initiating measures to improve the environment in the 
mining basin region, and were in support of his re-election in 200918. 
In contrast, political prisoner Boubaker Akrem told Aljazeera that “Protests were 
censored, there was no media and no Facebook, and people were scared to tell their 
stories because the regime was too strong” (Moshiri, 2011).  As reports surrounding 
the Gafsa riots were spread on Facebook, the regime responded by blocking the site 
for two weeks. The extent of the online repression was reflected in the 2009 
Freedom House Internet freedom index which ranked Tunisia lower than Iran and 
China.19 Tunisian CSO and news blog Nawaat reported that, between April and June 
2008, 300 people were arrested across Gafsa including labourers, teachers, trade 
unionists, members of the Movement of Families of Striking Miners, and human 
rights activists. Many of the detainees were tortured, violated, and had family 
members threatened. Another 150 people were arrested in Redeyef in June and July 
after demonstrations while at least 200 people were prosecuted in connection with 
the protests. Some were given eight-year prison sentences after unfair trials where 
defence lawyers were not permitted to present their cases or medical evidence of 
torture (Nawaat, 2009).  UGTT pressuring the government to release those arrested 
during the protests demonstrates a degree of civil society independence and its 
performance of the role of ‘protecting from despotism and opposing the 
authoritarian state’ function of civil society à la Paine.  The consequent release of 
union activist Adnane Hajji proves the success of UGTT pressure in influencing state 
decision making.  
3. La Révolution  
 
The revolution occurred because the economic based social contract between Ben Ali 
and Tunisians had been broken. High levels of state corruption and unemployment 
led to calls for freedom and dignity. In the immediate months and years after the 
revolution, various opinion-based works have been published (see Bettaïeb, 2011) 
leaving the narrative of the revolution and a consensus of the events not entirely 
agreed upon. However, the act of self-immolation by street vendor Mohamed 
                                                        
18 La Presse (2008) ‘Marche populaire de soutien au Président Ben Ali à Gafsa’ (republished on All 
Africa) 
 http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200804110902.html (Accessed 4/6/2014). 
19 Freedom House (2009). Tunisia 2009 country report. Available at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/tunisia#.Vbn5hEZwaUk [accessed 
12/5/2013]  
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Bouazizi on December 17th 2010, outside the governorate office in the interior town 
of Sidi Bouzid to protest against police interference and a lack of economic 
opportunities certainly sparked the revolution. The sudden and widely unexpected 
event was an act of defiance against the Tunisian state’s undignified treatment of its 
people. Feeding on local anger over high unemployment rates and a lack of political 
and socio-economic freedom, the Tunisian revolution would eventually claim 338 
lives in the violent demonstrations where police and protesters clashed (Ajmi, 2012).  
 
Although the early stages of the revolution were the result of individuals coming 
together in near spontaneous action, from the unemployed and working classes in 
the interior regions to equally disappointed lawyers, doctors, and middle classes 
from the coastal cities, the overthrow of Ben Ali was driven to its conclusion by 
organised civil society. The protests in response to Bouazizi’s suicide demonstration 
did not spread like wildfire, as a romantically constructed narrative suggests. Yet 
civic activism has been credited as a major factor in Ben Ali’s downfall, particularly as 
military and foreign powers were apparently not involved. CSOs, which had become 
accustomed to state repression, collectively mobilised to form a protest movement 
against the heavy-handed response of the regime. The focus on opposition to the 
regime and the demand for rights united diverse groups around the common 
objectives of khubz, hurriya, karama watanya (bread, freedom, national dignity). 
“Tunisia’s “spirit of solidarity” signalled the start of the revolution and the starting 
point for freedom of association and institutional reform for civil society activity” 
(Deane, 2013:5). Furthermore, Deane attributes the effectiveness of Tunisian CSOs as 
revolutionary actors to their homogeneity.  
“Despite regime regulations and repression, Tunisia’s civil society groups 
benefited from the relatively cohesive, tolerant make-up of Tunisian society, a 
society free from ethnically driven conflict. Historically, economic cleavages 
proved the most pervasive cause of social conflict in Tunisia leading to the 
revolution” (Deane, 2013: 8). 
The UGTT played a fundamental role in the Revolution through organising and co-
ordinating demonstrations which represented ‘grassroots’ involvement. From the 
outset, after Bouazizi’s self-immolation, local trade unions were echoing his 
sentiments of social and economic injustice. On 24th December, when police opened 
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fire on protesters in Menzel Bouzaienne, the UGTT disseminated news that two 
protesters had been fatally wounded. Major protests were held in Sfax, Kairouan, and 
Ben Guerdane on December 25th, then in the capital Tunis on 27th next to the UGTT 
headquarters indowntown Tunis. On December 28th, the regime acknowledged the 
situation when Ben Ali addressed the nation in a television broadcast, warning that 
protests are unacceptable and will negatively impact the economy. Ben Ali criticises 
the "use of violence in the streets by a minority of extremists" and says the law will 
be applied "in all firmness" to punish the “thugs” responsible for the riots (Rifai, 
2011). Ben Ali later tried to pacify protests with concessions, in addition to 
dismissing the governors of the Sidi Bouzid, Jendouba, and Zaghouan governorates. 
He also dismissed the ministers of communication, trade and handicrafts, and 
religious affairs for reasons related to the uprising, the Arabiya news channel 
reported.  Meanwhile, local union activists informed international news channels of 
their situation on the ground. UGTT management levels authorised the regional 
sections of Sfax, Kairouan and Tozeur to organise strikes (Piot, 2011), and 
subsequently UGTT leadership called for a general strike on 6th January. 
The protests were initially against corruption and demanding better economic 
opportunities. However, when the regime responded heavy-handedly, the nature of 
the protests altered to demanding political freedom, regime change, and an end to 
Ben Ali’s rule in favour of a representative government. This occurred between 8-
12th January after the killings in Kasserine and Thala by masked gunmen who shot at 
protesters from rooftop, killing 22 people and injuring approximately 200 (Ryan, 
2013a). UGTT leadership changed its mediating stance and fully supported the 
protest movement, calling for another general strike on 11th January. When the third 
general strike was called on 14th January, thousands took to the streets of the capital. 
Protesters gathered outside the feared Ministry of Interior on the central Avenue 
Habib Bourguiba to demand that Ben Ali stand down, famously chanting Dégage (get 
out). This marked the fall of the Ben Ali regime, as he fled to Saudi Arabia the same 
evening.  
Similarly to UGTT, the Tunisian national lawyers association (ONAT) played a crucial 
role in the revolution. Under the Ben Ali regime, the judicial system remained under 
the control of the executive whose “influence over the judiciary persisted due to the 
failure to adopt long-awaited reforms of the judiciary” (Human Rights Watch, 2013). 
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However, Gobe (2010) points to growing discontent amongst lawyers from 2000 
onwards. Lawyers who were not loyal to the regime and opposed the system were 
arrested and the ease with which their protests were suppressed meant their 
politicisation and mobilisation failed to destabilise the system.  The judiciary was co-
opted but ONAT was able to work against the system. It became a limited space for 
dissent and “one of the few institutions of civil society that has managed to preserve 
its autonomy and independence” (Gobe, 2010: 338). Gobe adds that it was “one of the 
only areas where politics can be expressed through professional demands... 
[and] …an arena of political protest by default, a sort of alternative political field” 
(2010: 334). Using their political leverage and professional duty as defender of 
rights, lawyers protested against the use of governmental repression against the 
uprising on December 31st 2010. This was significant as it meant that elites, in 
addition to the youth and the working class, were joining the revolution. The 
mobilisation of ONAT contributed to bestowing legitimacy and credibility on the 
protesters’ demands and the revolutionary process, by demonstrating that 
grievances with the regime cut across socio-economic cleavages to resonate with the 
middle class and the wider population. This sentiment was reinforced when the 
lawyers’ protests were also subjected to police brutality (Ryan, 2010). Tunisian 
Blogger, Lina Ben Mhenni, argues that the 300 lawyers, who protested in front of the 
Court of Justice in solidarity with Sidi Bouzid, criticising the government, and asking 
the president to leave, represented a turning point in the revolution (Ben Mhenni, 
2010). On 6th January 201120, 95 per cent of Tunisia's 8,000 lawyers participated in 
an ONAT-organised strike in protest against beatings they said they received from 
police at sit-ins in Tunis and other towns in the previous week and violence by 
security services against protesters.   
Diwan (2012) addresses the numerous factors surrounding the important role of 
middle classes in the Arab uprisings, arguing that the middle class, who were vital in 
helping Arab autocrats maintain their legitimacy, could no longer be co-opted.  
Economic liberalisation in the 1990s led to a market oriented middle class and 
greater inequality led to the development of a wealthy Arab 1% while insufficient job 
creation and high unemployment amongst educated youth created suitable 
                                                        
20 Al Jazeera (2011). Thousands of Tunisia lawyers strike. Available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/201116193136690227.html [accessed 
12/5/2013] 
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conditions for uprising. Middle class youth, rather than hardened Islamists, leading 
the Arab uprisings (2012:6) support his theory.  
No independent press existed until after the revolution, only foreign press who 
worked with CSOs. Therefore, citizen journalism, blogging and cyber-activism as well 
as investigative journalist CSOs such as Nawaat, were pivotal in the revolution. The 
regime recognised their influence when bloggers Slim Amamou and Azyz Amamy, 
were arrested on 6th January21. While journalists were surveyed by the regime, social 
media could spread information from Sidi Bouzid, initially, and other protest 
locations then upload the information to international media outlets such as Al 
Jazeera and France 24. In particular, Al Jazeera’s coverage and broadcasting of citizen 
generated media in the form of mobile phone video uploads from protesters in 
Tunisia helped spread awareness. Lynch adds that “Al Jazeera has played a vital, 
instrumental role in framing this popular narrative by its intense, innovative 
coverage of Tunisia and its explicit broadening of that experience to the region” 
(2011). Cyberattacks from hacker activist group Anonymous crashed the websites of 
the Tunisian Stock Exchange, the Ministry of Industry, the President, and the Prime 
Minister (Kushner, 2014). Anonymous are not Tunisian but their activism inspired 
students who responded by protesting the following day in cities across the country. 
The importance of social media co-ordination, however, has been over-emphasised. 
Wolfsfeld et al (2013) summarise the cyber-enthusiasts Vs cyber-sceptics debate 
regarding the importance of social media in uprisings but argue that analysis of 
political context should take precedence and social media should be viewed as a 
dependent variable. Social media is only one channel of communication and just one 
aspect of the protest movements. Norris notes that “structural factors, such as 
corruption, hardship, and repression” were the overriding causes of the uprising 
(2012: 5). Furthermore, the same social networks that may contribute to 
empowering citizens, may also be used against them for control and repression 
(Benkirane, 2012). 
Civic action played a significant role in Ben Ali’s downfall and pressure from a re-
emerging and new civil society has continued to ensure reforms are undertaken. 
Deane describes a ‘new social capital’ of “social networks and associated norms of 
                                                        
21 Al Jazeera (2011). Thousands of Tunisia lawyers strike. Available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/201116193136690227.html [accessed 
12/5/2013] 
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reciprocity created by activists and organisations, in the capital and the interior, 
united in their opposition to the Ben Ali regime” (2013:15). Opposition politicians 
under Ben Ali were also members of major, legal CSOs such as the Tunisian League of 
Human Rights (LTDH), the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (AFTD), the 
Tunisian Association for Struggle against Torture (ALTT), the National Committee for 
Liberties in Tunisia (CNLT), and UGTT. For example, throughout his career, Mustafa 
Ben Jaafar remained an oppositional political figure through the Democratic Socialist 
Party and later the Democratic Forum of Labour and Liberty (FDTL) a.k.a Ettakatol, 
one of the few legal opposition parties under Ben Ali, but he also held membership in 
the UGTT and LTDH. In addition, Moncef Marzouki was chairman of LTDH and later 
ran for the presidency against Ben Ali in 1994, while Maya Jribi co-founded the 
Progressive Democratic Party and founded the Association of Research on Women 
and Development. However, political figures such as Hamma Hammami (leader of 
Worker’s party) and his wife Radhia Nasraoui (lawyer and Human rights activist) 
were too critical of the regime and became targets for state arrest, intimidation, and 
torture22. Notwithstanding, the connections between the political and public space 
had allowed civil society to remain in existence but, in some cases, on the periphery 
of political life under Ben Ali. Opposition parties that avoided antagonising the 
regime, however, lacked the infrastructure and grassroots support and could 
therefore not play an influential role in the revolution. In contrast, CSOs such as the 
UGTT, had the networks and organisational structures to unite people from different 
political and economic backgrounds, and in different regions, particularly the 
interior. As this narrative has shown, CSOs played a role in shaping the events 
leading up to 14th January through demonstrations, applying pressure on the 
government, and UGTT-organised and lawyers’ strikes.  
4. Degage  
 
The breakthrough in a democratic transition is “the collapse of the regime and the 
rapid emergence of a new, democratic system” (Carothers, 2002:7). This description 
does not entirely apply to the Tunisian situation in which the slow 10-month process 
that led to the October 2011 elections did not result in a democratic system. Ben Ali 
and the close members of the ruling Trabelsi family fled, but the RCD state-party was 
yet to be disbanded. Members of the regime stayed in government and tried to 
                                                        
22Amnesty International. (1994) UA 69/94 TUNISIA: Health Concern/Torture: Hamma Hammami, 
Available at  https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde30/006/1994/en/ [accessed 15/3/2015] 
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control the aftermath of the revolution and Ben Ali’s departure. Technocratic Prime 
Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi tried to assume the presidency but protests forced 
him to defer to the legal interpretation of the constitution that the Speaker of the 
Lower House, Fouad Mebazaa, was entitled to take the vacancy (Murphy, 2013: 232). 
This importantly prevented a power struggle and enabled a new interim government 
to be appointed. Ghannouchi announced the new cabinet on 17th January, which 
included 11 leading opposition and civil society ﬁgures among its 23 ministers 
(Murphy, 2013: 233). However, this was an attempt to control political unrest and 
ensure the RCD could retain power by incorporating the disaffected into the system 
and implementing sufficient reforms to regain control of the country. Opposition 
leaders objected to the inclusion of RCD members in the unity government and 
further protests sustained pressure on Ghannouchi. On 22nd January, approximately 
2000 police officers, calling for better working conditions and a new union and 
seeking to disassociate from Ben Ali's repressive regime, joined the thousands of 
civilian protesters who were calling for the complete removal of all RCD members 
from the interim government.23 The following day, members of the ‘Liberation 
caravan’, who had travelled from different parts of the Sidi Bouzid governorate, 
broke the night curfew and joined the continuing protests against former RCD 
ministers who were remaining in government.24  
In response to these protests, on 24th January politicians created the ‘Council of the 
Defence of the Revolution’. Formed by 12 leading opposition parties and members of 
UGTT, ONAT, LDTH and the Association of Judges, the council was tasked with 
overseeing the interim government and ensuring that reforms continued to be 
made.25 Tunisia’s interim government promptly reformed state laws by encouraging 
greater civic participation and the creation of new political parties and civic 
organisations. Realising pressure from civil society and the wider population, which 
became progressively more organised, Ghannouchi increasingly surrendered control 
of the process until 27th February when he and all ministers who had served in Ben 
Ali governments, Ahmed Najib Chebbi, Ahmed Brahim, Elyes Jouini, Afif Chelbi and 
                                                        
23 Al Jazeera (2011). Police join protests in Tunisia. 23 January. Available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/2011122133816146515.html  [accessed 
12/3/2015] 
24 Al Jazeera (2011). Liberation caravan reaches Tunis. 23 January.  Available at  
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/2011123124352723753.html [accessed 
12/3/2015] 
25 Reuters (2011). Talks under way for body to oversee Tunisia cabinet. 23 January. Available at 
http://af.reuters.com/article/idAFTRE70I4P820110124?sp=true [accessed 13/3/2015] 
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Mohamed Nouri Jouini announced their resignation. Beji Caid Essebsi was appointed 
prime minister by Mebazaa the same day. In further reforms, the interim government 
established the Higher Authority for the Realization of Revolutionary Objectives, 
Political Reform and the Democratic Transitions on 18th February 2011(Nouria, 
2011). This body “instituted new laws of association, providing a number of positive 
protections for NGOs” (Deane, 2013:12). 
An announcement was made in early March that the RCD would be formally 
dissolved, “thereby eliminating the key institutional bases of the ancien regime” 
(Murphy, 2013: 234). Following this, the Islamist Ennahda party was legalised on 
11th March marking significant democratic changes. Doubts remained whether the 
‘old guard’ of the RCD had been entirely removed. Prime Minister Essebsi was an 
RCD member and had served in Bourguiba’s cabinet, but not Ben Ali’s. Essebsi 
dissolved political police and security apparatus, “a central demand by protesters 
and political forces, thus building national consensus” (Paciello, 2011:11). It was an 
important break from the old regime and a step towards dismantling power 
structures.  
The Higher Commission for Political Reform created a new electoral law for the 
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) elections. This included 33 constituencies, 
higher allocation of seats to south and south-Western constituencies to redress the 
regional imbalance, representation for Tunisian diaspora, 50% of nominations on 
lists were women and 1 had to be under 30 years old. The electoral system used 
closed party lists and the ‘Hare Quota with Largest Remainders’ proportional 
representation system to ensure no one party monopolised the election. The decision 
to implement an electoral system that disperses power and fosters inclusiveness 
proved to be important as it prevented Ennahda from dominating the assembly (see 
Carey, 2013). In other measures to ensure fair elections, “judges, regional governors, 
local officials, military personnel and former senior officials of the RCD were banned 
from running” (Murphy, 2013: 235). Decree-Law No. 2011-8726 established an 
Independent High Commission for Elections (ISIE) that was tasked with ensuring 
that elections are democratic, pluralist, fair and transparent.27 ISIE rescheduled NCA 
                                                        
26 Le Centre pour le Contrôle Démocratique des Forces Armées (DCAF) (2014) Décret-loi n° 2011-87 
du 24 Septembre 2011 organisant les partis politiques. La législation du secteur de la sécurité en 
Tunisie. Available at http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/30451 [Accessed 15/3/2015]  
27 Independent electoral commission (ISIE) Official website. Available at  http://www.isie.tn   
[accessed 07/5/2015] 
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elections from 24th July to 23 October to allow more time for preparation and voter 
registration. During this period CSOs actively encouraged citizen mobilisation and 
voter registration, while also pushing Tunisians to defend their rights. These 
measures represent the success of legal structures for the elections as new, 
democratic institutional structures are established to oversee democratic transition.  
As “new democracies must be institutionalized, consolidated, and become legitimate” 
(Lipset, 1993:7), institutionalising the democratic process increased the new 
system’s legitimacy.  Furthermore, Murphy notes an attempt to install civil political 
culture,  
“The norms of civility – freedom, equality and tolerance of plurality – were 
woven into both the process and the legal construction, although retaining the 
role of the state in curbing uncivil behaviours, including those which might 
challenge equality on the basis of gender or religious belief and those who 
were implicated in the repressive incivilities of the ancien regime” (Murphy, 
2013: 237).  
Decree 88-201128 provided a new legal framework that strengthened civil society, 
creating a new context within which organisations operate by providing clear 
requirements for CSOs and providing protection that was previously not afforded to 
them. It guaranteed the freedom to form and to join associations and to implement 
activities. This strengthened the role of civil society and their development and 
enshrined their legal independence. Article 3 of Decree 88 encourages the criteria of 
civil political culture: democracy, plurality, transparency, equality, and human rights, 
while Article 4 prevents incivility by prohibiting associations from adopting bylaws 
that call for “any incitement of violence, hatred, fanaticism, or discrimination of 
religious, racial, or regional grounds.”29 Human Rights Watch said that 2011-88 
“replaced earlier repressive legislation that criminalized participation in officially 
unrecognized associations. It had been hailed as an important step toward bringing 
Tunisian national law into line with Tunisia’s obligation under international human 
                                                        
28 Decree No. 88 of the year 2011 Pertaining to Regulation of Associations, published 24 September 
2011 – Translation by International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) Available at 
http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Tunisia/88-2011-Eng.pdf [Accessed 19/9/2014] 
29 Decree No. 88 of the year 2011 Pertaining to Regulation of Associations, published 24 September 
2011 – Translation by International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) Available at 
http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Tunisia/88-2011-Eng.pdf [Accessed 19/9/2014] 
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rights law to uphold freedom of association.”30 Chomiak (2012) also argues that civil 
society is an additional guarantor of Tunisia’s new political openness. CSOs became 
easier to establish, although they still had to be registered centrally. As a result, 
approximately 7,000 to 10,000 new associations, unions, and professional 
organisations were registered within 10 months of the revolution.  
5. October 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections   
 
On 18th April 2011, interim President Mebazaa issued Decree-Law 27 establishing 
ISIE31. This commission oversaw the October 23rd elections to form a 217-member 
National Constituent Assembly (NCA), tasked with drafting a new constitution. 
Despite some infractions, 4,308,888 Tunisians voted (a 52% turnout rate) in 
elections that were adjudged to have been free and fair. Ennahda won 40% of the 
popular vote and, due to the proportional representation election system, formed a 
‘troika’ government with the Congress for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol parties. 
The nationwide, societal involvement in the elections suggested a “general consensus 
in favour of democratic politics” (Murphy, 2013: 239). 113 political parties and 
independents representing a wide spectrum of political ideologies registered in post-
revolutionary Tunisia, in comparison to only nine registered parties who 
participated in elections under Ben Ali’s regime. The gender parity law, passed in 
April 2011, ensured that 27 percent of the seats were allocated to female candidates 
(Chomiak, 2012:3). 
Civil society played a vital role in the election process by observing practices at 
polling stations across the country.  
“A number of old and new civil society organisations had formed election 
observatories, including the Association Tunisienne pour l’integrite et la 
democraties des elections (L’ATIDE), Mourakiboun, Reseau Oﬁya, the National 
Election Observatory and I-Watch Tunisia. They were joined by over 500 
international observers from the National Democratic Union, the African 
                                                        
30 Human Rights Watch (2014) Tunisia: Suspension of Associations Arbitrary: 157 Associations 
Suspended Outside the Legal Process. August 13, 2014. Available at  
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/13/tunisia-suspension-associations-arbitrary [Accessed 
7/9/2014] 
31 Le Centre pour le Contrôle Démocratique des Forces Armées (DCAF) (2014) Décret-loi n° 2011-87 
du 24 Septembre 2011 organisant les partis politiques. La législation du secteur de la sécurité en 
Tunisie. Available at http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/30451  [Accessed 15/3/2015] 
  
127 
 
Union, the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Carter Centre” 
(Murphy, 2013: 239).  
Stepan called this election a “successful democratic transition, albeit not yet a 
consolidation of democracy” (2012:89) having met the democratic transition criteria 
Linz and he prescribe; firstly “sufficient agreement” on “procedures to produce an 
elected government.” Secondly, a government that comes to power as “the direct 
result of a free and popular vote.” Thirdly, this government’s de facto possession of 
“the authority to generate new policies,” and fourthly, “the executive, legislative and 
judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with 
other bodies de jure” such as military or religious leaders (Linz and Stepan, 1996:1). 
The NCA elections are an indicator of transition, insofar as a new democratic 
government takes power, but in the Tunisian case, it does represent an entirely 
successful transition. Despite Stepan’s argument and application of his criteria, it is 
naïve and reductive, in the Tunisian case, to say after one election and less than a 
year after the revolution that democratic transition had successfully occurred when 
the deep state, established by the former regime, still largely remained. Tunisia is 
different to the South American or eastern European cases from which Stepan 
determined criteria for transition. As established in this chapter, the Tunisian 
uprising and revolution were internally motivated, bottom-up process insomuch as 
popular protests forced Ben Ali’s departure and the gradual dismantlement of the 
remaining regime, giving way to democratic reform. This is in contrast to cases 
where the national government initiated and negotiated the transition e.g. Brazil, 
national government under US government pressure instigated transition e.g. Chile, 
or the whole political system changed due to external control being relinquished e.g. 
Poland. O’Donnell and Schmitter emphasise they do not address revolutionary cases 
in order to maintain the project’s focus and normative bias (1986, Vol. 3: 10). Further 
work on these transitions is detailed in the Transitology literature, which is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  In October 2011 the Tunisian government needed to 
implement these electoral changes, in response to societal pressure, in order to 
achieve transition.  This process could later lead to a democratic consolidation, 
rather than asserting that transition had been achieved.  
Diamond (1999) identifies various criteria in the process of democratic 
consolidation, all of which Tunisia needed to enact to achieve transition. After the 
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October 2011 elections, the Tunisian government still needed to reform the police 
(1999: 94-95), the judiciary (1999: 111), local government (1999: 121-122), and the 
state bureaucracy (1999: 93-94). Corruption and malpractice (1999: 91) by the 
former regime also needed to be addressed. Further transition and change were 
required rather than consolidating democracy on the foundations of a bureaucratic, 
corporatist one-party state.  
6. The vital role of state institutions in the early stages of transition 
 
The Tunisian transition did not require an institution-building process after Ben Ali’s 
departure. The bureaucracy that the French colonial powers established remained after 
independence and placed a firmer grasp over the population throughout the dictatorship. 
Hibou noted the upholding of Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime through his party’s 
monopoly over state institutions, gradually becoming “a state bureaucracy regulating 
the whole of daily life and imposing its logic down to the smallest detail” (Hibou 
2011: 110). However, it was these institutions that helped maintain stability through the 
revolutionary turmoil and prevented Tunisia from descending into chaos or civil war. 
Driven by the desire to maintain their power and positions of privilege, RCD elites 
ensured a swift constitutional handover of power which enabled RCD to dominate, to 
varying degrees, the following two interim governments (Paciello 2011: 10). This peaceful 
and leaderless handover of power reinforced the strength of state institutions and set the 
tone for a largely peaceful transition. As a result, the revolution did not immediately lead 
to the removal of the state's institutional foundations, which remained functional 
throughout and in the aftermath of the revolution. Indeed, "where in the world would you 
find a people who made a revolution on Friday and went back to work on 
Monday?"(Omri, 2013).  
Tunisia’s neighbour Libya demonstrated that despite removing the Gaddafi regime, 
democratic prerequisites are necessary for democratic transition. The lack of 
institutions and pre-existing structures, amongst other factors such as the new 
government’s inability to control its borders or provide security for its citizens, has 
made its transition chaotic (Engel, 2014).  
Transition could not have continued were it not for pre-existing political parties, 
institutional structures, and democratic culture of compromise and consensus. The 
importance of pre-existing institutional power and the Tunisian tradition of 
constitutionalism and following the legal procedures helped the transition as laws 
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were upheld. e.g. Ghannouchi complying with Articles 56 and 57 of the 1959 
Constitution to allow Mebazaa to be President. The fact that “Tunisian politics had 
reverted to what it has historically known best – constitutionalism” (Murphy 
2013:232) ensured that the following democratic sociotransition was peaceful. The 
top two layers of the Tunisian state, Ben Ali’s extended family and the RCD, were 
rapidly removed, but bureaucratic state institutions continued to function for a short 
period with an interim president and government.  
The role of the also pre-existing and influential civil society that pushed the 
government for greater transparency ensured the constitution drafts met popular 
expectations. Further protests against the presence of RCD members in the cabinet 
resulted in the resignation of Ghannouchi and the remaining two ministers who served 
under Ben Ali on 27 February 2011 (Paciello 2011:10). Furthermore, in 2013, the first 
draft of Constitution Article 28 included an ambiguous definition of the status of 
women. In response, women from trade unions and organisations of all political 
persuasions, such as AFTD, protested against what appeared to be an infringement 
on women’s rights.  
The period between Ben Ali’s departure in January and the October elections in 2011 
was precarious for Tunisia. Although the transition period has been marked by a 
constant struggle to maintain a balance between breaking from old guard institutions 
and the “undoubted resistance of RCD elites to whole-scale change” (Murphy 
2013:233), bureaucratic state institutions, active and organised civil society, the lack 
of military interference, and political culture of consensus, helped Tunisia navigate 
the uncertain process leading to elections.   
7. Interim government, the constitution drafting process and the 2011-2014 
interregnum period.  
The constitution drafting process was a fragile time for Tunisia where the transition 
could have been de-railed and the newly elected entity could have used their 
democratic legitimacy to reinstate authoritarianism. However, a “spirit of solidarity” 
(Deane, 2013) and a desire for political consensus saw the country make strides 
away from dictatorship.  
Civil society utilised the new freedoms it was afforded to positively influence the 
constitution drafting process. The 1959 Constitution guaranteed the freedom of 
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political conscience; Article 5 emphasised the principle of pluralism and Article 8 
guaranteed freedom of opinion and expression32. However, the Ben Ali police-state 
had suppressed these rights and forced the population to accept only the state-
prescribed one-party inclusive secular republicanism. After the revolution, Tunisians 
could enjoy these rights which were further guaranteed in decrees 2011-87 and 88 
issued by the interim president. Regarding the constitution, civil society groups were 
active in voicing their demands and disapproval against articles they considered 
unsatisfactory. For example, OpenGovTN’s campaign #7ell (Open Up), which was 
adopted by a number of NCA members during the constitutional drafting process, led 
to pressure resulting in the access to information laws (Decree 21) and Article 62 of 
the Constitution which states “Public information is the rule, secrecy is the 
exception” (Keskes, 2012). L’Association Tunisienne de Transparence dans L’energie et 
Les Mines (ATTEM) mobilised 14 CSOs focused on transparency in natural resource 
governance to work with the head of the NCA energy committee in the drafting of 
articles 12, 13, and 136 which ensure “transparency and accountability in the 
governance of Tunisia’s resources” (Karam, 2014) and that part of natural resource 
revenues are allocated to regional development. Al Bawsala played an important 
oversight role in enhancing transparency during NCA plenary sessions by “publishing 
NCA documents and posting on social media the attendance records of deputies and 
their individual votes.”33  
Outside of the NCA, CSOs also continued to play an active role in the transition and 
fulfil an anti-despotism function in pressuring for employment and judicial reform. A 
report by Foundation for the Future (FFF) notes that many of the newly created, 
post-revolution organisations, were “heavily involved in the democratic transition” 
(2013:11). The report cites unions - such as L’Confédération Generale des Travailleurs 
Tunisiens (CGTT), the UGTT, the Union of Tunisian Judges (SMT), the Union of 
administrative Judges (UJM) and the Free Union of Industrialists and Traders (UICL) 
- and associations working for democracy, citizen action, transparency and freedom 
such as the Tunisian League for Citizenship and Touensa. Unemployed youth 
associations, e.g. Association of Young Tunisian Democrats (JDT), maintained 
pressure on the government for employment and development while CSO networks 
                                                        
32 The Constitution of Tunisia, 1959, World Intellectual Property Organisation, Available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=188948  
33 The Carter Centre (2014) The Constitution making process in Tunisia:  Final Report 2011-2014,  
  
131 
 
like Lam Echamal worked on democracy promotion.34  Similarly, ONAT and the 
Association of Tunisian Judges (AMT), with assistance from International Centre for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ), helped affect transitional justice reform. In response, the 
Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice signed an agreement on May 16, 
2012 “with the United Nations and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to partially fund a much-needed judicial reform process that includes civil society 
in processes of transitional justice” (Freedom House, 2012: 11). 
Civil society efforts during the constitution drafting process and pressure for overall 
reform created a public space that became an arena for debate, reconciliation, and 
learning to accept difference. Al Bawsala helped to provide this space by organising 
debates between politicians and members of the public.35 A by-product of this 
opening was that action and direction for civil society during this phase became 
incohesive. Having worked together as a unified actor against Ben Ali, the free and 
open public space in which civil society could now operate lent itself to 
contradictions and discord. This left individual CSOs searching for their relative 
positions within this social habitus (Bourdieu, 1985). Some actors within civil society 
continued to act in a Gramscian, ‘against the state’ manner while others looked to 
work with the state. Despite this struggle to define themselves and their purpose, 
Tunisian civil society had a positive impact on the political transition and performed 
a collective pro-democracy function by holding the state to account. Nevertheless, 
civil society became a reflection of the national political situation: polarised. 
7.1. Religious-Secular polarisation of  Tunisian society 
 
This subsection demonstrates that the polarisation which existed within the political 
and civil society spaces reveals a degree of political incivility. The end of government 
oppression meant that civil society and political parties were no longer forced to 
adopt the government’s state-secularist agenda. In reaction, Tunisians exercised the 
newfound freedom afforded to them which resulted in expressions of freedom to 
(positive liberty) and pluralism. However, the expansion of freedom and pluralism 
led to a division as society learnt to accept the diversity of opinions in socio-political 
matters. This division largely manifested itself as a polarisation between those who 
wanted religion to be entirely in the private space away from state control and those 
                                                        
34 Lam Echamal homepage. Available at http://www.lamechaml.org/qui_sommes_nous.php  
35 MPs / Citizens Debates, Al Bawsala. Available at   
http://www.albawsala.com/en/debats_elus_citoyens    
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who favoured the inclusion of Islam in the new constitution: secularists and Islamists 
respectively. This secular-religious polarisation in society, which also manifested in 
civil society, confirms the ‘intolerance of opposition’ legacy from the previous regime 
remained and that civil society was not entirely civil or democratic. A mistrust in the 
intentions of the political other led to a lack of tolerance and equality. Civil society 
was unable to entirely fulfil a democratising role because not all criteria of civil 
political culture were shared across civil society actors. The polarisation did not, 
however, prevent civil society from performing an effective oppositional function 
that pressured and scrutinised the government and NCAs progress therefore 
continuously driving the transition. This subsection addresses how the process of 
Tunisia confronting this social polarisation was an essential part in maintaining 
transition towards democracy and democracy learning (Sadiki, 2015) by developing 
trust and tolerance in harmony with freedom and pluralism while agreeing in 
equality for all. 
Following the 2011 NCA election, the winning Islamist party Ennahda formed a 
‘troika’ coalition with two centrist parties. Yet, mistrust and suspicion existed 
throughout the Tunisian population regarding whether Ennahda’s election victory 
was the first step in a long-term project with the intention of Islamising Tunisia. This 
period was fraught with delays and disputes over the constitution and charges by the 
secular opposition that Ennahda was packing the bureaucracy with its followers 
(Brown, 2014). Secular civil society groups played an effective oversight role in the 
constitution drafting process as they worked towards ensuring Islamic law was not 
forced into the constitution. For example, the first draft article on blasphemy (Article 
3) called for insults on the sacred to be punishable; “The state guarantees freedom of 
religious belief and practice and criminalises all attacks on that which is sacred”. 
Concerned that this would lead to reduced freedom of speech, civil society drew 
public attention to the risks of including such an article in the constitution. In 
response, Ennahda removed ‘criminalisation’ and takfir (accusation of apostasy) was 
prohibited. The previously mentioned civil society opposition to the inclusion of 
complementarity of women to men also led to the phrasing of Article 28 being 
changed to equality. Ennahda eventually compromised and confirmed it would not 
impose Sharia as the main source of legislation.  
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Stepan argued that Tunisia adhered to the “Twin Tolerations” relationship between 
religion and politics during the 2011 elections, whereby religious citizens accept 
democratically elected officials of the state to govern and legislate. In turn, the state 
must permit religious citizens to express their views and values (Stepan, 2012). “In a 
democracy, religion need not be “off the agenda,” and indeed, to force it off would 
violate the second toleration” (Stepan, 2000). This may have been the case in the 
election but secular civil society still needed to exhibit tolerance towards the 
presence of Islamists in politics, therefore religion was not ready to be removed from 
the agenda. As an Islamist and leading party of the troika, Ennahda were under 
greater pressure than other parties to prove their democratic credentials and ability 
to compromise with other political actors. The post-election, constitution-writing 
period was marked as a time of reconciliation36 between the secular and Islamist 
differences in Tunisia’s national identity. This societal divide also manifested in civil 
society as groups supported different ideologies and parties. Understanding the 
difference between social and political activism is an aspect of a democracy learning 
process (Sadiki, 2015).  In addition, civil political culture is not an inherent civil 
society characteristic but is developed through the democracy learning process. As 
theories of democracy assert, civil society is a contributor to democratic transition 
and, as such, also needs to exhibit greater civility. A further aspect of understanding 
and measuring democratisation is assessing the extent to which civil political culture 
is imbedded.  
Donker (2013) addresses the difference between social and political Islamic activism. 
Under Bourguiba and Ben Ali, social expression of Islam was prevented via state 
repression and societal exclusion of religion while Islam in politics was branded a 
threat to the Tunisian economic model. The Ennahda election victory shattered this 
myth and highlighted “the necessity for Tunisian society to reconcile its effective 
social and political pluralism not only with categories of Western modernisation, but 
also its Muslim-Arab identity” (Merone and Cavatorta, 2013: 254). Ennahda had 
accepted democracy in the 1980s and favoured embracing a civil state; which led to 
                                                        
36 Transitology emphasises the importance of transitional justices but says little about social 
reconciliation. O'Donnell and Schmitter, ‘Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies’ (1986: 28-36) addresses the importance of transitional justice at state 
level, e.g. trials for perpetrators of state-ordered injustice, violence, or rights violations, but not at the 
social level of accepting difference political and religious views between people in the same populous. 
Grosescu’s work offers an additional critique of transitology’s overgeneralisations by concluding that 
“the comparative analysis of southern European, Latin American and eastern European cases 
indicates that there is no clear link between transitional justice and democratisation” (2013:6). 
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disagreement with pro-Sharia Salafists (Merone and Cavatorta 2013: 255), yet 
Ennahda’s intentions and credentials were constantly questioned. Indeed, Tunisians 
Leftists, such as the Democratic Patriots' Movement, remained suspicious of whether 
Ennahda, in conjunction with Islamist CSOs, were pursuing an ‘Islamist project’: with 
the eventual goal of turning Tunisia into an Islamic state. 
The aftermath of the revolution allowed previously marginalised people and 
suppressed opinions into the political sphere. With the former RCD at one end, 
Salafists represent the other end of the spectrum and are an important political and 
social actor. Furthermore, it also was an important part of the reconciliation for 
Tunisians to accept that Salafism is the product of both external and domestic 
factors. Merone and Cavatorta (2013) emphasise the indigenous origins of Tunisian 
Salafism in contrast to the assumption that the ideology was entirely imported after 
the revolution but, in addition, that it represents disenfranchisement with the 
dictatorship. When Ennahda embraced democratic practices and ideals, members 
disaffected with this approach formed the Tunisian Islamic Front (TIF) in 1986 
(Torelli, Merone, and Cavatorta, 2012:148). These members were drawn from those 
who had been either jailed or engaged in jihad in Bosnia or Afghanistan/Pakistan. 
Tunisia’s Salafi-Jihadists returned after the revolution and others were released from 
prison in amnesty. Ennahda, which “represent a new form of political Islam” (Torelli, 
2012: 6), was a unique case of being an Islamist party that was playing a mediating 
role between Salafists and secularists. Ennahda had to dispel secularist fears of using 
Sharia as a source of legislation, while being the only actor capable of negotiating 
with Salafists (Torelli, 2012: 11-13). Rashid Ghannouchi, who was a compromising 
democratic Islamist and the focal point of Ennahda, was key to this mediation. 
“Ghannouchi, whose experience in exile during the Ben Ali regime, in particular, 
appears to have fostered a commitment to principles of liberal democracy and 
pluralism” (Carey, 2013:2). Ennahda’s attempt to moderate and include Salafists in 
the political process demonstrates an attempt at pluralism and accepting difference 
rather than exclusion. Ennahda tried to integrate Salafists into the political process as 
Ghannouchi had hoped they would become “moderate over time” (Merone and 
Cavatorta, 2013: 267). Ennahda legalised the Salafist Jabhat al-Islah party on 29th 
March 2012 as a representation of political pluralism, to mobilise ultraconservatives 
away from jihadi-Salafism, and as an opportunity to embed Salafism in the political 
process. Merone and Cavatorta argue that the political system needs to integrate 
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Salafist demands, despite their incoherence, as the transition process will be 
strengthened by ensuring the disaffected are recognised (2013: 268). Al-Islah 
developed a political programme that addresses social, economic and cultural issues 
while referencing respect for pluralism, alternating power, and non-violence. 
However, their program represents incivility as Islam takes precedence over 
liberalism, the personal status code would be abolished, and the state would enforce 
only what religion has determined to be right (Torelli, Merone, and Cavatorta, 
2012:147). 
Secular-Islamist tensions were expressed prior to the October 2011 NCA elections 
when Nessma television channel broadcast the animated film Persepolis, in which 
God is depicted as an old man. Perhaps this was a deliberate move by Nessma to test 
the limits of freedom and media censorship in the run up to the elections. Angered by 
this scene which they consider blasphemous, thousands of conservative Tunisians 
marched in defence of public Islam as they felt laïques (seculars) were damaging 
Tunisia’s Islamic identity (Donker, 2013: 211). Some protests turned violent as 50 
demonstrators were arrested and Nessma chairman Nabil Karoui's home was 
firebombed. Karoui was later fined 2,400 dinars (£964) for "troubles to the public 
order" and "offence to good morals" (The Guardian, 2012). This incident 
demonstrated that freedom of expression was not unlimited with regards to religious 
matters. US Ambassador Gordon Grey added that the conviction “raises serious 
concerns about tolerance and freedom of expression in the new Tunisia” (Fisher, 
2012). 
Part of Tunisia’s social reassessment and subsequent need for reconciliation was the 
way Islamism had entered the political and public discourse. Public piety and levels 
of religious charity and education increased. The opening of political and social 
spheres meant Islamists were visible and active: “more women began to wear the 
headscarf, more men started growing a beard and some started wearing jalabas37 – 
previously impossible in public. Mosques opened between prayers, religious classes 
started and attendance of mosque prayers rose markedly in the ﬁrst period after the 
revolution” (Donker, 2013: 211). Furthermore, use of Islam became more prevalent 
in public debates, including televised debates that gave Salafists a platform (see 
Merone and Cavatorta, 2013:252-253). 
                                                        
37 A long loose-fitting unisex traditional North African outer robe. 
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Similar to the UGET/UGET clashes in the 1980s, the expression of Islam in 
universities focused attention on wearing the face-covering niqab in public 
institutions. Forbidden under Ben Ali, the niqab became an issue of freedom of 
religion and identity. These debates developed between those who believed in 
maintaining the secular character of higher education versus those who felt that 
radical secularists keeping elite positions e.g. the university dean, represented 
maintaining the old regime (Donker, 2013: 217). Clashes at universities coincide 
with the re-emergence of the UGTE in the wake of the revolution. UGET circles 
believed that “supporters of the Ennahda Movement remember very well that they 
managed to make their presence felt in the political arena during the 1980s and early 
1990s, primarily through their activities within the university” (Zabas, 2012). The 
Manouba University demonstrations were a turning point but highlighted the 
fracture in Tunisian society. Salafists joined protests and threatened staff over the 
right for female students to wear the niqab and the right for prayer space which 
spokesman for the Salafi students, Mohammed Bakhti, said is allowed in the United 
States, Britain and Germany (Middle East Online, 2012).  However, replacing the red 
and white Tunisian flag with the black, Salafist flag that bears the shahada 38 was 
controversial in Tunisia, especially in the midst of the polarised context which spread 
from Manouba to other universities as it mixed political issues with personal matters 
which “offended most Tunisians” (Mamelouk, 2012). Mamelouk summarises of their 
difference as follows: “Secularists view the Salafis as long-bearded closed-minded 
intolerant religious zealots and in return the Salafists view secularists as atheistic 
Francophiles who are anti-Arab and anti-Islam” (2012). It was this unwillingness to 
accept difference that characterised the societal polarisation. 
While some Islamists civil society groups focused on teaching or charity work and 
ensuring freedom of expression, CSOs that aimed to implement political or political-
religious agendas appeared to represent incivility that could threaten the transition. 
The issue was the confusion and ambiguity between two types of Islamist activism; 
one aimed at societal change and the other aimed at politically inﬂuencing post-
revolutionary Tunisia. Indeed, Donker notes that “sometimes board members were 
Nahdaoui (members of the Ennahda party) but they would always explicitly state 
that their organization was independent from the party” (2013: 212). 
                                                        
38 The Islamic declaration of faith: there is no God but God and Muhammad is His prophet. 
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Despite Ennahda’s efforts to appear moderate and committed to democratisation, 
civil society was divided along secular and Islamist lines. The ensuing dynamics 
between the two polarised camps suggested a relationship of intolerance and 
mistrust, which was exacerbated through violence. Mongi Rahoui, head of the 
Democratic Patriots' Movement, says he and other outspoken politicians experienced 
threats in what he viewed as a deliberate campaign by Ennahda to silence dissent 
(Ryan, 2013b). These threats were carried out by the Leagues for the Protection of 
the Tunisian Revolution (LPR); an example of violent incivility that was present in 
civil society. Formed in 2011 while Essebsi was interim Prime Minister and granted 
legal status in June 2012, the LPR “claiming to fight corruption and old-regime 
remnants” (Patel & Belghith, 2013). However, these neighbourhood groups, who 
were often Ennahda members and former political prisoners under Ben Ali, used 
aggression and violence to support an Islamist cause. They were accused of trying to 
intimidate opposition parties and incurred hostility from more secular types. In 
December 2012 the LPR violently broke up a trade-union rally39 while a pro-
Ennahda rally in February 2013 contained many league members.40 
The attack on the American Embassy led by Salafi extremists in September 2012 was 
the first incident in a series of events that altered Ennahda’s relationship with Jihad-
Salafists. The destruction clearly demarcated what were considered acceptable levels 
of protest or political expression. The attacks were a response to a US made video 
that deprecates Islam but became a decisive moment in the relationship between 
Ennahda and Salafists, with Ghannouchi openly declaring that (Jihadi) Salafists were 
a threat to the nation (Donker, 2013: 220). 
Freedom and pluralism existed which maintained an active civil society that could 
express themselves and affect NCA proceedings but the lack of trust, tolerance and 
equality in civil society meant that civility was only partially developing. The political 
assassinations in 2013 were a turning point in both Tunisia’s transition and the 
development of political civility. 
 
                                                        
39 The Economist (2013) Murder most foul, Available at http://www.economist.com/news/middle-
east-and-africa/21571474-assassination-secular-opposition-leader-forcing-islamist-led  
40 Al Jazeera (16 Feb 2013) Mass rallies in Tunisia for Ennahda party, Available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/2013216143220471317.html (Accessed 
13/2/2015) 
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7.2. Assassinations and Political deadlock in 2013 
Civil society protests became progressively less frequent from 2011 onwards, 
however, people continued to take to the streets when crises occurred. In response 
to the assassinations of leftist opposition politicians Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed 
Brahmi, on 25 July 2013, protests were held against Ennahda41 for the country’s 
security failings and the perception that the Islamist party’s ruling coalition had been 
too lenient on hard-line Islamists. These protests and calls for Ennahda to step down 
led to a political deadlock where members of the NCA froze their membership and 
NCA activities were officially suspended, meaning no progress was made on the 
constitution. Ennahda further distanced themselves from extremists, yet their 
apparent leniency on Jihadi-Salafism meant other political actors and the general 
public lost faith in their ability to govern and maintain security. The assassinations, 
however, had an important effect of unifying the nation. Similar to the 2011 
elections, it highlighted the vast majority’s preference for a peaceful transition, 
regardless of ideological difference, and identified who was against democracy.  
7.3. National dialogue and Ennahda’s step down 
The four largest and oldest CSOs, the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), the 
Tunisian Bar Association (ONAT), the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Crafts 
(UTICA) and UGTT, collectively also known as the ‘The Quartet’, played a vital role in 
overcoming this deadlock by establishing a ‘national dialogue’ (hiwar watani). The 
dialogue reduced political polarisation and paved the way for the Ennahda-led troika 
government to step down. In this process, major political party representatives were 
brought together to address the challenges posed by the deadlock and to negotiate 
agreements on how the transition could progress. This ad hoc civil society coalition 
was the only actor capable of securing the buy-in of all conflicting political parties, 
while simultaneously possessing the popular trust necessary to lead this process at 
such a critical juncture in the country’s democratic transition. The Nobel Peace Prize 
awarded to the quartet in 2015 is a testament to the significance of their 
achievement. Frazer (2014) notes that the initial recognition of interests was a key 
step to trust building between participants and could lead to the success of the 
process.  
                                                        
41 Reuters Available (23 Oct 2013) Thousands protest before Tunisia crisis talks, Available 
 at  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/uk-tunisia-crisis-idUKBRE99M0ML20131023 
(accessed 25/3/2015) 
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“Some members of the Quartet were also known to be close to the opposition 
and, as representatives of different sections of Tunisian society, all Quartet 
members had a stake in the outcome of the dialogue. For these reasons, 
Ennahda’s leaders were sceptical that the process could lead to a fair 
outcome. Initial tentative discussions between the parties and the Quartet, 
therefore, focused largely on the Quartet’s own interests in mediating. Only 
once the Quartet had explicitly acknowledged its own interests could it build 
trust and the discussions move forward.” 
Houcine Abassi, UGTT secretary general, “initiated a marathon of negotiations with 
representatives of political parties, civil society organizations and foreign 
ambassadors” (Ben Hamadi, 2015). The hours of negotiations, which he personally 
oversaw, included a secret meeting between opposition party Nidaa Tounes leader 
Beji Caid Essebsi and Rachid Ghannouchi in a Paris hotel. Prime minister of Ennahda 
government, Ali Larayedh, agreed to step down under the terms of the UGTT 
proposed roadmap which included the Islamist led government being replaced with 
a technocratic government to finalise the constitution and the formation of an 
independent electoral body to organise new legislative and presidential elections. 
Ennahda relinquished power in government but only because the players in the 
system found a compromise that revived the process forwards towards finishing the 
constitution and the next round of elections. Pikard (2015) praises Ennahda for the 
concessions and compromises they made, including the removal of references to 
Sharia law, in order to ensure that a constitution could be drafted which included 
external and public input and satisfied the vast majority of the NCA. He also credits 
all Tunisian political leaders for their part in the constitution making process. 
Ennahda’s political action had a reconciliatory effect on a divided Tunisian society as 
it allayed fears from secularists that Ennahda’s political intentions were to cling to 
power.  
Regarding the role of the UGTT, Samir Cheffi, deputy secretary-general, stated that 
“National dialogue and national consensus are the best solutions to solve 
disagreement.” Adding that Tunisian politicians had little choice but to engage in 
order to maintain transition, “away from making judgments about one party or 
another, we believe that our mission is to bring all parties closer, based on the 
initiative that we are proposing at the UGTT”. Comparing Tunisia to Algeria and 
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Egypt and noting Tunisia’s lack of economic resources, Cheffi emphasised that “the 
most important thing for us right now is to save the country from descending into 
violence" (Ryan, 2013c). Sadiki argues that the UGTT’s leading and moderating role 
in the National Dialogue process “has helped tone down ideologically driven divides 
and mutually exclusive political agendas, voices and forces” (Sadiki, 2014). 
Ennahda stepping down was a major turning point in the transition and an indication 
of civility in the political sphere. The inclusion of disparate actors, including a major 
role from the quartet from civil society, demonstrates pluralism and equality. It also 
implies that trust has been built; trust in the quartet’s mediation of the process and 
the roadmap, and trust in other political actors who would establish the new 
technocratic government. In addition, by demonstrating that the Islamist party had 
put Tunisia before their party interests, it helped develop trust between Ennahda 
and secular liberalists' who feared the former were aiming to transform the country 
into an Islamic state.   
7.4. New Constitution ratified and technocratic government appointed 
A draft that was deemed suitable to Islamist, secularist, leftist politicians alike, in 
addition to civil society insofar as it did not generate major objections, was accepted 
in NCA on 27th January 2014. 200 assembly members voted in favour, 12 against, and 
4 abstained, therefore greatly exceeding the two-thirds majority required for passage 
(Dreisbach, 2014). Compromises had been made throughout the two years of 
drafting, including the removal of references to Islamic law as a consensus was 
achieved. Although a constitution is only meant to establish broad concepts that the 
laws and decrees are left to elaborate on and the roles and rights of Tunisian CSOs 
are delineated in detail under Decree 88, there is a fleeting reference to civil society 
in the 2014 Tunisian Constitution. Article 139 mentions that “Local authorities shall 
adopt the mechanisms of participatory democracy and the principles of open 
governance to ensure broader participation by citizens and civil society...”42 Rather 
than guaranteeing rights to civil society, it enshrines their participation in the 
political process. The creation of a liberal constitution represents the establishment 
of a democratic institutional structure (Carothers, 2002: 7). This occurring three 
                                                        
42 Constitution of The Tunisian Republic, translated by Jasmine Foundation, Available at 
http://www.jasmine-
foundation.org/doc/unofficial_english_translation_of_tunisian_constitution_final_ed.pdf    
(accessed 17/8/2014) 
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years after the collapse of the old, authoritarian regime demonstrates, however, the 
slow pace of transition in Tunisia. 
Ennahda stepping down enabled the Mehdi Jomaa43-led technocratic government, 
which largely consisted of independents and technocrats, to temporarily take power, 
while preparing for parliamentary and presidential elections, as established in the 
national dialogue’s roadmap objectives. The Jomaa government represents the 
outcome of civil society action in creating, mediating and encouraging debate 
between political parties that facilitated the resolution of a political crisis. The non-
partisan, caretaker government seemed to be more popular than had the Troika and 
did not divide Tunisian public opinion to the same extent. An opinion poll by the 
Sigma polling agency after Jomaa assumed office, showed that nearly 70% percent of 
the public shared the view that the country “is heading in the right direction”, 
compared to the previous October, when only 15% shared this view (Romdhani, 
2014).   
The Jomaa government oversaw a greater step towards transparency as Tunisia 
joined Open Government Plan (OGP). In order to qualify to join OGP, the government 
had to undertake reforms relating to transparency, openness and citizen 
participation. The 2-year national action plan, finalised in September, included the 
government’s commitment to include CSOs in decision-making and the OGP steering 
committee includes government and CSO representatives. The implementation of the 
action plan, which has 22 commitments related to transparency reform along most 
sectors, is being monitored and later evaluated by CSOs: a step that would be 
consolidating democracy. Further evidence that incivility and violence were not 
tolerated in civil society was demonstrated when the LPR was banned on May 26 
2014. The group was accused of using violence to advance its political goals (Ben 
Said, 2014). Despite these reforms and commitments, CSOs also oversaw the 
implementation of the government agenda. For example, Tunisian youth CSO I-
Watch44 established the ‘Jomaa Meter’45 to monitor government performance related 
to promises made. 
 
                                                        
43 Former Enginner for Hutchinson/Total in France and Minister of Industry in Tunisia.  
44 I Watch homepage. Available at http://www.iwatch-organisation.org/ [Accessed 19/2/2014] 
45 Jomaa Meter. Available at http://jomaameter.org/?locale=en#.VcoERvNViko [Accessed 7/8/2015] 
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8. October 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential elections to February 2015 
inclusive coalition government  
A second successful post-revolution election was another important indicator that 
Tunisia was becoming a consolidated democracy. Nidaa Tounes won a parliamentary 
majority with 85 of the 217 seats (39.17%) while Ennahda came second with 69 
seats (31.79%), significantly less than the 89 seats (42%) they had held in the 
National Constituent Assembly following the 2011 elections (Martin, 2014). Nidaa’s 
presidential candidate, Beji Caid Essebsi, who had served in both Bourguiba and Ben 
Ali regimes, also won. In the build-up to the elections, civil society had encouraged 
voter registration and participation in the election process. Using their experience 
from 2011, civil society watchdogs and monitoring bodies ensured the election 
process was, once again, free and fair by designating more than 14,000 observers to 
supervise the elections in addition to personnel from the EU and Arab League 
(Chekir 2014: 4).  Despite the large numbers of mobilised civil society actors 
monitoring polling stations, it did not prevent violations, which CSOs also noted. A 
report by The Tunisian Association for the Integrity and Democracy of Elections 
(ATIDE) criticised the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) for their poor 
management of the elections.46 
After post-election negotiations, an inclusive coalition government was formed on 6th 
February 2015 and was approved by 166 of 217 members of parliament.47 The unity 
government including the two main parties, Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda, with two 
other smaller parties, Afek Tounes, and Union Patriotique Libre (UPL) and led by 
Prime Minister Habib Essid. Despite winning 103,000 votes and therefore 8 seats, 
Afek Tounes’s campaign focused on the party’s identity and unique characteristics, 
rather than battling the two major parties. Likewise, UPL’s 140,000 votes (16 seats) 
were largely gained by its promises to voters in rural and border regions (Chekir 
2014: 7-8). Although part of the opposition, Popular Front’s 124,000 votes (15) 
ensure leftist views are represented in the national assembly. This indicates that 
after splits and defections in the first years after the revolution (Sadiki, 2012), the 
                                                        
46 Association Tunisien pour l’Integrité et la democratie des elections, « Elections legislatives 2014 : 
Entre l’affirmation de la citoyennete et la faiblesse de l’ISIE », Tunis 31 Octobre 2014, Available at 
www.ATIDE.org [Accessed 10/12/2014] 
47 Al Jazeera (2015). Tunisia parliament approves unity government. 6 February. Available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/tunisia-approves-coalition-government-
150205123748042.html [Accessed 7/9/2015] 
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Tunisian political party landscape began to develop character and an identity partly 
due to the institutionalisation of tolerance of difference, plurality, and a developing 
democratic culture beyond the former regime’s myth of reform. This also can be 
attributed to a consolidation of democracy. 
Ltifi argues that comparing the 2011 to the 2014 elections shows that the 
polarisation was one of the community rather than political views and that Nidaa’s 
victory does not represent the return of the ancien regime. The Mouvement 
Destourien, headed by Hamed Karoui, a former prime minister during the reign of 
Ben Ali, and Kamel Morjane, a former foreign minister, won four seats and performed 
poorly in the presidential election.  “The victory also represents a change from the 
dilemma of Islam, the key word in the 2011 elections, to a new dilemma: that of the 
state” (Ltifi, 2014: 4) and from political Islam to national identity. Having already 
been removed after the national dialogue, the electorate registered their 
dissatisfaction with Ennahda’s failures at moderating Jihadi-Salafists, preventing the 
violent acts from the LPR, and improving the faltering economy. Ltifi believes the 
results are a sign of Tunisia leaning “towards greater political rationalism and 
realism” (Ltifi, 2014: 7).  
Despite the relative achievement of starting to overcome ideological polarisation, 
both Ltifi and Chekir (2014) recognise the significance of a lower youth turnout 
representing young people’s dissatisfaction with the transition process, poor results 
in improving employment prospects, and lack of faith in political actors. Youth 
engagement in the political process is key for continued democratic consolidation 
and is another mission in which civil society could further engage. 
9. Chapter Conclusion  
The Revolution was not a military or palace coup but a form of grassroots, civil action 
in response to worsening economic conditions, blatant state corruption by the ruling 
family, and police-state oppression which subsequently increased as a response to 
popular protests. Sustained popular pressure on the government to implement 
reform led, in turn, to pressure on political leaders from Ben Ali to Habib Essid . This 
popular pressure represented an oppositional-resistance manifestation of civil 
society action that demonstrated a confrontational relationship between the state 
and civil society. Top RCD figures, such as Mohammed Ghanouchi, may have played a 
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role in encouraging Ben Ali to leave but the RCD was dismantled in response to 
continued protests. In 2013, NCA members chose to suspend their activities but 
Ennahda stepped down in the face of continued civil action and mediation from the 
Quartet, demonstrating both confrontational and co-operational relationships 
between the state and civil society. 
The role of civil society was significant during the revolution and fundamental 
throughout the transition period that followed. During the revolution, civil society 
acted together against Ben Ali and then the remaining RCD politicians who sought to 
remain in power. After the revolution, newfound freedom established by the 
increasingly less authoritarian state in Decree 88 created a larger public space. This 
enabled civil society to dramatically expand and begin to perform a pro-democratic 
function by encouraging greater pluralism. Liberal-Associative CSOs operating in this 
space demonstrated democracy learning processes within organisations through 
increased freedom and pluralism. However, variation in ideological perspectives 
caused polarisation across society and shaped the manner in which CSOs interacted 
with each other. Mistrust and intolerance existed in relationships between CSOs with 
vehemently secularist or Islamist agendas.  
Tunisia’s post-revolution freedom has been established in the context of an 
authoritarian government legacy. Political culture does not change suddenly with a 
revolution or elections and, as a consequence of the authoritarian legacy, the macro-
level practices and discourses in Tunisian civil society have demonstrated political 
incivility during the democratic transition. For example, intolerance and mistrust of 
alternative socio-political perspectives, often regarding religion or support of 
political parties, has been evident. Nevertheless, civil society played a role in guiding 
Tunisia though the revolution and transition towards democratic consolidation.  
Tunisia’s democratic prerequisites have been vital to the transition’s success. 
Extensive state-building procedures and programmes were not required, as major 
elements of a political society already existed e.g. judiciary, state bureaucracy. After 
Ben Ali’s departure, the Tunisian government proceeded to function effectively and 
the country did not descend into civil war. Although a new constitution was drafted 
and ratified in 2014, it was largely inspired by the 1959 constitution, a document 
that guaranteed individual and political freedoms but which had not been respected 
by the former authoritarian regime.  
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Despite Tunisia’s transition not being rapid or meeting the great expectations that 
came with the revolution, this chapter has demonstrated civil society has been 
present, active, and influential since  the 2008 Gafsa uprising and throughout the 
2010-2015 period. The 2011 elections did not immediately lead to a consolidated 
democracy and the transition process stopped during the 2013 deadlock. However, 
the civil society-led national dialogue convinced the troika to relinquish power in 
order to see that the transition continued. Furthermore, civil society has been active 
and influential throughout the transition ensuring democratic consolidation has been 
occurring since January 2011, not only in the aftermath of the 2011 or 2014 
elections. Watchdog organisations (Al Bawsala, I-Watch, Mourikbouun) and 
democracy building, sensibilisation groups who have helped Tunisians transition 
from subjects to citizens and understand the meaning of citizenship, (CSID, JID, 
Touensa) had been working towards creating democracy in Tunisia since their 
inception.  
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CHAPTER SIX – QUALITATIVE SURVEY OF MEMBERS OF TUNISIAN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS 
1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses this thesis’ development, use, and analysis of an online, self-
completion attitude survey for members of Tunisian civil society organisations 
(CSOs) to assess the extent to which their political culture is civil. Firstly, it covers the 
theoretical and methodological considerations in the designing of this positivist 
method, including the piloting processes and subsequent alterations. The criticisms 
of the survey and issues of sample size are addressed. Secondly, it addresses the 
stages of data analysis that were undertaken: the use of frequency tables and bar 
graphs produced from Bristol Online Survey (BOS) and re-coding, index creation, 
cross-tabulation, t-test and ANOVA correlations created from the SPSS software 
package.  
From the small yet generalisable sample size, this chapter concludes that, after 
analysis of the discourse of Tunisian CSO members’ attitudes, values and beliefs, 
distinct characteristics of civil political culture (CPC) are evident in Tunisian civil 
society. While CPC is generally evident in attitudes of CSO members, the results 
identify variation within the surveyed CSO population. Female respondents are more 
likely to hold attitudes of Trust and Pluralism than males. Furthermore, when 
comparing responses based on ages groups and regions, ‘non-youth’ and ‘Interior 
region’ respondents are more likely to hold attitudes of Trust than ‘youth’ and 
‘coastal’ or ‘capital’ regions. This is significant because it identifies that all criteria of 
civil political culture do not develop simultaneously. This survey seeks to understand 
the political culture of CSOs but recognises disparity will exist amongst a 
heterogeneous selection of the overall Tunisian population. Questions that produced 
inconclusive results and reflections on survey process are also acknowledged.  
This chapter contributes statistical data analysis on attitudes, values and beliefs to 
this thesis. This creates understanding regarding the discourse manifestation of 
political culture while assessing its civility. This survey, like any other survey in 
isolation, is a ‘snapshot’ of Tunisian CSO political culture. However, it is just one of 
three methods, in addition to qualitative interviews and ethnographic participant 
observation. Therefore, this survey is a fundamental tool to understanding the 
attitudes, values and beliefs of Tunisian CSO members; the norms and discourses 
aspect of understanding political culture.  
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2. Hypotheses 
Hypotheses are required for effective data analysis and to determine what is 
expected to be seen in the data. One general hypothesis was made relating to civil 
political culture and an additional three hypotheses relating to the demographic 
differences. These differences are important because political culture is not static 
and Tunisian civil society does not exist in a vacuum; both are responsive to regional, 
generational, socio-economic, and gender differences. Furthermore, CSOs are often 
homogenous with regards to their members, who are more or less representative of 
a certain group, for example JID members are mostly middle-class youth from 
affluent neighbourhoods in the capital (see Chapter Eight). The experiences and 
changes affecting gender, age, regions in post-revolution Tunisia regarding their 
place in society in relation to others may affect members’ rate of CPC development.  
I. I expect to see evidence of civil political culture.  
This thesis seeks to demonstrate whether civil political culture (CPC) is evident in 
Tunisian CSOs and as this survey arranges questions pertaining to the six criteria of 
CPC into sections, from which indexes can be created,  it will demonstrate which are 
more evident or more strongly believed than others.  
Tolerance is easier to develop and show as it can manifest itself as an almost 
begrudging recognition rather than a deep acceptance of the ‘other’. However, I 
expect to see less evidence of Trust because Tunisian citizens had lived under a 
dictatorship where they did not trust the government. Regarding Hibou’s description 
of a general ambiance of mistrust in both the regime and others in society (2006: 
187), I predict Trust might require more time to develop.  
I expect the discourse of CSOs to reflect the desirability of financial transparency, 
while they may not necessarily adhere to or practice it. This would be due to the 
large number of CSOs in post-revolutionary Tunisia (approximately 18,000)48 and 
the government’s inability to enforce this ruling. Furthermore, the CSO law (Decree 
88) does not provide a sufficiently clear financial framework. Therefore, some CSOs 
fail to abide by the financial regulations either due to a lack of understanding of or 
                                                        
48 IFEDA (2014). Le centre d’information, de formation, d’études et de documentation sur les 
associations. Available at http://www.ifeda.org.tn/stats/francais.pdf [Accessed 11/6/2015] 
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attention to the framework, or their use of the Decree’s ambiguity to not declare 
funding.  
Freedom may be desirable for CSO members but respondents may be selective as to 
who they think is deserving of freedom. Tunisia’s Personal Status Code from 1956 
has enshrined gender equality and I expect to see this expressed. However, other 
forms of equality may not be evident as respondents may also be selective as to who 
they think is deserving of equality or not. These limitations of freedom and whether 
equality should be granted to all is evident in the polarisation that occurred between 
supporters of an Islamist political vision and those in favour of maintaining 
secularism. This political divide that manifested in society and might also be present 
in the public space and in the attitudes of CSO members.  
I expect to see evidence of Pluralism. In contrast to the co-opted political landscape 
of dictatorship, in post-revolutionary Tunisia there is a plurality of voices in the 
political sphere while democratic processes are occurring and being installed at 
national level. However, CSOs may still be organised and operate with ‘strong man’ 
leadership styles because the delegation abilities of CSO leadership may be less 
prevalent due to the lack of familiarity with collaborative work.  
Organisational culture of CSOs might also remain influenced by the vertical or 
hierarchical structures of dictatorship and CSOs operate as petit dictatorships 
whereby unilateral decisions are made by presidents which reflect their opinions 
and personality. It is equally plausible that this mode of operation is entirely rejected 
in a reaction against the dictatorship style of management and the new norm of 
operations is horizontally structured, free discussion based organisations. 
II. I expect to see a difference between youth and non-youth. 
Roy describes how the youth in the MENA region as changing and “feel less strongly 
bound to patriarchal customs and institutions that have been unable to cope with the 
challenges facing contemporary Middle Eastern societies” (2012:8). Indeed, the 
youth are credited with instigating the revolution (Ben Hassine, 2011) and factors of 
globalisation and Internet exposure suggest the Arab Youth does not share the values 
of their parents’ generation.  Whether this makes the youth more or less inclined to 
exhibit CPC remains to be seen. However, for under 26-year-olds, the definition of 
youth employed in this survey, their formative years were under Ben Ali rule. 
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Therefore their beliefs and values may have been shaped by dictatorship rather than 
global influences.  While they might be quicker to reject dictatorship cultures, it is 
also plausible that youth have adopted individualism rather than the co-operative 
elements required to foster CPC. 
III. I expect to see a difference between men and women’s responses.  
Tunisia’s Personal Status Code of 1956 is progressive in terms of rights for women, 
but Tunisia has remained a patriarchal society. Men may not be used to having their 
authority challenged, which suggests that women might show a greater affinity to 
democratic values.  
IV. I expect to see a difference between the regions.  
Interior regions are more socially conservative than the coastal or capital regions, 
which may demonstrate less progressive attitudes. However, social conservatism 
may not be contradictory to civic democratic culture. Larger urban areas, mostly 
found on the coast or capital may produce more individualism, while interior 
regions, with stronger community connections, could see greater evidence of trust 
and co-operation values. The historical neglect and lack of development that the 
interior regions have experienced might manifest in greater resentment towards 
government bodies and institutions. 
3. Design Process 
Chapter two establishes that the attitude survey questionnaire is a positivist method 
and outlines the use of surveys in political culture studies, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the method, and how they have influenced the design of the survey 
employed in this thesis. This thesis asserts that political culture manifests as Practice 
and Discourse, and the survey method focuses on the latter. To do so, it seeks to 
understand whether the beliefs, attitudes, and values of CSO members demonstrate 
CPC, which this thesis argues are required for CSOs to perform a democratic function. 
Therefore, the design process considered question types which were most suitable in 
understanding the criteria of CPC: Tolerance, Equality, Freedom, Pluralism, Trust and 
Transparency. The survey also asks questions that address behaviour (practice) of 
CSO leaders and members (survey sections 7, 8 and 9) but cannot observe the 
behaviour; it only accepts what respondents say about their practice: the discourse of 
the practice, so to speak. This subsection addresses question rationale, decisions to 
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conduct the survey online and in Arabic, the piloting process and results, overcoming 
disadvantages of the survey method and the criticisms received.  
3.1. Question rationale  
The rationale behind the development each question in the survey is established 
below and thematically addresses why questions were included, what issues they 
sought to uncover and what was aimed to be learned from them. More extensive 
details are included in the technical appendix. To start, the ‘About You’ section was 
designed to determine respondent demographics and ensure a representative 
sample. The six criteria of civil political culture (CPC), Tolerance, Equality, Freedom, 
Pluralism, Trust, and financial Transparency, were each given their own section. 
Section 7, ‘Democratic Practices’, inquires about attitudes towards democracy and 
which democratic practices exist in the respondent’s CSO. Section 9 specifically 
addresses organisational culture and Section 10 seeks to understand how 
respondents think civil society should be. 
3.2. Design considerations 
Seeking a high response rate, the survey was designed to be as easy to understand 
and easy to complete as possible. Therefore, continuity in question type was 
provided where possible. Firstly, when choices are provided, it is less demanding for 
the participant. Furthermore, “Open-ended questions rarely provide accurate 
measurement or consistent, comparable information across the whole sample” (Salant 
and Dillman, 1994: 80). With the exception of questions 48 and 49 (which gave an 
‘other, please state’ option) and 57 (which asked for the name of respondents’ 
organisation) respondents only had to ‘select’ questions from a continuum (ordinal) 
or list of options (nominal). Therefore the majority of questions are statements with 
close-ended, multiple choice response options with a five-point Likert scale. The use 
of a four-point Likert scale does not provide a midpoint and therefore forces 
respondents to answer. Therefore, this survey uses a five-point scale which allows a 
midpoint of a ‘do not know’ option and which does not force respondents into a 
definite answer or into a decision if they are genuinely undecided. An ‘Other’ option 
to the questions was not included and the online survey was also designed to not 
permit respondents to continue to the next page until they had completed all the 
questions. This was to ensure that respondents provided answers to every question, 
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rather than leaving gaps in the data.  The use of values (agree/disagree) instead of 
ranking numbers (1-5) is also less confusing. Hofstede used five-point value scales is 
his works on institutional culture (Hofstede et al, 1990). This survey draws 
inspiration from Hofstede’s methods and survey design due to the similarity between 
CSOs and intuitions (established in Chapter Two). 
Lewin’s 1939 study on leadership styles influenced Question 51: “Describe your 
manager’s leadership style.” In Lewin’s study, 10-year-old boys were assigned to 
different activity groups led by an adult who employed different leadership styles 
(Autocratic, Participative, Delegative) while the boys’ behaviour was observed over 
the course of 5 months. The name of each leadership style was not included because 
without an explanation they can be interpreted differently. Also, once translated into 
Arabic, their meaning could be distorted. Therefore Autocratic was defined as “makes 
decisions which reflect his/her opinions and personality” and Participative as “acts as 
a member of the team” (see Survey Questionnaire in Appendix).  Bureaucratic was 
also included to see how much disparity there is between practices and discourse 
amongst CSO managers and to their adherence to rules. 
Similar and recent attitude surveys conducted in the Tunisian context were used as a 
comparison and to aid the design of my own. Despite the differences in style and 
subject, surveys from Gallup, World Values Survey, Pew Global Attitudes Project, 
Zogby International, Arab Barometer, and BBC Media Action were used in the design 
process. The method of these surveys differs from an online one as they are 
conducted face-to-face by an interviewer who records the answers. This method for 
surveying was not implemented because it is too labour intensive, time-consuming, 
and lacks anonymity. 
I have chosen not to use a “refused” option because these questions are not 
sufficiently controversial to warrant refusal. Therefore, a “refused” or ‘I do not want 
to answer’ options have not been included. The ‘I don’t know’ midpoint option is 
sufficient if the participant decides to opt-out of a question.  In addition, the 
anonymity of the questionnaire should be sufficient to ensure respondents are not 
concerned by the repercussions of which option they select. Furthermore, 
“Nonresponse can distort the sample when individuals refuse to respond or cannot 
be contacted. Nonresponse to specific questions can distort the generalizability of the 
responses to those questions” (Schutt, 2011: 161). 
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The BBC Media Action (2013) survey uses a grid layout. A grid is more economical 
with space, but this layout had not use been used because it does not encourage the 
participant to read each question individually and increases the likelihood that the 
participant will ‘chose at random’. Buckingham and Saunders note that a clear and 
attractive layout is especially important for a self-completion survey (2004: 84). In 
addition, following the YouGov49 online opinion survey website’s format, one 
question at a time is more aesthetically pleasing and easier for the respondent to 
understand. All the questions from each section were placed on one page.  
The decision to conduct the survey using Arabic language was made for the following 
reasons. The use of only French would exclude certain sections of the Tunisian 
population, particularly residents of the south where French is less commonly 
spoken. Tunisians are more likely to read Arabic than French fluently because the 
education system is more orientated towards Arabic than French. Public school 
students start learning French as a foreign language in the third grade while maths 
and sciences are only taught in French at high school level. Furthermore, fluency in 
French is related to social class making it an elite language. Despite French not being 
an official language, it is widely understood in Tunisia due to the French colonial 
presence from 1881-1956.  Therefore, because French is the language of colonialism, 
its use in a foreign researcher’s survey could have been seen as an Orientalist 
practice. Newspapers, television news, official government statements in Tunisian 
are in Modern Standard Arabic50 (MSA) and using Arabic creates a more equal power 
balance between researcher and respondent. In addition, the 2014 Tunisian 
Constitution says “Tunisia is a free, independent, and sovereign state. Islam is its 
religion, Arabic is its language, the republic its system.”51  The 1959 Constitution states 
the same: “La Tunisie est un État libre, indépendant et souverain ; sa religion est 
l'Islam, sa langue l'arabe et son régime la république”52. The use of MSA for written 
questions was more appropriate than Tunisian Arabic because the latter is 
considered a dialect and is not a codified language, which would have been 
                                                        
49 YouGov.  Available at  https://yougov.co.uk/#/  [accessed 18/11/2013] 
50 Based on Classical Arabic, Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) is the standardized and literary form of 
Arabic used and understood throughout the Arab world in spoken in formal situations, higher 
education, sermons, media, and in courts of law. 
51 2014 Tunisian Constitution, Article 1, Jasmine Foundation (unofficial translation) 
http://www.jasmine-
foundation.org/doc/unofficial_english_translation_of_tunisian_constitution_final_ed.pdf  
52 The Tunisian 1959 Constitution. World Intellectual Property Organisation. Available at  
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/fr/tn/tn028fr.pdf  [4/12/2012] 
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problematic to create widely understood questions. Furthermore, the survey might 
not have been taken seriously since Tunisi is commonly used in informal contexts. 
Therefore, the survey did not benefit those who are more comfortable speaking 
French. Had the survey only been available in French, this would have been 
convenient for upper/middle class residents of Tunis aka Tunisois but would have 
excluded the majority of the population. Therefore survey respondents would have 
been from a particular demographic of CSOs and would have been less 
representative of the wider CSO population.  
The decision to conduct the survey online was made for logistical and 
methodological reasons. Through the piloting process with Tunisia Live and my 
experience of working with JID in the ethnographic study (see Chapter Seven), I 
realised that the initial plan of conducting the survey in paper format would be an 
unsuitable solution for the following reasons. Firstly, CSOs do not always operate like 
businesses, some are voluntary, and therefore they are not ‘in the office’ all together 
at the same time, making it difficult to be present to clarify any questions. Secondly, 
the practical and logistical issues of distributing and collecting surveys, in different 
parts of Tunisia, in addition to the data entry process would be time consuming. 
Indeed, Watt et al. note that “using web-based evaluation questionnaires can bypass 
many of the bottlenecks in the evaluation system e.g. data entry and administration” 
(2002: 327). Therefore, an online survey’s support software will automatically 
organise the date and would not require me to manually input the results.  
Furthermore, conducting a survey online has various advantages which made it 
suitable for my study. 1) It has greater outreach as an online survey does not require 
me to personally give the surveys to each respondent or CSO. I emailed the survey’s 
online link to the bureau exécutif of each CSO, which I asked them to send and 
forward to their members. An online survey has the potential to increase the number 
of respondents because it does not require the researcher to physically distribute 
and collect the survey form. 2) Greater convenience for the respondent as the survey 
can be completed in the respondent’s leisure or in own time. 3) Easier data 
monitoring as the support software instantly indicates what data has been collected 
and makes the data easier to organise. 4) The data will be compatible with SPSS, 
standard academic operating software for the analysis process. 5) By electronically, 
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instead of personally, distributing and collecting the surveys, and automatic instead 
of manual data entry, the time costs will be considerably reduced.  
3.3. Piloting process  
In addition to possessing suitable knowledge of the subject matter during the survey 
creation process, piloting a survey before undertaking research is an important and 
necessary process. The piloting process ensured that any ambiguities in the phrasing 
of the questions were removed and any unclear terms were clarified. Moser and 
Kalton refer to piloting as a dress rehearsal and describe various benefits of the 
process (1985, 47-52), such as ensuring that research is not conducted with 
unsuitable questions because this increases the likelihood of producing inaccurate 
data. Considering how respondents may react to questions is another vital matter to 
address. The questionnaire was piloted in order to test the following issues. 
1. Flow; whether the questions fit together, if there are smooth transitions, and 
one question leads into the next or if the order is confusing.   
2. Do questions jump from one topic theme to another?  
3. Timing; how long it takes to complete?  Whether some elements should be 
cut? 
4. Whether the respondent interest and attention levels are tested; if 
respondents get bored or if the questionnaire is too long.  
5. If the wording or the phrasing of questions is ambiguous.  
6. If the respondents feel as if they are being led to give certain answers. 
7. If there are any questions likely to offend or make the respondent 
uncomfortable.   
8. If there are any problems with the quality of the translations. 
9. If respondents felt like they wanted to explain any of their answers or give 
more details.  
For further details on the pre-piloting and piloting processes, see Chapter Six 
Technical Appendix. 
The pre-piloting process produced the following recommendations. The options in 
certain questions required clarification e.g. in Q3 because the education systems in 
Tunisia and UK are different. In Q6, the terms ‘Atheist’ and ‘Agnostic’ were explained. 
Certain terms needed developing, for example ‘media’ in Q14 was developed to 
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include a specific definition; newspapers, television, radio, etc. Some questions used 
academic language which made them inaccessible. Ambiguous or Western-centric 
ideas, like gender equality, were rephrased, to just men and women. Some questions, 
particularly those regarding management style and working culture were too vague 
and included terms that required explanation. In the Arabic translations for Q49 and 
Q51 on leadership and culture, the terminology was dropped, because it was 
misleading, and only descriptions were given.  
Following the results and feedback from the piloting process, major improvements to 
the following questions were made. In Q6 the ‘Salafi’ and ‘Spiritual Muslim’ options 
were removed, so that the question only includes ‘practising Muslim’ or ‘non-
practising Muslim’. These options remove any prejudgment about how the 
respondents chose to pursue Islam, which may have caused discomfort.  How 
respondents chose to practice Islam is a personal and possibly highly nuanced 
variable. If it is suggested that there is a difference between someone who pursues 
Islam in their private life but does not see it as having a public role (political, Jihadi, 
Salafi, Sufi, Spiritual etc), this implies a prejudgement. Instead, the recognition of the 
variation will have to be revealed through reconciling respondent answers to this 
question with their answers to the other survey questions.  
Q17, “CSOs should be allowed to pursue any goals they desire”, was unclear, therefore 
“as long as their means and methods are non-violent” was added to the statement. 
Even the most liberal and tolerant person would not be prepared to admit that 
violence is an acceptable method of operation for a CSO. In Tunisia, The National 
Leagues for the Protection of the Tunisian Revolution (see Chapter Four) became 
unpopular due to their aggressive methods and the Tunisian government forced 
them to cease operating when they adopted violent means. Weber argues the state 
holds ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’ (1946: 334) to which 
citizens defer as part of a ‘state-citizen’ agreement. If the state monopolises violence, 
there is no space for CSOs to employ violent means. Therefore, if respondents 
disagree with Q17, it suggests that the CSO population find some goals acceptable 
and others not, even if they are non-violent. 
Respondents found Q22 had ambiguity regarding some groups as they asked, ‘What 
do you mean by ‘some/certain groups?’ Suggesting that not allowing certain groups to 
operate, irrespective of their goals, implies a degree of intolerance. Holding the belief 
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that certain people or groups cannot be involved is not a true manifestation of liberal 
democracy. Indeed, there are limitations to freedom and a line should eventually be 
drawn regarding groups that incite hatred or violence. A UK group like the English 
Defence League might be unpopular yet they are still legal and are allowed to express 
their voices. This, and other extreme groups, may be largely unpopular, but on the 
condition that their methods are not violent and their presence and activities do not 
present a danger to the public, they should be allowed to operate. Freedom and 
Democracy are not about agreeing with everyone, but creating a platform for people 
to freely express themselves, so long as this does not encroach on other people’s 
freedoms. Q22 was therefore rephrased as “There are some groups or organisations 
which are too dangerous to the common good to be allowed to operate” 
In Q49 and Q51 the ‘terms’ were removed so respondents could focus on just the 
explanations. This enables the respondents to focus on the meaning rather than just a 
term, which can be interpreted differently by different people. Terms like ‘Autocratic’ 
and ‘Bureaucratic’ often imply negativity, while both can have positive attributes, for 
example ‘Autocratic’ can mean the organisation is efficient and if the president is a 
passionate and driven leader, that can be inspirational for the staff. It does not 
necessarily mean that the organisation is undemocratic or corrupt. ‘Bureaucratic’ has 
the advantage of being potentially more rigorous, or that its procedures help to form 
a certain culture in the organisation or to help the organisation operate in a certain 
way. 
Not every issue from the pilot test was amended. To some respondents, Q16 was 
ambiguous and various rewordings were offered. I disagreed with their assessment 
as there is no ambiguity to the statement ‘Non-Muslim Tunisians are entitled the 
same rights as Muslim Tunisians.’ It tests the respondent's prejudice to towards non-
Muslims. Suggesting that Tunisians should be treated differently based on whether 
they are Muslim or not is an indicator of intolerance.  
3.4. Overcoming disadvantages, sampling methods and boosting response 
rate  
There are disadvantages to conducting an online survey which can influence the 
sampling method. This online survey is designed to be as clear as a paper copy. An 
introductory statement is included to explain the purpose of the research to ensure 
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respondents understand what is being asked of them providing further clarity. Each 
page of the survey is for each section and simple instructions are given. 
The survey sample needs to be representative of the wider CSO population in order 
to have valuable data. This subsection identifies how these two interconnected 
problems were addressed. Firstly, only CSO members with Internet access can 
complete the survey in this format. As of 31/12/2013, less than a month before my 
survey was launched, the number of Internet users in Tunisia was 4,790,634; 43.8% 
of the population and 37% of homes have Internet access53. According to the BBC 
Media Action survey results, “29% of Tunisian households have access to at least one 
desktop computer, and 34% have access to at least one laptop computer. 30% of 
Tunisians used the Internet “today or yesterday” and 60% access the Internet at least 
once a day.”54 These rates of Internet connectivity in Tunisia were sufficiently high 
for an online survey and, for the majority of my research, I contacted CSOs who had 
websites or Facebook pages55. Tunisian CSOs often conduct their activities via 
Facebook, because it is cheaper than paying for their own website. The sample 
population of an Internet survey presents a bias in favour of Internet literate users 
and CSOs. Small, rural community CSOs may be less frequently using the Internet but 
I concluded that sufficient numbers of CSOs members will have Internet access; 
either at home or through their organisation.  This online survey regrettably 
excludes those who are not Internet literate, those who do not have Internet access, 
and ‘hard-to-reach’ respondents.  
Secondly, the inclusion criterion for the survey was that the respondent had to be a 
member of a CSO, therefore I had to ensure that only members of CSOs completed it. 
Besides reading from the IP address of the respondents, there is no way to check who 
is responding to an online survey.   Therefore, the opening page clearly explained 
that the survey is for CSO members only. Furthermore, a 57-question survey is 
sufficient to deter non-CSO member time wasters. Regarding distribution, I 
controlled who the survey website address was given to by contacting the bureau 
exécutif of the CSO and asked them to privately distribute the website of the survey 
                                                        
53 Internet World Stats: Tunisia, Available at http://www.Internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#tn  
[Accessed 1/12/2014] 
54 BBC Media Action (2013) Audience Survey, Tunisia, Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/publicationsandpress/research_summary_tunisia_october2013.h
tml[accessed 11/12/2013] 
55 On Dec 31st 2012 Tunisia had 3,328,300 Facebook subscribers, a 31.0% penetration rate. Tunisia 
Available at http://www.Internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#tn  [Accessed 1/12/2014) 
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to their members.  I also shared the link directly by targeting organisations via email 
to reduce the response rate from the people I did not want to include.  
The survey maintains anonymity, despite being online, because respondent names 
were not collected. The last question asks which organisation the respondent works 
for. This was not to jeopardise the anonymity of the questionnaire but to ensure only 
civil society members answered the survey and a sufficient range of organisations 
were collected to ensure that the survey sample is representative. The survey does 
not include highly controversial questions, therefore, I did not anticipate revealing 
the respondent’s organisation being a problem. However, the survey did receive 
some erroneous answers e.g. “I don’t want to say” and the falsely named “the union of 
blabla” 
The third issue was regional distribution. Although the population of Tunisian civil 
society members will be smaller and different to the Tunisian population in general, I 
have used INS statistics from the ‘2013 Population Census’ to develop a guideline 
which ensures a representative survey sample.  The Tunisian Population is 65% 
Urban / 35% Rural and 51% Male / 49% Female. Question 5 of the survey 
questionnaire asked: “Which region of Tunisia are you ‘originally’ from?” This is an 
‘attribute’ question which is used to determine the parameters and variables through 
which the survey data will be analysed and to establish the demographics of the 
survey population. In addition, it ensures that the population sample is 
representative of the Tunisian population. I grouped the 24 governorates into 7 
regions. By using statistics from the 2013 Population census56, a population spread 
by region estimation can be created. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
56 Institut National de la Statistique Tunisie, Tunisia, Available at http://www.ins.nat.tn/indexen.php 
[Accessed 11/12/2013] 
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Region  Governorates Population 
Percentage 
Percentage 
of CSOs in 
region57 
Survey 
response 
percentage 
Grand 
Tunis 
Ariana, Tunis, Ben Arous, 
Manouba 
23.4% 24.2% 36.3% 
North Bizerte 5.2% 2.7% 6.9% 
North 
West 
El Kef, Béja, Zaghouan, 
Jendouba 
10.6% 11.1% 2.0% 
West 
Coast 
Nabeul, Sousse, Monastir, 
Mahdia, Sfax 
30.7% 24.2% 29.4% 
Centre Kairouan, Kasserine, Siliana 11.5% 14.6% 4.9% 
South 
Central 
Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid 7.1% 6% 6.9% 
South Tozeur, Gabès, Kebili, 
Medenine, Tataouine 
11.5% 17.2% 13.7% 
 
For a CSO member data sample that is accurately comparable to the Tunisian 
Population, it was necessary to ensure that none of these 7 regions was widely over 
or under-represented in the survey. The table above demonstrates reasonably 
similar distribution albeit notable overrepresentation of Grand Tunis and 
underrepresentation   the North West and Centre regions. However, the population 
of CSO Members is not entirely similar to the Tunisian Population and no source 
could provide a reliable figure. Further data from Ifeda, a CSO information platform, 
shows that the majority of CSOs are based in the Grand Tunis and West coast regions 
(24.2%) but the former is overrepresented in the survey. The North is also 
overrepresented while the North West and Centre are underrepresented. However, 
the number of CSOs in each region does not correlate to the number of members in 
each organisation. 
A fundamental challenge of a survey is the ability to reach respondents and online 
surveys have their own unique limitations. Firstly, as mentioned above, online 
surveys exclude those who are Internet illiterate. Those who do not have Internet 
access become hard-to-reach respondents. However, this was not a major obstacle 
considering the demographics of the respondents, the survey population is CSO 
members, not for example nomadic peoples in regions without electricity. Secondly, 
there are possible cooperation problems.  Although online surveys in many fields can 
attain response rates equal to or slightly higher than that of traditional modes, 
                                                        
57 IFEDA - Le centre d’information, de formation, d’études et de documentation sur les associations. 
Available at http://www.ifeda.org.tn/fr/index.php?id_page=13&lang=fr [Accessed 11/12/2013] 
  
161 
 
Internet users today are constantly bombarded by messages and can easily delete 
your advances.  
Two sampling methods were used for this survey; targeting and snowballing.  People 
in CSOs were specifically targeted by emailing their organisation’s websites and 
Facebook pages asking them to complete the survey. After conducting interviews 
with a CSO manager or lead (Chapter Six), I politely asked him/her to complete the 
survey and encouraged them to distribute it to their members.  Personality goes a 
long way and entering an office ‘in person’ can increase the probability that CSO 
members complete the survey. Wherever possible, I tried to greet as many members 
of the organisation, after the interview, as possible and asked them to complete the 
survey.  This face-to-face trust aspect is important in the Tunisian context.   
Informally, through meeting people at civil society events, I told them about the 
survey, collected their email address, and sent the survey to them also asking them to 
send the survey to their colleagues. Through social media, I posted the survey on my 
Facebook wall and asked my friends to ask their friends to re-post the survey on 
their Facebook walls. This ‘word of mouth’ process of promoting the survey 
represents a ‘snowballing’ approach to sampling.  These targeting and snowballing 
approaches of distributing the survey meant that there was no way to calculate the 
overall response rate, other than comparing to the number of responses I hoped for; 
1000. 
Boosting the response rate was necessary because the problem of a lower than 
expected response rate was encountered after the survey was launched. Nulty’s 
judgement, that “Response rates to online surveys... are nearly always very much lower 
than those obtained when using on-paper surveys” (2008: 312) was correct in the case 
of this research as it became difficult to impress upon people to complete the survey. 
Two approaches to boosting my survey response rates were used. Firstly, issuing 
repeat reminders the names of the organisations represented, then I reminded non-
respondent organisations who I had already interviewed. As recommended by 
Zúñiga (2004), I ‘persuaded respondents that their responses will be used’ for the 
purpose of my Ph.D. research in the hoped that this would make them realise the 
value of their response. Secondly, a ‘snowballing’ method whereby the people who 
had been asked to complete the survey (study subjects) would ask more subjects, 
from among their acquaintances to also complete the survey was also used. Since the 
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CSO community often knows each other, through mutual projects and events, this 
was considered to be effective. There are implications and caveats with snowballing 
because there is less control over who the survey reaches and it can create a 
community bias which makes the survey sample less random and driven by the 
respondents. However, a diverse range of people and types of organisations within 
civil society and geographically across Tunisia had been interviewed which means 
the community bias would have been weak. Diversity is evident as 55 different 
organisations were represented. See Technical Appendix for a full list of 
organisations. 
Incentives or prizes for completing the survey were not included because that would 
require respondents to include their email address and therefore compromise the 
anonymity of the survey. Based on the piloting survey results, respondents were 
informed completing the survey would only take about 15 minutes and respondent 
of anonymity was affirmed on the first page of the survey.  
“This survey is anonymous and your responses will be treated as confidential, i.e. 
the survey results will be reported in aggregate only and no individual details 
will be disclosed”. 
 
3.5. Criticisms of the survey 
In the feedback I received from people who completed the survey, there were two 
main complaints; length of the survey and the question about religion. Firstly, the 
survey was long because it aimed to address a number of issues, and was therefore 
divided into 10 sections. Quinn (2002) recommends the obvious by suggesting 
keeping questionnaires brief because “the less time it takes for a student to complete a 
survey, the more likely it is they will do so” (Nulty, 2008: 305). Indeed, four different 
people who had completed the survey told me that it was a struggle to complete. 
However, the survey was long and included questions of a similar nature to increase 
reliability. It was considered in the design process that because Gallup, World Values 
Survey, Pew Global Attitudes Project, Zogby International, Arab Barometer surveys 
were over 100 questions in some cases, then 57 questions would have been 
acceptable.  
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Although the five-point Likert scale and ‘tick the box’ format made the survey easy to 
complete, it became evident, unfortunately, that 57 questions for a self-completion 
online survey are too arduous.  
Secondly, Question 6, about religious beliefs, caused some problems for respondents. 
Q6. How would you describe your religious belief?    
 Practicing Muslim 
 Non-Practicing Muslim 
 Agnostic  (Belief the existence of God cannot be proven or disproven) 
 Atheist  (Belief there is no God) 
 Other 
 Not sure 
 
The majority of the problems with this question were addressed during the piloting 
and feedback from various Tunisians and academics, for example by changing the 
phrasing of the question and by removing the ambiguous and inappropriate options 
of ‘Salafist’ and ‘spiritual Muslim’. However, two people with whom I had conducted 
one to one for Chapter Six, with emailed me explaining their refusal to distribute the 
survey because it made them ‘uncomfortable’, they thought it was not relevant, and 
they did do not want to talk about religion. Sonya Ben Yahmed, Association 
Tunisienne Femmes Démocrates, told me that religion is not part of their association 
and that “We are a secular society and our religious choices concern only us” (Email 
dated 13th March, 2014). Sami Tahri, UGTT Spokesman, also took issue with the 
religion question saying that,  
“With regards to the questionnaire, I think it poses a serious problem in the 
question relating to the faith. This is not an issue within the Tunisian society, 
or some parties would like to impose this issue that is foreign to Tunisia. The 
questions should be oriented towards the social aspects for NGOs dealing with 
social issues and otherwise for other NGOs. That's why I cannot disseminate 
the questionnaire.”  (Email dated Monday, June 09, 2014) 
In retrospect, the sensitivity of this question should have been recognised and that 
the inclusion of “I do not want to answer this question” or “refused” options would 
have meant that respondents who felt uncomfortable with this question could have 
still completed the survey. However, this decision was not taken because this survey 
sought to collect fully useable answers rather than missing data. Also, the Tessler 
(2002) survey study on Islam and political culture (reviewed in Chapter Two) gave 
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the impression that questions regarding religion were appropriate. Unfortunately, 
the BOS survey does not allow modifications to a survey once it has been launched, 
therefore it was not possible to address or amend this issue once complaints were 
received. 
Perhaps there would have been a far greater number of responses if the 
demographic ‘religion’ question was not included, yet the unwillingness to answer 
this question suggests to me that sensitivity regarding religion and “religious belief” 
potentially indicates an underlying intolerance in a society; either by the respondent 
or how he/she will think others will perceive them. 102 responses were received and 
only 2 direct complaints were made. It is also possible there were others who did not 
register a complaint but chose not to complete the survey because of their sensitivity 
to this question. Although it proved problematic for the survey results, the aversion 
from some respondents to the religion question suggests that respondents who did 
not want to answer the religion question are sensitive about religion. It might also 
imply a default secular position that some CSOs hold. The UGTT email does not 
indicate a rejection of religion as a divisive political category, but rather that the 
organisation does not want to proliferate the existence of an Islamist/Secularist 
divide in Tunisia. On the other hand, it could represent their aversion to a white, 
European researcher trying to study them from within a narrow box defined by their 
supposed religion or trying to correlate their attitudes, values, and CSO practices 
with Islam. 
4. Survey Results 
4.1. Data analysis process 
The survey was available for 7 months from 20th January to 20th August 2014.  It was 
not kept open for longer to avoid the risk of socio-political events overtaking, and 
therefore influencing, the research period. After closing the survey, the data was 
analysed by using the following different statistical models and data manipulation 
tools, each of which has a particular focus: Frequency tables, data-recoding, the 
creation of indexes, t-test and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test. 
Firstly, the results were organised into descriptive statistics of frequency tables that 
featured bar charts and percentages for each question in the survey. During this 
analysis of individual variables through figures and charts, the following questions 
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were asked: Do patterns occur? Which results are anomalies? Which questions 
produced inconclusive results? Disaggregated data analysis was conducted by 
analysing the data question by question and looking for overall conclusions in each 
section of the survey. For these results in frequency tables with bar charts, see 
technical Appendix. 
Secondly, recoding of the data helps produce more accurate crosstabulations, 
therefore recoding the demographics of Age and Region into dichotomous and 
trichotomous variables for more precise analysis. Recoding and disaggregating the 
survey population by Age, Gender, and Region might highlight nuances in the data. 
Question 2 demonstrated that the data is skewed because 50% of respondents are 
under 25 years old and 50% over 25. This was re-coded into a Youth Vs Non-Youth 
dynamic.   Also, due to the low number of responses from North, North West, Centre, 
South Central and South regions, these were pooled into one group (Interior) in 
order to create a more meaningful comparison to Capital and Coast. This may appear 
reductionist but the Interior regions have been historically neglected and left 
underdeveloped by the former dictatorships, therefore the people may have different 
attitudes from those who lived in the more economically and infrastructurally 
developed coastal and Capital areas. The crosstabulation table below demonstrates a 
more even distribution between 3 regions than 6. See frequency table for Q5 in 
Technical Appendix. The income, education level, and religious belief variables were 
not used for SPSS analysis because they were not useful or did not require further 
analysis. 
 
Region 
Total Capital Coast Interior 
What is  
your gender? 
Male 23 11 18 52 
Female 14 19 17 50 
Total 37 30 35 102 
 
Thirdly, indexes were created by pooling the sections of the survey in groups of 
questions which are related to the six criteria of civil political culture (CPC). This was 
performed in order to highlight trends or associations between demographic 
variables (Age, Gender, and Region) and criteria of CPC (Tolerance, Equality, 
Freedom, Pluralism, Trust, and financial Transparency). Creating Indexes averages a 
range of variables into an index.  By merging questions on the same subject, such as 
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Section 2: Questions 7, 8, and 9 which address values and beliefs regarding tolerance, 
a Tolerance Index was created. Indexes for the other aspects of CPC (Equality, 
Pluralism, Trust, and financial transparency) except Freedom were created.  
It was not possible to create an effective or meaningful index for Freedom because a 
score of 5 in Q17-19 and 27 represent greater values of freedom than a score of 1, 
whereas in Q21, 24, 26 a score of 1 represent greater values of freedom. Therefore, 
the index would be misleading and inaccurate. Furthermore, the questions address 
different aspects of freedom; respondent’s values of freedom in addition to the 
freedom they are afforded by the Tunisian state. Despite the questions being 
significant on an individual basis, it was only during the indexing process that I 
realised the questions in the Freedom Section should have been phrased in a manner 
which can be grouped. Values and beliefs in freedom were instead analysed via 
descriptive statistics of Frequency Tables. Creating an index for institutional culture 
questions was also not possible because the questions’ options were not all 
ordinal/numerical on a five-point Likert scale and some were frequency questions 
and some were nominal variables. Therefore, these questions produced different 
types of answers which could not be grouped into an index. 
Using the average scores from all respondents demonstrated which of the six aspects 
of CPC are most prevalent in the respondent’s attitudes. The score is from 1-5, 1 
lowest and 5 highest, based on the five-point Likert scale choices. 
 
4.3
4
3.72 3.73
4.4
Tolerance Equality Pluralism Trust Financial
Transparency
Index average scores 
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Fourthly, after re-coding demographic variables and creating indexes, it was possible 
to perform T-tests. By testing two ‘independent58’ means, these tests display whether 
a ‘degree of association’ or correlation between a dichotomous demographic variable 
(Youth/Non-Youth and Gender) and an index existed or not. These tests look at the 
differences between two different groups. Like Crosstabulation, a T-test requires a 
theoretical reason to compare a variable to an index in order to check for an 
association.  These t-tests were conducted to test the four hypotheses on pages 146-
148. 
Finally, the region variable has three categories, a trichotomus variable, which 
cannot be run with the T-Test function. Therefore an ANOVA test was required to 
test the means of three or more groups. These tests show whether an overall 
difference exists between the three groups of Capital, Coast, and Interior populations 
when tested against the 5 Indexes from aspects of CPC (Tolerance, Equality, 
Pluralism, Trust, and financial transparency.) 
 
4.2. Results 
Number of responses  102 
Gender representation  51% men 
49% women 
Highest represented age group 74.5% between 18-35  
Age distribution 50% Over 26  
50% Under 26 
Number of different organisations 
represented 
55 
Highest represented region Greater Tunis (36.3%) 
Educational Level 89.2% undergraduate degrees or higher 
Religious beliefs 78.4% Muslim  
21.6% Agnostic, Atheist, Other, or Not sure. 
 
The results show an even gender distribution but a skew towards capital and coastal 
cities meaning the interior regions were less represented. The number of 
respondents was lower than anticipated which means the results cannot claim to be 
entirely representative of Tunisian CSOs members. However, the regional, age, and 
                                                        
58 An Independent variable is used to explain or predict a response, outcome, or result. It is thought to 
be the cause of some effect. Field, Andy (2013). Discovering Statistics using IBM SPSS Statistics, 
London: Sage Publications Ltd, 4th edition 
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gender distributions in relation to the Tunisian populations, the range of 
organisations represented, in addition to the inclusive factor of the survey being 
conducted in Arabic means that the results are fairly generalisable. Therefore the 
results constitute indicative data.  
To summarise the results, the values, beliefs and attitudes that are in accordance 
with CPC are evident amongst the Tunisia CSO members who participated in this 
survey. There are some inconclusive issues, that are addressed on an individual 
basis, but the frequency table analysis and indexes largely demonstrate CPC. A 
similar organisational culture is not evident which suggests that institutional 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) does not exist amongst Tunisian CSOs. This 
finding demonstrates the vibrancy and diversity of CSOs in Tunisia. The following 
paragraphs analyse the results from each section of the survey and of each criterion 
of CPC. 
Section 1 – Demographics (1-6) – show that while Gender, Age, and Region were 
useful variables for comparison, Education level demonstrated that the CSO 
population is highly educated. The monthly income question proved to be inaccurate 
because some respondents are students, whose income is provided by their families. 
This made it difficult to determine any coloration between income and class. Most 
respondents are practicing or non-practicing Muslims (78.4%) while 21.6% were 
Agnostic, Atheist, Other, or Not Sure. This indicates that personal faith and religious 
beliefs are not related to civil society values. Furthermore, that civil political culture 
is not at odds with Islam.  
Section 2 – Tolerance (7-9) – demonstrates high levels of tolerance towards working 
together with other CSOs, co-operating for mutual goals, and other CSOs pursuing 
their goals on the condition that they are peaceful.  This is represented in the 
Tolerance Index average score of 4.3. The t-test results demonstrate that Women 
were more tolerant (See appendix for table). The P value of 0.011 is less than 0.05, 
therefore there is some evidence that there is an association between Gender and 
Tolerance. The comparison of means displays a 0.28 difference between Men (4.17) 
and Women (4.45). This indicates that male respondents demonstrate fewer values 
of tolerance than female respondents. This result confirms the hypotheses of 
difference in results between Men and Women.  
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Section 3 – Equality (10-16) – demonstrates almost complete agreement with 
equality to female participation, accesses to media, right to pursue cultural 
preference of choice and Non-Muslim Tunisian’s participation in Tunisian civil 
society. There is less agreement regarding CSOs with secular or religious agendas 
and the inclusion of former RCD members. The complete agreement in all but two 
areas is demonstrated in the Equality Index average score of 4. 
Questions 10 and 11 show no overall agreement regarding whether groups with 
specifically secular or religious agendas should be active in civil society. There is 
more acceptance of groups with secular agendas, 62.8% (47.1% and 15.7%), than 
groups with religious agendas, 46.1% (36.3% and 9.8%). This suggests Tunisian CSO 
members are unsure and in disagreement as to whether CSOs should be allowed to 
have political agendas but demonstrates less suspicion of secularist CSOs. Question 
12 shows no overall agreement regarding the inclusion of former RCD members in 
civil society. 40.2% (34.3% and 5.9%) agree with their inclusion while 43.1% (22.5% 
and 20.6%) think they should not be included and 14.7% don’t know. This suggests 
that Tunisian CSO members are unsure and in disagreement as to whether former 
RCD members deserve to be active in the public space. See Crosstabulation for 
further analysis. 
Section 4 – Freedom (17-27) – results appear somewhat contradictory. The majority 
are against government interference and 87.2% believe the government should allow 
civil society organisations to operate freely. However, a vast majority also believe 
that the government should protect society from offensive opinions and 81.3% think 
there are some groups that are too dangerous to the common good to be allowed to 
operate. There is no agreement regarding whether the state should be determining 
what is offensive and whether respondents believe the freedom of association laws 
in Tunisia provide sufficient protection for CSOs. Questions 19, 20, 21 and 27 show 
almost complete agreement towards freedom of expression, that racially offensive 
views should be silenced, that religiously offensive views should be silenced and in 
favour of the concept of universal human rights. This suggests the limits of freedom 
and that race and religion are taboo subjects. Question 17 shows 59.8% (39.2% and 
20.6%) support for CSOs being allowed to pursue any goals they desire, as long as 
their means and methods are non-violent. 27.4% (23.5% and 3.9%) disagree which 
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suggests either that there is not complete acceptance or that the question is too 
ambiguous. 
Section 5 – Pluralism (28-32) – demonstrates that values of Pluralism are evident 
because respondents understand that disagreement is inevitable but they also 
believe that higher quality decisions are made by groups than individuals. 
Furthermore, 99% have tolerance and respect for alternative opinions. Question 30 
shows no trend towards CSO members changing their minds. This question sought to 
understand if respondents had the willingness to accept different views but this does 
not account for the quality of the argument.   
30.  I often change my mind when I hear other people’s arguments. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
2.0% 2 
2 I do not agree: 
 
32.4% 33 
3 I do not know: 
 
23.5% 24 
4 I agree: 
 
39.2% 40 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
2.9% 3 
 
The Pluralism Index average score of 3.72 is the lowest score but this is caused by 
the result to Q30.  If this question is disregarded, there is strong evidence of other 
pluralistic values. The t-test results demonstrate that women expressed greater 
values of pluralism. The P value of 0.022 is less than 0.05, therefore, there is evidence 
that there is an association between the Gender dichotomy and the Pluralism Index. 
The comparison of means displays a 0.24 difference between men (3.60) and women 
(3.84). This suggests that men demonstrate fewer values of Pluralism than women. 
This result, in addition to women expressing greater levels of Tolerance (Section 2), 
could be explained by a patriarchal mentality residing in Tunisia59. Despite being one 
of the most liberal Arab societies, roles being defined by gender and male authority 
are common features of society (Ghribi, 2014). This result confirms the hypotheses 
of difference in results between men and women.  
Section 6 - Trust (33-35) - suggests high levels of internal trust but shows no trend 
towards CSO members trusting other CSOs. The Trust Index average score was 3.73, 
                                                        
59 Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD)Official Page,  Statement, 2 October 2014 
“Enough condescension on the Tunisian women and people”, Available at 
https://www.facebook.com/femmesdemocrates/photos/a.247294818675110.59337.153986931339
233/732287603509160/?type=3&theater [Accessed 10/01/2016]  
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making it the second lowest score but this is due to the lack of trust in CSO members 
outside of the respondents own CSO. Despite hypothesising that trust would be low, 
the result that trust within a CSO (internal) is greater than trust external levels is 
congruent with Putnam’s "social capital" argument on the benefits of liberal-
associational civil society. In Making Democracy Work, he asserts that trust is 
fostered among people through their social interaction and cooperation in 
associations (1993).  This highlights a disparity between CSO member’s discourse, 
regarding their willingness to co-operate and work with other CSO, and their 
practice, of not trusting other CSOs enough to work with them. The intention is 
evident, yet the practicalities may be more challenging.   
The t-test result shows that Non-Youth (Over 26 years old) respondents demonstrate 
greater levels of Trust than Youth respondents. P-value 0.014 is under 0.05 which 
means there is significance between ‘Youth/Non-Youth and Trust Index’. The 
comparison of means displays a 0.3 difference between Youth (3.58) and Non-Youth 
(3.89).  It is possible that this indicates that youth have less experience and are less 
acquainted with working in co-operation. This age difference is similar to the Pew 
Global survey ‘Tunisian confidence in Democracy’ (2014) which concludes that older 
Tunisians are more favourable toward democracy than the young.  
Using the ANOVA Test, the ‘Region Vs Trust Index (Q33-35)’ ANOVA test was the only 
one to show any notable difference. 
Region compared to Trust Index   
 N Mean 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Capital 37 3.6306 3.3743 3.8870 
Coast 30 3.7000 3.4503 3.9497 
Interior 35 3.8667 3.7115 4.0218 
Total 102 3.7320 3.6050 3.8590 
 
Comparing the means of the Capital (3.63) and Interior (3.87) regions displays a 0.24 
difference. The Interior has a higher index score which shows that, on average, 
respondents from the Interior regions demonstrate greater levels of trust or are 
more trusting than Coastal and especially Capital respondents. For full tables of 
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results from T-tests and ANOVA tests, see Technical Appendix. The Trust results 
confirm the hypotheses of regional difference and difference in results between 
youth and non-youth. 
The content of Section 7 - Democratic practices (36- 38) and Section 9 – My CSO (47 
and 48) – are appropriate to be ‘pooled’ together.  CSO leaders are not considered 
infallible rulers as, for example, 92.2% believe in being allowed to express 
disagreement with their CSO’s management. Questions 47 and 48 are related to 
democratic practices in decision making and selecting positions and/or leadership. 
Question 47 shows that 75.5% say that the decision-making process is ‘consultative 
at all levels’. Question 48 shows that 88.3% use democratic methods to determine 
positions in the organisation; 60.8% use ‘elections’ and 27.5% use ‘consensus after 
debate’. 
73.5% believe their organisation has a well-defined organisational structure but this 
contrasts with 56.9% who think job descriptions are flexible and authority within 
their organisation is questioned. As job descriptions of some organisations show 
fluidity, this suggests that there is flexibility in the appointment of roles and 
responsibilities. This could mean that either horizontal management structures are 
in place or could also imply internal disorganisation.  
Section 9 – My CSO (43-46) – assesses trends in ‘organisational culture’ and observes 
if there are similarities, or even cases of institutional isomorphism, within Tunisian 
CSOs. This section’s results demonstrate no obvious trend regarding institutional 
culture which means the survey data does not provide firm evidence that 
institutional Isomorphism exists. Many of the questions in this section cannot be 
pooled; in particular, questions 43 to 51 require individual or paired analysis in 
order to make conclusions. It is not obvious what conclusions can be drawn from 
Question 43 apart from that CSO members have a range of experience and most have 
only been involved in CSOs in the post-revolution period; only 25.4% (17.6% more 
than 5 years and 7.8% more than 10 years) have been active pre-revolution. At the 
time of the survey, the revolution had taken place 4 years earlier.  93.1% of CSO 
members were volunteers with a smaller 6.9% being professional, paid members. 
This 6.9% might also include people are who unemployed but are paid by the 
ministry of work to work for a CSO. As 4.9% of organisations meet daily, this 
suggests that a small, professional core of CSOs exists. There is no agreement as to a 
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trend regarding the working environment of Tunisian CSOs. 4.9% and 6.9% 
responded with ‘very formal’ and ‘very informal’ respectively, meaning the 
remaining 88.4% was split between ‘formal’ (53.9%) and ‘informal’ (34.5%). 
Question 49 shows no clear trend in the culture and philosophy of CSOs, although 
Person culture scores highest with 44.1%. Question 50 shows that 92.2% of 
organisations have an internal law or constitution. This suggests that the remaining 
7.8% are either disorganised, are breaking the 2011-88 law, or are in the process of 
writing their internal law or constitution. 
Section 8 - Financial Transparency (39-42) - shows 85.3% of respondents know who 
funds their CSO and agreement towards practices of Financial Transparency in CSOs. 
80.4% think funding that CSOs receive should be made public while some 
respondents in Q42 show unsureness (9.8%) or reluctance (9.8%).  This is reflected 
in the Financial Transparency Index average score of 4.4, the highest Index score in 
the survey. 
Section 10 asks ‘What is desirable?’ (52-56) and shows very strong approval of CSO 
independence, respect for other CSO objectives, and internal democratic practices. 
Question 54 shows 66.7% disagreement that CSOs should be obedient to 
government. 20.6% don’t know and 12.8% agree which demonstrates a majority but 
no central trend exists. There was also no trend agreement regarding limitation to 
CSO activities.  
4.2.1. Inconclusive results 
As this survey collected 102 responses, it is difficult to generate precise inferences 
given the sample size. Instead, the value of this research is the indicative data of the 
Tunisian CSO population’s beliefs, values, and attitudes it provides. Indeed, they 
established some very clear results and quite notable trends. However, the responses 
from the following individual questions did not produce clear or notable results. For 
example, Questions 10 and 11 suggest that Tunisian CSO members are unsure and in 
disagreement as to whether CSOs should be allowed to have political agendas. 
Therefore, this subsection addresses these inconclusive results.  
Q10.  Groups with an explicitly religious agenda should be allowed to participate in 
civil society. 
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Q11.  Groups with a specifically secular agenda clear should be allowed to participate 
in civil society. 
Q12.  Members of the former RCD members should be allowed to participate in civil 
society. 
Q17.  Civil society organisations should be allowed to pursue any goals, as long as their 
means and methods are non-violent. 
Q23.  Freedom of association laws in Tunisia provide sufficient protection for civil 
society organisations. 
Q26. The state determines what is considered offensive and improper. 
Q30.  I often change my mind when I hear other people’s arguments. 
Q35.  I trust members of other organisations 
Q46.  Describe your working environment?  58.8% formal / 41.2% informal 
Q49.  Describe the philosophy and culture of work within your organisation. 
Q51. How would you describe the way the leadership of the head of the organisation?   
Acts as a member of the team: 45.1% 
Q56.  The activities and campaigns of CSOs should be limited. 
 
The statistical tool of crosstabulation was used to compare inconclusive issues. A 
crosstabulation allows the comparison between two or more variables and 
determines whether a relationship exists between them. Crosstabulations also 
disaggregate survey responses to allow closer examination of results. For this reason, 
I used crosstabulation analysis on individual questions results from the survey that 
produced inconclusive responses: Q10, Q11, Q12, Q17, Q23, Q26, Q30, Q35, Q46, Q49, 
Q51, and Q56. By dividing the results of these questions by the recoded demographic 
variables (Youth/Non-Youth, Gender, and Region), I hoped to see a clearer 
explanation of the manner in which the respondents answered.  
Crosstabulations for Questions 10, 11, 46, 49, 51 did not produce any further 
explanation and nothing could clearly be ascertained from Q35 due to the large 
amounts of ‘Don’t know’ responses. However, Q12 produced a significant finding. To 
the ‘Q12.  Members of the former RCD members should be allowed to participate in civil 
society.’  I expected to see more respondents from the Interior disagreeing with the 
statement because the party-state apparatus was more unfavourable to these 
regions, therefore people associated with the Party, do not deserve to be active in the 
public space. 
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Members of the former Constitutional Democratic Rally should 
be allowed to participate in civil society? Total 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
I don’t 
know Agree 
Strongly 
agree  
 Capital  5 9 6 14 3 37 
 13.5% 24.3% 16.2% 37.8% 8.1% 100.0% 
Coast  8 5 5 9 3 30 
 26.7% 16.7% 16.7% 30.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Interior  10 7 6 12 0 35 
 28.6% 20.0% 17.1% 34.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total  23 21 17 35 6 102 
 22.5% 20.6% 16.7% 34.3% 5.9% 100.0% 
 
This crosstabulation demonstrates there is slightly greater unfavourability towards 
former RCD members participating in civil society from respondents in the Interior; 
48.6% (28.6% + 20.0%) disagree, compared with the 37.8% from the Capital and 
43.4% from the Coast. Also, fewer respondents from the Interior agree with their 
inclusion, 34.3% compared to 45.9% and 40%. This relates to my hypothesis that 
there are greater resentment and less acceptance towards those associated with the 
former regime who should, therefore, be afforded less liberty.  
Q17 showed that slightly more Non-youth respondents (66.4%) agree that ‘CSOs 
should be allowed to pursue any goals, as long as their means and methods are non-
violent’, than Youth (52.9%) Also, slightly more Youths (31.4%) disagree with the 
statement than Non-youths (23.6%).  This suggests that Youths are less accepting of 
difference while Non-Youths are more accepting of difference, a result I found 
surprising because I predicted the younger generations to be more tolerant. 
Closer inspection of the results for Q23 demonstrates the inability for most to answer 
the question (most selected Don’t Know) which suggests a widespread (across 
Gender, Youth/Non-youth, and Region) unfamiliarity with the Freedom of 
Association laws. This may suggest that CSO members could be more familiar with 
CSOs laws.  
Q26 showed that more Youth (41.2%) agreed that “The state determines what is 
considered offensive and improper” than Non-Youth (27.4%). In addition, more 
Women (40%) than Men (28.8%) agreed with the statement. This might suggest 
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women are more socially conservative or perhaps want more legal protection against 
indecent behaviour. It could indicate that Young women want more state protection 
against the offensive and the improper but this is dependent on how the respondents 
interpreted the question.  
For Q30, more Non-Youth (52.9%) agreed with the statement that “I often change my 
mind when I hear other people’s arguments” than Youth (31.4%). 39.2% of Youth 
disagree with this statement, compared to 29.4% of Non-Youth. Furthermore, more 
females (64%) agreed with the statement than men (21.2%). Also, 50% of men 
disagree with this statement, compared to 18% of Non-Youth.   
  
 
I often change my mind when I hear other people’s 
arguments. 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
I don’t 
know Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Total 
What is your 
gender? 
Male  2 24 15 11 0 52 
 3.8% 46.2% 28.8% 21.2% 0.0% 100% 
Female  0 9 9 29 3 50 
 0.0% 18.0% 18.0% 58.0% 6.0% 100% 
Total  2 33 24 40 3 102 
 2.0% 32.4% 23.5% 39.2% 2.9% 100% 
 
This more significantly demonstrates that Men, young men, in particular, are either 
more stubborn or think they know better or are harder to convince during an 
argument.  
Q46 showed that 71.4% of respondents from the Interior describe their working 
environment as ‘Formal’, compared to 50% from the Coast and 40.5% from the 
Capital. Furthermore, 10.8% of Capital CSOs are ‘Very Informal’ compared to only 
2.9% in the Interior. Maybe this suggests that Interior CSOs take their work more 
seriously or that CSOs in the Capital more frequently social club/associational CSOs 
than activist organisations with clear goals. It is also possible that respondents have 
different understandings of what formal and informal means or that the degree of 
formality is seen as less important than the context of the work.  
Crosstabulations for Q56 demonstrated that Non-youth Men from the Interior are 
more likely to disagree with the statement ‘the activities and campaigns of CSOs 
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should be limited.’ This may suggest that this demographic is more rebellious and less 
willing to accept limitations. It could also suggest that they have greater aspirations 
for what CSOs can do and achieve. Crosstabulation analysis was useful in some cases, 
such as Q12 demonstrating greater suspicions from the Interior Regions’ for RCD 
participation. However, to find answers to the results would require estimation and 
speculation or further research beyond the scope of this thesis.  
4.3. Reflections on the Survey process  
Conducting an online survey proved to be a bold and ambitious research method 
strategy because, although the Internet penetration rates in Tunisia were considered 
to be sufficiently high and the piloting process had rectified all major problems, it 
yielded a smaller than anticipated sample size. While the small sample size means 
that any conclusions cannot make over-arching claims, clear indications of trends in 
the opinions, attitudes and values held by this sample of CSO members were evident 
in the results collected. 
If the survey had been conducted verbally through face-to-face interviews, as per 
surveys on Tunisia by Zogby International, Gallup, Pew Global Attitudes Project, 
World Values Survey, and Arab Barometer, I predict that more responses would have 
been collected. However, for methodological reasons, such as face to face interview 
offering no privacy to respondents, and logistical data collections reasons, the 
decision was made to use an online survey. If the survey were to be repeated, the 
religion question would have been removed to enable greater participation as fewer 
CSOs would have objected to distributing the survey. However, the refusal by some 
to engage with this question indicates the sensitivity surrounding this subject in 
Tunisian CSOs. Also the length of the questionnaire would be reduced to around 30 
questions. This would make the completion less strenuous for respondents and 
might also boost response rate.  
5. Chapter Conclusion  
The data collected in this survey addresses the three relationships of civil society - 
with the State, with other CSOs, and with organisation’s own members. The results 
suggest that the criteria of civil political culture are evident in Tunisian civil society, 
which are enabling it to start fulfilling a democratic function. While CPC is generally 
evident in attitudes of CSO members, female CSO members are more likely to hold 
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attitudes of Trust and Pluralism. Furthermore, Trust is more prevalent amongst 
respondents from Interior regions and non-youth respondents.  
The frequency tables and bar charts suggest the following results. Section 2 largely 
suggests tolerance, respect, and cooperation in and between CSOs. Section 3 shows 
agreement towards female participation, accesses to media, right to pursue cultural 
preference of choice and Non-Muslim Tunisian’s participation in Tunisian civil 
society but disagreement regarding politicised and religious CSOs and the inclusion 
of former RCD members. Section 4 suggests that Tunisian CSOs members believe 
freedom should exist but it should be a freedom that has limitations such as causing 
religious offense, rather than American-style unrestricted freedom of speech at all 
costs. It is also expressed that the government has a duty to determine what is 
offensive or improper. Furthermore, CSO members express their unwillingness for 
the government to interfere but are also unsure that sufficient legal protection is 
given to CSOs. These contradictions might demonstrate the different understandings 
of freedom amongst CSO members with some preferring greater limitations.Section 5 
shows agreement towards the value of including various points of view and 
collective decision-making processes but less towards this process swaying people’s 
decisions. Section 6 suggests high levels of internal trust within a CSO but less 
towards other organisations. Section 8 largely shows agreement towards practices 
regarding financial transparency. Sections 7 and 9 show agreement towards 
democratic practices. Section 10 shows very strong agreement that CSOs should be 
independent of the state, should respect the objectives of other organisations, and 
should operate with internal democratic practices. Also, there is strong agreement 
that CSOs should not be obedient to their government. These results demonstrate 
normative acceptance of civil political culture. 
Tunisian CSOs are predominately run by voluntary members on a part-time basis. 
Regarding organisational culture, they are mostly consultative in decision making 
and determine positions through internal elections or consensus after debate. Q49 
and Q51 demonstrate that organisational culture and leadership styles vary, 
therefore trends do not exist. 
By using SPSS software and running cross-tabulations and correlations tests, it was 
possible to analyse the survey responses more deeply by dividing the responses by 
demographic category variable. Furthermore, the Indexing process allowed each 
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section of the survey, corresponding to each criterion of civil political culture (CPC), 
to be grouped together. This allowed general trends to be observed. The indexes 
show there is evidence of CPC but that Tolerance, Equality, and Financial 
Transparency were more prevalent than, Pluralism, and Trust. Financial 
Transparency (Q40-42) was evident from looking at the frequency tables and bar 
graphs but SPSS analysis showed it was the most prevalent value. With the dividing 
and indexing processes used together, SPSS software data analysis was able to 
demonstrate where CPC was present or absent and who was more likely to 
demonstrate it.  
Regarding any ambiguity in the results, SPSS could not add further analysis than 
Frequency tables and bar graphs regarding Institutional Culture. The 
crosstabulations were successful at disaggregating unclear individual responses, 
such as Q12 demonstrating that slightly greater unfavourability towards former RCD 
members participating in civil society from respondents in the Interior. However, the 
results from other crosstabulations posed further questions or required additional 
hypotheses to understand the results.  
T-tests and ANOVAs were useful for creating general trends, but the low-response, 
statistically insufficient and insignificant data means that these trends cannot be 
used to draw significant conclusions. The results are sufficient to suggest indications 
of attitudes from civil society members. The Interior’s mistrust of the RCD Party 
members in civil society and Women showing greater CPC are similar to predictions 
made in the hypothesis. However, there were surprising results such as youth 
scoring lower than Non-Youth. I expected the Youth to demonstrate more democratic 
culture but in all cases, except Trust, there was no association.  
The t-tests showed that a) Non-Youth respondents demonstrate greater Trust values 
than Youth and b) Women respondents demonstrate greater Tolerance and 
Pluralism values than Men. The ANOVA tests showed that Interior respondents 
demonstrate greater levels of trust than Coastal and especially Capital respondents. 
The means difference from the t-tests regarding Gender across three indexes enables 
a plausible generalisation to be drawn that the responses in this survey from Women 
in Tunisia CSOs demonstrate great evidence of civil political culture than Men in the 
areas of Tolerance, and Pluralism. The T-Test or ANOVA test results from Equality 
and Financial Transparency showed no level of association. 
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It is important to note some potential caveats with these results. Significance test 
analysis cannot be overly relied on because there are three implications regarding 
the data. Firstly, the sample size means these conclusions should not be overstated. 
Secondly, as discussed regarding the sampling methods and despite the range of 
CSOs represented, it is also plausible that the collected population sample is not 
sufficiently varied enough to be entirely representative of CSO members in Tunisia. 
Thirdly, although there is justification for re-coding the region demographic based on 
the Bourguiba and Ben Ali government’s systematic neglect of Tunisia’s interior 
regions, the recoded ‘Interior Region’ variable still groups together five separate 
regions and 15 governorates. To assume people from all these regions are like-
minded would be making an over-arching claim. Despite these considerations, these 
survey results indicate evidence of CPC in Tunisian CSOs. 
This attitude survey is a wide-reaching research method that identifies patterns and 
a broad spectrum of CPC values in civil society members. The operational use of 
Welch’s theory of political culture, implemented in this thesis, recognises that 
discourse is only one manifestation of political culture analysis. These survey results 
demonstrate discourse rather than practice, although the practices in which CSOs 
engage were questioned. As this entirely positivist method of inquiry lacks nuanced 
and personalised engagement, the interview process in Chapter Seven enables 
greater insight into details of CPC gained through human interaction-based research. 
Answers to the inconclusive issues that the survey data produced can also be 
uncovered when compared with interview data results.  
In comparison to the pre-revolution era discussed in Chapter Four, this survey 
indicates a development and embedment of some aspects of CPC that would not have 
been possible in authoritarian Tunisia. Although the survey was not able to offer an 
assessment of whether CSOs are Oppositional-Resistance or Liberal-Associative, the 
questions help to provide assessments of the three relationships in which CSOs 
engage; with the State, with other CSOs in the public space, and the internal dynamics 
with their own membership. Indeed, the development of these CSOs relationships 
indicates where CSOs self-consciously position themselves against the state and 
other CSOs, if relationships with others have developed, whether they discriminate 
or not: all of which would not have been possible in a restricted public space. This 
chapter has demonstrated that an attitude survey can be an important research 
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method for providing a broad understanding of or identifying trends within the 
political culture of civil society. However, for a holistic understanding of political 
culture, micro-interpretivist approaches are additionally required.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN – STRUCTURED QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS 
1. Introduction 
The function of this chapter is to examine the norms and values of CSO leaders as 
expressed through their discourses during a structured, one to one interview. 66 
interviews with leaders of Tunisian CSOs were conducted between February 2014 
and July 2014 with an additional 9 interviews with non-CSO members to verify the 
findings. All interviews were within the same period; after the new constitution had 
been ratified and no further major political events took place.  Chapter Six 
demonstrated evidence of some aspects of civil political culture however some 
aspects were not so certain as there were 11 questions that produced inconclusive 
results. These interviews were conducted to provide human interaction with subjects 
and provide them with the opportunity to explain their norms and values, through 
their discourse, and to describe their behaviours in greater details than from within 
the limitations of studying subjects from a removed position through surveys. For the 
collection of more nuanced and personalised data, the personal interaction also 
provided the opportunity for follow up questions with CSO leaders. In the 
operationalisation of Welch’s theory of political culture, the interview method is 
required because it is a micro-interpretivist approach that provides interaction with 
subjects. Face to face interviews, like ethnography (See Chapter Eight) is preferable 
to studying remotely and deducing from historical sources because it reduces the 
risk of producing synoptic or Culturalist analyses.     
2. Sampling 
I sought to target important, influential and famous organisations. Of the highest 
priority were the Quartet of UGTT, UTICA, LTDH, and Ordre National Des Avocats De 
Tunisie (ONAT) due to their influential role in the democratic transition (See Chapter 
Five). Prior to the political deadlock in summer 2013, the Quartet had been an 
important force in Tunisian politics. In particular, the UGTT had been crucial in 
organising mobilisation during the revolution and early states of the transition.  In 
addition, there were well-known organisations such as UGET, UGTE, and Association 
Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (AFTD) that were active before the revolution 
and mentioned in the Chapter Two, Three, and Four. Although hundreds of 
organisations have been established in the post-Revolution era, I aimed to speak to 
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CSOs who, based on my fieldwork preparation, had been important during the 
transition period such as Al Bawsala, Mourakiboun, I-Watch, and Destourna.60  
The table of completed interviews (see Technical Appendix) shows the diverse range 
of organisations that were interviewed. Comparing older organisations, such as 
Forum Tunisien pour Les Droits Economiques et Sociaux (FTDES), who were active 
before the revolution, to the newer ones represented an interesting dynamic because 
their methods and approaches may vary. In addition to interviewing organisations 
that could be categorised as Liberal-Associative or Oppositional-Resistance, it was 
ensured that organisations who were working towards a range of different causes 
and issues were included e.g. Charity (Inara, Alwen Tounes) Youth (JID, Sawty, Voix 
d'enfant rural, WeYouth) Environmental (Network of Sidi Bouzid, Oxygen, We Love 
Sousse) Development and Training (Tunisian Association for Management and Social 
Stability (TAMSS) and Culture (Verolution, Toupat Sidi Bouzid, Sfax Outdoor Sports & 
Sfax Mzyehna). There were many organisations who worked on raising awareness 
(Sensibilisation in French) regarding citizenship and the culture of democracy 
(Qairawanioun, Association Tunisienne Pour La Promotion Du Droit à La Différence, I-
Lead). I interviewed ‘single issue’ groups like Mnemty (racism) Esslam (Fairtrade for 
artisans) Reform (police and security sector reform) Association Tunisienne Droits 
Constitutional (ATDC) (legal reform) Edupartage (educational reform) and Notre 
Santé D’abord (free healthcare). Two movements, which were not strictly CSO but 
represented civic activism, were also interviewed. Sajin-52 were fighting against the 
oppressive Tunisian laws against cannabis possession that were established during 
dictatorship as a means of control and Open Gov were a network linked to the Open 
Governance Programme (OGP) in order to promote transparency at national and 
regional government levels. Although there is a skew towards organisations in the 
capital (36 of the 66 interviews are with Tunis-based organisations), it was ensured 
that the other regions were also represented in the interview process as 
organisations from Bizerte, Zaghouan, Sousse, Sfax, Sidi Bouzid, Regueb Gafsa, Gabes, 
Medenine, and Djerba were included in the research. Furthermore, the dynamic that 
regional organisations often had more local and specific goals, such as Sousse Demain, 
                                                        
60 Al Bawsala, Mourakiboun and I-Watch are political watchdogs who have influenced the transition 
by holding politicians to account and observing constituent assembly and electoral procedures. 
Destourna was a leading organisation in the civil society arranged the Bardo sit-in after the 
assassination of Mohammed Brahmi (July 2013) which led eventually to the National Dialogue and the 
Ennahda-led troika stepping down.  
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Djerba Ulysses, Association Cepsa, Gabes Action, than CSOs based in the capital was 
recognised. Association Amis Bassin Minier pour l’environnement is based in Gafsa but 
are an environmental pressure group that addresses issues outside of the region. The 
CSO platform Jamiaty61 was also utilised to find contact details for CSOs and my 
contacts, who work for and with CSOs, also provided names of other organisations. 
Cultural organisations were included but those with religious objectives were not. 
This was in order to narrow the focus of this thesis but also due to the sensitivity 
regarding the secular/Islamist split in political, public, and private spheres. Quranic 
School and Islamic charity groups play a role in both the public and private spaces 
while Dawa movements are seeking to implement the political goal: the Islamisation 
of the state. Although not power-seeking, the objectives of these groups are blurring 
the lines between political and public space activism (Donker, 2013) therefore not 
entirely conforming to the definition of civil society established in this thesis. While 
religious organisations can add to a civil society’s vibrancy, their position in Tunisia 
remains contentious due to accusations that they are supporting an Islamist project.    
3. Interview methodology  
This subsection develops the approach to interviewing undertaken in this thesis as 
mentioned in the methods chapter.  CSO leaders, presidents or members of the 
bureau exécutif, were chosen as interview subjects because they have an overview of 
the running of their own organisation and can comment on relations with other CSOs 
and the government. I conducted one to one, face-to-face interviews for the following 
reasons. Firstly, in one to one interviews, individuals’ responses are not influenced 
by another person’s presence, especially others in the organisation. This does not 
guarantee or increase honesty but it removes the possibility of influence from the 
other member of their organisation, respondents’ opinions being swayed and a 
‘groupthink’ conclusion from being reached. Therefore, the expressed norms and 
values would be the interviewee’s discourse rather than an influenced discourse. 
Secondly, it is also easier to probe and ask follow-up or concept checking questions 
to unclear and ambiguous answers to individuals rather than groups. Thirdly, 
interviewees might not have agreed to conduct group interviews because if they 
were not expressing the realities of their organisation, the other member would be 
                                                        
61 Jamaity is an interactive and participatory platform for Tunisian associations. Available at 
http://www.jamaity.org/  [Accessed 15/1/2014] 
  
185 
 
aware their answer was insincere. Where possible, one to one interviews took place 
but some were conducted as pairs as it would have been socially awkward and 
impractical to ask one person to leave, e.g. Khalid Ouazzani & Nizar Abdessaied from 
Associo-Med and Fahima Askri and her volunteer assistant, Houriya Ben Hassine, at 
TAMSS.  
The questions are structured in a specific order that start with an ‘ice-breaker’, 
designed to establish a rapport with the interviewee, then are arranged in sections 
relating to aspects of civil political culture. Sensitive issues, such as finance and 
documents from the organisation, were placed last (See question rationale in 
Technical Appendix for further details). This did not undertake a piloting process, as 
with the survey preparation, but I discussed my questions and received feedback 
from supervisors and other academics who had North African fieldwork experience 
in the creation phase, which allowed me to improve the questions and ensure they 
were not confusing. The translation process for the questions was similar to the 
survey as I completed it with the assistance of trained interpreters to ensure any 
meaning was not lost in translation. This also helped to refine the questions and re-
consider what they are asking.  
4. Interview process 
Interviews often lasted 45 minutes but varied from 30 to 60 depending on time 
constraints; for example, Boubaker Bethabet (ONAT) and Khalil Ghariyani (UTICA) 
could only afford 30mins. These time constraints meant that some questions were 
missed. The headquarters of the CSO or a café were the most common interview 
locations while some were conducted in the members’ homes. Interviews were 
conducted in English, if comfortable for the interviewee, otherwise in French or 
Tunisian Arabic with the assistance of an interpreter; most frequently by Myriam 
Ben Ghazi (former Journalist) and also Dorra Agrebi or Hamza Zaghdoud 
(interpreters). Interviews were recorded with the verbal consent of interviewees. 
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5. Data interpreting process 
This flow chart represents the stages of interpretation and analysis that took place 
with the interview data that was collected in this research.  
 
After conducting an interview, the interpreter and I would discuss the flow of the 
interview, whether we found it difficult, and our thoughts on the answers the 
interviewee gave.  I made notes after each interview, sometimes on the findings of 
the interview or as comments and pointers to myself about how to conduct future 
interviews. For example, after two interviews in Sousse, I reflected on the limitations 
of rapport building and professionalism. 
“I think he (Qais Lahmar) found the comment (where I showcased my 
knowledge of Arabic profanity), and the interview in general, amusing, yet it is 
important that I don’t seem too friendly or comical with my interviewees. We 
laughed a few times during the interview, but the balance of building a 
rapport and trust, or making the interviewee think of me joker is a fine line. I 
want them to take me and my work seriously, yet also feel comfortable 
enough to open up and be honest. Funnily enough, in the next interview 
Faycal Labayed swore. I think it’s important for me to maintain my 
professionalism, even if interviewees chose not to. I think Qais still found me 
amusing rather than offensive, so I think I finished the interview with my 
reputation intact.”  
I) Conversation 
with 
Interpreter* (if 
present)
II) Notes made 
after interview
III) Notes made 
during 
transcribing 
process
IV) Summaries of 
completed 
Interviews 
(March and June)
V) Read CSO 
interviews 
VI) Identify and 
summarise 
themes
VII) Interpret 
findings in 
comparison to 
theoretical 
frameworks
VIII) Make 
conclusions
IX) Read Non-
CSO interviews 
X) Identify and 
summarise 
themes
XI) Compare Non-
CSO findings to 
CSO interview 
findings
XII) Create 
overall 
conclusions
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The process of transcribing interviews provided me with the chance to make further 
notes on the findings because I was more focused on the answers than the interview 
process. The data was codified because interviews were structured and the same 
questions were put to all interviewees, in the majority of cases and when time 
constraints were not a factor.  In March and June, I made notes of the themes and 
trends that I was starting to notice appearing in the data. Once all the interviews 
were completed and transcribed, I read them all searching for themes and trends. I 
also sought to recognise and pay attention to interesting individual responses or 
cases and unique responses. With these summarised themes I was able to compare 
the findings to the theoretical frameworks of this thesis; evidence of civil political 
culture and democratic values and evidence of what type of institutional culture 
exists.   
6. Interviews with Non-CSO members 
The additional interviews with non-CSO members were conducted in order to verify 
my findings and to provide a more critical view of civil society and civil society 
activities. The decision to conduct further interviews was made after interviewing 
Intisar Kherigi from Jasmine Foundation (a Tunisian Think Tank that brings CSOs, 
academics, and politicians together), who saw herself and her organisation as part of 
civil society yet separate and different from other Tunisia CSOs. Intisar mentioned 
the following problems with Tunisian CSOs. They are poorly informed because the 
government does not release sufficient information and they do not conduct their 
own research. They rarely have solutions but often simply highlight problems. They 
spend too much time talking, not enough acting, and fail to run their own CSOs 
efficiently. In addition, CSOs have an exaggerated belief in their impact and influence 
on public and political space.  
These interviews provided alternative opinions of civil society and balance to the 
research. There is a risk that CSO members had not been entirely honest about their 
practice, provided favourably optimistic views of civil society or especially 
favourable assessment of their own organisations.  This verification is also necessary 
because I was not able to observe the behaviour (practice) of all the CSOs I 
interviewed. These interviews were with people who have experience of dealing with 
Tunisian CSOs, journalists, consultants or members of Non-Tunisian/ International 
CSOs, and demonstrate how CSOs are perceived by them. Pre-arranged questions 
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were included but interviews were not fully structured to allow greater flexibility. In 
order to verify or discredit my interview results, I discussed some of my findings 
asking whether or not they concurred or disputed them.   
7. Results and findings 
In comparison to the more easily separable quantitative research results produced in 
Chapter Six, the interview process produced results that demonstrated the six 
criteria of civil political culture were more interconnected and expressed through 
different themes. Furthermore, the results showed neither clear evidence nor the 
absence of the six criteria of civil political culture but rather how the interviewees 
understood and demonstrated them while expressing their limitations. 
7.1. Tolerance through Trust and Transparency 
The first finding was the manner in which Tolerance is linked to Trust, Transparency, 
cooperation and collaboration, independence, and the Islamist/secularist 
polarisation of society that occurs in civil society. It became evident in the interview 
process that Tolerance was a complicated criterion of civil political culture because it 
could not be understood in isolation and was interconnected with, and linked to, 
other issues. For the interviewees. Tolerance is conditional on the criteria of Trust 
but also values, co-operation and collaboration, in addition to the secular/Islamist 
divide based on the long-term vision for the state. Furthermore, Tolerance is not 
simply either evident or absent, but rather on a scale and the degree to which CSOs 
express tolerance varies. The levels of Tolerance are therefore defined by different 
factors and Tolerance is a scale between CSO member’s acceptance of other people’s 
existence in the public space to a refusal to work with Islamist groups based on an 
assumption of the latter’s long-term vision for an Islamised society. Therefore, the 
primary indicator for tolerance is the Islamist/secularist divide in political ideology. 
Democracy requires tolerance of voices and opinions that other members of society 
and the public space may dislike. This means that democracy is initially an internal 
process. Some of the interviewees, however, are externalising democracy but stating 
democracy starts with the other and whether they believe in democracy or not. The 
accusation expressed in interviews that “We believe in democracy, but they don’t” is 
not a fully tolerant position because it fails to include their right to espouse an 
alternative vision.  People who take this position might think they are being tolerant 
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but their unwillingness to accommodate, in their own vision of tolerance, views for 
the future of the Tunisian state are fundamentally different to their own represents a 
degree of intolerance. 
Emna Menif admits that Kolna Tounes can work with other CSOs, and even on 
different goals, but only if they have the same values. Emna is “not supportive of the 
normalisation of Islamists” and she qualifies this by saying those who are part of the 
‘Islamist project’ are participating in politics and democracy with the ultimate 
objective of turning Tunisia into an Islamic state. She thinks their participation is just 
a strategy because they believe in something completely different. She says she has a 
Humanist and Citizenship background, they use the Quran. Emna is very pro-
democracy but her fear of anti-democratic forces represents an intolerance towards 
difference.   
In the political sphere and prior to the interviews being conducted, the Ennahda 
party as the major part of the Troika government had constantly compromised on 
constitutional issues and stepped down from power to allow a technocratic 
government to rule. However, Islamist groups are not fully trusted. Adel Nagati of 
Journalists Association of Kairouan states that “There are people who don’t believe in 
democracy but are using it to attack democratic people like Hizb-Ettahrir”. However, 
Hizb-Ettahrir is a political party that was legalised by the Tunisian Government on 17 
July 2012.  
The reality of how democratic Islamist groups are is not relevant as there is an 
ideological position on the part of some secular CSO members that is fundamentally 
intolerant because it constantly assumes the Islamist ‘other’ is not democratic before 
the Islamist other acts. This represents a degree of intolerance. This research 
demonstrates that, for some, the boundaries of intolerance start when a group has, or 
is perceived to have, an Islamist vision or objectives. Those with Islamist values that 
underpin their civic engagement in the public sphere are then excluded from the 
vision and understanding of tolerance. Importantly, none of the CSOs I interviewed 
proclaimed they have an Islamist vision nor were any interviewees willing to label 
other CSOs as Islamist.  
As mentioned with Emna Menif’s position, the interviewees’ understanding of 
Tolerance extends beyond the legal and legitimate existence of other CSOs in the 
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public sphere. It also includes those who they actively co-operate with, and their 
willingness to work with, people who do not share their values, whether they are 
Islamists or not. CSOs recognise the existence of Islamist groups but some do not 
approve of them and have no intention of working with them.  
Jawher ben Mabarek explained Dostourna had collaborated with UGTT, ATID, 
Femmes Démocrates, LTDH and stated, “We can collaborate with organisations that 
have different objectives but not with different values, for instance, we won’t work 
with an organisation that defends the Niqab.”  He added, “We can debate or 
participate in a discussion with an association that has an Islamist background but 
not work on an action with them, it is forbidden (in Dostourna guidelines).”  
Marwa Mansouri from Association Cultivons la Paix somewhat echoes this sentiment 
by expressing, “For me, democracy is to accept the other who is different from you 
and work together for positive change.” She added, “I think that if we are trying to 
establish democracy then we need to work with people from different backgrounds 
because that is how we move forward. Being different does not mean that we can’t 
collaborate; there is certainly a minimum of common ground that we can find and 
work with.” However, she seems to contradict herself by also stating that “we work 
with other CSOs on one condition, they have to share our values.” The bringing 
together of difference and the requirement of sharing values are mutually exclusive 
requirements. It suggests levels of Equality and Tolerance that are conditional on her 
terms.  
The majority of interviewed CSOs, however, express Tolerance through their 
willingness to work with other CSOs and in coalitions, despite differences, without 
mentioning the exclusion of any groups due to their long-term vision of the state. The 
following quotes are examples of this co-operative and inclusionary attitude. 
 “We have to work altogether because we cannot work by ourselves, the 
impact would not be so good.” (Selim Abbou, Tounesa) 
 “The nature of our CSO obliges us to collaborate with the other CSOs in our 
network and they don’t necessarily have the same objectives as we do. We 
also work with CSOs in partnership for certain projects in a certain amount of 
time.”  (Riadh Werghi, Union des Jeunes Démocrates Tunisiens)  
  
191 
 
 “We have to put our differences aside and work, which is, of course, difficult.”  
(Amel Chaherli, Alwen Tounes) 
  “Yes, and it’s happened a few times like when many work for the same thing. 
E.g. In the 1st draft – Complimentary to Women; FTDES worked with Women’s 
groups etc. More than 40 organisations worked together. It depends on the 
issue, social and economic ones are popular.”  (Messaoud Romdhani, FTDES) 
Romdhani makes a salient point that civil society becomes effective when a large 
number or network of organisations can rally behind campaigning on a single issue, 
combined with media attention, then the government is forced to listen. For the 
majority of CSOs, the fragmented ‘solo’ campaigns are less effective, have less impact, 
and are easier to ignore. In addition to Destourna and Kolna Tounes, a smaller 
number of CSOs expressed a view that they cannot work with CSOs who have an 
Islamist vision. 
 “We don’t work with organisations that have ideological backgrounds, like the 
Islamists” (Amira Achouri, Association of Kairouanees for a Culture of 
Citizenship) 
 “The Quranic associations can’t be considered part of civil society because 
they are working on their own agenda.” (Kamel Abid, ATPC)  
Some CSOs expressed they only work with people and CSOs that they trust. This 
means issues of Trust and Tolerance are linked, not isolated. However, the nuance is 
that Tolerance is passive compared to Trust being proactive as the trust of another 
entity is not required to tolerate them operating.  For example, interviewees express 
cases and examples of distrust but not intolerance towards a range of actors and 
groups such as a lack of trust in Political parties. 
 “Today civil society is in much stronger position than political parties and in 
the most recent survey Tunisians trust 1st the army and 2nd the CSOs.”  (Samir 
Kilani, Ofiya) 
 “I don’t see them (political parties) as honest, they are not transparent 
enough, they are not trustworthy. Maybe some of them have changed a little 
but they still have the old way of building up a political party, they are 
hierarchical so it’s very hard to climb the ladder, and are undemocratic and 
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the decision-making is between 2 or 3 or 10 people and there are thousands 
in the party.” (Zied Boussen, Jeunes Independent Démocrates) 
Zied’s points of being more attracted to civil society work than joining a political 
party and also of equating honesty and Transparency with Trust are reiterated by 
other interviewees. Interviewees also noted that people find working in civil society 
is more comfortable than political parties. Parties are not that transparent which sets 
a bad example for civil society, and there is a lack of trust in political parties, for 
example, 
 “Political parties have always been preserved as “not so good to be part of”. 
We have always had a lack of trust toward people with political agenda.” 
(Jawher ben Mabarek, Destourna) 
 “The people are sick of how bad the political parties are, so they go to civil 
society.” (Mohammed Masri, Network of Sidi Bouzid Associations)  
 
There is evidence that CSOs are not entirely trusted, by the government and the 
public. The following quotes are examples of cases where Trust is yet to be 
established.   
 “Under Ben Ali, civil society was hated, but now it’s tolerated but not taken 
into consideration. E.g. Terrorism and violence, 2 years ago when artists were 
attacked, that was a warning that was ignored by the government. Because 
the old reflex and mentality of ‘you’re with us or against us’ still prevailed in 
the government. The mentality of the government did not change enough.” 
(Messaoud Romdhani, FTDES) 
 “The government nationally and locally still sees the civil society as the 
enemy. There is no trust between the two sides. In Sidi Bouzid there is some 
collaboration with the local authorities.” (Aida Daly, TOUPAT) 
 “Two months ago we invited the parents of members to a meeting and 
showed them the activities of the association, what we are doing, to break the 
ice between parents and our association, to let them talk to us and show we 
are like a second family for our members, and we have to have their trust in 
the association.” (Anis Boufrika, We Love Sousse) 
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However, there are numerous examples in the interview data that demonstrate how 
Trust has developed between CSOs and others bodies, and additionally that trust is 
exhibited via cases of CSO collaboration and co-operation. Mouraikboun, I-Watch and 
Al Bawsala, three influential, watchdog CSOs, mention how Trust has developed  
between the government and their organisation due to continued engagement. 
 “We have daily contact with the Election commission, the election 
management authority, and parliament because we are monitoring them. It 
wasn’t respectful in the beginning but after some months and years, when 
they understood that we are not ‘against them’, but just fighting for the rights 
of the people and for open data and transparency of political process. And we 
proved that we are non-partisan, not fighting for any political parties, so I 
think they now respectful, and we don’t have any problems.” (Rafik Halouani, 
Mourakiboun)  
 “I-Watch has a good reputation with the government. They know that we are 
neutral and independent and have no political affiliations. If you go to our 
Facebook page, for example, you will see criticism from us against the 
government and parties, but we don’t belong to any. When there is something 
wrong, we say it strongly, when something is true, we say it. When something 
happens that affects the neutrality of Tunisian civil society, the government 
becomes suspicious and more scared it.” 
“We work directly with the government on one thing, in the organisation of 
‘International Anti-Corruption conference’, it will take place from 21-24th 
October 2014, and this conference is the biggest platform that will gather 
1500 experts from 130 countries. This is in partnership with Tunisian 
Government and Transparency International, and it is hosted by I-Watch. 
Therefore, we are part of a steering a committee with Government including 
ministries of Transport, Finance, Tourism, Interior, Defence, all the vital ones.” 
(Mouheb Garoui, I-Watch) 
 
Ghada Louhichi from Al Bawsala thinks the determination, perseverance, motivation, 
and professionalism of the staff has made Al Bawsala a successful and trusted CSO, 
but also adds that because it is their job as they are full-time paid staff. 
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“I remember when we were first observing in the NCA (National Constituent 
Assembly), one of the deputies was angry with us, Tahar Hmila, he’s one of the 
oldest, he doesn’t like us much. He said to me and my colleagues ‘Go find a 
job’, and she (one of Ghada’s colleagues) said ‘this is my job’. But we love our 
jobs. Every day we have something new, something different, or 
unexpected.”… “Some of the deputies, when they introduce us to anyone, 
yesterday, for example, we were talking with some students from the United 
State who were in the NCA and one member said, “Ghada comes to the NCA 
even more than some deputies.” This shows some confidence and trust we 
have built with the deputies. It wasn’t easy, at the beginning they were 
suspicious, like ‘Who are you? ‘Why are you here? What agenda are you 
implementing?’, all these conspiracy theories, you know. For the commissions, 
we’re there from the beginning to the end, even late at night. They saw us 
working and they know we are not just reporting on the bad things.”  
Furthermore, Trust and Financial Transparency are also connected and influence the 
potential for CSOs to collaborate and co-operate. This is based on Transparency 
providing a good impression because it implies Trust. The following quotes 
demonstrate how CSOs are unwilling or hesitant to work with other CSOs with 
opaque funding sources. 
 “(Revealing sources of funding) is important for transparency and building 
trust between citizens and civil society.” (Mouheb Garoui, I-Watch) 
  “Now with the boom of CSOs the situation is different, there so many CSOs 
and they can’t all be trusted in terms of funding so we continue to work with 
our historic partners.” “…we collaborate with organizations that we trust like 
LTDH and Femmes Democrates.”  “We can collaborate with organization that 
have different objectives than ours on certain occasions, for instance when 
we worked on elections, we collaborated with the medical association and 
students associations and so on.” (Imen Bejoui, l'Association Tunisienne des 
Jeunes Avocats (ATJA) 
 “We can’t really work with the newly created CSOs because we don’t know 
where they get their funding from so we are very sceptical about it and also 
lots of political parties are behind some CSOs and that goes against our first 
value which is Independence. It is not up to us to say whether these small 
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CSOs are trustworthy or not but we have a set of standards that we abide by 
and work with.” (Boubaker Bethabet, ONAT) 
 “There is a lack of trust between citizens and CSOs mostly because of the 
funding sources . People know it is all foreign funding and so they have 
doubts about it. And Political parties have also discovered that civil society 
can bring them money so they started CSOs of their own, this increased the 
amount of distrust between people and civil society.” (Adel Nagati, 
Journalists Association of Kairouan) 
 “We don’t find it difficult to find funding because we have a brand and are a 
known organisation by funders and we interact with other funders, we have 
worked with funders and completed projects, they trust us and know how 
our work is.” (Ghazoua Lteif, Sawty) Trust has been established between 
Sawty and funding bodies who they have been working with for 2 years.  
The legal framework, established by Law 88, allows Islamist organisations to exist 
but Messoud Romdhani (FTDES) highlighted that Salafist groups who call for 
violence are breaking the law. Therefore, Romdhani understands the law as being the 
crucial criteriom of Tolerance because Tolerance is defined by what is legal.  Beyond 
the legal framework, there is no agreement of tolerance in civil society. While the 
law, indeed the Tunisian political system, remains in transition, discovering the 
limits of tolerance is a challenge for the new democracy.  
Moez Ali of UTIL claimed his rejection of Islamism is based on freedom of conscience. 
UTIL is a Humanitarian CSO but worked on the ‘Bus Citoyen’ project with 5 other 
CSOs who all had different goals; Sawty (Youth), TOUENSA (Citizenship), ACT 
‘khammem ou karrer’ (economic and cultural development of disadvantaged regions 
of Tunisia), Femmes et Dignité (Women’s Rights), and ATIDE (Transparency and 
Corruption-fighting). Ali explained ‘Bus Cityon’ aimed to encourage voting because 
“Women’s rights were threatened after the Revolution. Certain factions who do not 
believe in the role of women in society, Salafists and extremists, wanted women out 
of politics, cover their heads and to stay at home.” This represents the ability of CSO 
to cooperate and collaborate within their own circle of Tolerance. Ali explained his 
position and why the ‘Bus Citoyen’ project took place.  
“We are a country that has strong Islamic roots that goes back to the 14th 
Century, so we  are not in a position to take lessons from others to bring other 
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ways of thinking, other ideologies and insert them in our society. We have no 
lessons to take from the others. My grandmother and mother grew up in a 
moderate state with a modern Islam, that respects women, values of the 
family, and people in general. And it gives freedom of thinking, it’s mentioned 
in the Constitution as freedom of conscience. But people don’t understand 
freedom of conscience, it’s to be judged for what we do and not what we think. 
This is the Islam we know, and these are the values Islam we know. So the 
people who want to insert the Wahhabism, which was created in the early 
19th century, so they are not in a position to give us lessons about Islam. We 
grew up knowing that the only one who can judge us is God, not people. This 
is how we grew up and how we want Tunisia to be.”  
 
This suggests that Ali’s fundamental normative position is tolerant. His objection to 
Islamists is because, according to Ali, they do not want tolerance. Ali, therefore, 
cannot tolerate what he believes to be intolerance. Members of Tunisian civil society 
who reject what they perceive to be intolerant behaviour or attitudes demonstrates 
their ‘externalisation of democracy’; the manner in which their understanding of 
tolerance begins with their assessment or judgement of others. From the other 
perspective, Yassine Jebloui of Notre Santé d’Abord, a medical support CSO, is the 
only interviewee to explain any specific incidences of intolerance expressed by 
Islamists. This suggests that most interviewees exhibit bias against Islamists for only 
reasons of ideological difference. Yassine explained how his CSO was prevented from 
operating. 
“We had one problem when we worked near Nabeul, people said you can’t 
come here because there were religious people, you know extremists, who 
didn’t want us to go. They didn’t want us to help with giving out glasses and I 
think there are a lot of associations who work with Ennahda and work as 
religious associations who mainly work in this area (healthcare) and they do 
not want to have competition.” 
“There was another problem that we had, sometimes you make an action, and 
then after you have people who are from Ennahda who said that ‘we called 
them to help you’. This happened in Manouba.”   
“In Nabeul, there are a lot of problems and a lot of extremists. They were 
governing there, and if they say you can’t go, then you can’t go. Sometimes you 
  
197 
 
have associations who work there who say we only want the Islamic 
associations to work here, not the other ones.”  (Yassine Jebloui, Notre Santé 
d’abord) 
Despite interviewees criticising Islamists, the belief that Islamists organisations 
should be stopped or banned from participating in the public sphere was not 
expressed. This represents the attitude that freedom should still be afforded to these 
groups and an understanding of tolerance that is related to freedom of speech. 
These results indicate that the boundaries of tolerance are dependent on trust, 
transparency, and exhibited through willingness or lack therefore, to co-operate and 
collaborate. Their approach to what should not be tolerated are certainly dependent 
on degree of acting within the law and in some cases but not exclusively, whether the 
‘other’ is classified as Islamist or not. The extent to which Tunisian CSOs exhibit 
democratic culture is shaped by the perception of Islamist groups. There are 
interviewees who did not present in their discourse any expressed objections or 
reservations towards those with Islamist visions for Tunisia’s future. However, for 
those who did, this means their perception of democracy is exclusive of the Islamists 
vision. Islamism influences their understandings of and attitudes towards Trust, 
Tolerance, and Transparency. Furthermore, Islamism shapes whether a CSO is 
viewed as Independent or is considered plausible for cooperation and collaboration. 
Cooperation is a step further beyond tolerance as interviewees expressed that 
tolerance is a prerequisite for cooperation and collaboration. The reason some 
secularists express intolerance towards Islamist is because they are afraid of the 
non-democratic element of the Islamist vision.  
7.2. Legally established Freedom  
Freedom and Tolerance are linked by the civil society member’s understanding of the 
public space.  Freedom to operate in this public space is a dramatic improvement in 
comparison to the Ben Ali era where even non-political CSOs were not granted legal 
status or were restricted. For example, physician Souhail Alouini, from Open Gov 
Tunisia, was prevented from forming a medical CSO in 2006 and Sfax Outdoor Sports 
President Zaher Kammoun told me they were not permitted to engage in caving 
because the Ministries of Interior and Defence linked it to terrorist activities. 
Freedom is understood as a technical, more neatly defined legal issue regarding how 
much room CSOs are permitted and where the boundaries of freedom are marked as 
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the use of violence and hate speech.  CSO members recognise that freedom is 
required to ensure the quality of democracy. CSOs are protected by law 88 therefore 
interviewees explained that the government has not shutdown their operations, they 
have not experienced interference from religious groups, and rather than being 
pressured by the government, they feel that they are the ones who are applying 
pressure. Amira Yahyahoui (Al Bawsala) said “They wouldn’t dare” while Faycal 
Labayed (Sousse Demain) rhetorically asked, “Do I look like I give in to pressure?” 
There were only two cases where interviewees mention state interference and 
interruption of their activities.  
 “We wanted to work on the rural women health but we faced resistance from 
male farmers and even the Ministry of Health, so many hospitals didn’t let us 
in. Police as well were following us for a while.” (Hachem Aydi, Cultural 
Association Mouwantaneen) 
  “There is a lot of pressure on CSOs coming mainly from the ministry of 
interior, political parties, and some Salafist groups. Mainly Ennahda controls 
the south of Tunisia so they would vandalize our projects and events and they 
would even infiltrate the beneficiaries to sabotage us.  As for the ministry of 
interior there were always correspondences and phone calls to have us 
change or shut down a project and we were arrested couple times during 
events in Sidi Bouzid and Kassrine. They had also shut down one of our 
project for security reasons (the project was by Chaambi Mountain.” (Riadh 
Wergi, Union des Jeunes Démocrates Tunisiens) 
Cases such as the latter could provide a reason for intolerance towards Islamists 
groups that is based on a reaction and informed by experience rather than ingrained 
ideological intolerance. Riadh did not know if the people who have interfered with 
their work were connected to the Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution. 
 
Interviewees understood that the freedom in the space that the state gives civil 
society is not limitless. The limits of the freedom afforded to CSOs are hate speech 
and calling for or implementing violence. The statistical results from Chapter Five 
also suggest that CSO members believe there should be limits to freedom of speech. 
Messoud Romdhani (FTDES) states that Salafists groups that are calling for violence 
and intolerance are breaking the law of associations. Indeed, Law 88 states,  
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“Article (4): Associations are prohibited from the following: One: Adopting in 
their bylaws, data, programs or activities any incitement for violence, hatred, 
fanaticism or discrimination on religious, racial or regional grounds.”62 
This demonstrates that the Tunisian state has played a role in ensuring that civil 
society is legally civil. This is also in agreement with the argument Jamal (2007) 
makes, that civil society is not an independent variable but is influenced the system 
of government. 
7.3. Equality and Pluralism identified in the democratic practices, learning 
processes and Institutional Culture  
Equality and Pluralism are criteria of civil political culture that are expressed 
through the CSO’s internal dynamics and therefore more easily identified.  Equality is 
equal opportunity for anyone (gender, age, ethnicity, religion, or sexuality) to 
become members and, once a member, the chance to influence the CSO or gain 
executive bureau positions. Equality is indicated, internally, by equal opportunities 
and lack of exclusion in CSO membership. By contrast, inequality is demonstrated by 
friends and family members, certain age groups, a gender or an ethnicity being given 
preferential treatment.  
Pluralism is the inclusion of diverse opinions and the spread or decentralisation of 
power and decision-making. Pluralism is indicated by consultative, collaborative, or 
democratic decision-making processes in which there are mechanisms for members 
to influence the decisions and the membership of the executive bureau. Power is 
multi-dimensional rather than concentrated in the hands of the CSO president or 
founder. If organisations have consultative decision-making processes or a 
mechanism for members to influence decisions, this suggests that they are Pluralist. 
Whereas if decisions are top-down from the executive bureau or against the 
membership’s wishes, this implies a lack of Pluralism. There are limitations to 
pluralism with regards to members who are from political parties. Law 88 states that 
party members are not allowed to gain executive bureau positions in CSOs. However, 
most cases of equality and pluralism were expressed through the CSO’s institutional 
culture: the extent to which their practices and their decision-making processes were 
democratic. The composition of a CSO’s bureau exécutif is also an indicator of 
                                                        
62 Decree Number 88 for the Year 2011 Pertaining to Regulation of Associations, Published on 24 
September 2011, translated by International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. Available at 
http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Tunisia/88-2011-Eng.pdf [Accessed 14/12/2013] 
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equality and the following quotes highlight the extent of gender diversity in CSO 
bureaus. 
 “We have an executive bureau that is composed of 7 members five of them are 
women and two are men. 30% of us are of youth. Every idea is welcomed 
whether it is coming from the executive bureau or from the members, we 
don’t make the distinction. We get together we talk about it and execute the 
plan.” (Saloua Ghrissa, ATPDD) 
 “The bureau is divided equally between both genders.” (Yassin Nasr, 
President of Association Cepsa)  
 “Democracy in Tunisia needs so much more time to be established. I think 
after the revolution women everywhere should be in decision-making 
position, you might say that I am only saying that because I am a woman but 
the truth is that I believe women should be given an equal opportunity to lead 
challenge because I believe in this transitional period we need finesse, 
flexibility and strength and women combine the 3.”  (Imen Bejoui, ATJA) 
The power relations between the bureau and regular members also expressed the 
extent of equality and pluralism. Jawhar’s description of Destourna, as “a completely 
decentralised, network of small cells”, was a unique case, but most CSOs described 
how their leadership takes the major decisions while being considerate to the 
membership.   Amir explains how WeYouth’s bureau is receptive to feedback. 
 “At the end of any project we made, we ask them (the members) for their 
opinions.  Sometimes they are unhappy and say what they want.”…“We have a 
good bureau but I support the idea that everyone is a normal member and 
we’re all the same. It’s not the era of the executive board giving all the 
orders.”… “I was a member of another Tunisian NGO, so when I feel that my 
work was just the Bureau’s gain and they want to force any idea or project, so 
I said I don’t feel comfortable so I quit. So I don’t want my members to quit.” 
(Amir Ben Ameur, WeYouth) 
Furthermore, interviewee’s explanations of their CSO’s decision-making processes 
and democratic practices, such as discussion, consensus, and voting, were also 
representations of Equality and Pluralism. The following quotes express how 
different CSOs implement inclusive practices. 
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 “I am the President but we don’t support bureaucracy. But always, if I want to 
take initiative, I present the ideas to the board members and we debate and 
have discussions about that initiative and if this project will be ok, what would 
be gained, what obstacles we may face. So we make a kind of plan about the 
project, basically, we support democracy in our NGO.” “I think leadership is 
not about taking decisions or being authoritarian, but you have to have 
influence, if you have an idea and support it with arguments and motivation, 
all of us work like this, if you have an idea just suggest it.” (Amir Ben Ameur, 
WeYouth) 
 “I’m a team player, not a ruler. The CSOs is happy because of the teamwork. 
We listen to each other, there no one person who decides. We vote for which 
theme we are going to work on, and then we select three themes that are the 
most relevant to Sidi Bouzid and proceed to vote on them.”  (Ghada Chokri, 
President of I-Lead) 
 “Most of the ideas are from the bureau because we are part of this 
environment and we know the needs and what the region lacks and we try to 
stay apolitical and keep the association out of the political feud.” 
(Abderrahamane Hadj Belgacem, Gabes Action) 
 “As for ideas, they usually come from the members and also the ideas that our 
followers on FB might suggest.”  (Adel Nagati, Journalists Association of 
Kairouan)  
  “We have a Facebook page and whoever has any suggestions or anything can 
send a message to the inbox.  We also have meetings once or twice a month.” 
(Amel Amraoui, Sajin 52) 
 “There is no president who gives orders. We all are presidents and members.” 
(Chedly Ben Messaoud, Association Djerba Ulysse)   
 “We are a very Horizontal association.” (Adel Hechimi, Friends of the Miners 
Basin) 
 “Inside these walls, we practice democracy, we have a book for suggestions or 
we can also accept suggestions in our weekly meeting and then we vote to 
determine which ones to execute.” (Naceur Yassine, Cepsa) 
Sawty is a large CSO with regional chapters but Ghazoua explains the overall feeling 
of unity rather than having regional loyalty.   
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 “The members all feel like ‘we are Sawty’ first of all, they (each chapter) are 
not very independent of each other. They are trying to focus on each region 
because each region has its own specificities so they try to target the youth 
there and respond to their particular needs. But Chapters try to coordinate 
with each other when they work, and they all identify themselves as Sawty.  
The duty of the national board is to notice when a chapter is going far from 
the fields we work in and help try to remain focused on the collective aims. 
National projects and activities gather all the members.” (Ghazoua Ltaief, 
President of SAWTY) 
 “We believe in unity, we have been trying to teach Tunisians to get over 
regionalism, tribalism, and nepotism.”   (Sami Tahri, UGTT Spokesman) 
 
Institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), whereby organisations hold 
similar attitudes, engage in similar practices and operate with similar management 
styles, was not evident in the survey results of Chapter Six. The inquiry into the 
existence of isomorphism is relevant because it seeks to establish whether a central 
tendency or similar trends exist in Tunisian CSOs or whether they are varied and 
heterogeneous. Isomorphism is conventionally applied to institutional practices. 
However, this research applies it to examine the extent of political culture norms 
convergence between CSOs. The interview data largely confirms that organisations 
are not necessarily becoming increasingly similar or are adopting a certain, singular 
approach to civil activism. This is partly due to the varying objectives of CSOs which 
require different approaches. Delivering their message and initiating or 
implementing change is a common theme for CSOs. However, political watchdogs, 
awareness raising groups, and charity or service providers operate differently, each 
according to their goals.  Furthermore, the manner in which groups deliver their 
messages varies. Some use public displays in press releases and conferences or 
training workshops. Others target the general public through their projects. Some 
engage in seeking to influence National Constituent Assembly (NCA) members 
through lobbying in person or sending written recommendations. Oppositional-
Resistance approaches of protests, demonstration, or sit-ins were also employed.    
Regarding management style, interviewees often cited Al Bawsala as a great example 
of a CSO because they are effective and influential. However, their business model is 
not possible for all other CSOs to aspire to or even imitate. Al Bawsala is a unique, 
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professional reporting and watchdog association that became the most trustworthy 
information source on NCA activities. As the interview with Amira Yahyaoui 
demonstrated, they may have a pro-democracy agenda, but their institutional culture 
has been centred around Amira’s leadership and top-down mentoring rather than 
democratic practice and decision-making processes. In contrast, Ghazoua Lteif 
(Sawty) explains how she is inspired by various CSOs and tries to incorporate new 
ideas.  
“We are trying to build our own model, as a Youth organisation we are 
different, and there are not really a big number of youth organisations 
working with youth so we do not have a model in Tunisia because 90% of the 
NGOs you see today were created post-Revolution so we are all in the stage of 
learning. Even the old organisations, for me, are not very inspiring models. 
When I travel and see organisations abroad, I am inspired. There are great 
initiatives. Every time I go to a foreign training session or exchange 
programme, I try to learn new tools and skills, and then transfer them to 
members of Sawty when I get back. Even from the Arab World, not just 
European or American models. US models are very professional but I’ve seen 
some great initiatives in Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt.” 
In addition to different approaches civic activity CSOs seek to undertake, the 
variation in training CSOs receive adds to the diversity in civil society. The range of 
both Tunisian and International consultant-trainers and funding bodies that provide 
training for CSOs, such as British Council, British Embassy, The Department for 
International Development (DFID), USAID, The U.S.-Middle East Partnership 
Initiative (MEPI), The National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican 
Institute (IRI), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) or GiZ 
(the German Society for International Cooperation), suggests a pluralism of 
approaches to civic activism.   
 
Inquiry into issues of transparency demonstrated that most organisations require 
funding for their activities and some CSOs demonstrated similar discourses 
regarding their acquisition of funding.  Energy Sector INGO Associate, Lucy Kamoun, 
noted that some Tunisian CSOs understood the norms and the language they must 
adopt to be successful with their proposal applications.   
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“As CSO associate, I had to evaluate a large number of local CSO proposals for 
our small grants program. Our INGO’s proposal template follows the same 
guidelines and structures many other international donors follow. I noticed 
that CSOs are aware of the ‘donor jargon’ and their proposals usually reflect 
what they believe the donor wants to hear, from the way their proposal 
objectives and outcomes are phrased to the operational and financial 
management style they adopt for their proposed projects. It is not a surprise 
that the ‘successful’ Tunisian CSOs such as Bawsala and I Watch are those well 
versed in grant proposal writing and who are more able to attract funding.” 
In addition to using the international standard terminology, some CSOs tailor their 
projects to align with the donor’s requirements in order to gain funding.  However, 
others reject funding if it contains conditions or does not suit their needs. Ghada 
Chokri explained how I-Lead refused support from a Danish organisation (VNG) 
because they could not agree on terms: I-Lead wanted training assistance but VNG 
could not provide it. Another CSO that did not bow to international donor’s 
requirements was Inara, is a charity organisation that aims to provide logistics rather 
than operating with a budget. The founder Sami Chaherli explained how low means 
can still have a high impact and that it is possible to make positive change a without 
huge budgets and international funding. “I don’t need money for the association; I 
can give you a list of 10 families, or 50 students, or schools. You can send them food, 
clothing, supplies, in the name of the association or by yourself. No money needs to 
go into the Inara account if people don’t want.”  
Despite variations in practices, similar trends in normative values were evident. 
Democratic practices, essential to civil political culture, were considered normatively 
desirable and appearing to be an independent was vital. Interviewees also conveyed 
the importance of members’ inclusiveness and members having equality and 
freedom to express themselves. While institutional isomorphism was not clearly 
present, the diversity in types of CSOs and the methods they employ demonstrates 
the vibrancy of Tunisian civil society. 
7.4. Women and Racism: the limitations of Equality 
The limitations of equality were evident when addressing the status of Women and 
the issue of racism. In contrast to the mentalité of male superiority that tangibly 
manifests within party leadership (Petkanas, 2013: 10), there are many female 
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leaders in Tunisian CSOs and 22 of the 66 interviewees were women. Article 3 of Law 
8863 requests that CSOs observe equality and the interview data certainly suggests 
that women are not marginalised and gender equality is evident in civil society. CSOs 
were a driving force in protesting against the first draft of the constitution that 
included an article regarding Women’s ‘complimentary’ status in relation to men64. 
Messaoud Romdhani (FTDES) explained how “More than 40 organisations worked 
together” on campaigning against this article. Women’s rights are often vehemently 
defended in the liberal agenda against intolerance or Islamism. Anis Boufrika thinks 
the constitution is thanks to the hard work of NGOs and Tunisian Women. He also is 
adamant that Tunisian Women are a vital difference because “Women are harder to 
corrupt than men.” The statistical results in Chapter Six also suggest agreement with 
Boufrika.  
Although the following issues cannot lead to generalisations but only point to 
underlying nuances, there were a few cases where gender-related issues were 
highlighted. Firstly, the perceived threat that Ennahda poses to women’s rights has 
made women an important post-revolutionary issue, but also something that can be 
exploited. Discussing why their organisation has refused advances from any political 
party, Wafa Garbout thinks parties try to work with CSOs for their own gains and to 
appear gender sensitive. “They’re using you just for their image, especially women, 
because they want to seem liberal and progressive” (Wafa Garbout, United Colleges 
Association (UCA). Secondly, both UGTT and LTDH talked about the need to change 
with the times, especially integrating more women and youth, which suggests these 
organisations are male dominated. Thirdly, although gender-parity exists in CSOs, 
women leaders still face the struggle of men challenging their authority. Imen Bejoui 
explained the difficulties she faces. 
“As a woman, I have always felt that I was not in the decision-making process, 
I was respected but not included. Now being the president of ATJA I am the 
decision maker and it is not an easy task but I am up for the challenge.” (Imen 
Bejaoui, ATJA) 
                                                        
63 Decree Number 88 for the Year 2011 Pertaining to Regulation of Associations, Published on 24 
September 2011, translated by International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Available at 
http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Tunisia/88-2011-Eng.pdf  
64 Wording on women sparks protest in Tunisia, (19 August 2012), Al Jazeera, Available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/08/201281981854620325.html  
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Fourthly, despite being President, Amira Achouri explained, “I’m the only girl in the 
organisation, so it’s difficult to manage things in a group of men” (Amira Achouri, 
Association of Kairouanees for a Culture of Citizenship). It was unclear exactly what 
she meant but it could imply a degree of sexism or that, as a woman, it is harder to 
convey authority, she is not trusted or her ability to take the right decision would be 
questioned. Furthermore, nearly all of the strong female leaders are based in Tunis: 
Amira Yahyaoui, Selima Abbou, Emna Menif, Marwa Mansouri, Imen Bejaoui, Amal 
Amraoui, Intisar Kherigi, and Ghazoua Ltaief. As Amira Achouri is based in Kairouan, 
a more conservative city in the interior region, it possible that female leaders away 
from the capital are more likely to face these issues. Hasham Aidi, President of 
Cultural Association Mouwantaneen, a CSO based in Reugeb, a small town the Sidi 
Bouzid Governorate, explained the appeal of their organisation to women. 
“For us here, people, especially girls and women, join in because it is an 
opportunity for them to leave their houses, their daily routine and to meet up 
with people (friends of the opposite gender) who she can’t meet elsewhere 
like in her house.”    
 
This is not to suggest that organisations express inequality but this case highlights 
that female inclusion can be limited by the conservative social conventions in some 
parts of Tunisia regarding a woman's role in society. Therefore, CSOs that have a 
neutral base of operations or headquarters (locale in French) have the social 
advantages of allowing women a more respectable location in the public space than 
the male-dominated café scene, thus potentially preventing further unequal 
participation. This suggests equality exists despite social norms. In addition, CSOs 
provide a democratic public space, which is a positive indicator of the role CSOs play 
in democratisation. Indeed, women’s participation, particularly from conservative 
areas, in CSOs cannot be reduced to the availability of a locale and this issue is 
beyond the scope of the study, therefore this thesis does not seek to make any wider 
claims about the status of women in Tunisian civil society.  
No racism or race-related issues were expressed in any interview, except with Saadia 
Mosbah of Mnemty, an awareness-raising, pro-Human Rights, education, and 
development CSO. This is partly because Mosbah argues that racism is not recognised 
as a problem in Tunisia but that an underlying layer of racism exists in society and 
therefore civil society. For example, slave names are still on birth certificates and 
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how a teacher called a student using the term "slave". Mosbah explained how 
Mnemty asked the NCA to make committing racism a crime but they refused to 
discuss this topic. She thinks it contrary to the idea of Human Rights and equality if 
race issues are ignored. She acknowledges Mnemty are begrudgingly accepted.  
“We are independent and that scares other organisations, so they feel obliged 
to invite us to their events, but at 11PM the day before it takes place. They are 
afraid that we will take the money of the funders, but we will prove them 
wrong, and we will show them that we can work without the money.” 
As only one interview addresses racism, this thesis does not seek to make any wider 
claims about the status of racial equality in Tunisian civil society.  
7.5. Independence and effectiveness: the limitations of Pluralism 
The limitations of pluralism were also evident for two major reasons. Firstly, in the 
prevention of politicisation and maintenance of independence. Secondly, in favour of 
organisation efficiency where strong leadership, succession planning, and 
sustainability can take priority over democratic practices and therefore hinder the 
pluralism of the organisation. 
Law 88 seeks to prevent the overlap between the political sphere and civil society 
activity by stating that “Article (9): Founders and directors of an association must not 
be among those who assume the central management posts in political parties.”65 
Furthermore, organisations pride themselves on their independence from control or 
affiliation to political parties for reasons relating to Trust.  In spite of a legal 
limitation to complete inclusion and pluralism, Mouheb from I-Watch explained how 
they maintain a balance of independence without being exclusionary. 
 
“We have very strict rules, I-Watch doesn't accept members that belong to 
political parties, however, the main principle in I-Watch is “No exclusion” so 
these members with political affiliations don’t have access and cannot be 
involved in lobbying and advocacy projects. You can be a member and watch 
what we are doing but you cannot get involved in the projects, especially the 
elections ones. If you want to get involved in I-Watch, you just gotta resign 
from your political party. We do not discourage young people from joining 
                                                        
65 Decree Number 88 for the Year 2011 Pertaining to Regulation of Associations, Published on 24 
September 2011, translated by International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Available at 
http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Tunisia/88-2011-Eng.pdf 
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political parties but we believe that the two don’t match or work together. 
Choose civil society or political parties. The board members are not in 
anyways allowed to join political parties, or even express on their Facebook 
page affiliation or alignment with political parties.” (Mouheb Garoui, I-Watch) 
 
Whether an organisation that promotes or advocates for democracy has to, in fact, be 
democratic itself is a contentious issue. However, interviewees largely agreed that it 
was the case and even viewed it as a requirement.  
Despite the normative desirability of internal democratic elections or voting 
procedures, either regarding the selection of leadership and bureau members or 
consultation with members regarding the organisation’s decisions or actions, CSOs 
are seeking to strike a balance. On one hand, having skilled personnel is vital to 
making the organisation run effectively and bring sufficient stability to enable the 
organisation to develop. On the other hand, applying democratic ideals, such as 
pluralism and equality, and including democratic practices to determine which 
member is given decision-making authority may increase the CSOs credibility. 
Implementing too many democratic practices too soon can, in some cases, be 
detrimental to the CSO's effectiveness. Ensuring that the organisation is an 
established and functioning entity before power is transferred has been served to be 
a prudent approach for some. Presidents of professional (salaried) CSOs tend to have 
more expertise and have not stepped down because they are concerned that 
replacements would not have sufficient abilities to do their job. For example, 
Yahyaoui (Al Bawsala) and Masmoudi are both looking to eventually step down but 
are in the process of training or looking for suitable replacements. (Martin, 2015: 
805) 
 “Of course I’m going to say it's very participatory [laughs]. Unfortunately, 
until today all the ideas for the projects were mine. When I talk about the 
people who will take over this NGO, they are excellent at doing the work but 
don’t have enough initiative. In the beginning, I was involved in each detail, 
maybe this scared some of them because none of them were activists before, I 
am the only one who was active under Ben Ali, so they didn’t have the same 
way of thinking and treating Politicians.”  
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“The big problem I had was Al Bawsala was mine, and I used my name66 to 
promote it, I mean if it wasn’t me Sahbi Atig67 would never have given up one 
hour a week. I worked on the ground a lot and then over time I had to stay 
more in the office because when you read what the press was writing about Al 
Bawsala, its ‘Amira’s NGO’ or sometimes just my name …now the staff are 
becoming more independent and more involved, having more ideas” (Amira 
Yahyaoui, Al Bawsala). 
 
To move away from this personification of Al Bawsala, Amira began sending other 
team members to radio shows, interviews, and conferences and stopped any 
involvement with the Al Bawsala website. Amira planned to leave Al Bawsala in one 
year’s time (and did so in June 2015) but was mentoring Ons Ben Abdelkarim to 
succeed her. This was not a democratic succession process, but a handover rather 
than an election took place to ensure the continued effectiveness of the organisation. 
Masmoudi points to a lack of ability in Tunisia.  
“I would like to hire an Executive Director, who will work under me, and 
possibly in a few years I could quit, I have no intention of being President for 
life, but it takes time to build these skills, especially in Tunisia, they don’t have 
them. You have to be careful who you hire as Executive Director, we still 
haven’t found somebody we can trust to run the organisation.” … “In civil 
society, in general, we don’t have the skills, these are new organisations, and 
we don’t have a lot of people who have experience in running organisations, 
especially non-profit ones.”  (Radwan Masmoudi, CSID) 
 
Some voluntary CSOs have decided to maintain stability and consistency with their 
managing personal and leaders. Moez Ali has been the only President of Union des 
Tunisiens Indépendants pour la Liberté (UTIL) as the other founding members left or 
pursued a career in politics. His years of pre-2011 experience with USAID had 
enabled the members to re-elect him. His family members are also not involved in 
UTIL because he considered that “this isn’t moral.” He is not, however, overly 
controlling as he explains UTIL project managers are given complete control over 
their work. He explained that he is looking to step down to enable “younger people to 
                                                        
66 Amira is famous in Tunisia because her father, Mokhtar Yahyaoui, a judge and human rights activist, 
was a vocal opponent of the corruption undertaken by the Ben Ali regime. 
67 Ennahda NCA member for Ariana and chair of Ennahda the parliamentary group.  
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take over.” The presidents of organisations I interviewed generally had the intention 
of, eventually, resigning and transferring leadership, recognising it is the right thing 
to do. Many echoed the sentiment of Saadia Mosbah, President of M'nemty, “It’s high 
time I stepped down at the next general assembly.” This suggests that remaining in 
power indefinitely would no longer be considered an acceptable practice. Conversely, 
Chawki Gaddes (ATDC) told me, ‘I tried to step down in the last General assembly but 
the whole bureau refused’ because they feared the organisation would not function 
as effectively without him. (Martin, 2015: 805) 
Amira told me “Tunisians love to discuss, but never to work” and recalled an 
occasion when a CSO member told Amira she is like a TGV (French high-speed train), 
a testament to both Al Bawsala’s effectiveness and her strong leadership. She 
responded that they are like a yellow Tunisian bus; slow. If a CSO that has a strong 
leader with experience, expertise and is effective at ‘getting things done’, democratic 
practices can sometimes be bypassed or overlooked in favour of efficiency and 
effectiveness in CSO activity, even if the CSO promotes democracy. In this case, 
equality and pluralism are compromised. 
Being a democratic CSO is a normatively ideal position, indeed many interviewees 
state we have to ‘practice what we preach’, for example, “You cannot advocate for 
transparency and participatory democracy if you are not applying this internally” 
(Mouheb Garoui, I-Watch). Anis Boufrika (We Love Sousse) concurs; “I am very 
convicted to democratic ways and democratic values, and if we defend these values, 
we have to apply them.” However, the balancing act between democracy and 
effectiveness is a logical and practical explanation for where the limits of pluralism 
exist. 
What CSO members have been learning about democracy reveals the processes of 
change they have been undertaking and indicates degrees of Equality and Pluralism. 
Attempting to implement democracy has made members realise they need to be 
pluralistic and treat members equally. The following quotes demonstrate what, and 
the ways in which, CSOs have been learning about democracy in addition to how it is 
practically implemented.  
 “For us, democracy also means involvement, if you are the president of a CSO 
that does not mean that you are always right when you discuss your ideas 
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with others and listen to their ideas, that is when you have better results.” 
(Radwan Fatnassi, FTDES) 
 “The most important thing we have learned is the practice of democracy, the 
acceptance of other views and the tolerance and the importance of 
consensus.” (Zouhayer Hammoudi, Government Participative) 
 “In democracy there are a lot of values that you might be totally convinced are 
correct and would be willing to fight to see implemented. However, because of 
democracy, other people may be convinced of the opposite, and if the vote 
favours them, you find yourself losing the battle. Learning to accept defeat is 
important” (Mohsen Mhadhbi, ARAA Pour la Civilisation et Citoyenneté)   
  “We learned democracy in theory and we have the chance to practice it our 
CSO while having our elections, writing our status and discussing projects. We 
learned how not to be afraid to disagree and say it straightforward”.  (Aida 
Daly, TOUPAT) 
 “We learned that we have to listen to each other and that there should not be 
one person who decides.” (Ghada Chorki, I-Lead) 
 “Decisions should not be taken vertically and there should be room for 
debates. Voting should be the way to solve our disagreement and we should 
resort to voting if consensus can’t be reached. Also, working with other CSOs 
contributed to our learning about democracy, doing this kind of activities 
should be very collaborative and so no CSO should dominate the decision 
making” (Adel Hechimi, Friends of the Miners Basin) 
 “For me, civil society is like a smaller prototype for society. CS is a prototype 
of the society in general if we can work on being democratic in our 
organisation it is a start, and then we can move to applying democracy in the 
family and schools. So we don’t take unilateral decisions, we use voting 
instead.” (Myriam Belhaj, OVC) 
 “We can say ‘no’ and we are allowed to disagree. The President of the CSO can 
be challenged and should listen to what other members have to say and do 
what the majority decides. We often disagree, so we resort to voting.” 
(Wissem Ksiksi, Oxygen) 
 
Jawher Ben Mabarek (Destourna) found that the application of democracy is also 
different to how he had previously understood the concept. “I thought that 
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democracy was about laws and texts and I found out that is a culture of the people. 
The problem is we live in a country where the culture of people is not democratic so 
we need to rebuild this society.” Other interviewees concurred, describing how they 
understood that a specific culture is required to support the processes and 
institutions of democracy. 
 “Elections are not the definition of democracy” (Marwa Mansouri, Association 
Cultivons la Paix)  
 “Democracy is a process but it’s also a mentality. This is something you hear 
in lots of NGOs, that it’s about a revolution in mindsets, like a Cultural 
Revolution, and this is something we’re struggling with, how do we achieve 
this?” (Intisar Kherigi, Jasmine Foundation) 
 
Furthermore, interviewees who described democracy as something new or 
unfamiliar to Tunisia, indicate that change and learning are occurring, despite the 
process being slow. 
 “We are not used to democracy, before the revolution we didn’t have any, not 
in our political life and not even in our family life.” (Houda Khalil, Zaghoun 
Centre for Development and Democracy)  
 “We learned a lot. In the beginning, there was a ‘diarrhoea of democracy’ 
where people don’t know the limits. Democracy is good, but there are limits of 
liberty; everyone has to know that your liberty stops where other’s starts. We 
learned through our organisation that you cannot ask for everything, there 
are limits. But we’re still learning. The process of learning democracy is not 
finished, it will take more time. We’re quick, for sure, but I think it will take 5 
to 10 years and the new generation will fully understand the meaning and the 
rules of democracy.”  (Souhayel Alouini, Open Gov TN)  
 
In conjunction with the democracy learning processes, interviewees expressed the 
training opportunities with which CSOs can engage. These were chances for 
members to increase their organisation’s capacities in addition to their 
understanding of democracy. Interviewees indicated that knowledge and skills are 
passed on within CSOs, from trained to untrained, while CSOs are helping mentor 
others.  
  
213 
 
 “We were present at many conferences and capacity-building training 
sessions. We learned about democracy and elections. We even organised an 
event about how to do elections and the role associations play during 
elections, and how they must be equal and neutral but must observe.” 
(Abderrahamane Hadj Belgacem, Gabes Action)  
 “Civil society is about ‘enabling people’ by giving them practical skills, and I 
think civil society is the perfect antidote to the education system. The 
Tunisian education system teaches people how NOT to think, it’s about 
groupthink and how to answer the question exactly the way they want to you 
answer it: memorise and regurgitate. Civil society is providing a much bigger 
space where people can do things in different ways and even fail. Our 
education system doesn’t allow failure. If you’re a failure it’s stamped on your 
forehead because everyone knows who repeated a year. Our education 
system is really theoretical, it’s abstract and lacks practice but civil society is 
an arena for tangible learning.” (Intisar Kherigi, Jasmine Foundation)  
 
This learning process that all these CSOs describe relates to De Tocqueville’s idea 
that civil society is a school of democracy. In this process CSO members are learning 
that disagreement is not a problem but it can be overcome, learning to accept defeat, 
learning the practical aspects of democracy, learning the culture of democracy, and 
learning to be organised in order to be able to perform a democratic function 
towards the state. Rafik had a particularly interesting point about what democracy 
can reveal.  
“I have discovered the real face of human beings. We are working on sensitive 
issues, elections and election results, sometimes people try to corrupt you, to 
bribe you, to threaten you. How people talk behind your back. It’s not easy, we 
discovered another face of people, and we learned how political parties and 
MPs are working. It confirmed suspicions and allegations he had about 
politicians” (Rafik Halouani, Mourakiboun).  
8. Reflections 
I chose to conduct one to one interviews, but there were some of the cases where I 
conducted interviews with two people at the same time, from the same organisation, 
produced interesting responses, for example with Khalid Ouazzani & Nizar 
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Abdessaied from Associo-Med. Khalid regarded certain issues civil society as 
political, whereas in Nizar’s opinion they were purely civic. This debate is not unique 
to Tunisia and is a reflection of DeTocquveillian Vs Gramscian conceptualisations of 
civil society. Nizar was sceptical of civil society working with the government or in 
political fields and thought civil society should be like a hobby, where friends meet to 
do what they feel or undertake actions for the good of society that benefit the 
country; close to a liberal-associative model. Khalid thought differently and that civil 
society has to have an impact on the government or the government would never 
address the problems of society. Also, that civil society should be a power, which 
applies pressure to the government, if required; otherwise there is nothing else to 
check the government’s powers. This debate represented the diversity in the 
understanding of civil society in Tunisia. 
9. Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter reveals that the criteria of civil political culture are evident in the 
discourses of the interviewed Tunisian CSOs members. In particular, evidence exists 
of Equality and Pluralism as most CSOs express a degree of consultation between 
leaders and members and inclusive decision-making procedures. The quantitative 
survey in Chapter Six sought to independently measure each criterion of civil 
political culture in CSOs. The interviews discussed in this chapter, however, 
demonstrate that CSO members view some of these criteria as interconnected. The 
limitations of Tolerance in civil society are linked to Freedom, Trust, and 
Transparency. This impacts on the relationships between CSOs and is evidenced by 
the fact that CSOs’ ability to collaborate and co-operate is shaped by the perception 
of whether the ‘other’ in civil society is Islamist or not.  
Regarding the internal dynamics of CSOs, despite recognition of the importance of 
practicing democracy, certain organisations sometimes chose to overlook Pluralism 
to a certain extent by focusing on efficiency and effectiveness of their work and the 
development of their organisation. This means practices and decision-making 
processes of a democratic nature are being bypassed. The learning process that CSOs 
are undergoing requires addressing how to balance ‘habits of co-operation, solidarity 
and public-spiritedness’ (Putnam, 1993:89-90) and internal democratic practices 
within the organisation with simultaneously running an organisation efficiently. 
Indeed, the Liberal-Associative “schools of democracy” model of civil society may 
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help members understand democracy through participation in a CSO, but unless the 
organisation is effective it struggles to fulfil a democratic function towards the state 
and other CSOs. 
The inconclusiveness of the interviews lies in the fact that they assess the discourse 
and not the practice of CSO members. Therefore, it was not possible to verify if 
interviewees ‘do what they say they do’ or whether their discourse is at odds with 
their practice.  Recognising this potential disparity between discourse and practice, it 
is possible that interviewees could be lying or trying to present a more positive 
image of Tunisia which suggests how they want civil society and CSOs to be.  The 
methodology operationalised in this thesis, developed from Welch’s dualistic 
understanding of political culture, addresses this disparity. Having addressed CSO 
member discourse through survey and interview approaches in the results of 
chapters Six and Seven, this leads to the need to perform ethnographic participant 
observation to understand behaviour.    
Regarding relations with the state, the results in this chapter provide evidence that 
some organisations are performing a democratic function of influencing the state 
through Oppositional-Resistance means. For example, I-watch, OpenGovTN, and Al 
Bawsala are seeking to enhance Tunisia’s democracy by making electoral and 
parliamentary processes more transparent. While Chapter Five demonstrated the 
vital role civil society played during the revolution and transition, this chapter 
evidences the extent to which civil society vibrancy has developed. Furthermore, the 
data reflects a genuine understanding of the Oppositional-Resistance role CSOs 
perform. Liberal-Associative organisations are also performing a democratic function 
and influencing their members and society through a democratic learning process. 
The vibrant discussions, that would have previously been permitted to occur, 
represent progression that is changing the nature of discussion in the public space. 
Civil society is filling the public space with discussions that are, in part, deliberative 
and democratic. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT - ETHNOGRAPHIC PARTICIPANT-OBSERVATION TO ASSESS THE DEMOCRATIC 
POLITICAL CULTURE OF A TUNISIAN CSO.  
CASE STUDY: JEUNES INDÉPENDANTS DÉMOCRATES (JID)  
This was a largely productive meeting where everyone in the salon (living 
room) of Zied’s parents’ villa was sat on sofas, armchairs, or at the dining 
table working on their laptops. The new projector, donated by GiZ, was 
displaying JID’s manifesto on the wall. Zied was mostly delegating and 
overseeing everything that was happening. I felt a bit useless just watching 
people working with my notebook in hand, so I asked Zied ‘Kifesh najjem 
n3awen?’  (How can I help? in Tunisian Arabic dialect). He asked me to contact 
any professors or experts on political violence and find resources on the 
subject. Also, an email in English, to an American donor, needed to be 
proofread.  
It was nice to witness a productive JID session rather than just a meeting that 
had no concrete outcomes. I noticed a great burden still seems to fall on Zied’s 
shoulders; not only as the host of the meeting but as the leader of the [Fight 
against Political Violence] project. He sometimes seems very happy and 
willing in his role, but at other times the pressure of leadership seems to affect 
him as an exasperated look falls across his face. It is difficult to tell whether he 
works harder than others because of his position in the organization or 
because he cares more. 
It was nearly 9pm by the time we finished and everyone seemed tired. Emir 
insisted he gave me a lift home instead of me taking a taxi. The timing and 
duration of the meeting meant that we missed dinner, so we stopped at one of 
the many brightly lit, modern decor cafes on the main road in Ennasr for 
makloub (a Tunisian folded and oven-baked sandwich). I had met Emir before 
in a couple of meetings but cynically wondered if the reason for his insistence 
on driving me home was because he wanted to practice his English or because 
he was trying to figure out who this British guy is who observes his CSO 
meetings. I know the taxi fare rates double at this time of night but I doubted 
his motivation was to save me money. I also would not have minded walking 
around or waiting for a taxi considering that this middle class suburb of Tunis 
is very safe. Over dinner, Emir wanted to know my opinions about JID and 
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Tunisian civil society in general. We agreed participation in civil society is 
more rewarding when you feel some progress is being made, like during 
today’s meeting. Looking back, I realise my cynicism about Emir’s motives 
was misplaces, as he was only being typically hospitable with his invitation.  
[JID meeting, 9/12/2013, Zied parent’s House, Cite Ennasr, Tunis.] 
1. Introduction 
In contrast to the previous two methods in this thesis, that seek to make 
generalisations and comparisons about CSOs, ethnography focuses on the “small 
world” of everyday interaction (Lichterman, 2005: 1-2). The findings thus far may 
have relevance or highlight issues that are symptomatic of other Tunisian CSOs, but 
this chapter seeks to assess JID’s internal procedures, decision-making processes, 
and the extent to which civil political culture is exhibited within the organisation. In 
contrast to the other methods of this thesis which focus on discourse, this chapter 
asserts the study of practice requires observation and that the practice of civil 
political culture can be observed, measured, and assessed through ethnographic 
observations. The observation is however supported with interviews of JID members 
and analysis of their charter to determine their adherence to rules. This chapter 
concludes that JID underwent a democratic learning process and that the leadership 
transition fundamentally impacted on their institutional culture.  
2. Theoretical considerations for ethnographic research 
As Chapter Two establishes, assessment of political culture requires measuring of 
attitudes but also practice. Surveys have generalising and far-reaching value but they 
also have shortcomings and limitations, as explained in Chapter Six. Surveys alone 
are insufficient because they cannot observe practice, therefore making the 
observation of practice a requirement. Within the context of arguing that culture is 
not static and it does not take generations to learn democratic culture, this 
participant-observation study focuses on how individuals may undergo democratic 
learning, therefore acknowledging that this process that can be observed. Referring 
to changes in political structures in post-cold war Poland and the Czech Republic, 
Goldfarb discusses the reinvention and the radical transformation of political culture 
in addition to the impact of CSOs on this process (2011: 36 & 63-67). The learning 
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this CSO is going through is based on their own ‘trial and error’ processes and also 
from interaction with trainers and external consultants.  
Despite being a research method that produces a large amount of additional and 
discursive data, the purpose of this ethnographic case-study is to observe absence or 
presence of the elements of civil political culture, expressed through the same set of 
criteria of civil political culture as in Chapters Six and Seven; Tolerance, Equality, 
Freedom, Pluralism, Trust, Transparency, and Democratic Practices. It is a focused 
study in which only one Tunisian CSO is observed. It looks to observe political 
culture of a CSO by asking the following. 
 Tolerance - Are any prejudices expressed? Can ideology be observed? 
 Equality - Who works for the CSO? 
 Freedom - Any preventions or restrictions on their work? 
 Pluralism - Is there any evidence of diversity?  
 Trust - Internal trust between members? Does JID Work with other CSOs? 
 Transparency - How much of their work, accounts are publicised?  
 Democratic Practices - How are decisions made? What processes are used? 
I sought to identify uncivil practices by asking the following questions, 
 Are voices excluded?  
 Is any form of intolerance or prejudice expressed? 
 Are undemocratic practices evident? 
 Are certain members afforded preferential treatment?  
The nature of ethnographic research requires emersion into ‘the field’, which 
features as much interaction as possible, constant note taking, personal interactions 
and considering people’s personal lives to uncover the layers of culture, and 
maintaining naivety to observe without pre-conceptions while saving judgement for 
later. I sought to observe some factors addressing less obvious micro-cultures within 
the CSO types of interaction such as what and how people interact in addition to 
etiquettes and practices, and relationships between members. I also placed 
importance on out of office interactions, where JID members often spoke more freely 
about their thoughts, particularly if I had developed trust and a positive rapport with 
the staff. 
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2.1. Ethics 
I ensured that the implementation of my ethnography was not deceptive by 
conducting overt, rather than covert, observation. In covert research the intentions 
of researchers are unknown to the subjects or the subjects are unaware they are 
being observed, thus deceiving them, which makes overt research a more ethical 
approach. My presence and the task of my research were made obvious to the JID 
members from our first meeting when I explained who I was, the nature of my work, 
and its purpose. This honesty helped develop trust which, I believe, facilitated the 
observation process.  
JID’s name has been used but there was a possibility that members would not want 
their name to be used in the thesis. Therefore, I offered members the chance to 
remain anonymous and opt-out of the observation process if they so requested. 
However, initial members agreed to my presence and new members did not request 
to opt-out. I also offered the opportunity for participant analysis whereby JID 
members could approve, disapprove and comment on my work in case they found 
the observations and findings inaccurate or too critical. I explained to the CSO staff 
from the beginning of the ethnography that they would have an influence in the 
writing process. Indeed, they will be aware of my observation, however, it was my 
intention that honesty would make members at ease with my presence, reduce any 
suspicion regarding the intentions of my study, and help to foster further trust. 
2.2. Insider/Outsider Dynamic 
 
“Participant observers can be insiders who observe and record some aspects of life 
around them (in which case, they’re observing participants), or they can be outsiders 
who participate in some aspect of life around them and record what they can (in 
which case, they’re participating observers)” (Bernard, 2011: 260). Following 
Bernard’s definition, I set out to act as ‘observing participant’, because I intended to 
participate in JID work as part of my observations. However, for the majority of the 
time, I was a ‘participating observer’ because JID did not undertake a great deal of 
work, allowing me to focus on observing.  
Weinstein (2006) discusses the important distinction between insider and outsider 
status in an ethnographic study. To a certain extent, I obtained insider status within 
JID because I was not only an observer but I paid the 10 dinars (£ 3.50) membership 
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fee. I was an active member because I attended their meetings and tried to be part of 
their cause. They understood that I was always willing to help them and I tried to 
help improve the organisation in any way I could.  I was therefore an insider for their 
cause. My understanding of Tunisi helped. Since that first meeting I was made to feel 
very welcome at JID meetings and no one openly questioned or objected to my 
presence. Members refer to me as a friend, implying that they trusted me. They were 
very grateful for the essay I wrote for them; a comparison between British and 
Tunisian civil society essay that featured some recommendations. I enjoyed working 
with them but wished I could have helped more.  
In the years following the revolution, a considerable number of journalists and 
academics have travelled to Tunisia to conduct research. Initially, people were 
enthusiastic to tell their stories but after a few years, a degree of exhaustion was felt 
by Tunisians as foreigners attempted to neatly summarise their experience. 
Furthermore, as highlighted in Abaza’s 2011 article “Academic tourists sight-seeing 
the Arab Spring” foreign academics have been guilty of utilising the local experts 
without giving them sufficient credit to the knowledge acquired from those locals, 
instead only portraying them as the subject. This approach can be especially 
troublesome if these foreign academics only travel to a place once and then proceed 
to create a narrative based on a portrayal of their findings from a particular point in 
time. I believe that living in Tunisia for a year and my ongoing work with JID enabled 
the members to distinguish me from the aforementioned researcher. Rather than 
treating JID as a laboratory experiment, I believe I was seen as a committed academic 
who was seeking to acquire a more sophisticated understanding of the changing 
contextual dynamics and to present nuanced findings.  
I also felt that I connected with the members outside of JID activities. For a few 
examples, Sara invited me to attend her sister’s wedding party, where Selma was also 
present. When I told them I was leaving Tunisia, I expected to meet some for a coffee 
and say farewell, but they insisted on throwing a goodbye party for me.  I returned to 
Tunisia in 2015, a year after finishing my research, and met with Souhayel, Emir and 
Zied. Researchers often establish connections with their research subjects beyond 
their work. Indeed my experience is not dissimilar to the bonding experience Geertz 
describes with Balinese villages at the illegal cockfight. The villagers were impressed 
with how Geertz and his wife had joined the locals in fleeing from the police and 
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“demonstrated our solidarity with what were now our co-villagers” (Geertz, 1973: 
416). However, rather than using a similar trope to justify the authenticity of my 
work or make an overstated claim that my experience had enabled me to establish an 
intimate connection with the place and the people, there are various reasons why I 
remained, and will always be, an outsider. Acknowledgement of this fact prevents the 
blurring of subjectivity in this ethnography. Primarily, it is because I am not Tunisian.  
I did not achieve fluency in Tunisian Arabic and no matter how much I agree with or 
supported their cause, I will never have the ‘shared experience’ of being Tunisian and 
growing up in Tunisia.  Furthermore, I do not think I did enough work for JID, but I 
also think they did not exploit my expertise enough.  
Although it was my utmost intention to “make myself a part of their world” 
(Weinstein, 2006:364), I can assess that I walked the line carefully between insider 
and outsider. In comparison to the structured interviews (Chapter Six), where I 
remained very much an outsider and foreign interviewer, despite the interviewee’s 
knowledge that I was a resident in Tunis, and clearly had a firm understanding of the 
civil society and the public space in Tunisia. My understandings of French and 
Tunisian-Arabic improved dramatically since I arrived in Tunisia but I did not 
understand 100% of conversations that took place in meetings. The meetings often 
had pre-arranged agendas and the minutes were made available on the JID Facebook 
group which allowed me to compare what first Ines and later Oussama (general 
secretaries of JID) wrote to the notes I made. When more informal conversations 
took place and more colloquialisms were used, Zied, Mohammed, Souhayel, Oussama, 
or Sara helped to translate what was occurring. I also observed body language and 
non-verbal communication to help understand the interaction.  
3. Case selection: Jeunes Indépendants Démocrates (JID)  
As this ethnography is a single case study, is it relevant to establish why I worked 
with JID. I sought to work with a group that was consistent with the theoretical 
understanding of a CSO established in Chapter One: non-governmental, represents 
the will of a section of Tunisian citizens, and is working towards achieving civic goals, 
be they minority views or not. It was not necessary for the group to be a voluntary 
association; therefore, members could be full-time employees. However, the group 
must not be ‘power-seeking’ and looking to become part of elected or appointed 
government. I sought to work with an organisation that was new, Tunisian, not a 
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branch of an international organisation, and not affiliated with the Tunisian 
Government. Working with a new association would allow me to observe the steep 
learning curve that a CSO established after the revolution would experience in the 
undertaken of its democratic function. 
Jeunes Indépendants Démocrates (JID), Young Independent Democrats, is a youth-led 
CSO from Tunis. The organisation is absolutely independent, meaning members are 
not allowed to be members of political parties. There are three membership 
requirements; 1) Young: between 18-35 years old, 2) Independent: no political party 
membership, and 3) Democratic: belief in democracy. JID was formed after the 
revolution in 2011, by a group of young Tunisians living in Tunis, mostly students of 
different disciplines (Law, Medicine, Languages, and Sciences) with shared civic and 
democratic values. Some members had experience from pre-revolutionary 
involvement in civil society through activity in university campus clubs, but not 
through activity in established and more militant CSOs that were active during the 
dictatorship e.g. Trade Unions, UGET, UGTE, or LTDH. Civil society activism in a free 
political environment is a new concept (3 years old at the time of the study) to 
Tunisia. JID is one of the many new, post-revolutionary associations whose members 
were learning how to engage in civil activity as they progressed. 
Regarding access to conducting observation, from my positive experiences of 
interviewing and conducting ethnography in 2012 with Tunisia-Live68, I have found 
Tunisians open and welcoming to interviews and research. I, therefore, found access 
fairly easy to obtain and was confident I would be allowed to work with CSOs in 
survey, interview, and observation capacities. I used my contacts in Tunisia (Civil 
society members, Journalists, and academics) to help me find a suitable CSO with 
which to work.  
Fabian Stroetges, a fellow Durham Ph.D. Candidate, recommended I speak to Zied 
from JID. I emailed Zied explaining the nature of my research. He agreed to meet and 
added ‘Fabian's friends are my friends’, demonstrating that a trusted mutual friend 
was sufficient to gain access and that personal connections are important facilitators. 
I was impressed with what he told me about JID’s work. JID are a post-revolution 
established, youth-led, local, secular, awareness-raising, non-political, part-time, 
                                                        
68 The first Tunisian news website in English, launched post-revolution Available at 
http://www.tunisia-live.net/  
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volunteer-run CSO. They seek to represent Youth-related issues, promote democracy, 
and are committed to remaining politically independent. Zied seemed happy for me 
to observe JID’s activities and invited me to their meeting the next day. This 
introduction process was informal and casual but being introduced via a mutual 
friend helped to establish trust more quickly between Zied and me. At the meeting 
the next day in Zied’s parents’ house, I introduced myself to the other present JID 
members and explained my work. The members seemed happy for me to be there 
and were very welcoming. Ines, the general secretary, added me to the mailing list 
and Facebook group. This was my unofficial acceptance into the group. I was 
introduced to other members when they came to meetings and, to my knowledge, no 
complaints were made about my presence.  
JID has branches in two Governorates; Tunis and Monastir, although during my 
observation an attempt was made to create a branch in Gafsa. The observation was 
almost exclusively conducted with the Tunis branch (JID Tunis). Members of JID 
Tunis resided in the northern suburbs of the capital Tunis. These areas of Menzah 5, 
Menzah 6, Menzah 9, and Cite Ennasr are largely middle class with white painted 
gated and guarded villas and high-rise apartment bloc residences, modern shopping 
malls, private clinics, boutiques, and chic coffee shops, restaurants and patisseries. 
The streets are well-lit at night and noticeably less littered and dusty than the less 
affluent neighbourhoods of Tunis. JID members, who largely come from those 
neighbourhoods, are not rich but certainly above the Tunisian average. Indeed, JID 
largely represents a specific section of the population; middle-class youth from Tunis 
who are successful products of the national education system. The founding 
members are from the same neighbourhoods and universities. Although JID 
expanded to Monastir, the majority of JID Monastir members are from Tunis but are 
based there on studying medicine, dentistry or pharmacology.  
JID was an interesting case study because they combined typical and atypical CSO 
characteristics. In addition to matching the aforementioned criteria of a CSO and the 
access I was granted, JID was a suitable and typical example of a Tunisian CSO to 
study for the following reasons. Firstly, they are one of the 10,00069 organisations 
established post-revolution. Secondly, JID is one of the many part-time, voluntary 
organisations, a majority within Tunisian civil society. Thirdly, despite the number of 
                                                        
69 Le centre d’information, de formation, d’études et de documentation sur les associations (IFEDA) 
Available at  http://www.ifeda.org.tn/ (Accessed 20/7/14) 
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politicised CSOs, many claim to be politically independent. Considering that 
‘independence’ is literally JID’s middle name, it was interesting to discover the extent 
of their independence. Fourthly, JID is a Tunisian organisation, not the office or 
chapter of an international CSO, therefore does not represent a re-creation of an 
international institutional culture. Fifthly, JID is a pro-democracy advocacy 
organisation and, since there are many CSOs promoting citizenship and political 
awareness, their message is not a minority view. 
Besides the aforementioned typical traits, JID is also an atypical CSO for the following 
reasons. Many CSOs talk about youth, however, JID is one of only a few that are 
youth-led and entirely youth-focused. Furthermore, studying a youth-led CSO is an 
interesting aspect to this research because it examines the new generation that has 
only recently become politically active in the post-revolution context. JID were not 
part of the old regime or pre-revolutionary CSOs who have different habits but 
represent a group engaging in a learning curve with the practice of democracy.  
JID were an interesting CSO to work with for this study because their focus is on 
democracy promotion. This means they are more likely to be focused on the issues 
relating to democratic culture; the pro-democracy, political aspects, and practicing 
what they preach. In comparison to other types of CSOs, service providing and 
charity organisations are more likely to be concerned with the practical, on the 
ground work they are doing than their own democratic functioning and procedures. 
The regional CSOs tend to be focused specifically on their own region, governorate, 
or city. JID actively attempt to expand across Tunisia and their projects aim to 
address national, rather than regional, issues such as participation in elections. 
In addition to their apolitical position, JID retains its independence by sourcing 
funding from various donors, although they are often funded by GiZ and Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung. One drawback of JID’s independence is that their activities are not 
funded by one specific donor and their diverse funding does not include operational 
costs. Therefore JID cannot pay for a permanent HQ (locale). Instead, meetings had to 
take place at members’ houses. The majority of meetings were held at Zied’s parents’ 
house, while he was President, but Mohammad also hosted. Both these large wall 
surrounded villas with polished stone floors and bright, spacious salons, were well 
above the Tunisian average. Otherwise, meetings were held in middle class, stylish 
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cafes with glass tables, comfortable booths, and cushioned seats in the Ennasr, Bardo 
or Menzah suburbs.  
JID is a voluntary organisation. Therefore, the members either have jobs or are 
university students. The bureau executif consists of a President, Vice-President, 
General Secretary, Treasurer, Spokesperson, Human Resources Secretary, Internal 
Communication Officer, and website Editor. According to the JID Charter, their 
objectives are to:  
 “Educate Tunisians (firstly the youth) on the issues of our revolution to 
encourage them to make their contribution to the building of our emerging 
democracy. 
 Educate and communicate to all young people who want political, civic and 
citizenship education that is a necessary act to master; 
 Inform about the evolution of political, social and economic events which 
Tunisia is going through and share with all the youth of this country 
information whose reliability has been verified; 
 Bring the voice of young people that we represent to the highest levels of the 
State to enforce our rights and our will.” 
 
4. Methods  
4.1. Observation and Participation 
I observed JID over an 8-month period. JID is a part-time CSO that only met at 
weekends on an ad hoc basis, usually every other weekend. This meant that a 
prolonged or daily observation was not possible. During my observation period, in 
addition to meetings, I attended a conference hosted by Sawty where Zied spoke and 
represented JID, and at a music concert/event that JID Monastir had organised.  
Using Ethnomethodology (see Chapter Two) as a basis for the observation, the 
methods I employed were, for the most part, systematic. I used a template to guide 
the observation. It featured the subheadings of a) Date, Location, and attendees, b) In 
meeting discussion/agenda, c) Interaction style, d) Out of meeting discussion, and e) 
Personal feelings. Wherever appropriate, or if I was asked explicitly, I would 
contribute to the meetings and offer my opinions or suggestions. The majority of the 
time I would not because I was conscious not to interfere in their work or be 
perceived as another Westerner in Tunisia telling them ‘how to do democracy’. I 
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would also ask questions during and after the meeting. I would not always ask the 
same informant to clarify the discussion or further develop an idea. Initially, I was 
most comfortable asking Zied, as he was the point of access but I also asked Oussama 
or Emir if they were giving me a lift home. After JID held internal elections for bureau 
positions in February 2014, Sara and Souhayel, the new President and VP 
respectively, were patient and conscientious to ensure that I understood what was 
taking place in the meetings. These five had very good spoken English skills which 
made them the most useful informants. 
The use of literature produced by JID also aided the observation process. During the 
period of my observation, JID became increasingly efficient at posting the minutes 
(procès-verbal - PVs) from their meetings on the Facebook group page. These became 
a useful tool for noting any disparities or discrepancies. The PVs do not address style 
and manners of interaction. I also translated JID’s charter to allow analysis of their 
discourse and observe consistencies, or inconsistencies with their practice and 
assess whether they followed and adhered to their charter. 
My major contributions to JID were based on my academic knowledge and English 
language skills. I researched theoretical understandings of the concepts of political 
violence, structural violence, and violence against women for their project. I also met 
Dr. Christian Olsson (University of Brussels) to propose a training workshop. I 
suggested and researched foreign funding sources and proof-read letters to funders. 
Souhayel asked me to write a paper for JID that compares British and Tunisian CSOs. 
He also asked me to include recommendations for JID based on this comparison. 
Engaging in these tasks enabled me to be a participant-observer, rather than just an 
observer. This was important for trust-building, showing my commitment to JID and 
getting closer to ‘insider’ status.   
4.2. One-to-One interviews with JID members 
I complemented and verified the observations with one to one, semi-structured 
interviews with eight JID members. These were not a method for observing the 
members’ behaviours and practices, but I used them as an opportunity to 
comprehend the issues and the conversations that I did not understand and to verify 
or clarify information and incidents from meetings I observed. It is important that 
the observation data is verified due to potential misreading or misunderstanding. In 
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addition, the interviews revealed new information and enabled greater 
understanding of their more personal thoughts. These interviews also address the 
critique Crapanzano makes regarding Geertz’ ethnography which, he argued, only 
includes “a constructed narrative of the constructed native’s constructed point of 
view” (1986: 74). This ethnography, in contrast, includes an understanding of the JID 
members from their points of view and their voices. 
Like the structured interviews with CSO bureau members in Chapter Seven, these 
also had a devised set of questions specific to uncovering aspects of civil political 
culture; to what extent the interviewees are tolerant, pluralistic, act and protect 
freedom and equality within JID. For example, I asked “Do you ever feel ignored?” to 
assess levels of pluralism and tolerance. But due to the familiarity between myself 
and the JID members, these interviews were more conversational. The interviews 
took place in cafes, either one to one or with an interpreter present. I trusted the 
information I was given in the interviews as JID members trusted me because they 
saw me at meetings, knew I worked for JID and saw me as a member on the inside of 
the organisation. They also knew I saw some of the events and situations they 
discussed in the interviews. I had already established some rapport with the 
members so I felt that allowed them to speak freely. The interviews did not yield 
particularly surprising results and often confirmed what I had observed. Members 
did not overly present critical perspectives of JID but admitted some of the 
deficiencies and areas which require improvement.  
I also interviewed Moujib, a consultant in communications and MENA CSOs who had 
worked with NGOs and associations in Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco in addition to 
Tunisia. He used to live in France and Washington D.C. but he came back to Tunisia 
after the Revolution because he wanted to help; specifically NGOs that represent the 
LGBT community. Moujib explained to me that he developed his own methodology 
and approaches to CSO work and created his own training manual for CSOs. JID 
member Cyrine contacted him asking for help, explaining they were a new CSO that 
required institutional capacity building. He had been working with JID for two years. 
Moujib held a unique place in the research because, as a qualified NGO consultant, he 
is a non-member but is also an insider as a Tunisian. His responses during the 
interview were highly critical and offered more insight as he could also offer 
perspectives from both insider and outsider positions. He informed me of issues that 
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had not come to my attention through observation or interviews, such as the 
negative attitudes of certain members. He suggested certain members should leave 
JID because they were only seeking personal gain or to bolster their CV.  
5. Results and Findings 
5.1. Projects 
Through ethnography of civil political culture, I was able to observe the projects and 
campaigns that JID undertook. There were three major projects that JID undertook 
prior to my observation.  
1. ‘Ikhtiar (Choice)’ was a questionnaire platform to help guide people in their 
decision of who to vote for in the October 2011 National Constituent Assembly 
elections and featured a 30-question questionnaire70 that determined the 
Tunisian party whose agenda is closest to the respondent's answers.  
2.  ‘Forum 1.0’ (2012) was a 5-day conference that collaborated with associations 
from different parts of Tunisia to exchange knowledge and build relationships. 
The conference aimed to help CSOs understand how to function and work 
together, especially regarding work in the less developed southern Tunisian 
governorates. 
Four workshop sessions within the activity focused on issues regarding society, 
politics, economics, and culture, and featured relevant experts in each session. By 
the end of the event, participants completed the drafting of a set of 
recommendations for the constitution. The expected impact of this project was to 
make the youth heard regarding the writing of the constitution. Therefore, 
members of the National Constituent Assembly from Ennahda, Ettakatol, CPR, 
and Nidaa parties were invited to the event in order to convey the 
recommendation to the NCA. However, JID members went to the NCA and saw 
that the documents and recommendations produced by Forum 1.0 were not 
presented to the legislature.  
3. ‘High Schools’ (2012) was an educational project to inform high school students 
of the importance of voting, how it is a right in a democracy and the duty of 
citizens. 
                                                        
70 Available at [http://2011.ikhtiartounes.org/] (Accessed 12/8/14) 
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During my observation period, JID planned two projects. Ikhtiar 2 (launched in 
October 2014) was a revised and repeated project for the 2014 Parliamentary and 
Presidential elections. This focused on the registered voters, especially youth, by 
helping them find a political party that matches their interests. This required JID to 
meet with politicians from 10 political parties to devise questions and answers that 
reflect their platforms. I observed the process of the website being redesigned. ‘The 
fight against Political Violence’ (2013-2014) aimed to raise awareness about what 
constitutes political violence, training the citizens in the fight against political 
violence; educating the general public about the forms of political violence and the 
dangers it represents to Tunisia. However, this planned and proposed project did not 
materialise because JID could not find a funder willing to support it.  
5.2. Internal elections and Transition  
During the period of my observation, JID went through a major leadership change 
through bureau exécutif elections in February 2014 that brought in the 3rd elected 
bureau. For the purpose of this thesis, I refer to the three different bureaus as 
JID.1, .2 and .3 respectively. Before the general assembly meeting in February 2014, 
there were 25 candidates for 9 positions. However, none of the members wanted to 
be president. They all thought they were not ready, needed more experience, or were 
too shy. This is partly because Zied (JID.2 President) was an effective leader and 
other members were apprehensive about following in his footsteps. The JID charter 
permitted him to run for a second term but he declined. Zied also discouraged the 
other members of the JID.2 bureau from running because he wanted new active 
members to run for JID.3 elections. Instead, he wanted the JID.2 bureau to mentor the 
new bureau members through the training and hand-over process. JID.1 and JID.2 
were roughly the same members in different positions. For example, Hela and Zied 
were President and Vice-President respectively in JID.1, and then they swapped 
positions for JID.2. For this reason, Zied told me he wanted to have a change of 
leadership and a completely new bureau with no enduring members. He did not have 
the authority to make the decision of preventing current bureau members from 
running for election but they obliged. 
JID want Tunisia to embed the concept of gender equality in all aspects of society and 
politics. Therefore, they operate accordingly, applying these principles to be an 
example for others. One manifestation of said gender equality is male/female 
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rotation of Presidency. After Zied, there must be a female President. Two members 
from Al Bawsala, a watchdog and political monitoring CSO, were present as observers 
to ensure election fairness by counting votes and observing the election box.  
On the one hand, this transition gave other members an opportunity to ‘lead’. Zied 
was able to distance himself from being the face of JID but remained an active 
member and helped with the transition. This was important because of association 
personalisation. Indeed, as Moujib noted, by that time JID Tunis had already become 
‘JID Zied’. On the other hand, by determining who should or should not run in the 
election is a limitation on pluralism and is to an extent undemocratic because it limits 
the choice of candidates. This was not a written rule but a decision that Zied thought 
would benefit JID and to which other members did not object. 
In addition, JID.2 bureau members Hela, Khalil, Mohammed, Ines, and Salma became 
far less active after the election of JID.3. A drop in activity is a problem for voluntary 
associations, as members are under no obligation to attend or be active. However, it 
inhibited the transition. The old bureau exécutif was supposed to have the duty of 
training the new bureau members. Ahmed, Treasurer in JID.3, told me of his 
disappointment and frustration with the change of leadership, as the old members 
did not support or pass on the skills and knowledge they had developed and were 
not attending meetings. He expressed the most dissatisfaction with regards to the 
lack of information handed over to him by the previous treasurer, implying that CSO 
members do not work as hard when they are not in the bureau of an association. This 
might be the case for JID but further observation or interviews would be required to 
verify this claim for other organisations. After stepping down as President, Zied 
remained active and present at meetings and Emir is an active member and works 
hard to promote JID through his position as an advisor to the Minister of Youth and 
Sport. 
Confirming Ahmed’s account, Moujib thought JID members seem to stop working 
when they no longer have a title or a bureau exécutif position e.g. Ines, Mohammed, 
Hela, and Salma. They all had a sudden drop of interest and he could not understand 
why they did not give the tools to the new bureau. After the February elections, 
Moujib thought the only hard working people were Souhayel, Yasmine, Khalil, Aicha, 
and Oussama. He credits Souheyel and Yasmine for being hardworking, preparing in 
advance, and taking the initiative. Towards the end of my observation, the 
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aforementioned members were playing a more prominent role in the organisation. 
The election of a new bureau caused disruption but allowed new members to 
develop and grow into the ‘power vacuum’. 
5.3. Expansion and restructuring 
JID was founded on 15th January 2011 by 7 members in Tunis. Therefore, it operated 
as both a local and national bureau. They attempted to change the structure of the 
organisation during their 2014 general assembly in order to create a Gafsa regional 
bureau. This would have been a significant step in decentralising power from Tunis 
and empowering Monastir and the new Gafsa bureau. The attempted expansion to a 
JID Gafsa bureau was stifled and then halted indefinitely. This was due in part to 
insufficient trust developing that was required to form any agreement. JID Tunis 
thought JID Gafsa were only seeking money while JID Gafsa was concerned that JID 
Tunis wanted to dominate and exploit them. JID Gafsa members were insistent on 
being supplied with sufficient funds to have their own office. Gafsa is a more 
conservative region of Tunisia than the capital where it is less acceptable for women 
to meet in public cafes or non-family members’ houses; hence their demand for an 
office.  JID has multiple donors who fund specific short-term projects rather than the 
organisation’s operational costs and overhead. Therefore, JID Tunis does not have 
sufficient funding for their own HQ and do not have the funding necessary for a Gafsa 
bureau. As this situation could not be resolved, JID Gafsa suspended their operations. 
The lack of funding and organisational difficulties affected JID’s ability to expand. 
However, the attempt to expand signifies the level of JID’s ambition. Furthermore, 
not conceding to JID Gafsa’s financial demands demonstrates that JID Tunis did not 
compromise their principles of remaining independent, as they believed having a 
semi-permanent donor (e.g. funding for a three-year project) would compromise 
their independence. After the 2014 general assembly after the election of JID.3, JID 
Tunis became increasingly focused on their internal matters, such as task delegation 
and roles and responsibilities. Moujib confirmed that, as a result, JID Monastir and 
JID Tunis began to act increasingly independently. In comparison to Sawty, a similar 
Youth organisation, the latter’s regional chapters were more closely co-ordinated 
(see Chapter Six).  
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5.4. JID charter 
Analysis of the JID charter is important for the observation of rule use and identifying 
consistencies, and inconsistencies, between the organisation’s discourse and the 
members’ practice. I translated JID’s charter with the assistance of Myriam, my 
interpreter and research assistant. She found the process annoying because the 
flowery, vague text was frustrating to read and translate. JID seemed to be trying to 
make the organisation sound more important and grandiose but produced a 
document that is imprecise and ambiguous.  
Their objectives (see page 210) seem quite general but their projects demonstrate 
the ways in which they have attempted to implement them. The “High Schools”, 
Ikhtiar, and political violence projects were ways of ‘informing’ and ‘educating’, while 
to ‘Bring the voice of young people to the highest levels of state’ was attempted 
through Forum 1.0. Article 1 of the JID charter addresses the age limit for members 
(35) which ensures the ‘youth’ element of the CSO. Independence is maintained with 
the requirement for members to remain “completely independent of political 
parties.” Aspects of civil political culture are guaranteed through articles such as 
Article 23: “All decisions must be taken by consensus or by vote”, which ensures 
pluralism and equality. Similarly, Article 26: “For each project, a project leader will 
be elected by a majority vote of the regional office” entrenches democratic processes. 
The manner in which the bureau executif consists of 5 members demonstrates 
‘power-sharing’ and pluralism is also embedded in the annual meeting of the general 
assembly where “an item must be included in the agenda if it is proposed by at least 
three (3) members” (Article 3). A degree of equality is implied in Article 4: “All 
members of the assembly may also propose projects for the Association.” 
Transparency of their work is not addressed. On the contrary, Article 32 states 
“confidentiality is a requirement of all members vis-à-vis internal meetings of the 
association and projects that are carried out by it”. This encourages a lack of 
transparency. The concepts of Tolerance and Freedom are not explicitly mentioned. 
Regarding rule use, the roles of bureau members are clearly defined and during my 
observation I saw members conform to these roles.  
The focus of my interview with Yosra (JID Monastir) was ascertaining where JID’s 
discourse matches their practice. She admitted that their charter is not clear and 
there are problems with it, but added that JID is learning how to be an organisation 
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and the charter amendments that have been introduced are further evidence of this 
learning process. She added that they have improved the manner in which their 
meetings are conducted but were not always so effective at putting their ideas and 
planning into practice. In the meeting on 19th April 2014 where JID members 
discussed amendments to the charter of separation between national and regional 
bureaus, they mostly seemed disinterested in making amendments and wanted the 
meeting to finish as quickly as possible. Moujib had comments on the charter, adding 
“it doesn’t matter how good the charter is, people only turn to it when there are 
problems, like all CSOs in Tunisia.” He thought that a ‘set of internal rules’ would be 
more effective because he thought JID is defined by their lack of rules. 
In comparison to other charters I translated (Mnemty, Cepsa, and Friends of the 
Mining Basin), JID’s contains far fewer rules and does not include responsibilities and 
rights of members. Mnemty’s charter, which seemed to be written in accordance with 
the Law of Associations (Decree 88), was stricter than JID’s, including a set of rules 
with references to punishments or disciplinary hearings. Cepsa’s charter included 
elements of freedom, equality, and tolerance, Article 11: “All members are bound to 
respect the thoughts and the decisions coming from colleagues and to speak in a civil 
way.” It also placed greater emphasis on pluralism, Article 8: “Suggestions are to be 
written in the book of suggestions in the headquarters, or during the regular 
meetings, or on the Facebook page.” Furthermore, the Cepsa charter clearly explains 
the financial aspects of the association. The Friends of the Mining Basin charter made 
more references to finance. Article 18 states that the association is a non-profit and 
defines financial rules and regulations, the duties of the accountant, and reporting of 
public funding were included. 
Sawty President Ghazoua Ltaeif said their internal code is discussed and sometimes 
amended at each general assembly but some parts remain fixed. With the assistance 
of TAMSS and with MEPI funding, a mentor was assigned to Sawty to help them 
develop a manual of ‘procedures’ that is given to each new member and contains 
general rules. This is also updated and modified when deemed necessary. Chapter 
Seven demonstrated that other CSOs considered Al Bawsala to be an important and 
influential CSO. However, Ghada Louhichi (project manager) discussed the 
consistency between Al Bawsala’s practice and discourse and, although she has not 
even read it carefully, their charter was informal but had some general rules. “Being 
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young, fresh, and flexible is important for the current climate in Tunisia” she added. 
Al Bawsala also holds evaluation sessions every six months which provides the 
opportunity to make amendments as they learn more and evolve. 
Upon examining these CSOs’ charter in order to extrapolate consistencies between 
discourse and practice, the following conclusions can be made. CSOs are required to 
create a charter by Decree 88 and seem to recognise that some rules are required 
and that some principles or values should be included. These cases demonstrate that 
CSOs maintain some flexibility and are open to change or adapt with the times. They 
are not a helpful indicator for JID’s practice, as members almost never referred to 
their charter. However, the use of the charter by JID members when “things go 
wrong” indicates its use as a legalistic device to settle disagreements and as a tool for 
checks and balances, rather than a code that informs their commonplace practice. 
5.5. Decision-making processes 
The decision-making processes in JID seem to be consensual. I witnessed a common 
trend of ideas and suggestions for projects being accepted or rejected depending on 
the strength of the argument of the member presents. For example, Salma has a 
strong personality and is a charismatic debater. She told me how she managed to 
convince the JID members in a meeting to side with her point of view. However, she 
also acknowledges how debates lead to decisions.  
“I’m very vocal so I haven’t felt ignored. I always try to convince them. We 
once had a debate about participating as JID in the Bardo sit-in. We had a big 
debate about it and eventually we agreed that we shouldn’t participate. 
Another example: the congress against violence. 8 people were against 
participating in it as UGTT partners, I wasn’t. They were against it because 
UGTT is big and always tends to be dominant. JID participated in organising 
the event without even showing our logo. The UGTT liked the concept we 
proposed, but before we did all this, all of the members were against it 
because they were afraid that the event is going to be politics heavy. They said 
that we’re independent but this event is going to include Islamist associations 
and parties etc. so they wanted it to do it differently. So we debated it and I 
was successful in convincing everyone to participate, I told them that we can 
expand our network and that the workshops about political violence can be 
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beneficial for us, and even if this event doesn’t work out, we can take what we 
learn and apply it in our projects against political violence. So personally, my 
voice was always taken into consideration. For example, USAID suggested that 
we distribute flyers to promote power separation during the constitution. I 
said that the project is sloppy; they would give us $20,000 to create and 
distribute the flyers without having a say in the content. I said that we don’t 
do sub-contracting, it should be up to us to create the content of the flyers and 
the sponsor should only provide the funds. I don’t like working with sponsors 
that tell us what to do.  I said no even though they were going to give us a big 
amount of money.” 
Emir’s proposition to advocate against the harsh Tunisian law on cannabis was 
rejected. Emir argued that people caught in possession spend a whole year in jail. 
They often re-offend and get sent back to prison, proving that this aspect of the 
justice system does not work. He added that it is related to citizenship and that law 
52 (relating to cannabis) is a form of structural violence and oppressive regime 
tactic. JID members decided they did not want to get involved with this because it 
does not fit with their objectives and Emir had to accept this collective decision. 
Although Emir’s idea was considered, the discussion did not require a vote because 
no one else sided with him. 
I did not observe cases of members being excluded from debates but there was an 
occasion, during a planning meeting for Ikhtiar 2, when Cyrine felt that the point she 
was trying to make about the layout of the website was not given due consideration. 
When we adjourned the meeting, she and I walked to a nearby hanout (small grocery 
shop) to buy some drinks. She said she understood that the meeting had to move on, 
especially because foreign trainers from GiZ were present, but she still felt a little bit 
overlooked.  
6. Interpretations of results  
From my observation and from what most members have expressed, it is possible to 
summarise JID in one sentence; too much talking and not enough action. Although 
they realise their lack of ability and admit to lacking expertise, JID members 
recognise that they are undergoing a learning process. Considering that the 
organisation’s goals are focused on raising awareness, their projects require a more 
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‘intellectual’ approach than, for example, a service-providing charity organisation. JID 
struggled with the difficulties of turning ideas and concepts, like democracy, into 
workable awareness raising projects because they need to be better prepared and 
have a greater understanding of both democracy and Tunisia. Therefore, they were 
open to new ideas and understood that they needed further training. Moujib points 
out two types of members in JID, 1) The logical and realistic who know what is going 
on and how to work, and 2) Those who think they know what they are doing but they 
lack the capabilities and instead challenge everything but offer no solutions. He also 
added that there are opportunists in JID who are only looking to participate in an 
organisation or training sessions so it would look good on their CV. 
The major issue Moujib highlighted was JID’s (mis)understanding of what they were 
working towards; democracy. To be working in democracy promotion, groups need 
to have a better understanding of democracy itself. Some members did not 
understand that democracy is accepting something with which you disagree in 
addition to respecting all human rights. In a training session that Moujib ran that I 
could not attend, he used his own methods where he trains people from the 
perspective of a homosexual to help them to understand what it feels like to be 
persecuted and treated like an outsider. This training exercise demonstrated that 
some members had homophobic attitudes. I was unaware that some members knew 
little about tolerance towards homosexuals. Moujib highlighted the importance of 
LGBT issues in relation to a CSO promoting democracy.    
“You can’t not respect human rights or LGBT community and say we’re 
working for democracy. How can you work on democracy and human rights if 
you have problems with homosexuals? Where’s the acceptance and tolerance 
of difference? Imagine if a sexually confused student asked a JID member 
‘What about the right to be homosexual?’ and the JID person says ‘it’s wrong’ 
or ‘they have no rights’, this means JID are preaching intolerance” (Moujib). 
Therefore, before he could engage in any strategic work with JID, Moujib told me he 
focused training sessions on educating them about democracy. In a later training 
session, these members had become less homophobic. This demonstrates part of the 
democracy learning process these members had experienced and how they were 
developing an understanding of tolerance and equality by learning to treat people 
equally and by understanding that democratic culture is not exclusionary to anyone. 
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On a personal level, Moujib is proud of making members more tolerant and less 
homophobic. As this thesis argues, development of tolerance and equality are criteria 
of civil political culture. Before conducting an interview with Moujib, I was entirely 
unaware of the homophobia that some members had expressed. This is because 
issues of homophobia were not brought into the conversations and the members 
who had particularly homophobic feelings had no reason to express these issues. 
This demonstrates that, as Crapanzano indicates, talking to people and engaging with 
them about what is occurring is an essential part of ensuring that an ethnographic 
inquiry is representative of the subjects’ perspectives. Conducting interviews and 
verifying information with informants does not necessarily undervalue the 
observational status. 
After the February 2014 election and the change from JID.2 to JID.3, the terms 
professional and professionalization became used more frequently. This did not refer 
to making JID a professional and salaried organisation as JID remained a part-time, 
voluntary CSO. There had been discussions about hiring a manager for a project, 
which would have been the first step towards financial professionalism, but a 
suitable project had not been devised. For JID, professionalization involved defining 
clearer job descriptions and more evenly delegated work and task. In JID.2, Zied, 
Farah, and Selma had been doing most of the work. Sara positively described Zied 
and Farah as “the Superman and Wonder Woman of JID” because of what they had 
achieved. However, as a consequence, Moujib thought that the transition from Zied’s 
to Sara’s presidency was poor. He argued that Zied did not seem to trust others to 
satisfactorily complete the work. Therefore, he did not share or delegate tasks or give 
others the opportunity to work and acquire skills and experience. In addition, Salma 
did not trust others to complete tasks correctly, so she did too much herself. Moujib 
thought Zied and Salma were guilty of caring too much, “When you love an 
association too much it can destroy it because you think it’s ‘your’ association.” 
The move towards professionalization in JID.3 was not meant as an expression of 
criticism of the JID.2 leadership, but rather a recognition that practices had to 
change. This is primarily because, unlike JID.2, the members of the JID.3 bureau were 
not old friends. Therefore, the style of interaction at meetings needed to be different. 
Throughout my observation, I largely witnessed respectful, tolerant conversations at 
JID meetings. Two conversations taking place during a meeting is quite common. I 
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did not interpret this as impatience or impoliteness but that members were 
enthusiastic to contribute and that the atmosphere was generally relaxed. There 
were heated moments during meetings, but I interpreted these to represent passion 
and interest rather than intolerance or incivility. Founding members, however, 
interacted in a different way to newer members. They were friends long before they 
were colleagues in the same organisation. Therefore, their behaviour was different 
and they made comments that are more familiar, e.g. sexual innuendos and minor 
insults. For example, during one meeting Zied covered Salma’s mouth so the debating 
on that issue would end and the other points of the meeting could be addressed but 
this was done in jest. Salma knows she’s argumentative but justified the interaction; 
“Given the fact that we’re friends, sometimes the behavior, when seen from the 
outside, looks strange. We had a debate about Egypt and it got intense. They’re not 
professional relationships (laughs)” (Salma). Towards the end of a long meeting 
when people were getting tired and a point was being argued, Mohammed told Zied 
to “Sakker fammek” (shut your mouth). This is normally considered a rude phrase in 
Tunisia, but due to their long friendship, Mohammed knew he could speak to Zied in 
this manner without any repercussions. Oussama told me that “old friends can be 
rude to each other, that’s normal,” but he added that he would not accept being 
spoken to this way by the members of the JID.3 bureau. Therefore, as JID.3 
interactions were still friendly but more formal with less bantering and joking 
insults, members considered this behaviour more professional. 
Regarding meeting practice, professionalization also referred to the efficiency of 
meetings. In JID.2, Zied had the ‘final say’ but that was also because members looked 
to him for decisive leadership. In contrast, JID.3 more frequently came to a group 
decision without referring to an arbiter. On 20th April 2014, after discussing the 
responsibilities of each member, members decided that a clearer description of each 
bureau position was required, as the charter does not provide clear definitions. This 
demonstrates a step toward sharing responsibility, distributing power, and 
professionalism. JID.3 also held more organised meetings that were chaired more 
effectively and had specific agendas. On a few occasions, Souhayel even allocated 
time limits to each point to make meetings more efficient, which also encouraged 
decision-reaching discussions. The following are notes from a March 2014 meeting:  
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The meeting was under a time constraint therefore it was interesting to see 
how well JID worked under pressure. I think they worked efficiently in this 
meeting; all eight of the issues on the agenda were covered in just over an 
hour. Souhayel chaired the meeting; he was very effective at making sure the 
meeting kept to time and issues that were not on the agenda were not 
discussed. He even set a timer on his phone to make sure the meeting stayed 
on track. This seems to be a new ‘norm’ for JID meetings; letting everyone 
know the agenda at the start. It was interesting to see that Zied has returned 
to ‘member’ status and didn’t try to control the meeting. He was asked for his 
views and opinions, like any other member, but Souhayel led the meeting. I 
think that holding the meeting at Cafe Bonzai in Bardo, rather than at Zied’s 
parents’ house, changed the power dynamics as it did not give anyone host 
status. [JID Meeting, 23/03/2014] 
As JID.3 were operating differently to JID.2, professionalization was also utilised 
rhetorically as motivation for being more active, making a difference, and having an 
impact, rather than just holding meetings and talking about issues. An aspect of the 
lack of action is based on the concern with maintaining a ‘good’ public image. 
Considering JID has a good external image, members are hesitant about engaging in 
an unsuccessful project for fear of damaging it. This highlights the point Intisar 
Kherigi makes (see page 213) that the Tunisian education system discourages 
students from learning through trial and error for fear of being labelled as failures. 
Regarding their efficiency and effectiveness, or lack thereof, there is a struggle with 
the part-time nature of JID’s work and members’ other commitments. Despite this 
balancing act, there were mixed opinions amongst members as to whether JID should 
professionalise and have permanent, salaried members of staff or remain voluntary.     
Zied’s leadership and the transition from JID. 2 to .3 redefined the organisation’s 
democratic function. In JID.2, Zied was an effective leader. He was very approachable, 
pleasant, and welcoming, considerate and a team player but also ensured tasks were 
achieved. He was fluent in English, French, and Arabic and he had the personal skills 
necessary to develop good relations with funders. The drawback to this positive 
leadership was that it led to a cycle of members expecting Zied to undertake any task 
and Zied pre-emptively addressing tasks without asking others. This is not to say JID 
was acting like ‘petit dictatorship’ because freedom, pluralism, equality and tolerance 
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were evident in their interactions. It meant that members had become increasingly 
dependent on Zied.   
Although the JID charter entitled Zied to run for a second term as President, it is 
notable that Zied did not want to hold on to power. He told me that people in other 
CSOs had begun to associate JID with Zied. For this reason, he thought JID certainly 
needed a new President. He said it was usually the case in Tunisia that CSOs are 
mentioned in the same breath as the President and he was keen to avoid this type of 
personalisation in JID. Indeed, Moujib confirmed this as he said ‘JID Tunis had 
become JID Zied’. Zied wanted to avoid further personalisation as he was aware of 
the dangers it posed to JID’s external image. For the internal operations of a CSO, if 
the leader is doing everything by themselves it creates a delegation problem. Other 
members are not given the opportunity to learn to do things and thus all the skills 
become concentrated in one person. This leads to the personalization of the CSO and 
makes a future hand over difficult. The dilemma for CSOs is whether they continue 
with someone who knows how to run a CSO and is an effective leader, or 
democratically change leadership to give others a chance to learn leadership skills. 
As mentioned in Chapter Seven, CSO leaders I interviewed recognise that 
transferring power is normatively the ‘right thing to do’ but this ethnography has 
identified that personalisation, due to an effective leader in a CSO, can lead to a 
stagnation or the concentration of skills and expertise with a few members. Although 
in the case of JID this personalisation did not lead to a reduction of democratic 
practice in the long-term, as Zied chose to step down, other CSOs did not have a 
change of leadership in over three years. The two-term limit in JID’s charter 
prevented this from occurring in the long term. However, signs of this phenomenon 
could be observed during the JID.2 term. Other members did not want to run for 
President because they did not think they could do the job as effectively as Zied. This 
is also due to other members not developing the CSO knowledge and skills during 
Zied’s leadership prior to an election, either because they did not feel the need to 
learn or because these tools were not shared. I could also see, from our 
conversations, that Zied was becoming tired of being President and running JID. He 
had been interning with Democracy Reporting International71 but was looking to 
                                                        
71 Democracy Reporting International. Available at http://democracy-reporting.org/  
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move his career forward. After the observation period finished, Zied became a full-
time Advocacy Officer at Al Bawsala.  
The problem at JID was the quality of their transition. The intentions of power 
sharing and giving other members a chance to lead were beneficial for JID’s 
democratic credibility.  When Zied stopped being president, it allowed the 
opportunity for others to participate. However, this was problematic because they 
were less effective. Zied made sure JID.2 bureau members did not run for JID.3.  In 
some ways, this is limiting the election by determining who can and cannot 
participate, but it was to ensure non-Bureau members were given the opportunity to 
lead. It was a good intention, in terms of democratic practice, but was a tactical 
mistake because the transition overlooked the importance of skills and the handover 
of CSO skills did not occur. Moujib explained that Zied, Selma, and Farah, who were 
proactive members that completed most of the tasks, made way for Sara, Souhayel, 
and Oussama. The first three were trained by Moujib, who had given them the tools, 
documents, and work strategies, but these have not passed on their knowledge to the 
new three. After they were no longer in the bureau executif, their presence at JID 
meetings dropped remarkably. Ahmed, the JID.3 treasurer, was particularly annoyed 
by the insufficient handover of tools and skills from the previous bureau. Zied’s 
intent on the renewal of leadership and depersonalisation of JID led to a transition of 
power but did not ensure a transition of skills. 
However, despite their struggles, JID have stayed true to the principles established in 
their charter. The political independence of members is paramount and is a rule that 
is observed, while political neutrality in their work remains highly prioritised. The 
environment of long-term friends and family-like interaction is changing to become 
more colleague-based and professional, but their friendliness remained despite the 
decreasing levels of ‘bantering’. Members became increasingly included in decision-
making processes. However, being an effective debater remained a helpful attribute 
in determining JIDs policies. The middle-class bias is recognised but it is something 
they admit they would like to address but remains a challenge. 
7. Chapter Conclusions 
“What Tunisians are experiencing is the smell of democracy but the problem is that 
too many people are waiting for change rather than working for change” (Moujib). 
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The members of JID do not fall into this category. The democracy learning process 
they have undergone in a CSO meant that, on an internal level, they developed 
aspects of civil political culture. Lacking knowledge of both democracy and the 
complexities of their own country has meant that JID was not able to accomplish as 
many projects as members had hoped, which reduced their external influence. 
However, the limitation of JID’s impact on the public sphere does not diminish the 
impact that participation has had on the members. The positive impact for JID is the 
Tocquevillian, school of democracy learning process that they have undergone in this 
period. This study demonstrates the learning progression that has taken place 
regarding the internal relations of a CSO. JID has therefore performed a democratic 
function predominantly through a Liberal-Associative form of civil society. In this 
school of democracy, the majority of the lessons were learned by the members as 
they tangibly engaged in embedding the values of democracy. In addition to the 
norms JID members developed, it was evident that trainers and consultants have a 
role in this democratic learning process. Members benefitted on a personal and 
organisational level from the capacities they acquired through their associative work 
by means of conscious and subconscious learning. Whether they use these skills to 
improve JID, another voluntary CSO, or to enhance their careers, the democratic 
values and organisational skills they have developed will have a positive impact on 
their role as members of a democratic system.   
My observation period witnessed a developmental change from a group of old school 
friends to a more formal, colleague style organisation who also managed to stay true 
to their conviction of remaining politically neutral. They appear to be pluralistic with 
very few cases of members’ views being side-lined in discussion, and I observed 
evidence of equality, gender in particular. Some members were more socially 
conservative than others, but this did not impact on their work. JID were aware of the 
middle-class bias within their organisation but attributed it to the location of their 
organisation; a middle-class area of Tunis. During the observation I did not witness 
any expressed prejudice, only during an interview was the issue of homophobia from 
two members brought to my attention. Decisions were most often made through 
agreement after discussion, often leading to consensus, but voting was implemented 
for elections. JID.2 was strongly led by Zied and Farah, where Zied often had the last 
word and in 2012/2013 JID undertook more activities. They recognised that 
personalisation was occurring and sought to address it.  The leadership learned that 
  
243 
 
taking on too much responsibility can hinder a CSO and is certainly not sustainable 
for a voluntary CSO. Although the leadership transition process could have caused 
less upheaval for the CSO if JID.2 had transferred their skills and knowledge to the 
new bureau more systematically, the leadership of JID.3 made the organisation more 
pluralist as responsibilities were shared and further personalisation was prevented. 
The publishing of JID PVs online increased the group’s transparency. JID did not 
experience any limitations to their freedom to operate in the public sphere. The 
preventions or restrictions to their work only occurred by the prohibition of CSOs 
from entering schools, which applied to all civil society. Internal trust between 
members was very high, which I experienced after being welcomed so quickly to the 
CSO in addition to new members who joined during my observation period. 
Regarding their relationships and co-operation with other CSOs, JID showed their 
willingness to work with other CSOs who shared their values, such as Sawty. Their 
attempt to expand to Gafsa demonstrated further willingness to work with others 
and also address their middle-class bias. However, like the political violence project, 
it was largely financial issues that prevented this extension from manifesting but 
sufficient levels of trust to co-operate were not established either. Their engagement 
with the state was more limited as they only worked with the state through Forum 
1.0 and when conducting interviews for the Ikhtiar project.   
The timing of the research was also significant as the majority of my observation 
took place during a politically quieter period. In 2014, the constitution had been 
ratified, the Ennahda coalition had stepped down, and a non-partisan technocratic 
government was running the country. There was less for CSOs to be active about. The 
revolution was now three years old and JID were somewhat reactive to the political 
situation. In addition, the first half of 2014 saw a degree of civic action fatigue and a 
dip of enthusiasm. JID.3 was unsure of how to progress as an organisation in this 
period and was already somewhat reinventing itself through professionalization. 
Towards July 2014, civil society became more active in the build up to the October 
2014 elections and JID started to implement Ikhtiar 2. Interestingly, Zied played a 
prominent role due to his experience in organising the first Ikhtiar and his 
connections with the donors. 
This ethnography has demonstrated that practicing democracy helps to imbed the 
values of democratic culture. JID were engaged in a learning process involving the 
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intricacies of democracy, the tolerance that is required, and how to implement 
democracy. This ethnography has also made it apparent that civil society members 
must improve their organisational skills, at personal and associational levels, in 
order to influential the political and public spheres. JID’s organisational difficulties 
affected their efficiency and effectiveness, as proven by the failure to implement the 
political violence project. CSO impact and effectiveness are also dependent on 
securing funding, and JID has been successful at acquiring funding for some projects. 
However, even if JID have not been as successful or influential as their members had 
hoped, individuals have undertaken a learning curve through which they acquired 
organisational skills, and a deeper understanding of democracy, and the contextual 
intricacies of where they want to make an impact: Tunisia. 
Regarding rule use, the charter was barely to almost never referenced and I did not 
hear anyone quote it. The norms of respectful interaction had been established. The 
moments of disrespectful interaction appear uncivil but were representative of the 
way old friends can interact rather than JID being an uncivil organisation. In spite of 
all their problems and the fact that JID members do not always follow his advice or 
the methods he prescribes, Moujib was surprised that JID still manages to function as 
a CSO. This implies that he admits there are alternatives to his approach.   
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THESIS CONCLUSION 
1. Introduction 
The objective of the research conducted in this thesis was to address the gaps in the 
current literature regarding the contribution of civil political culture in enabling civil 
society organisations to positively influence the political transition from 
authoritarianism to democratic governance. Therefore, this thesis has asked “Have 
Tunisian civil society organisations exhibited a civil political culture”, and how has 
this influenced their ability to fulfil a democratic function through the post-2011 
transition?”. Three sub-questions that emerged from the primary research question 
are 1) Has civil society in Tunisia exhibited political civility through the democratic 
transition? 2) How has political civility in civil society organisations supported the 
democratic transition? 3) How does this inform the theoretical understanding of civil 
society’s position in democratic transition? The historical chapters provide the 
structural factors which determine the context in which civil society operates. Civil 
society under authoritarianism was shaped by the lack of space provided by the 
state, while the post-authoritarian era demonstrates that civil society filled the 
opened public space. The fieldwork research chapters provide the political culture 
determinants and explain the nature of the Tunisian CSOs which occupy the public 
space. This concluding chapter presents the research’s key findings and summarises 
the results from the three research methods. It elaborates on methodological 
advances this study offers to further political culture research and the limitations of 
this research are addressed and potential further study possibilities are suggested.  
2. Key findings 
This thesis has demonstrated that the role of civil society has been important as 
Tunisian CSOs have played a democratising role in the country’s transition through 
activities aimed at the monitoring and oversight of governmental decisions and 
procedures and through engaging in a process of democratic learning. Through their 
practices in the revolutionary and transitional periods, CSOs have exhibited 
attributes of civil political culture. Oppositional-Resistance type CSOs, that challenge 
the state’s monopoly and pressure the government, and Liberal-Associative types, 
that seek to inform the citizenry and protect their freedoms from elected despotism 
and an overbearing state, are present in Tunisia. Both these types of CSOs can play a 
democratising role in a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. However, this 
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democratising role can only be fulfilled if CSOs exhibit attributes of civil political 
culture. After the 2011 revolution, the Tunisian state provided civil society with an 
increased public space, which civil society used to perform a democratic function by 
facilitating a balanced relationship between the state and non-state actors.  
This research project was informed by the functions of civil society, as defined by 
civil society theory, by democratisation theories, and by civil political culture 
theories.   These theories enabled the development of six criteria of civil political 
culture (Tolerance, Equality, Pluralism, Freedom, Trust, and Transparency) to be 
employed as an analytical tool to measure CSO civility: the extent to which CSOs 
demonstrate civil political culture. These criteria were applied through quantitative, 
qualitative, and ethnographic research methods to assess civility in the three 
relationships in which CSOs engage; with the State, with other CSOs in the public 
space, and their internal dynamics with their members. The major finding from all 
three research methods is that civil political culture, required for stable democracy, 
is developing in Tunisian civil society. 
 
3. Theoretical summary 
The understanding of civil society has evolved through the ten various functions, 
described in Chapter One, it has performed in different historical periods to 
culminate into a modern, pro-democratic force. Both Oppositional-Resistance and 
Liberal-Associative conceptualisations are equally significant to enabling civil society 
to fulfil a democratic function. Oppositional-Resistance CSOs perform a democratic 
function by pressuring the state, ensuring the maintenance of democratic 
procedures, and acting as a more vigorous check on state authority while posing a 
greater challenge to ideational state hegemony. Liberal-Association CSOs can 
pressure the government but also offer a supportive stance for a liberal government 
but also encourage citizens to engage in a democracy learning process through 
participation in associative life. Civil society is not, however, intrinsically a force for 
democratisation. It can only perform a democratic function if it exhibits civil political 
culture (civility). This applies to both Oppositional-Resistance and Liberal-
Associative forms of civil society. By denoting the importance of political culture, this 
thesis has demonstrated that political culture cannot be disregarded in the analysis 
of a political transition.  This thesis contributes to civil society theory by highlighting 
  
247 
 
the theory’s linkages with democratisation theories and civil political culture 
theories.   
Democratisation theorists Diamond (1999) and Linz & Stepan (1996) argue that civil 
society remaining independent is vital to it performing a democratising role. 
Authoritarian government structures prevent civil society from freely existing and 
operating independently. Public space is largely restricted or co-opted by the 
government and the development of political civility is not encouraged. Therefore, 
studies of civil society in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) context have been 
shaped and limited by the persistence of authoritarian governments and have 
instead sought to explain how religious, kinship groupings can perform a civil society 
function or resorted to using Culturalist, macro-interpretivist approaches to argue 
that the region’s culture prevents the existence of civil society and democracy. Other 
works disregarded the importance of political culture by focusing on Structuralist 
explanations for political conditions.   
4. Methodological summary 
The methodology developed for this thesis sought to overcome the shortcomings of 
other political culture studies, in particular, those in the MENA region and can 
contribute to the study of political culture, civil society, and democratisation. 
Implementing Welch’s theory of political culture, which asserts that political culture 
is exhibited through practice and discourse, a methodology was specifically 
developed for a political culture research project that captures the two expressions 
of culture. Therefore, this thesis has operationalised Welch’s theory into a practical 
methodological approach to studying political culture which posits the need to 
collect multi-layered data to gain a greater understanding of political culture. In 
addition, the use of Welch’s theoretical conceptualisation of political culture is a 
more sophisticated analytical approach for assessing a political culture than works 
that do not sufficiently engage with the concept. 
The understanding that political culture manifests as discourse and practice is the 
fundamental epistemological grounding of this thesis. Therefore, although 
ascertaining practice through asking subjects about their practice is sufficient to a 
certain extent, there is a discrepancy between what people say and what people do. 
This means that observation of practice is also required and a triangulation of 
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methods is necessary for the process of inquiry that requires the researcher to both 
ask about and observe political culture. The triangulated, mixed methods approach is 
implemented from the theoretical requirement to understand practice and discourse, 
rather than motivated by the novelty of using three methods.  The three methods 
have enabled an investigation of civil society that addresses the three relationships 
in which CSOs engage; with the State, with other CSOs in the public space, and with 
their members and the internal dynamics. This multifaceted approach has created a 
greater understanding of how CSOs see themselves and how they internalise 
democratic attributes. By enabling CSO members to reflect on their own processes, it 
has enabled investigation of civil society not only in terms of what it does but how it 
sees itself. This degree of reflexivity has enabled investigation into how CSO 
members envisage their attributes internally. 
This approach offers an improvement on political culture works that use a single 
method, a macro-interpretivist approach, or seek to make overarching 
generalisations. By focusing on a micro-interpretivism approach that employs three 
separate methods for measuring political culture. The recommendations Hudson 
(1995) makes regarding the study of political culture in the MENA region context, 
including the disaggregation of culture, are implemented as the research focuses on 
the political culture of CSOs specifically. Further claims regarding a Tunisian national 
culture are not made from the collected data and results. 
This thesis has demonstrated that the analysis of political culture requires a 
multifaceted approach. The use of survey, interview, and observation methods 
combined is an optimal approach to studying political culture because it 
comprehensively addresses practice and discourse. The six criteria of civil political 
culture, developed from the theoretical framework chapters, were used to structure 
the method of inquiry. Questions and observation plans were designed regarding the 
extent to which Tolerance, Equality, Pluralism, Freedom, Trust, and Transparency 
were present or absent in Tunisian CSOs. Addressing CSO’s internal practice is vital 
to the assessment of civility. In order to understand a CSO, the internal operations 
need to be analysed. This research has demonstrated that not only do the relations 
between CSOs and between civil society and the state matter, so too do the internal 
attributes of CSOs. 
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The methodological approach of this thesis contributes to an alternative 
understanding of civil society. The methodological approach was possible due to the 
lack of authoritarian government structures in place in Tunisia. This enabled an 
online survey and ethnographic-observation to be conducted without suspicion or 
censorship from subjects or state-interference.     
5. Historical summary 
Chapters Four and Five present an historical summary of Tunisian civil society, 
which was limited and restrained under colonialism and authoritarianism, and its 
influential role during the revolution and in the democratic transition.  A civil society 
had existed, survived, and developed from Beylical rule via French colonialism to the 
21st Century. The Tunisian monarchy, which was semi-independent from Ottoman 
control, allowed civil society to perform an independent financial function that 
limited the potentially despotic government tendencies of the Bey. During the French 
protectorate, civil society, which included oppositional political parties, developed an 
Oppositional-Resistance function to the imperialist presence. This developed into the 
independence movement, which, crucially for the development of political civility, 
did not engage in guerrilla warfare and was almost exclusively non-violent. 
The vibrancy of civil society that existed at independence was lost in the post-
independence era. The dictatorships of Habib Bourguiba, and later Zine el Abidine 
Ben Ali, controlled the population, restricted the public space, and ensured that CSOs 
were largely co-opted by the regime or determined a threat and therefore crushed. 
National trade unions played a vital role in the independence struggle, but their 
leftist tendencies posed a threat to the one-party rule. To prevent challenges to the 
state, their leadership structures were co-opted and constrained. Islamist 
organisations, previously permitted to exist as a counterbalance to leftist thought, 
were subsequently suppressed. Oppositional-Resistance forms of civil society were 
forced underground and some adopted oppositional political agendas as the political 
system did not permit pluralism. Liberal-Associative groups, which remained 
uncritical of the regime or whose goals aligned with those of the regime, were 
permitted to exist and provided some degree of consultation with the government. 
Ben Ali used the number of these loyal, largely uncritical CSOs as a false indicator of 
Tunisia’s democratic credentials. Neither form of CSO could effectively perform a 
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democratic function due to the constraints of authoritarian government and the lack 
of political pluralism.  
Despite these constraints and lack of independence, major civil society groups who 
were organised and nationally networked as opposition groups, at home or in exile, 
were connected prior to the 2011 revolution. Although their leadership was largely 
co-opted by the regime, the UGTT could claim some independence and had the 
capacity to mobilise its large membership base. The 2008 Gafsa uprising 
demonstrated that a disparity existed between the UGTT’s co-opted upper-echelons 
and the oppositional stance of the regular members. 
Tunisia’s historical experience and strong institutions placed the country in a 
position that was more conducive to the successful completion of a democratic 
transition. The extensive building of state institutions would not be required. 
Furthermore, this thesis has demonstrated that the foundation for an organised civil 
society and Oppositional-Resistance CSO activism existed prior to the revolution. The 
revolution and subsequent transition process demonstrated the importance of civil 
society in generating change. After the 2011 Revolution, the interim government 
provided civil society with a new legal framework (Decree 88) with fewer 
constraints and greater freedoms, which allowed it to develop a democracy 
promoting capacity. 
The behaviour and decision-making processes of both political party leaders and 
members of the NCA in this transition period influenced the development of a civil 
political culture in Tunisia. For example, the formulation of coalition governments, 
the desire to achieve consensus in the constitution writing process, and Ennahda’s 
agreement to relinquish power to a technocratic government. 
The work of Tunisian civil society in this transition period was also vital for the 
development of civility. The use of violent conduct and methods in civil society, such 
as that exhibited by the LPR, who were consequently outlawed in 2014, was not 
accepted as evidenced by its prohibition under Decree 88.  
Chapters Four and Five use a macro-interpretivist approach to address the history of 
Tunisia civil society and civil society’s role in the revolution. Although this thesis 
considers this approach insufficient for understanding a political culture or 
representing findings of the thesis, this broad synoptic analysis represents a useful 
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overview for establishing an historical background and providing context to the 
research period. 
6. Results summary 
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight demonstrate that political civility is growing and 
developing in the discourses and practices of Tunisian CSOs, enabling them to fulfil a 
democratic function. The six criteria of civil political culture are evident, to varying 
degrees, in CSOs in the Tunisian transition. Despite the interconnectedness of these 
criteria, this research has demonstrated that they do not develop simultaneously. 
Furthermore, the six criteria should be considered in gradual or nuanced terms 
rather than understood in the absolutist binary of present or absent.  
Key to this development is the Tunisian state’s relationship with civil society. It is 
vital because civil society exists in relation to the state with the state regulating the 
space in which CSOs operate. Although aspects of Decree 88 are imprecise, 
particularly those in relation to financial transparency, this legal framework 
provided freedom, equality, and the foundation for CSOs to operate in post-
authoritarian Tunisia. CSOs expressed the absence of state interference in their 
activities. 
The manner in which CSOs engage with each other is important to understanding the 
extent of their political civility. The coalitions and collaborations between CSOs, or at 
least their willingness to work with each other, demonstrate increasing levels of 
trust. Conversely, factors such as a CSO’s perceived political allegiances or ideological 
tendencies, the sources of their funding and the degree of its transparency, and the 
degree of their membership’s involvement with the former regime, cause suspicion 
on the part of other CSOs. This can lead to intolerance or a lack of trust or equality 
amongst other civil society actors. 
The internal operations and procedures of CSOs are also significant in this research.  
The results showed that CSO members recognise the normative importance of 
democratic practices and values while imbedding democratic culture has been a 
more gradual process. For some, in particular, participation in a CSO has been akin to 
a Tocquevillian ‘school of democracy’, whereby both individuals and organisations 
engage in a process of democracy learning through their actions and interactions. 
Therefore, understanding the institutional culture and internal dynamics of CSOs was 
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important to assessing their political civility. This required addressing decision-
making processes, the manner in which internal disputes are overcome, and the 
organisation’s structure. The research showed that management styles largely 
included consultative processes that afforded pluralism and tolerance to members. In 
addition, positive relations between bureau exécutif and the membership suggested 
equality amongst members. In some cases, the depersonalisation of leadership, the 
establishment of routine practice, clearer definition of roles and responsibilities from 
CSO’s charter or internal rules was required. 
Chapter Six demonstrates that civility is developing with separate analysis of each of 
the six criteria and the high-scoring criteria indexes created. These quantitative 
results demonstrate that greater levels of trust are exhibited towards respondents’ 
own organisations than externally to other groups. General trends of tolerance, 
equality, and pluralism were exhibited, but disagreement regarding politicised and 
religious CSOs and the inclusion of former RCD members was also evident. While 
agreement towards the implementation of democratic practices and independence 
from the state was expressed, respondents also preferred some limitations to 
freedom. 
Chapter Seven utilised a set of interview questions specifically designed to assess the 
existence of the six criteria of civil political culture. Unlike Chapter Six’s analysis of 
each criterion in isolation, these results demonstrate the interconnectivity of the six 
criteria of civil political culture, in particular, the linkages between Trust, Tolerance, 
and Transparency. Therefore, the improvement of one criterion is linked to 
improvement in the others. CSOs become aware of the importance of Transparency 
because it leads to greater Trust, which leads to greater Tolerance. Conversly, the 
limitations of Tolerance in civil society are linked to Freedom, Trust, and 
Transparency. In particular, CSOs’ ability to collaborate and co-operate is shaped by 
the perception of whether another CSO has Islamist sympathies or not. CSO 
operations and projects have meant that in some cases Pluralism is overlooked, to a 
certain extent, as leaders focus on the development of their organisation and the 
efficiency and effectiveness of their work. This may occur at the expense of 
democratic practices, which can reduce the development of democratic culture. 
However, aspects of the Liberal-Associative “schools of democracy” model of civil 
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society are evident as interviewees explained how they have gained a greater 
understanding of democracy through participation in a CSO. 
Chapter Eight presents the ethnographic participant-observation results, which were 
essential to the theoretical understanding of the practice of civil political culture. 
These single case results from working with one youth-led, pro-democracy CSO, 
Jeunes Independent Démocrates, are less generalizable, but the previous two research 
methods were not able to verify if interviewees ‘do what they say they do’. Therefore, 
the observation of internal behaviour was the most effective and most valid method 
for understanding internal interactions. 
The observation data demonstrates the problems of personalisation of leadership or 
when too much responsibility remains with a few members. To a certain extent, a 
lack of trust in other members of the CSO was evident as members may not trust 
others to perform tasks. This meant that the transition of leadership was problematic 
as somewhat personalised leadership could reduce the democratic function of the 
CSO and lead to anti-democratic outcomes. This can be manifest in leaders that seek 
to retain their positions or refuse to delegate, which in turn makes the CSO 
dependent on their leader for expertise, skills, and institutional memory. 
The members’ partial but developing understandings of both democracy and the 
complexities of their own country has meant that JID’s impact in assisting the 
Tunisian transition had not met members’ expectations. However, the observation 
period established that JID members were engaged in a democracy learning process. 
Practicing democracy was assisting JID in imbedding the values of civility. Learning 
to work, co-operate, and collaborate with other members, through inclusive rather 
than exclusive interactions encouraged tolerance and acceptance of other views. In 
addition, the organisational skills they were developing, in particular the sharing of 
roles and responsibilities, helped in making the organisation more equal and 
pluralistic. Prior to undertaking this thesis, ethnographic observation of a Tunisian 
CSO had not been performed.  
7. Potential further research 
There were two issues that this research could not answer but require further 
investigation. Firstly, the question of whether the authoritarian state has been 
entirely dismantled and overthrown or has only been forced to retreat. Although the 
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authoritarian character of the Tunisian state has been changed, the extent to which a 
‘deep state’, a political elite, or a particular socio-economic group remains in control 
of the country needs to be addressed. From a legal perspective, the authoritarian 
state has been overthrown. Ben Ali, the dictatorial figurehead of power, was removed 
and the Trabelsi clan were forced into exile, while the network-structure of control, 
the RCD party, was dissolved. Opposition political parties were legalised, new leaders 
elected, and the constitutional changes that include a greater separation of powers 
demonstrate that political structures have been changed. However, the networks of 
corruption and patronage that include politicians, businesspeople, officials and 
security officers, who are determined to keep their privileges, remain. For example, 
former RCD members have formed new parties. Even President Essesbi was a 
member of the Bourguiba government. Fethi Jemmi, from Echbika, stated, "The 
Tunisian revolution was largely peaceful, but it also meant that we inherited the 
whole administration intact and many of these civil servants are trying to hold on to 
the past and the privileges that they received" (Hussien, 2013). As this thesis has 
addressed the political culture of CSOs, rather than government or business circles, 
further research would be required to assess if an old elite is still entrenched in the 
country and to what extent this is obstructing the democratic transition. 
Secondly, this thesis addressed the relationships between CSOs and the state, other 
CSOs, and its own members. It has not addressed the relations and interactions 
between CSOs and the Tunisian general public. A further study into the relations 
between CSOs and citizens could ascertain whether CSOs are imbedding civil political 
culture in the population. It would assess the impact of CSOs on encouraging 
democracy learning amongst Tunisian citizens or whether the practices and 
discourses of CSOs, whether they are politically civil or not, are influencing citizens 
and vice versa.  
This thesis has also opened the potential for further ethnographic studies of CSOs to 
be conducted. The participant-observation was a single case study of one 
organisation. Additional secondary or tertiary ethnographies with different 
organisations would have been helpful for a comparative aspect to be included. 
Various comparative studies could be conducted with potentially illuminating 
findings regarding CSO political culture. For example, a comparison between JID and 
organisations from less affluent areas or from the interior or coastal regions in 
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Tunisia could address the middle class and regional biases JID represent. The 
regional variations highlighted by the findings of the Chapter Five attitude survey 
demonstrate that perceptions of democratic values differ across regional lines. Other 
possible comparisons could be drawn from observing an organisation with greater 
experience in civil society activity, such as a CSO that was established pre-revolution, 
which might have established rules and procedures but also potentially show less 
flexibility or willingness to adapt. If an organisation with different objectives is 
observed, such as a charity-based organisation, their focus might be on the delivery 
of aid or services rather than internal democratic practices. A unique further case 
study would be Shams or Chouf, two organisations that are fighting against 
homophobia and working for the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Tunisia. It 
would be an interesting representation of CSOs that are a target of prejudice (Tounsi, 
2015) and could demonstrate a lack of tolerance or represent the boundaries of civil 
political culture in Tunisia. Some comparative perspective was gained through 
interviews with Al Bawsala (Ghada Louhichi) and Sawty (Ghazoua Ltaif) but the 
aforementioned possibilities represent the potential scope for further work beyond 
this PhD thesis. 
Prior to ending this thesis, the following epilogue addresses significant events that 
have occurred after the research period. These events demonstrate the 
precariousness of transition by providing evidence that events in the 
democratisation process may progress, halt, or regress simultaneously or 
consecutively. Despite progress, Tunisian civil society faces ongoing challenges in the 
political transition, particularly amid the current volatile security context, which 
provides the state with the pretext to reduce the public space in which CSOs operate. 
This reinforces the ongoing importance of Oppositional-Resistance CSOs performing 
a democratic function. 
EPILOGUE 
This epilogue demonstrates the continuing importance of civil society and the extent 
to which this thesis, as a study of a transitional period, has been a snapshot of 
political culture. Furthermore, the political culture of Tunisian CSOs is not static but 
continues to evolve, particularly as the country’s transition is ongoing. Two of the 
major CSO achievements towards democratic consolidation after the period of 
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research (2013-2014) and some of the current challenges facing civil society are 
discussed below.  
 
For their “decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in 
Tunisia”72, the Quartet was awarded the Nobel peace prize in October 2015. 
Interviewees noted that the Quartet (UGTT, LTDH, ONAT, and UTICA) were of vital 
importance in pushing the Tunisian transition forward. This collaboration of four 
major CSOs, responsible for steering Tunisia through the National Dialogue process 
out of a political deadlock, was rewarded and received international recognition for 
their invaluable contribution towards safeguarding the country’s democratic gains. 
This award was welcomed by the Quartet as recognition of the efforts of the Tunisian 
civil society in playing an oversight and support role throughout the most critical 
junctures of the country’s democratic transition.  
Protests on the fifth anniversary of the revolution, however, reminded political 
leaders that issues of economic disparity, unemployment, and corruption – the 
original causes of the revolution – have yet to be sufficiently addressed. The 2016 
protests started in Kasserine, a neglected region with the highest national 
unemployment rate: 30%73. The regime responded with the imposition of curfews 
but recognised the validity of the protests. This represents the degree of change that 
has occurred in leadership but the extent to which protesters feel that not enough 
has changed and corruption still exists, implying that the deep state is still being 
removed 5 years on.  
 
Furthermore, the securitisation of the state is threatening the public space in which 
civil society operates. An issue of current importance is the state’s security discourse 
in its response to terrorism, as civil society activists and human rights advocates 
have sounded the alarm about this discourse’s potential for limiting civil society 
freedom. National security and counterterrorism issues have become a priority for 
the Tunisian state. Since my research period ended, Tunisia has witnessed an 
increased number of attacks by Uqba Ibn Nafi Battalion militants have taken place 
against Tunisian soldiers at checkpoints in the Chaambi Mountains in 2014. 2015 
                                                        
72 "The Nobel Peace Prize 2015 - Press Release". Nobelprize.org. Available at 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2015/press.html Accessed 7/12/15 
73 Al Jazeera (2016) Tunisia unemployment protests spread to capital. Available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/clashes-spreading-tunisia-unemployment-protests-
160121190816218.html. Accessed 3/2/2016 
  
257 
 
saw three major ISIS-claimed attacks: the Bardo museum attack, that resulted in at 
least 22 deaths, the Sousse beach resort attack that claimed the lives of 38 tourists, 
and the Mohamed V Avenue bombing which targeted presidential guards, killing 12. 
The March 2016 failed ISIS incursion into the southeastern border town of Ben 
Guardane was the last of this series of attacks to date. The government’s response to 
each of the attacks has proven the state’s willingness to sideline individual and civil 
society freedoms on the account of combatting terrorism. The counter-terrorism bill 
advanced by the government in the wake of the Bardo attack was largely denounced 
by civil society for its infringement on individual rights and due process74. 
Furthermore, the state of emergency, which has been the government’s kneejerk 
response after each terrorist attacks, has been used to quell and disperse legitimate 
and peaceful civil society movements and protests (Keskes, 2015).  President Beji 
Caid Essebsi used a speech following the Sousse attack to accuse civil society groups, 
namely those responsible for “Winou El Petrol?”, a CSO social media campaign 
demanding transparency in natural resource revenue management, of destabilising 
the country and making it more vulnerable to terrorism75.  
Civil society has suffered previous government crackdowns using the pretext of 
counter-terrorism. In the wake of a 22 July 2014 terrorist attack that killed 16 
national guardsmen near the Algerian border, the Jomaa Government forced 157 
CSOs to suspend their activities ''for security reasons'' and some were sanctioned for 
financial irregularities76. Nawaat noted that the suspensions were based on Articles 
10 and 11 of Law 52, dated 1975 (Bellamine, 2014), a vague law that grants power to 
Governors to “ensure the implementation of laws, regulations and government 
decisions” and “maintenance of public order”77. However, this executive decision 
breeches CSO Decree 88 which gives the judiciary exclusive authority to determine 
whether a CSO should be dissolved, through a process that includes issuing a 
                                                        
74 Human Rights Watch (2015) Tunisia: Flaws in Revised Counterterrorism Bill. Available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/08/tunisia-flaws-revised-counterterrorism-bill. Accessed 
31/3/2016 
75 Réalités (2016) Béji Caied Essebsi : Voilà le résultat de « Winou el pétrole ».  Available at 
http://www.realites.com.tn/2015/06/beji-caied-essebsi-voila-le-resultat-de-winou-el-petrole/. 
Accessed 3/2/2016. 
76 Human Rights Watch (2014) Tunisia: Suspension of Associations Arbitrary.  Available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/13/tunisia-suspension-associations-arbitrary. Accessed 
11/09/2014. 
77 Law No. 75-52 of 13 June 1975, establishing the powers of senior managers of the regional 
administration. Available at http://www.legislation-
securite.tn/fr/node/28690?secondlanguage=ar&op=OK&form_build_id=form-
cdb970e8d130bec0a652e4d20add37eb&form_id=dcaf_multilanguage_form_render     
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warning to the CSO in question, before suspending its activities for 30 days and 
dissolving it as a last resort78.  CSO freedoms have been negatively affected by 
government measures to counter terrorism and extremism and legal reforms have 
taken a backseat to security issues. CSOs have a new role in ensuring anti-terrorism 
laws do not contravene the 2014 constitution, reduce the newly-acquired public 
space, or jeopardise the recently gained liberties.  
 
Finally, a notable achievement is the progress civil society has made with regards to 
the range of social problems it is addressing. Civil society is now tackling issues of 
homosexuality and racism, matters that were previously considered off-limits. Five 
years after the revolution, civil society groups have succeeded through continuous 
mobilization, awareness raising, and advocacy, in putting a spotlight on issues and 
rights long neglected or regarded as taboo by the society and the legislature. 
Homosexuality is perceived by most Tunisians as violating the Quranic scripture and 
thus being against Islam, leading some to note “LGBT Tunisians are treated as second 
class citizens” (Samti, 2015). Furthermore, Article 230 of the Tunisian Penal Code 
criminalizes “homosexual acts” with a punishment of up to three years in prison. In 
2014, Moujib told me that LGBT CSOs operate “underground” because Tunisia was 
not ready for their activism. Two years later, regardless of the social stigma and the 
severe state penalisation, Shams, a group of young Tunisians committed to de-
stigmatising homosexuality and advocating for legal rights for the LGBT community 
preserved in demanding its legal right to exist as a CSO. After having been refused 
authorisation in December 2014, in May 2015, “in what seemed to be a landmark 
victory for sexual and gender rights in the Middle East and North Africa, the Shams 
organization for LGBT rights became the first group of its kind to receive official 
authorization from Tunisia's interior ministry” (Kilbride, 2016). This victory, 
however, revealed the intolerance of Tunisian society and an unwillingness to 
respect pluralism in beliefs and lifestyles. This was evidenced by the ensuing 
“rampant homophobic abuse in Tunisia's national news, social media outlets, and 
community mosques” (Kilbride, 2016). Members of the group who appeared on 
national TV reportedly received death threats.79 The smear campaign that the CSO 
                                                        
78 Human Rights Watch (2014) Tunisia: Suspension of Associations Arbitrary.  Available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/13/tunisia-suspension-associations-arbitrary. Accessed 
11/09/2014. 
79 Frontline Defenders (2016) Tunisia: Court annuls the suspension of LGBTI organisation Shams. 
Available at https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/es/node/1750. Accessed 17/2/2016 
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was subjected to culminated in the Tunisian authorities filing a complaint to the 
judiciary to suspend the group’s activities. Article 45 of Decree 88, which “allows the 
executive to request the judiciary to suspend the activities of a registered NGO when 
it breaches the provisions of the law,”80 lead to a ruling to suspend the group’s 
activities. Shams has since filed a complaint against the Tunisian government and, on 
23 February 2016, the group won the law suit against the state and is now free to 
pursue its activities legally.  
 
Shams’ victory is but one example of the perseverance of CSOs in challenging legal 
and societal intolerance and instilling pluralism and equality. Mnemty, a CSO that 
aims to raise awareness about the rampant racial discrimination, began its activities 
in 2011 in a context where racism was not acknowledged by most as an existing 
issue. During my interview with Mnemty president Saadia Mosbah, in March 2014, 
she stated “we asked them (the legislature) to criminalize racism and we carried out 
the necessary procedures. They totally refused to discuss this topic in the main room 
of the assembly because according to them, the issue does not exist.” Two years later, 
Mnemty was making important strides towards publicizing race and racism issues in 
Tunisia: the CSO launched the Tunisian Movement for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, starting with a march against racism on 21 March 2016 in the main 
streets of Tunis and seeking “to establish a law that criminalizes all forms of racial 
discrimination” (Tarfa, 2016). In tandem, an ad hoc CSO coalition led by FTDES 
presented a draft law criminalizing racial discrimination to the parliament81. While 
the parliament has yet to vote on the law, the issue of racism in Tunisia is gaining 
traction internationally thanks to civil society efforts, with outlets such as al Jazeera 
English running featured reportages on the issue82.    
By looking at the political culture of CSOs, it is evident that the process of democracy 
learning and the embedding of democratic culture is ongoing.  The progress made by 
the cases of LGBT and Anti-Racism CSOs is a testament to this. Conducting large-
scale, broad studies of civil society that produce evidence of general trends remain 
                                                        
80 Ibid 
81 Mosaique FM (2016) Le FTDES propose une loi pour criminaliser le racisme. Available at 
http://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/actualite-national-tunisie/8368/le-ftdes-propose-une-loi-pour-
criminaliser-le-racisme.html. Accessed 17/2/2016   
82 Al Jazeera (2016) Tunisia’s dirty secret. Available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2016/03/tunisia-dirty-secret-
160316153815980.html. Accessed 16/2/2016  
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valuable for formulating an overview. However, this thesis has demonstrated that the 
small stories in addition to the single cases observations of CSOs internal operations, 
provide micro-level, non-essentialist evidence that the processes of embedding civil 
political cultures, required for the long-term success of the democratic transition, is 
occurring. To further Michael C. Hudson’s 1995 work on MENA political culture, the 
case for bringing it back in, carefully, is to ensure that small-scale observation and 
individual cases are included. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Chapter Three: Tunisia specific surveys 
The Zogby survey (2013) titled ‘Divided and Dissatisfied with Ennahda’ focused on 
the general population’s trust and perception of the Ennahda led coalition’s 
performance in government. The results show a lack of confidence in Ennahda (only 
28%) and “the majority of Tunisians are disturbed by the government’s inef-
fectiveness and its failure to deliver on the political and economic promises of their 
revolution” (Zogby, 2013:1). This survey was conducted via face-to-face, in-home 
personal interviews with 3,031 adults in Tunisia. This survey provided examples of 
how to phrase questions pertaining to Trust.  
Gallup’s work in Tunisia during 2009 and 201083 was economic, standard of living, 
and entrepreneur focused, but was administered by face-to-face interviews in 
Tunisia with approximately 1,000 adults. Pew Global survey ‘Most Muslims Want 
Democracy, Personal Freedoms, and Islam in Political Life’ 84 consisted of 120 
questions mostly structured on 5 point scales e.g. for opinions towards various 
politicians (Favourable, Somewhat Favourable, Somewhat Unfavourable, Very 
unfavourable and Don’t know/Refused). Results for the survey in Tunisia are based 
on 1,001 face-to-face interviews. It came to the following conclusions; Tunisians are 
unhappy with the state of the country, but remain hopeful, democratic government is 
preferable but improved economic conditions are also of utmost importance. This 
demonstrated how to structure ‘preference’ and aspirations questions and justified 
the use of a 5-point scale. World Values Survey was long at 250 questions, was 
general, not country specific, and featured a wide range of topics and uses ‘Strongly 
agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree’ scales.  
The Arab Barometer: 2012 Tunisian Country report no.285  used 5 point scales and 
asked 1,196 respondents questions divided into 8 sections with the aim of creating a 
                                                        
83Gallup Survey (2011). Tunisia: Analyzing the Dawn of the Arab Spring. Available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/157049/tunisia-analyzing-dawn-arab-spring.aspx [accessed 
11/12/2013] 
84 Pew (2012) Most Muslims Want Democracy, Personal Freedoms, and Islam in Political Life: Few 
Believe U.S. Backs Democracy.  Available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-
want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/ [accessed 13/12/2013] 
85 Arab Barometer (2013) Tunisia, Survey Report II. Available at  
http://www.arabbarometer.org/content/arab-barometer-ii-tunisia [accessed 09/12/2013] 
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data set of social, religious, cultural and political values as well as evaluating 
confidence in public institutions, religious and political participation, and trends 
towards democracy. Results included, 68% believing that the economic situation was 
the biggest threat to Tunisia. 84% believe an authoritarian government is bad or very 
bad for Tunisia and 70% believe that a democratic system whereby all 
(left/right/Islamist) parties are considered by means of election is appropriate for 
Tunisia. Section 3: Attitudes to Democracy - 70% believe that, despite its issues, 
democracy is better than the alternative, 8% oppose, 22% neither. This result does 
not fluctuate much by region, education levels or age. Section 7, ‘Public 
Establishments and faith in their effectiveness’, was of particular interest because it 
tackled the issue of trust; an important part of civility and demonstrating a viable 
format for asking trust questions in Tunisia. This section demonstrated trust in state 
institutions from political parties and civil society organisations, in addition to 62% 
trusting the interim government. In addition, 89% trust in the army compared to 
58% trust the police, who had closer ties with the former regime. 
BBC Media Action survey (2013) on media consumption and preferences in Tunisia 
asked every respondent each question of the survey in an interview format.  To 
collect 1,000 responses, a team of researchers was employed. Suleiman’s survey 
(1993) focused on youth culture and attempting to measure the political knowledge 
of 9-17-year-olds. It aimed to understand the political and social values students 
have absorbed and record their cultural and political norms while focusing on 
gender. The survey questionnaire also included six different definitions of democracy 
for students to agree/disagree with (Suleiman, 1993: 75).  
Language Considerations 
Where possible I conducted interviews in English. If the interviewee was not 
comfortable speaking English, I asked my questions in French. I wanted to conduct 
my interviews in Tunisian Arabic. Although I am far from fluent in Tunisi, I thought 
that the interviewees will respond more positively than if I was interviewing in 
English with a direct translator. I thought that the interviewee would have more 
respect and listen more intently. However, I realised the limitation of my language 
skills. When Westerners speak Tunisi with an unusual accent, it is often confusing for 
Tunisians.  This is more a critique of my language skills than of Tunisians, therefore 
French or rephrased Tunisi by my interpreter was the most appropriate means of 
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communication. Before I began conducting the interviews, I translated the questions 
into French and Tunisi with the help of my interpreters to ensure the question 
meanings did not become lost in translation. During the interviews, the interpreters 
were strict with their rephrasing of the questions. My interpreters were all 
sufficiently tri-lingual (English, French, Tunisi) to cope with these situations. 
For the majority of my research I employed Myriam Ben Ghazi, a Tunisian former 
journalist and member of Watchdog CSO Al Bawsala, as my research assistant 
because my Tunisian Arabic language skills were not sufficient. I had known her for 
two years and we negotiated a fair financial payment before we started working 
together to ensure she did not feel exploited. When working together, we talked 
about ‘we’ and ‘our work’ as part of the process that we were working together, 
rather than her working ‘for’ me.  I trusted her judgement to ask follow-up questions 
or seek clarification in interviews, giving Myriam ownership of the research process. 
Despite being an already accomplished journalist and researcher, there was mutual 
benefit from the work as Myriam gained from my knowledge of research 
methodology and practice, and used the experience from our work to bolster her 
already impressive CV.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
264 
 
 
Chapter Six: Technical Appendix 
This Appendix develops information that is included in Chapter Six and provides 
greater detail. 
1. Piloting Process 
The ‘Piloting’ process undertook the following stages. 
1. Design Question 
2. Feedback from PhD Supervisors (Prof. Emma Murphy and Dr. Steve Welch) 
3. Pre-Pilot Feedback from Non-Tunisian Academics (Joel Rozen, Alice Alunni, 
and Anne Wolf)  
4. Pre-Pilot Feedback from former Tunisia Live staff (Huda Mzioudet, Meriam 
Ben Ghazi, and Sana Ajmi) 
5. Translation and feedback from Dorra Agrebi  
6. 2nd Translation checks by Hamza Zaghdoud  
7. Feedback from Tunisian Academics (He la Boujnah) 
8. Pilot testing with Tunisia Live staff. 
9. Assessing Pilot testing results and make improvements 
10. Re-check translation  
11. Launch survey for target population; members of Tunisian CSOs 
 
2. Pre-Pilot Test subjects 
By pre-pilot testing, I am referring to ‘ironing-out’ any potential problems before 
pilot testing, which made the pilot testing process less demanding on the Tunisia Live 
journalists. Pre-Piloting allowed me to gain critical perspectives of the questionnaire. 
I chose to ask a range of people to Pre-Pilot Test my survey.  Firstly, I gave the survey 
to Tunisian Journalists Huda Mzioudet (Libya Herald and Former Tunisia Live), 
Meriam Ben Ghazi (Al Bawsala and former Tunisia Live) and Sana Ajmi (World Bank 
and Former Tunisia Live) for I have mentioned above the advantages of journalist’s 
perspectives. Tunisian Interpreters Hamza Zaghdoud (BBC Media Action Interpreter) 
and Dorra Agrebi (Linguistics Student and Interpreter) were specifically helpful with 
maintaining the quality of the translations. Being proficient in Arabic, French and 
English, the interpreters were specifically adept at assessing the quality of the 
translations to ensure no meaning is lost. Non-Tunisian Academics with fieldwork 
experience in Tunisia, Joel Rozen (PhD Candidate, Princeton University), Alice Alunni 
(PhD Candidate, Durham University) and Anne Wolf (PhD Candidate, Cambridge 
University) aided this process because, as foreign researchers, they had faced similar 
experiences, and helped me avoid pitfalls and warned of potential insensitivity. 
Tunisian Academic and civil society member, He La Boujneh (Faculty of Law, Sousse 
University), ensure the questions were suitable for the Tunisian context by adding 
her perspective on the Tunisian understanding of civil society, institutional culture, 
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and political culture. He La was also helpful for identifying if my questions were too 
European or Western-centric. The feedback helped to refine the questions, making 
them more appropriate and more understandable while avoiding potential confusion 
and making the piloting process easier. 
3. Pilot Test Sample – Tunisia Live journalists 
Tunisia Live (TL) is the first Tunisian news website in English, launched post-
Revolution, by a group of Tunisians who felt the need to share the news of their 
country with the global audience. TL claims to be independent and aims to cover 
upcoming political and social events comprehensively. As a non-state news company 
it occupies a unique position between State and Civilian Journalism. These journalists 
are regularly asking questions to the wider Tunisian population, therefore they may 
offer insight into how the questions in my survey are likely to be received, whether 
they are likely to offend, be misunderstood, or contain too much jargon. They are 
multi-lingual and can also comment on the quality of the translations. Journalists 
who do not work for state-owned companies can be considered civil society actors, 
therefore, under this definition, TL is a CSO.  
4. Pilot Test Results 
Demographic questions 1-6 were ok except Q6 Religious belief which caused 
confusion rather than any offense. 
 Q6) Ambiguity over the concept of Spiritual Muslim. Agnostic and Atheist 
require explanations, so too does Spiritual; “less emphasis on the legal aspects 
of Islam and closer to the personal, human element” 
 Q6) Remove ‘Salafi’ Option because Salalfis are likely to consider themselves 
as a ‘Practicing Muslim’. This same issue was highlighted in the pre-piloting; 
therefore is seems that the Salafi option is somewhat redundant.  
 Q10) Agenda? What type of agenda? 
 Q 14,15,16) typing and spelling errors 
 Q16) Ambiguity regarding the question and various suggestions were made as 
how to rephrase it. 
 Q17) “CSOs should be allowed to pursue any goals they desire” unclear 
wording – Perhaps I should include “As long as their means/methods are non-
violent” 
 Q22) ambiguity over some groups; ‘What do you mean by ‘some/certain 
groups’ 
 Q25) intervene as a regulator 
 Q27) unpack/explain Human Rights a bit further. Confirm what Alunni says or 
delete Universal?  
 Q43) Typing error 
 Q49) requires a multiple choice answer because nobody answered it 
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5. Survey Question Rational 
Section 1, ‘About You’, was to determine demographics of gender, age, income, 
regional representation and religious belief, and create the parameters and variables 
through which the data would be analysed. Establishing the demographics of the 
survey population also ensure the sample is representative of the population, 
regarding gender and regional distribution. As the Tunisian population is 51% Male 
and 49% Female, it would therefore be appropriate to acquire a similar distribution 
for the civil society population. Age and Income indicate which age groups and 
classes are most present in civil society.  The population distribution by region is to 
ensure even regional as per table (page 11). I considered religiosity to be an 
important attribute to determine; however the phrasing of this question is critical as 
to obtain useful results [See Demographics study from Journal of North African 
studies]. This was not to establish a religion vs. democracy debate, but an aspect I 
would like to consider. 
The sections 2-6 and 8 are groups of questions are related to the six aspects of 
political civility/ civil political culture (CPC); Tolerance, Equality, Freedom, 
Pluralism, Trust, and financial transparency.  Q7-9 address tolerance, respect, and co-
operation of and between CSOs. Q10-15 Equality section addresses respondent views 
towards the religious/secular cleavage, gender prejudice, and treatment of non-
Muslims and former RCD regarding their participation in the public sphere. Q16-27 
tap into issues of freedom to operate and how much ‘freedom of expression’ CSOs 
think they should have and what other CSOs should have. In addition, the role of the 
state in securing that freedom and defending freedoms. Also issues of censorship, 
what is considered ‘offensive’, what should be done about groups that cause offense, 
and the state’s role in censorship? Regarding opinions on censorship, I am looking to 
find the extent to which people agree with it, on a scale rather than dichotomous 
responses. The Human Rights question (27) addresses the interest or lack of interest 
in Sharia law and preference for Islamic rights such as passing nationality to 
children, divorce laws etc. 
The Pluralism questions look at co-operation, personal reflexivity, willingness to 
accept different views, and compromise.  Trust is an aspect of political civility and is 
a key aspect towards co-operation. Whether trust exists firstly within a CSO and 
secondly between CSOs might give indications as to the nature of the public sphere, 
grounds for it being harmonious or fractured. Financial transparency issues relate to 
how the finances of the CSO are organised, how open the CSO is, and if they are 
following rules of the laws of association.   
Section 7, ‘Democratic Practices’, studies attitudes towards democracy and which 
democratic practices exist in the respondent’s CSO. These democratic practices 
determine what aspects of democracy CSOs are embedding. Largely follows Putnam’s 
argument, that practicing democracy leads to/imbeds democracy.  
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Section 9, ‘Your CSO’, directly asks about the specifics organisation culture, 
leadership, decisions making in the respondent’s CSO. They are Organisational 
Culture questions that address the norms and standards that CSO members see 
within their own organisation, the styles of participation, and the type of leadership 
their bureau executif adopts.  Inquiring how long members have with their CSO could 
identify whether members have only become active since 2011. Older, long-standing 
members of civil society may see things differently from new, post-uprising activists. 
It could also suggest members move frequently between CSOs. Addressing if CSO 
members are they employed or volunteers determine the extent of the cleavage 
between professional and volunteer CSOs and how many are making a living from 
civil society work.  
Section 10, ‘what is desirable?’ attitude questions that address how respondents 
want civil society to be. This is indicated by the inclusion of should in the phrasing of 
these question. These questions can also help determine State and civil society 
relations.  
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Survey Results 
Section 1: About You 
1. What is your gender? 
1 Male: 
 
51.0% 52 
2 Female: 
 
49.0% 50 
 
2. What is your current age? 
1 Under 18 years: 
 
1.0% 1 
2 18-25: 
 
49.0% 50 
3 26-35: 
 
25.5% 26 
4 36-45: 
 
8.8% 9 
5 46-55: 
 
14.7% 15 
6 More than 55: 
 
1.0% 1 
 
3. What is your educational level? 
1 
Primary 
education:  
0.0% 0 
2 
Secondary 
education:  
7.8% 8 
3 
Vocational 
training:  
2.9% 3 
4 
High education - 
professorship / 
vacation: 
 
49.0% 50 
5 Master: 
 
40.2% 41 
 
4. What is your monthly income in Tunisian dinar? 
1 Less than 200: 
 
33.3% 34 
2 200-399: 
 
9.8% 10 
3 400-599: 
 
7.8% 8 
4 600-799: 
 
10.8% 11 
5 800-999: 
 
9.8% 10 
6 1000-1199: 
 
6.9% 7 
7 1200-1399: 
 
2.0% 2 
8 1400-1599: 
 
2.0% 2 
9 1600-1799: 
 
2.0% 2 
10 1800-1999: 
 
1.0% 1 
11 More than 2000: 
 
14.7% 15 
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5. Which region in Tunisia are you originally from? 
     
1 
Greater Tunis - Ariana, 
Tunisia, 
Ben Arous, Manouba: 
 
36.3% 37 
2 North - Bizerte: 
 
6.9% 7 
3 
North West - Kef, Zaghwan, 
Jendouba, Beja:  
2.0% 2 
4 
Coast - Nabeul, Sousse, 
Monastir, 
Mahdia, Sfax: 
 
29.4% 30 
5 
Centre - Kairouan, Kasserine, 
Siliana:  
4.9% 5 
6 
South Central - Gafsa, Sidi 
Bouzid:  
6.9% 7 
7 
South - Tozeur, Gabes, 
Medenine, Tataouine:  
13.7% 14 
 
6. How would you describe the religious belief? 
1 Muslim practitioner: 
 
38.2% 39 
2 Non-practicing Muslim: 
 
40.2% 41 
3 
Agnosticism - belief in the 
existence of God cannot be 
proved or denied: 
 
12.7% 13 
4 
Atheist - faith that there is no 
god:  
2.9% 3 
5 Other: 
 
3.9% 4 
6 Not sure: 
 
2.0% 2 
 
Section 2: Tolerance 
7.  Civil society organizations with common goals can work together. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
2.0% 2 
3 I do not know: 
 
0.0% 0 
4 I agree: 
 
54.9% 56 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
42.2% 43 
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8. Civil society organizations with different goals can work together on projects of 
mutual interest. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
3.9% 4 
3 I do not know: 
 
7.8% 8 
4 I agree: 
 
65.7% 67 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
21.6% 22 
 
9. Each civil society organizations the right to achieve their goals peacefully. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
1.0% 1 
3 I do not know: 
 
2.9% 3 
4 I agree: 
 
34.3% 35 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
60.8% 62 
Section 3: Equality 
10.  Groups with an explicitly religious agenda should be allowed to participate in of 
civil society. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
13.7% 14 
2 I do not agree: 
 
25.5% 26 
3 I do not know: 
 
14.7% 15 
4 I agree: 
 
36.3% 37 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
9.8% 10 
 
11.  Groups with a specifically secular agenda clear should be allowed to participate 
in civil society. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
4.9% 5 
2 I do not agree: 
 
20.6% 21 
3 I do not know: 
 
11.8% 12 
4 I agree: 
 
47.1% 48 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
15.7% 16 
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12.  Members of the former Constitutional Democratic Rally should be allowed to 
participate in civil society. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
22.5% 23 
2 I do not agree: 
 
20.6% 21 
3 I do not know: 
 
16.7% 17 
4 I agree: 
 
34.3% 35 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
5.9% 6 
 
13. Women should be able to participate as fully and freely as men in civil society. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
0.0% 0 
3 I do not know: 
 
1.0% 1 
4 I agree: 
 
14.7% 15 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
83.3% 85 
 
14.  Civil society groups should have equal access to the media: newspapers, TV, 
radio and other. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
0.0% 0 
3 I do not know: 
 
2.0% 2 
4 I agree: 
 
23.5% 24 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
73.5% 75 
 
15. Every citizen has the right to pursue their own cultural preference. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
0.0% 0 
3 I do not know: 
 
0.0% 0 
4 I agree: 
 
26.5% 27 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
72.5% 74 
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16. Non-Muslim Tunisians are entitled to the same rights as Muslim Tunisians. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
2.0% 2 
2 I do not agree: 
 
1.0% 1 
3 I do not know: 
 
3.9% 4 
4 I agree: 
 
27.5% 28 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
65.7% 67 
 
Section 4: Freedom 
 
17.  Civil society organizations should be allowed to pursue any goals, as long as their 
means and methods are non-violent. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
3.9% 4 
2 I do not agree: 
 
23.5% 24 
3 I do not know: 
 
12.7% 13 
4 I agree: 
 
39.2% 40 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
20.6% 21 
 
18. The government should allow civil society organizations to operate freely. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
6.9% 7 
3 I do not know: 
 
4.9% 5 
4 I agree: 
 
49.0% 50 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
38.2% 39 
 
19. Freedom of expression is essential in civil society. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
1.0% 1 
3 I do not know: 
 
0.0% 0 
4 I agree: 
 
29.4% 30 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
68.6% 70 
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20.  Racially offensive views should be silenced. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
2.0% 2 
2 I do not agree: 
 
2.0% 2 
3 I do not know: 
 
0.0% 0 
4 I agree: 
 
15.7% 16 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
80.4% 82 
 
21. Religiously offensive views should be silenced. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
2.9% 3 
2 I do not agree: 
 
10.8% 11 
3 I do not know: 
 
5.9% 6 
4 I agree: 
 
36.3% 37 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
44.1% 45 
 
22. Some groups represent a threat to the public interest and should not be allowed 
to practice their activities. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
2.9% 3 
2 I do not agree: 
 
4.9% 5 
3 I do not know: 
 
10.8% 11 
4 I agree: 
 
48.0% 49 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
33.3% 34 
 
23.  Freedom of association laws in Tunisia provide sufficient protection for civil 
society organizations. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
2.0% 2 
2 I do not agree: 
 
30.4% 31 
3 I do not know: 
 
37.3% 38 
4 I agree: 
 
23.5% 24 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
6.9% 7 
 
24. The government has the responsibility to protect society from offensive opinions. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
7.8% 8 
3 I do not know: 
 
18.6% 19 
4 I agree: 
 
52.0% 53 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
20.6% 21 
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25. The government interferes in civil society. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
23.5% 24 
2 I do not agree: 
 
44.1% 45 
3 I do not know: 
 
14.7% 15 
4 I agree: 
 
16.7% 17 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
1.0% 1 
 
 
26. The state determines what is considered offensive and improper. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
8.8% 9 
2 I do not agree: 
 
27.5% 28 
3 I do not know: 
 
29.4% 30 
4 I agree: 
 
32.4% 33 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
2.0% 2 
 
27. To what extent do you agree with the universal concept of human rights? 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
4.9% 5 
3 I do not know: 
 
9.8% 10 
4 I agree: 
 
35.3% 36 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
49.0% 50 
 
Section 5: Pluralism 
28. Decisions taken by individuals are usually of higher than the decisions taken by 
the groups that quality 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
10.8% 11 
2 I do not agree: 
 
61.8% 63 
3 I do not know: 
 
11.8% 12 
4 I agree: 
 
12.7% 13 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
2.9% 3 
 
29.  I respect viewpoints that differ from my own views. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
0.0% 0 
3 I do not know: 
 
1.0% 1 
4 I agree: 
 
52.9% 54 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
45.1% 46 
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30.  I often change my mind when I hear other people’s arguments. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
2.0% 2 
2 I do not agree: 
 
32.4% 33 
3 I do not know: 
 
23.5% 24 
4 I agree: 
 
39.2% 40 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
2.9% 3 
 
 
31.  Disagreement is inevitable. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
2.0% 2 
2 I do not agree: 
 
7.8% 8 
3 I do not know: 
 
2.9% 3 
4 I agree: 
 
47.1% 48 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
40.2% 41 
 
32.  Alternative opinions should be respected.  
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
0.0% 0 
3 I do not know: 
 
0.0% 0 
4 I agree: 
 
38.2% 39 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
60.8% 62 
   
Section 6: Trust 
33.  I trust the other members of the organization that I work within. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
7.8% 8 
3 I do not know: 
 
6.9% 7 
4 I agree: 
 
56.9% 58 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
27.5% 28 
 
34.  I trust the leadership of the organization that I work within. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
6.9% 7 
3 I do not know: 
 
11.8% 12 
4 I agree: 
 
53.9% 55 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
26.5% 27 
 
  
276 
 
 
 
35.  I trust members of other organizations 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
2.9% 3 
2 I do not agree: 
 
17.6% 18 
3 I do not know: 
 
40.2% 41 
4 I agree: 
 
35.3% 36 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
3.9% 4 
 
Section 7: Democratic Practices 
36. CSO members should be allowed to express disagreement with the leaders and 
managers of their organisation 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
2.0% 2 
3 I do not know: 
 
4.9% 5 
4 I agree: 
 
55.9% 57 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
36.3% 37 
 
37. The hierarchy in my CSO is a well-defined organizational structure, where 
members are required to complete their work by going through the proper 
procedures and persons, and where authority is respected. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
2.9% 3 
2 I do not agree: 
 
12.7% 13 
3 I do not know: 
 
10.8% 11 
4 I agree: 
 
52.9% 54 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
20.6% 21 
 
38. In my organization job descriptions are flexible and authority is questioned. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
2.9% 3 
2 I do not agree: 
 
17.6% 18 
3 I do not know: 
 
22.5% 23 
4 I agree: 
 
47.1% 48 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
9.8% 10 
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Section 8: Financial Transparency 
 
39. I know who funds the civil society organization I work for. 
1 True: 
 
85.3% 87 
2 Error: 
 
4.9% 5 
3 I do not know: 
 
9.8% 10 
 
40. The members of the civil society organizations should know who finances their 
organization. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
0.0% 0 
3 I do not know: 
 
2.0% 2 
4 I agree: 
 
22.5% 23 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
74.5% 76 
 
41.  Civil society organizations should publish their financial accounts. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
5.9% 6 
3 I do not know: 
 
3.9% 4 
4 I agree: 
 
28.4% 29 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
60.8% 62 
 
42. The sources of funding that CSOs receive should be made public. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
8.8% 9 
3 I do not know: 
 
9.8% 10 
4 I agree: 
 
35.3% 36 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
45.1% 46 
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Section 9: Your Civil Society Organization 
 
43.  For how long have you been active with civil society organizations? 
1 
Less than 3 
months:  
8.8% 9 
2 3-months 6: 
 
5.9% 6 
3 7-12 months: 
 
10.8% 11 
4 
More than 1 
year:  
16.7% 17 
5 
More than 2 
years:  
32.4% 33 
6 
More than 5 
years:  
17.6% 18 
7 
More than 10 
years:  
7.8% 8 
 
44.  Are you paid by the organization you work for or do you work voluntarily? 
1 Volunteers: 
 
93.1% 95 
2 Paid: 
 
6.9% 7 
 
45.  How often do the organization members meet? 
1 Monthly: 
 
30.4% 31 
2 Weekly: 
 
64.7% 66 
3 Daily: 
 
4.9% 5 
 
46.  Describe your working environment. 
1 Very formal: 
 
4.9% 5 
2 Formal: 
 
53.9% 55 
3 Informal: 
 
34.3% 35 
4 Very informal: 
 
6.9% 7 
 
47. Describe the process of decision-making in your organization. 
1 Consultation at all levels: 
 
75.5% 77 
2 
Middle management has 
authority:   
15.7% 16 
3 
Commands issued by 
senior management:  
8.8% 9 
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48.  How do you determine positions in the organization? 
1 Elections: 
 
60.8% 62 
2 
Consensus after the 
debate:  
27.5% 28 
3 
Appointment by the 
administration:  
7.8% 8 
4 
Appointment by family 
members:  
0.0% 0 
5 Friends preference: 
 
2.0% 2 
6 
Another way: Please 
detail:  
2.0% 2 
48.a. another way: Please detail 
 After applying allowances and interview. 
 EVERY category and discipline and values / e.g. young underground had their 
place and their leading ships 
 
49.  Describe the philosophy and culture of work within your organization. 
1 
Power is held by a small group or 
a central figure. There are few 
rules and little bureaucracy but 
decisions are often made quickly: 
 
10.8% 11 
2 
Highly defined structure, clear 
roles, and hierarchical 
bureaucracy. 
 
18.6% 19 
3 
Skilled and specialized people 
form small teams to solve 
problems: 
 
22.5% 23 
4 
All individuals believe themselves 
superior to the organization but 
each partner brings a particular 
expertise: 
 
44.1% 45 
5 
Positions in the organisation are 
secured by outperforming others  
2.9% 3 
6 
Members are put under pressure 
which makes them compromise in 
order to be effective: 
 
1.0% 1 
49a. Other: Please State 
I do not have a lot of experience to make the right decision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
280 
 
50. Does your organization have an internal law or constitution? 
1 Yes: 
 
92.2% 94 
2 Do not: 
 
7.8% 8 
 
51. Describe your manager’s leadership style. 
1 
Makes decisions which reflect 
their opinions and personality:  
14.7% 15 
2 
Ensures procedures are 
followed:  
9.8% 10 
3 
Gives responsibility to staff to 
make decisions themselves:  
26.5% 27 
4 Acts as a member of the team: 
 
45.1% 46 
5 
Less controlling and acts more 
like a mentor:  
3.9% 4 
 
Section 10: Attitude Questions: what is desirable? 
 
52.  Civil society organizations should be independent of the state institutions. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
3.9% 4 
3 I do not know: 
 
3.9% 4 
4 I agree: 
 
34.3% 35 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
56.9% 58 
 
53.  Civil society organizations should respect the objectives of other organisations. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
1.0% 1 
2 I do not agree: 
 
0.0% 0 
3 I do not know: 
 
2.9% 3 
4 I agree: 
 
46.1% 47 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
50.0% 51 
 
54.  Civil society organizations should be obedient to their government.  
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
32.4% 33 
2 I do not agree: 
 
34.3% 35 
3 I do not know: 
 
20.6% 21 
4 I agree: 
 
11.8% 12 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
1.0% 1 
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55.  Civil society organizations should operate with internal democratic practices. 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree:  
2.0% 2 
2 I do not agree: 
 
0.0% 0 
3 I do not know: 
 
2.0% 2 
4 I agree: 
 
32.4% 33 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
63.7% 65 
 
56.  Civil society organizations the activities of and campaigns should be limited. 
1 Strongly Disagree: 
 
11.8% 12 
2 I do not agree: 
 
24.5% 25 
3 I do not know: 
 
17.6% 18 
4 I agree: 
 
41.2% 42 
5 Strongly Agree: 
 
4.9% 5 
 
 
 
6. List of Organisations who responded to the Survey 
 
1. ةيعمج ةدارلإا ةيمنتلل نيلتاملاب -Association pour le développement sera Palmatlin  
2. ةيعمج عادبلاا يبابشلا -Association de la créativité de la jeunesse 
3. ةيعمج عادبلاا يبابشلا رزوتب  Association Jeunes Innovation Tozeur 
4. Association Création et Créativité pour le Développement et l'Embauche 
(CCDE) 
5. ASSOCIATION DEFI-TAHADI-CHALLENGE-DROITS DE L'HOMME A TRAVERS 
LES ARTS 
6. Association Gabès Action 
7. Association gouvernance participative 
8. Association internationale des étudiants en sciences économiques et 
commerciales (AIESEC) 
9. ASSOCIATION JEUNES LEADERS ZAGHOUAN 
10. Association Paix et Proseperite 
11. Association de la Promotion pour le Droit de la Différence (APDD) 
12. Association tunisienne des Ingenieurs Agronomes ATIA anciennement UTIA 
13. Association Un enfant Un espoir 
14. alkachéfa attonisiya (scout) 
15. alroki 
16. ARAB YOUNG VOICES 
17. Association des habitants Mourouj2 
18. Inara  
19. Association jeunes Science de Tunisie (AJST) 
20. Nsitni  
21. Association Tanitarts 
22. Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD) 
23. Association tunisienne des étudiants ne pharmacie  
24. ATIDE "Association Tunisienne pour l'Intégrité et la Démocratie des 
Elections" 
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25. British Council 
26. Forum des jeunes juristes atelier littéraire de walid solaiman 
27. FST 
28. Human Rights Watch 
29. I Watch 
30. Jeune Chambre international (JCI) 
31. Jeunes Indépendants Démocrates (JID) 
32. Jeunesse Sans Frontières - Tunisia (JSF) بابش لاب دودح - سنوت 
33. L'Association Tunisienne Réforme des institutions 
34. Mashreq'Shams Tunisia 
35. M'nemty HEDUCAP 
36. Notre Santé d'abord 
37. Reform 
38. Réseau Entreprendre Tunis 
39. SAWTY 
40. Sousse Demain 
41. Sfax El Mezyena سقافص ةنايزملا 
42. TOUENSA 
43. Tunisian Association for International Cultural Exchange (TAICE) 
44. Tunisian Association for Management and Social Stability (TAMSS) 
45. Tunisian Association of Dental Students (TADS) 
46. Tunisian Center for Public Health (TUNCPH) 
47. Tunisian Organization for Peace 
48. Tunisie Propre 
49. (UGET) L'Union Général des Etudiants de la Tunisie 
50. Union des tunisiens indépendants pour la liberté (UTIL) 
51. United Colleges Association (UCA) Youth Can Tunis ISLT debate club Youth 
Future 
52. United Colleges Association- UCA 
53. UTEE 
54. WeYouth 
55. The Space Of Wisdom 
 
Other 
 Je ne souhaite pas repondre à cette question 
 Je peux pas désolé 
 Aucune association 
 international union of blabla 
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T-test and ANOVA test results tables  
1. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Tolerance Index (Q7-9) = No Association 
Group Statistics 
 Is respondent 25 or 
under? N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Tol 
Index 
Youth 51 4.2941 .63472 .08888 
Not Youth 51 4.3137 .48722 .06822 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differen
ce 
Std. 
Error 
Differen
ce 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Tol Index 
Equal variances 
assumed 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.051 .821 -.175 100 .861 -.01961 .11205 -.24190 .20269 
  
-.175 93.738 .861 -.01961 .11205 -.24208 .20287 
 
Difference in means are tested and the significance is greater than 0.05 (0.821)   
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The P-value of 0.861 is greater than 0.05 therefore there is no significance between ‘Age’ and ‘Tolerance Index’.  There is not strong evidence that 
there is an association between the Youth/Non-Youth dichotomy and the Tolerance Index.   
2. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Equality Index (Q10-16) = No Association 
Group Statistics 
 Is the respondent under 25 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Equality 
Index 
25 or under 51 3.9888 .60666 .08495 
Over 25 51 4.0196 .50630 .07090 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Equality 
Index 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.166 .685 -.278 100 .781 -.03081 .11065 -.25033 .18871 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  -.278 96.899 .781 -.03081 .11065 -.25042 .18879 
 
P-value (0.781) is greater than 0.05, therefore there is not strong evidence that there is an association between the Youth/Non-Youth dichotomy 
and the Equality Index.   
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3. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Pluralism Index (Q28-32) = No Association 
Group Statistics 
 Is the respondent under 25 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pluralism 
Index 
25 or under 51 3.6824 .59622 .08349 
Over 25 51 3.7529 .42443 .05943 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pluralism 
Index 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.068 .304 -.689 100 .493 -.07059 .10248 -.27391 .13273 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -.689 90.321 .493 -.07059 .10248 -.27418 .13300 
 
P-value 0.493 is greater than 0.05 therefore there is not strong evidence that there is an association between the Youth/Non-Youth dichotomy and 
the Pluralism Index.   
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4. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Trust Index (Q33-35) = Non-Youth > Youth 
Group Statistics 
 Is the respondent under 25 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Trust 
Index 
25 or under 51 3.5752 .73357 .10272 
Over 25 51 3.8889 .50626 .07089 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Trust 
Index 
Equal variances 
assumed 
3.874 .052 -2.514 100 .014 -.31373 .12481 -.56134 -.06611 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  -2.514 88.821 .014 -.31373 .12481 -.56172 -.06573 
 
P-value 0.014 is under 0.05 which means there is significance between ‘Youth/Non-Youth and Trust Index’. 
The comparison of means displays a 0.3 difference between Youth (3.58) and Non-Youth (3.89). This means Non-Youth (Over 25 years old) 
respondents demonstrate greater levels of Trust than Youth respondents 
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5. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Financial Transparency Index (Q40-42) = No Association  
Group Statistics 
 Is the respondent under 25 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Transparency 
Index 
25 or under 51 4.3203 .81911 .11470 
Over 25 51 4.5229 .50002 .07002 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Transpare
ncy Index 
Equal variances 
assumed 
4.023 .048 -1.508 100 .135 -.20261 .13438 -.46922 
.0639
9 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  -1.508 82.721 .135 -.20261 .13438 -.46990 
.0646
8 
 
P value of 0.135 is greater than 0.05 = therefore there is not strong evidence that there is an association between the Youth/Non-Youth dichotomy 
and the Financial Transparency Index.   
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6. Gender Vs Tolerance Index (Q7-9) = Women > Men 
Group Statistics 
 What is your 
gender? N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Tolerance 
Index 
Male 52 4.1667 .62796 .08708 
Female 50 4.4467 .44979 .06361 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Tolerance Index 
Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.081 .776 -2.580 100 .011 -.28000 .10853 -.49532 -.06468 
  -2.596 92.526 .011 -.28000 .10784 -.49416 -.06584 
 
P value of 0.011 is less than 0.05, therefore there is some evidence that there is an association between Gender and Tolerance.    
The comparison of means displays a 0.28 difference between Men (4.17) and Women (4.45). This means that Male respondents demonstrate fewer 
values of tolerance than Female respondents. 
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7. Gender Vs Equality Index (Q10-16) = No association 
Group Statistics 
 What is your 
gender? N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Equality 
Index 
Male 52 3.9808 .60875 .08442 
Female 50 4.0286 .50073 .07081 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Equality 
Index 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.038 .845 -.432 100 .667 -.04780 .11061 -.26724 .17164 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  -.434 97.684 .665 -.04780 .11019 -.26647 .17087 
 
P value of 0.667 is greater than 0.05. Therefore there is not strong evidence that there is an association between the Gender dichotomy and the 
Tolerance Index.   
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8. Gender Vs Pluralism Index (Q28-32) = Women > Men 
Group Statistics 
 What is your 
gender? N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pluralism 
Index 
Male 52 3.6038 .56220 .07796 
Female 50 3.8360 .43835 .06199 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pluralism 
Index 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.288 .593 -2.320 100 .022 -.23215 .10009 -.43072 -.03358 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  -2.331 95.954 .022 -.23215 .09960 -.42987 -.03444 
 
P value of 0.022 is less than 0.05 therefore there is evidence that there is an association between the Gender dichotomy and the Pluralism Index.   
The comparison of means displays a 0.24 difference between Men (3.60) and Women (3.84). This suggests that Men demonstrate fewer values of 
Pluralism than Women. 
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9. Gender Vs Trust Index (Q33-35) = No Association 
Group Statistics 
 What is your gender? N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
 Trust Index Male 52 3.6538 .65666 .09106 
Female 50 3.8133 .63231 .08942 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Trust Index 
Equal variances 
assumed 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.041 .841 -1.249 100 .215 -.15949 .12772 -.41289 .09391 
  -1.250 100.000 .214 -.15949 .12763 -.41270 .09372 
 
P value of 0.215 is greater than 0.05 therefore there is not enough evidence that there is an association between the Gender and the Trust Index.   
The comparison of means displays a 0.24 difference Comparing means of Men (3.65) and Women (3.81). This could suggest that Women 
demonstrate more values of Trust than Men but the result is not statistically significant. 
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10. Gender Vs Financial Transparency Index (Q40-42) 
Group Statistics 
 What is your gender? N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Transparency Index Male 52 4.2949 .73699 .10220 
Female 50 4.5533 .60087 .08498 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Transparency Index 
Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.179 .673 -1.937 100 .056 -.25846 .13345 -.52321 .00629 
  -1.945 97.426 .055 -.25846 .13291 -.52224 .00532 
 
P value of 0.56 is greater than 0.05, therefore there is not strong evidence that there is an association between Gender and Transparency Index 
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T-Test results – demonstrations of association  
 
1. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Tolerance Index (Q7-9)    = No Association 
2. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Equality Index (Q10-16)   = No Association 
3. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Pluralism Index (Q28-32)   = No Association 
4. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Trust Index (Q33-35)    = Non-Youth > Youth 
5. Youth/Non-Youth Vs Financial Transparency Index (Q40-42) = No Association 
= Non Youth respondents demonstrate greater Trust values than Youth.  
 
6. Gender Vs Tolerance Index (Q7-9)     = Women > Men 
7. Gender Vs Equality Index (Q10-16)     = No Association 
8. Gender Vs Pluralism Index (Q28-32)     = Women > Men 
9. Gender Vs Trust Index (Q33-35)     = No Association 
10. Gender Vs Financial Transparency Index (Q40-42)   = No Association 
= Women respondents demonstrate greater Tolerance, and Pluralism values than Men.  
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ANOVA tests 
Region Vs Tolerance Index   (Q7-9)  = No significant difference 
Region Vs Equality Index   (Q10-16)    = No significant difference 
Region Vs Pluralism Index   (Q28-32) = No significant difference 
Region Vs Transparency Index  (Q40-42)  = No significant difference 
Region Vs Trust Index                         (Q33-35)      = Notable difference between Interior and Capital 
 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Min Max Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Capital 37 3.6306 .76893 .12641 3.3743 3.8870 1.00 5.00 
Coast 30 3.7000 .66868 .12208 3.4503 3.9497 2.00 5.00 
Interior 35 3.8667 .45158 .07633 3.7115 4.0218 3.00 5.00 
Total 102 3.7320 .64663 .06403 3.6050 3.8590 1.00 5.00 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   Trust Index   
Bonferroni  
(I) What region is the 
respondent from 
(J) What region is the 
respondent from 
Mean Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Capital Coast -.06937 .15846 1.000 -.4553 .3165 
Interior -.23604 .15208 .372 -.6064 .1343 
Coast Capital .06937 .15846 1.000 -.3165 .4553 
Interior -.16667 .16048 .905 -.5575 .2242 
Interior Capital .23604 .15208 .372 -.1343 .6064 
Coast .16667 .16048 .905 -.2242 .5575 
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Chapter Seven – Structured Interviews: Technical appendix 
Structured Interview to Manager of Tunisian CSO 
 
1. “Can you tell me about your organisation? What are your objectives/goals, and 
how you operate?”   
 
An introduction question that is designed to ‘warm’ the speaker and build trust. It is 
an easy, starter question to relax participant, encourage conversation, and build 
rapport. It also covers ‘what are your objectives’ and ‘what is your goal’ questions. 
 
2. How effective is the informal politics/non-governmental sector in Tunisia? 
 
This is a broad, open ended 2nd question that builds further trust and assures the 
interviewee that I am not coming to the interview with pre-convinced notions or 
looking for particular answers. It determines their opinions on the condition of civil 
society and state’s relation with civil society.  
 
3. Is your CSO independent or is it affiliated with any other state or non-state body? 
 
This determines whether the state, political parties, or external influence are 
infiltrating Civil Society. I expect Managers will most probably they will say ‘yes’, but 
later questions will reveal their understanding of independence and the extent of 
their CSO’s independence. The question does not attach a ‘value’ judgement to either 
option. 
 
4. How collaborative is the work within your CSO? (Prompt: Do you instruct and 
delegate? Or does a consultative process take place?) 
 
This is designed to uncover internal practices and features of the organisation 
culture. Similar to survey question. 
 
5. How do you think the staff would describe the leadership and management of your 
CSO? 
 
This helps to understand if there is patrimonalism or a ‘petit dictatorship’ culture in 
the CSO. What is the management/leadership style? Similar to survey question. Also 
determines a degree of self-awareness and how ‘in-touch’ the leaders are with their 
members. 
 
6. Do you collaborate with other CSOs? Have you worked with CSOs who have 
differing aims/differing objectives from yours? 
 
This helps to understand the levels tolerance or if this CSO has engaged in any cases 
of alliance building or co-operation. 
7. Can CSOs with different objectives work together for a common purpose? 
 
This questions the extent to which they believe CSOs can exhibit tolerance and the 
ability to work together for wider goals. The extent to which they believe a 
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harmonious Public space or the concept of a collective ‘greater good’ or than narrow 
self-motivated goals. 
 
Democratic Practices 
 
8. What do you think motivates people to engage with and participate in civil society 
activism? (Prompts - For the good of Tunisian society and development of 
democracy? For personal gain? To fulfil/implement their own ideology?) 
 
[What is compelling Tunisians to become involved in Civil Society? I have included 3 
options to encourage a response if one was not provided, not with the intention of 
leading them towards a certain answer.] 
 
9. In business and politics all over the world, sometimes favours are granted to 
relatives regardless of their abilities. Do you think this practice is also common 
among Tunisian CSOs?   
 
This aims to uncover whether ‘horizontal’ lines of organisation (Putnam) exist 
and/or a Wasta (influence) culture exists in Tunisian CSO? General statement related 
to other sectors and not specific to Tunisia attempts to make the question less 
accusative.] 
 
10. How did you get this position/ get your job?    
 
[Demonstrates how the leadership of the CSO is chosen, what democratic practices 
the organisation uses, E.g. elections. Addresses and verifies the nepotism issues] 
 
 
Relations with the government 
11. How would you describe Civil Society’s relationship with the government? 
 
This looks for a broad understanding of relations between the State and civil society. 
Open ended explorative question the gives interviewee the opportunity to express a 
range of views, perhaps stories or examples. 
 
12. How have CSOs been contributing to debates over the constitution? How have CSOs 
been contributing to laws over freedom of association and freedom of expression? 
 
Some CSOs influenced the constitution writing process and debates but this question 
looks to undercover what influence CSOs are having on shaping the future of Tunisia. 
Perhaps some CSOs are being excluded in this process? 
 
13. Does your CSO work with the government?  
 
This seeks to determine the nature of CSO activism, in particular regarding their 
approach; liberal-associative or Oppositional-resistance. Are they a co-operative and 
collaborative partner of the government or a thorn in the side of the government that 
fights and struggles for its demands and goals?  
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14. To what extent do you feel free to operate in Tunisian society? 
[Determines whether levels of government interference, whether authoritarian 
tendencies still remain or the public sphere is free to operate] 
15. Have you ever felt the pressure from governmental departments/religious 
institutions/other CSOs to modify your course of action?  
 
Determines whether levels of tolerance and co-operating within the public sphere, 
and how free operations are there. Also regards freedom. 
Funding 
 
16. Does Tunisian Civil Society sector receive sufficient funding? 
 
If Civil Society is to maintain its drive as an actor for representing public views, there 
may need to be a financial incentive for people to remain involved with maintaining 
the public sphere. If they reply that ‘yes, the government does not give us enough 
funding’ then an independent Civil Society does not exist and Tunisian Civil Society is 
made up of Quangos. Furthermore, funding does not have to be just from the 
Tunisian government and might be from foreign investment. It is also a gentler 
introduction to asking about funding of civil society ‘in general’ before asking 
specifically about their CSO’s financial situation  
 
17. How does your CSO fund its activities? How financially open is your CSO?  
(Prompt - Are CSOs in Tunisia expected to reveal their sources of funding?) 
 
This relates to issues of whether the CSO is independence or financially controlled. It 
also inquires whether their funding come with conditions and where it matters if the 
CSO is financially open or not?  Addresses issues of transparency.  
 
18. Do you personally receive a salary for your work with this CSO?" 
  
I imagine most CSO members are volunteers but "professional" activists may act 
differently or have different procedures from "amateurs". 
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Structured Interview Questions for CSO manager –Tunisian Arabic 
 
1. What are your objectives/goals, and how you operate?  
 
Chneya al-hadaf m’ta3 al-jam3iya m’te3kum? 
 
Independence 
 
2. How effective is the informal politics/non-governmental sector in Tunisia? 
 
Chneya al-hadaf illy el-sector non-governmental ye9dhanha lil Hayet el-si’ya’si’ya fii 
Tounes. 
 
3. Is your CSO independent or is it affiliated with any other state or non-state body? 
 
Hel al-jam3iya m’te3kum mustakilla wala la? Wa ila teb’3ah ay munnthama o5ra? 
 
Co-operation 
 
4. How collaborative is the work within your CSO? Do you instruct and delegate? Or 
does a consultative process take place? 
 
Kefa’sh ye’tim al-3mil de5il al-jam3iya 
 
5. How do you think the staff would describe the leadership and management of your 
CSO?  
 
Kefa’sh yusif 3dha al-jam3iya m’te3’kum tessir il –mektab al-temfedhi 
 
6. Do you collaborate with other CSOs? Have you worked with CSOs who have 
differing aims/differing objectives from yours? 
 
Hal tet’3am’lou ma jam3iyat o5ra? illy ahadafah mu5’telfa 3lykum 
 
Democratic Practices  
 
7. Can CSOs with different objectives work together for a common goal? 
 
Has-bri’ik, il jam3iyat illy a3ndha mu5’telfa tnejim t5dim m3a badh’ha lel wus’soul le 
hadafah wahid 
 
8. What do you think motivates people to engage with and participate in civil society 
activism? 
 
Has-bri’ik, chnowya illy j5ali al-nass yud5lou fil a3mel al-jam3iya’ti  
 
9. In business and politics all over the world, sometimes favours are granted to 
relatives regardless of their abilities. Do you think this practice is also common 
among Tunisian CSOs?   
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Fil al-hay’at asi’ya’si’ya ou fil a3mel, s3aat al-messouleen ud5lu akaribu’hum fi 
munasib jus ala’5tr mel 3aila mush ala5r’hum yist’7aku. 
 
10. How did you get this position/ get your job?    
 
Kefash t’hasalt al-munsib ha’tha? 
 
11. What have you (and your organisation) learned about Democracy through your 
experience in Civil Society? 
 
Chnoya illy t3lemtu (enti wil munathma m’te3ik) ala a-democratiyya min 5i-lal tej’rib 
fil muj’tema al-madani. 
 
Relations with the government 
12. How would you describe Civil Society’s relationship with the government? 
 
Kefa’sh tusif ala9at bay’na al-muj’tema al-madani wa al-hukuma 
 
13. How have CSOs been contributing to debates over the constitution? How have CSOs 
been contributing to laws over freedom of association and freedom of expression? 
 
Kefa’sh kanit mushera’ket al-muj’tema al-madani fii 3meleyyat se3yat destour 
 
14. Does your CSO work with the government?  
 
Teta3mila m3 al-hukuma wala la? 
 
15. Have you ever felt the pressure from governmental departments/religious 
institutions/other CSOs to modify your course of action?  
 
3mur’kumshi hassitu b’thghudh min al-hukuma wa ila min ay mu’essessah o5ra? 
 
Funding 
 
16. Does Tunisian Civil Society sector receive sufficient funding? 
 
Muassesset al-muj’tema al-madani 3ndha assez du financement bish t’nejem t5’dem? 
 
17. How does your CSO fund its activities?  
 
Kefa’sh tmouwlou n’shatat jamaitkum? 
 
18. Does your organisation publish its finances?  
 
Hal tun’shuru il temweel m’te3kum 
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19. Do you personally receive a salary for your work with this CSO? 
 
Est-ce que vous personnellement recevez un salaire pour votre travail avec 
l’organisation ? 
20. Does your organisation have a written constitution? Do you have any documents or 
literature about the organisation? 
3nd’kum ni’dham da5ili? 
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Interview structurée: à l’administrateur d’une organisation de la société civile  
1. Quels sont les objectifs de votre organisation? Et comment vous fonctionnez? 
Independence 
 
2. Est-ce que vous pensez que  le secteur non-gouvernemental/ société civile en 
Tunisie est efficace? 
3. Votre organisation est-elle indépendant us est-elle affiliée à une autre 
organisation étique ou non-étatique? 
Coopération 
4. Comment est la collaboration du travail au sein de votre organisation?  
5. Selon vous, comment votre personnel/membres décrirait la gestion de votre 
organisation? 
6. Est-ce que vous collaborez avec d’autres organisations ? Avez-vous travaillez 
avec des organisations dont les objectives sont différent dès votre? 
7. Est-ce que c’est possible que des organisations dont les objectifs son différent 
travaillent ensemble pour atteindre un but commun ? 
Practices démocratiques 
8. A votre avis, qu’est-ce qui motive les gens pour s’engager et participer dans 
l’activisme de la société civile ?  
 
9. Dans les affaires et la politique dans le monde entier, parfois des faveurs sont 
accordés aux membres des familles indépendamment des leurs-capacités. 
Pensez-vous que cette pratique et aussi courante chez les organisations de la 
société civile en Tunisie ? 
10. Comment avez-vous obturé votre poste ? 
11. Que-est-ce que vous avez (et votre organisation) appris sur à propos de la 
démocratie à travers votre expérience dans la société civile? 
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Relations avec le gouvernement 
12. Comment vous décrivez la relation entre la société Civil est le gouvernement ? 
13. De quelle manière les organisations ont-elles participé aux débats sur la 
constitution ? De quelle manière ont-elles contribué aux lois de la liberté 
d’association et la liberté d’expression ? 
14. Votre organisation travaille-t-elle avec le gouvernement? 
15. Avez-vous jamais senti de la pression de la part des départements 
gouvernementaux aux institutions religieuses au d’auteures organisations pour 
modifier votre plan d’action ? 
Financement 
16. Est-ce que le secteur de la société civile en Tunisie reçoive assez de 
financement ? 
17. Comment votre organisation finance-t-elle activités ? 
(les organisations en Tunisie sont-elles sensées révéler leur sources de 
financement ?) 
18. Est-ce que votre organisation publie ses finances? 
19. Est-ce que vous personnellement recevez un salaire pour votre travail avec 
l’organisation ? 
20. Est-ce que vous avez une constitution écrite, un règlement internale, ou des 
documents et de la littérature sur l'organisation ? 
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Interviews completed 
No Organisation 
name 
Interviewee 
Name 
Location  Organisatio
n type 
Organisation goals Language   Interprete
r  
Interview 
Date 
1 I-Watch Mouheb 
Garoui 
 
Tunis Watchdog Anti-corruption and 
transparency 
English No 5/2/2014 
2 Edupartage Amel 
Cheikhrouho
u 
Tunis Advocacy - 
Professional 
Education reform French, 
English, 
and 
Arabic 
Dorra 
Agrebi 
7/2/2014 
3 Velorution Adel Beznine Tunis Sport Encourage cycling culture English No 13/2/2014 
4 Union des Jeunes 
Democrates 
Tunisiens 
Riadh 
Werghi 
Tunis Youth 
Network 
Human rights and citizenship  
Sustainable development and 
agriculture 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
13/2/2014 
5 WeYouth Amir Ben 
Ameur 
Sfax Youth Youth development, training English No 17/2/2014 
6 Aljil Ahmed 
Missaoui 
Sfax Youth Cultural Revolution French No 17/2/2014 
7 Sfax Outdoor 
Sports & Sfax 
Mzyehna 
 
Zaher 
Kamoun  
 
Sfax Sport Sport, Ecology, Tourism English 
and 
French 
No 19/2/2014 
8 Inara Sami 
Chaherli 
Tunis Welfare Humanitarian English No 25/2/2014 
9 Forum Tunisien 
pour les Droits 
Economiques et 
Sociaux(FTDES)  
Messaoud 
Romdhani 
Tunis Economic Social and Economic 
Problems 
English Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
26/2/2014 
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10 Esslam Rosaline 
Matheau    
Tunis Welfare Encourage production of 
artisan products from women 
in South 
French Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
28/2/2014 
11 Alwen Tounes Amel 
Chaherli 
Tunis Women Charity Network French Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
3/3/2014 
12 Association pour 
le Paix et 
Properity 
Iskender 
Rekik 
Tunis Welfare Economic development, 
training 
English No 4/3/2014 
13 Jeunes 
Independent 
Democrates 
Zied Boussen Tunis Youth Raising Awareness English No 5/3/2014 
14 Association 
Tunisiennes 
Femmes 
Democrates 
(ATFD) 
Sonya Ben 
Yahmed 
 
Tunis Women Gender Equality French Hamza 
Zaghdoud 
 
11/3/2014 
15 Reseau 
d’Observation de 
la Justice 
Tunisienne en 
Transition (ROJ) 
Lofti Ezedine Tunis Legal Improvements in the Justice 
System 
Watchdog 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Dorra 
Agrebi 
12/3/2014 
16 Union des 
Tunisiens 
Indépendants 
pour la 
Liberté(UTIL) 
Moez Ali Tunis Humanitaria
n 
Gender equality, Rule of Law 
and real democracy, 
Citizenship awareness, and 
Human Rights 
English No 13/3/2014 
17 Tunisian 
Association for 
Management and 
Fahima Askri 
& Houriya 
Ben Hassine 
Tunis Developmen
t 
Social and economic 
integration of people in 
vulnerable situations. 
French 
and 
Arabic  
Dorra 
Agrebi 
17/3/2014 
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Social Stability 
(TAMSS) 
18 Notre Sante 
D’abord 
Yasssine 
Jabloui 
Tunis Health Provide specialist healthcare 
to interior and neglected 
regions. 
English  No 17/3/2014 
19 Police Reform Bouthayna 
Ben Kridis, 
Bassem 
Bougerra 
Tunis Watchdog Improve Police 
Anti-corruption  
English 
and 
French 
No 17/3/2014 
20 M’nemty (My 
Dream) 
Saadia 
Mosbah 
Tunis Anti-Racism Raising Awareness 
Human Rights 
Education and Development 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Dora 
Agrebi 
18/3/2014 
21 Centre for the 
study of Islam and 
Democracy  
(CSID) 
Radwan 
Masmoudi 
Tunis Pro-
Democracy 
Think Tank: promotes 
interparty co-operation and 
tolerance. 
English  No 19/3/2014 
22 Al-Bawsala Amira 
Yahyaoui 
Tunis Watchdog Transparency and Visibility English No 2/4/2014 
23 Tunisian Institute 
of Human Rights 
Studies 
Mohammed 
Ashraf Ayadi 
Tunis Human 
Rights 
Educational reform and 
Anti-Nuclear Weapons 
English No 5/4/2014 
24 United Colleges 
Association 
Wafa 
Garbout 
Tunis Youth Youth empowerment 
English Language 
 Human Rights 
English No 12/4/2014 
25 Ofiya Centre Samir Kilani Tunis Network 
Campaigner 
Democratic Awareness  
Women’s Rights 
French/Ar
abic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
15/4/2014 
26 Mourakiboun Rafik 
Halouani 
Tunis Election 
Observers 
Establish democracy in 
Tunisia 
Witness electoral process 
English Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
15/4/2014 
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Enhance democracy 
Work with youth 
27 Ordre National 
Advocats 
Tunisiene (ONAT)  
Boubaker 
Bethabet   
Tunis Lawyers 
Syndicate 
Representing Lawyers French/Ar
abic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
16/4/2014 
28 Cultivons la Paix Marwa 
Mansouri 
Tunis Democracy 
Promotion 
Human Rights 
Political Culture 
French Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
17/4/2014 
29 Destourna Jawher Ben 
Mbarek 
Tunis Civic 
Engagement 
Democracy Promoting French Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
18/4/2014 
30 We Love Sousse Anis Boufrika Sousse    
(in Tunis) 
Local 
promotion 
Culture (Art, Heritage, 
Cinema) Environment, 
citizenship 
English Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
23/4/2014 
31 Association 
Tunisienne Droits 
Constitutionnelle 
(ATDC) 
Chawki 
Gaddes 
Tunis Legal 
Reform 
Consult, advise, guide the 
government 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
25/4/2014 
32 Association 
Tunisienne des 
Jeunes Avocates 
(ATJS) 
Imen Bejaoui Tunis Lawyers 
Syndicate 
Represent Lawyers French Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
25/4/2014 
33 Association 
Vigilance 
Qais Lahmar Sousse Civic 
engagement 
Cultural restoration in Sousse. French Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
26/4/2014 
34 Sousse Demain Faycal 
Labayed 
Sousse Reform Local pressure, advocacy for 
infrastructural improvement 
French Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
26/4/2014 
35 Associo-Med Khalid 
Ouazzani & 
Nizar 
Abdessaied 
Sousse Medical 
Students 
Medical Awareness French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
26/4/2014 
36 Association of Ra’ba Roubia Sousse Educative Cultural, Rights, Women’s French Myriam 27/4/2014 
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Knowledge Forum Rights and 
Arabic 
Ben Ghazi 
37 Sajin 52 Amal 
Amraoui  
 
Tunis Social 
Movement  
Against the oppressive 
Tunisian Law on Cannabis 
French Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
28/4/2014 
38 Kolna Tunis Emna Menif Tunis  Civic 
engagement 
Political, Government 
pressure, lobbyists  
English 
and 
French 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
1/5/2014 
39 Journalists 
Association of 
Kairouan   
Adel Nagati Kairouan  Journalists Representing rights of 
journalists in the region 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
2/5/2014 
40 Association of 
Kairouan for a 
culture of 
citizenship  
(Qairawanioun) 
Amira 
Achouri   
Kairouan  Culture of 
citizenship   
Citizenship awareness English None 2/5/2014 
41 Open Gov Souhail 
Alouini 
Kairouan  Transparenc
y 
Promote transparency at 
National and regional 
government levels 
English None 3/5/2014 
42 FTDS - Kairouan Radwan 
Fatnassi 
Kairouan  Economic Employment and Economic 
Rights 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
3/5/2014 
43 Governance 
Participative 
Zouhayer 
Hammoudi 
Kairouan  Advocacy Promotive participative 
government, democratic 
culture 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
3/5/2014 
44 Association 
Tunisienne pour 
la Promotion du 
Droit à la 
Saloua 
Ghrissa 
 
 
Bizerte Human 
Rights 
 
Freedom of Expression 
Freedom 
Gender Equality 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
6/5/2014 
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Différence 
(ATPDD) 
45 Association 
Tunisienne pour 
la cityonnete 
(ATPC) 
Kamel Abid Bizerte Awareness 
Raising on 
citizenship 
Citizenship 
Political participation 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
6/5/2014 
46 Zaghouan Center 
for Development 
and Democracy 
Houda Khelil Zaghouan Democracy 
promotion 
Human Rights 
Political Culture 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
14/5/2014 
47 Araa pour la 
Civilisation et la 
Citoyenneté 
Dr. Mohsen 
Mhadhbi 
Zaghouan Civic 
engagement 
Spreading  values of 
citizenship and democracy, 
and public political 
involvement 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
14/5/2014 
48 Jasmine 
Foundation 
Intisar 
Kherigi 
Tunis Think Tank CSO, Academics, and Policy 
makers co-operation and 
Improve CSOs 
English No 15/5/2014 
49 Network of Sidi 
Bouzid 
Associations 
 
Mohammad 
Masri 
Sidi 
Bouzid 
Network Economic development, 
Environment, Women, and 
culture   
 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
21/05/2014 
50 Toupat Sidi 
Bouzid 
Aida Daly   Sidi 
Bouzid 
Cultural Regional heritage protection  French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
21/05/2014 
51 I-Lead Ghada Chokri Sidi 
Bouzid 
Youth Culture of dialogue and 
promote peaceful resolution 
of conflict 
English 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
21/05/2014 
52 Association of 
Cultural 
Citizenship 
Hachem Aydi Regueb Awareness 
Raising on 
citizenship 
Citizenship 
Political participation 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
22/05/2014 
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53 Association of the 
Friends of the 
Miner’s Basin for 
the Environment 
Adel Hechimi Gafsa Environmen
tal Pressure 
group 
Encourage the government to 
solve  environmental issues 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
23/05/2014 
54 Association of 
Human 
Development in 
Gafsa 
Nejib Nasra Gafsa Employment Social cohesion and finding 
employment for people in 
Gafsa 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
23/05/2014 
55 Association Cepsa Yassin Nasr    Gafsa Local issues Helping schools and hospitals 
Anti-corruption 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
23/05/2014 
56 Gabes Action Abderraham
ane Hadj 
Belgacem 
Gabes Local issues Regional development 
Citizenship awareness 
English 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
24/05/2014 
57 Association of 
Initiative and 
Reform 
Mohammed 
Ghris 
Gabes Youth  Training youth Arabic Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
24/05/2014 
58 Organisation 
Volonté et 
Citoyenneté (OVC) 
Myriam 
Belhaj 
Gabes Civic goals Election Observing, 
citizenship and voter 
awareness. 
Women and youth  
French Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
24/05/2014 
59 Oxygen 
Association 
Wissem 
Ksiksi 
Medenine Environmen
tal 
Development and 
employment in Environment 
context 
English 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
25/05/2014 
60 Voix d'enfant rural Anis Saada Medenine Youth Education  and youth 
employment and 
development 
English No 25/05/2014 
61 Association Djerba Chedly Ben Djerba Environmen Water access, protect French Myriam 26/05/2014 
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Ulysse Messaoud tal & 
Tolerance 
minorities, combat hatred Ben Ghazi 
62 L'Union 
tunisienne de 
l'industrie, du 
commerce et de 
l'artisanat 
(UTICA) 
Khalil 
Ghariyani 
Tunis Business 
Syndicate 
Defending business and 
entrepreneurs rights. 
 
French Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
04/06/2014 
63 Ligue Tunisienne 
pour la Défense 
des Droits de 
l’Homme (LTHD) 
Abdurahman
e Hdhili 
Tunis Human 
Rights 
Defender human rights. 
Politically involved national 
organisation 
French 
and 
Arabic 
Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
06/06/2014 
64 L'Union générale 
tunisienne du 
travail (UGTT) 
Sami Tahri Tunis Labour 
Union 
Defender worker’s rights. 
Politically involved national 
organisation 
Arabic Myriam 
Ben Ghazi 
07/06/2014 
65 Sawty / Sawt 
Chabab 
Ghazoua 
Ltaief 
Tunis  Youth Democracy promotion and 
regional development. 
English No 20/7/2014 
66 Association  
Tounesa 
Selima 
Abbou 
Tunis  Democratic values English No 23/7/2014 
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Interviews with Non-CSOs  
 Name Job title Date 
1 Asma Smahdi  Journalist  at Tunisia Live 10/6/2014 
2 Farah Samti  Freelance Journalist 22/7/2014 
3 Lucy Kamoun  Energy Sector INGO 21/6/2014 
4 Ghada Louhici  Al-Bawsala 14/7/2014 
5 Geoffery Weichselbaum 
 &  Rim Dhaoudi  
Director & legal officer Democracy Reporting 
International 
10/6/2014 
6 Moheddine Abdellaoui  International Republican Institute  13/7/2014 
7 Selim Kharrat  Consultant 11/7/2014 
8 Moujib Errahmen Khaldi Consultant 25/7/2014 
9 Badreddine Abdelkefi,  Member of the National Constituent Assembly in 
charge of Relations with Civil Society  
5/6/2014 
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Interviews with JID members 
 Name Position in JID Date 
1 Ahmed Badis Treasurer  6/4/2014 
2 Emir Sfaxi Active member 1/4/2014 
3 Farah Mokhtar  Former Vice President  and Active member 8/6/2014 
4 Oussama Ben Ali General Secretary 14/3/2014 
5 Salma Jrad Spokesperson 7/4/2014 
6 Sarah Behia President 27/2/2014 
7 Souhayel Hedfi Vice President 31/3/2014 
8 Yosra Tlijani General Sec (JID Monastir) 6/7/2014 
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